

Institute for Public  
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THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

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## Public Diplomacy Source Bibliography

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## SECTION I: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY THEORY & PRACTICE

Seib, Phillip. [“Public Diplomacy and Journalism: Parallels, Ethical Issues, and Practical Concerns.”](#) *American Behavioral Scientist*, vol. 52, pp. 772-776. Sage Publications. 2009

**Key concepts:** PD ethics, objectivity, mutual trust.

Phillip Seib of UCLA argues that practitioners of public diplomacy should employ the same ethical standards of objectivity and accuracy expected from journalists. Seib notes that while journalists are motivated by the “best obtainable version of the truth,” public diplomacy practitioners are expected to seek the “best obtainable version of the truth that serves [the interests of the United States].” Public diplomacy is an advocacy medium, however, its perception by foreign publics as “propaganda” has led directly to deep-rooted anger and mistrust, especially in the Middle East. With the expansion of internet and communication technology, the “west” faces competition from increasingly powerful *local* media markets. Channels run by the U.S. in the Middle East, such as Al Hurra, contradict local messaging and are seen as vehicles of bias that shy away from stories that portray the U.S. in a negative light. While it may be easier to portray a politically useful “Pro-American” message, perceived objectivity is necessary to build trust and eliminate anti-American sentiment, the ultimate goal of public diplomacy (not popularity). To build this trust while remaining objective, messages must be grounded in “substantive policy” rather than simple words and promises. Advocacy and objectivity can exist together as long as there is fundamental honesty and limited overt bias. As Seib mentions, Public diplomacy is “describing public policy, but it doesn’t improve on it, change it, or misrepresent it.”

Sigismondi, Paolo. [“Hollywood Piracy in China: An accidental case of U.S. public diplomacy in the globalization age?”](#) *Chinese Journal of Communication*, vol.2, no.3, pp. 273-287. Routledge. 2009.

**Key concepts:** China; globalization, Hollywood, intellectual property rights, piracy, public diplomacy.

In this article, Sigismondi of USC makes the case that Hollywood film piracy in China serves as an accidental—yet useful—agent of public diplomacy. With improving Information and Communication Technology (ICT), high-quality digital film copies are easily accessible via the internet in countries that oppose “unfettered introduction of Western cultural products,” such as China. This idea is made possible due to the

globalized world, in which supranational entities operate independently—both legally and illegally—from their respective governments, promoting the diffusion of goods and ideas *beyond* a country's elites. While film piracy is a direct infringement upon the global standard of Intellectual Property Rights and causes the U.S. entertainment industry to lose nearly \$3.5 billion annually, Sigismondi argues that its benefits are worth the cost. In China specifically, the illegal access of American films contributes to the diffusion of language, culture, and lifestyle in ways *not* permitted by the Chinese government. Through the consumption of Hollywood films, Chinese citizens are exposed to American “way[s] of living and thinking,” music, entertainment, and material culture—in an attractive way. While it is difficult to measure the sentiment of the Chinese public, it is evident that the attractive display of American life and culture in a non-institutional setting would be trusted more than information coming directly from the government. In many ways, film piracy is the direct spread of American life to foreign publics and serves as a useful tool of public diplomacy.

**Izadi, Foad. “US Public Diplomacy: A Theoretical Treatise.” *The Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society*, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 13-21. Routledge. 2016.**

**Key concepts:** American exceptionalism, cultural imperialism, excellence theory, hegemony, Orientalism, propaganda, public diplomacy.

Foad argues that U.S. public diplomacy “lacks ethical legitimacy,” and can only be improved if *major structural changes* are put in place. “Hegemonic” public diplomacy has served as the foundation for U.S. efforts, creating a system that focuses on American exceptionalism—an “us vs. them” or “east vs. west” struggle of ideas—that inaccurately vilifies the Orient and the Islamic world. In public relations, there are two important variables: *direction* and *purpose*. One-way communication is the pure dissemination of information, while two-way is an exchange of information. Symmetrical dialogue affects both sides, while asymmetry is one-sided and purely advocacy. Foad explains that to be distinguished from propaganda, it is essential for public diplomacy to operate under a *two-way, symmetrical model* that finds a middle-ground between one-way communication and total accommodation of the foreign public's interest. Successful public diplomacy is focused on relationship building, Foad argues, and Cold War-style image building is more challenging as technology more easily sheds light on global realities. It is noted that it may be paradoxical to take the symmetrical approach toward public diplomacy, an advocacy medium, but moving beyond American exceptionalism, toward an open dialogue would likely help build the necessary relationships to advance U.S. diplomatic interests.

**Dorman, Shawn.** [“Inside a U.S. Embassy: Diplomacy at Work.”](#) *American Foreign Service Association*, “What Career Track is Right for Me,” pp. 215-220. 2011.

**Key Concepts:** public diplomacy in action, Foreign Service tracks.

This section of the book, presented by Kelly Adams-Smith, explains the five career tracks of the foreign service: Consular, Economic, Management, Political, and Public Diplomacy. Adams-Smith describes the many aspects of each track, including day to day responsibilities, type of work, and the ideal characteristics/background of a person in each role. She emphasizes that while a Foreign Service Officer chooses a track, each officer is a “generalist,” often taking on responsibilities that would fall under the umbrella of each different track.

**Krasner, Stephen D.** [“Learning to Live With Despots.”](#) *Foreign Affairs*, 16 Apr. 2020.

**Key Concepts:** Democracy promotion, intervention

In this article, Krasner discusses a new approach to foreign policy, one where the U.S. should not “fix the world’s problems,” but should also not ignore them. The Bush administration aimed to make the rest of the world like America, while the Obama and Trump administrations aimed to be mostly uninvolved in world affairs. Krasner argues that both are highly flawed approaches. While imposing democracy on other countries has been unsuccessful (i.e. Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan), globalization has allowed heavily resourced small and dangerous transnational groups to flourish, making isolationism an inherently risky option as well. Krasner presents an alternative, third path that the U.S. should follow, one where the United States aims not for good government but *good governance*. Krasner argues that the United States should not aim to impose democracy, but should provide assistance to leaders it deems can maintain security within their own borders. Furthermore, the U.S. should provide support in economic development, the provision of services and aid, and overall stability. While allowing non-democratic regimes to operate is a tough pill to swallow for Americans, imposing democracy and encouraging leaders to give up power has proven to be an ineffective and violent process. Krasner explains that democracy is not inevitable as countries modernize, and despotic regimes have persisted as the primary form of government for all of human history. The U.S. must learn to live with it rather than get rid of it. This poses many questions to Foreign Service Officers: what type of public diplomacy messaging would be most effective under this foreign policy approach?

**Gonzales, Carissa.** [“The Evaluation Revolution in Public Diplomacy.”](#) *The Ambassadors Review*. 2015.

**Key Concepts:** PD Evaluation, metrics of success

In this paper, Gonzales discusses the trouble that Foreign Service Officers face in evaluating the success of public diplomacy. Not only is public diplomacy evaluation underfunded, but there is limited consensus on *what* should be measured and *how* it should be measured. There is a “misleading conflation” between operational evaluation of program logistics (how smoothly the event ran), and impact evaluation (the policy impact/what people are thinking). Gonzales argues that for public diplomacy to be a part of the “mainstream of international relations” as a universally respected instrument of power, its practice must be *thoroughly* and *properly* evaluated. Washington leadership has already established “evaluation bureaus,” however, Gonzales argues that a mental shift in PD evaluation is necessary. She believes that decision makers must understand that evaluation takes time, and “longitudinal” polls can more accurately explain *long term changes* in attitude and behavior, rather than “one-time reflection” polls. Furthermore, she believes that public diplomacy decision making should be more centralized, flexible, and public diplomats should be *encouraged* to take risks and act on behalf of their close up knowledge on the ground. Overall, Gonzales calls for a reevaluation of PD success metrics in the twenty-first century with the purpose of understanding attitude and behavioral changes as they relate to policy goals.

**Melissen, Jan.** [“Consular diplomacy's first challenge: Communicating assistance to nationals abroad.”](#) *Policy Forum Article*, vol. 7, pp. 217-228. 2019. *Asia & The Pacific Policy Studies*.

**Key Concepts:** consular, digital technology

In this article Melissen explains Consular diplomacy is facing a communication problem. Consular work has traditionally been neglected, and viewed as “second rate,” despite its increasing importance in the diplomatic sphere. Furthermore, in many cases, it is harder to get through to nationals abroad “than it is to deliver assistance.” To confront these problems, Melissen presents a series of ideas. Firstly, he believes that foreign ministries should study communication trends to understand how best to reach people. Furthermore, foreign ministries should focus on their *relationship* with citizens, steering away from a “customer-service” style approach where nationals simply call for and receive help; the relationship should be deeper than that. Additionally, Melissen argues that foreign ministries should ponder internally—and then explain externally—the connection between consular services and other important diplomatic concerns. Consular services should be viewed as intertwined with the big picture of diplomacy. Overall, Melissen argues that a more “citizen-centric” approach to Consular diplomacy is essential.

**Dietz-Surendra, Shanna. [“Addressing Controversial Topics in Public Diplomacy.”](#) *Council of American Ambassadors*. 2018.**

**Key Concepts:** audience, image

This article gives insight to how Diplomats can effectively address controversial topics in public diplomacy. It is generally the best policy to have an open and honest dialogue, however, Foreign Service Officers are often worried about “deviating from the official talking points and saying the wrong thing.” Dietz-Surendra cites various approaches to confront controversial topics. One example is the use of small discussion groups within the walls of the consulate, free from technology, allowing for more candid conversations with greater dialogue and less “fear of attribution.” Another approach is the use of U.S. specialists to speak on topics in their areas of expertise. Not only do they carry greater authority, but they don’t “speak on behalf of the U.S. government.” Similarly, foreign nationals with first-hand experience in the United States serve as credible messengers. Lastly, Dietz-Surendra explains that movies with “just the right angle” can serve to stimulate conversations with foreign publics (so long as it is made clear that the movie does not necessarily reflect the views of the United States government). Overall, this article highlights that while certain topics may be difficult to address (such as U.S. gun control policy), robust dialogue with foreign publics is essential and possible if the correct approach is taken. Perhaps these tools have been “lost in the shuffle” over the years as PD practitioners have focused on online outreach? This is a sort of back to basics approach.

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## SECTION II: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN CHINA

**Łoś, Robert. [“U.S. and China: Hard and Soft Power Potential.”](#) *Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal*, vol. 22, no.1, pp. 39-50. 2018.**

**Key concepts:** hard and soft power, economic resources, China, United States.

In this article, Łoś compares the hard and soft power potential of the U.S. and China as they emerge as international rivals. In understanding what “power” means, he notes that one must first understand the *nature of relationships*—whether they are rooted in military conflict, cooperation, or competition. The U.S.-China relationship is the last. Łoś notes the different types of “power” (economics, military, and soft power), and finds that while the U.S. and China remain competitive economically, the U.S.’s advantage economically (GDP value, investment), militarily (military expenditure, weapons), and in soft power (state participation in international organizations, tourism, entertainment,

Nobel prize winners) is unquestionable. When looking at these factors, it appears that the U.S. is more “powerful.” Loś argues that if China were to overtake the U.S., it would need to accompany its hard power efforts with great *soft power capabilities*. Soft power is also important to avoid international concern over China’s growing military strength. This article further argues that it is not democracy that leads to power, but the utilization and application of resources, as well as the nature of the changing international system.

**Li, Weidong & Jia, Ruixue** [“Public diplomacy networks: China’s public diplomacy communication practices in Twitter during Two Sessions.”](#) *Public Relations Review*, vol. 46, no.1, 2020. ELSEVIER.

**Key concepts:** networks, multiple actors, two-way, dialogue, twitter, China

This article examines China’s public diplomacy communication on Twitter during the Two Sessions, an annual meeting of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference—the most important political conference of the year. The authors seek to examine the different “networks” initiated by China on Twitter during Two Sessions, to help understand the effectiveness of Chinese public diplomacy. Li and Jia seek to create a metric of success by understanding network centrality; who has the most influence; who engages with the networks that China initiates; and the characteristics of the whole network. This study finds that China takes a *one-way, state-centric* approach to public diplomacy on Twitter. While the Chinese state-owned media plays the largest role in the dissemination of Chinese public diplomacy information, foreign practitioners have a monopoly on NGOs, researchers, and correspondents, providing a negative (and more credible) view on Chinese policy. Furthermore, networking patterns showed that networking *power* is “not concentrated to a small core set of actors,” theoretically requiring China’s state-owned media to engage with other actors to increase its centrality and influence. China, however, “fights alone,” failing to build the necessary relationships that would increase engagement and network centrality. Chinese public diplomacy is more focused on achieving political goals than building mutual understanding—which would be particularly challenging anyway, on Twitter, considering the platform is not allowed in China. The authors of this article pose the sociological principle of homophily, and discuss the potential of understanding echo-chambers as a way to both cope with a polarized network and bridge together publics with different attitudes when conducting public diplomacy. Overall, building these bridges would serve to benefit Chinese public diplomacy.

**D’Hooghe, Ingrid.** [“China’s Public Diplomacy.”](#) pp. 285-331. 2015. Brill.

**Key concepts:** Crises, SARS, China, Public Diplomacy

*Chapter 7* of the book addresses the difficulty of conducting public diplomacy during a time of crisis. Crises have the potential to damage a country's reputation—regardless of who is to blame for the origin of the crisis (poor decisions or natural disasters). Crisis diplomacy, according to the author, entails “hostile audiences” and a “highly visible and competitive” communication environment, and it is easy for governments to *lose control* over the framing of the crisis response. D’Hooghe analyzes the response of the Chinese government under various crisis settings, specifically the SARS epidemic, food and toy safety, and the Wenchuan earthquake. She found that Chinese crisis response typically followed a similar pattern of initial denial, followed by evading responsibility, downplay, and eventually corrective action/mortification. While China took many steps of admirable corrective action toward the health and product-safety crises that were favorable domestically, inadequate response and general lack of transparency *hindered* their efforts to take responsibility, fix the situation, and maintain their image. This chapter goes into great detail of the complexities of these situations, and serves as a very relevant analysis—considering the COVID-19 crisis. The SARS response was nearly identical to what is understood about the Chinese response to COVID-19.

Lin, Fen and Tsan-Kuo, Chang. [“From Propaganda to public diplomacy: Assessing China’s international practice and its image, 1950-2009.”](#) *Public Relations Review*, vol. 40, pp. 450-458. 2014. ELSEVIER.

**Key concepts:** China, propaganda, national image, soft power

This article analyzes the differences between propaganda and public diplomacy in terms of Chinese information broadcasting. Western nations no longer have a monopoly on news broadcasting, and in many countries, governments are establishing news outlets to promote internationally their own perspective. This is *mediated public diplomacy*, targeted for short term gain using mass communication technologies and the internet to sway the opinion of foreign publics. The authors argue that while motives may be the same (i.e. cultivating favorability), whether or not something is perceived as “propaganda” truly depends on the ideological stance of the receiver. The authors found that academic curiosity toward Chinese affairs has been more focused on public diplomacy than propaganda in recent years, and search items note that “propaganda” and “public diplomacy” were—in general—mutually exclusive terms. This emphasizes a more “level playing field” of international broadcasting, where many actors are not necessarily spreading “propaganda,” but “their perspective.” While China will continue to have trouble shedding its image as a “propagandistic state,” this marks a

transformation for China and the overall thin line between propaganda and public diplomacy.

Hartig, Falk [“Communicating China to the World: Confucius Institutes and China’s Strategic Narratives.”](#) *Politics*, vol. 35, no. 3-4, pp. 245-258. 2015. *Political Studies Association*.

**Key concepts:** China, Confucius Institutes, strategic narratives

This article analyzes the use of Confucius Institutes (CI’s) as a tool of Chinese Public Diplomacy. According to Hartig, CI’s are “non-profit educational organizations promoting the teaching of Chinese language outside of China, training language instructors, and strengthening cultural exchange and cooperation.” CI’s are traditionally located on college campuses across the world (though they are expanding their reach currently), and are primarily funded by the Chinese government. While CI’s offer host institutions a variety of language learning opportunities, these institutes face a series of practical and ideological concerns that have led many to view them as a platform for the foreign policy narratives of China. Hartig notes that having control over the global narrative—how the world is structured, who the players are, how it works— is true soft power. While China’s strategic narrative of a “harmonious world” (one that presents China as a growing power with a peaceful rise and development) is different from that of the west, the portrayal of China in this manner is a key tenet of CI’s. This suggests that these institutes are not only seeking to spread language and culture, but to educate foreigners on the “real China,” or, more specifically, the China they wish the world would see. Teachers at CI’s use materials that *support Chinese official narratives*, and avoid topics that threaten Chinese sensitivities (and if they don’t, they could lose funding from the Chinese government). Beyond these ideological concerns, they also face practical concerns including the inability to staff people where the local language is not English (such as Africa). This reading could be very well paired with a GW Hatchet Op-Ed from last year that argues the CI on GW’s campus should be removed. It is linked below:

<https://www.gwhatchet.com/2020/05/28/its-time-to-shut-down-gws-confucius-institute/>

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### SECTION III: CURRENT EVENTS

Witze, Alexandra. [“Trump Agenda Threatens Legacy of U.S. Science Diplomacy.”](#) *Nature*. 2017

**Key concepts:** science, Trump, reputation

This short article discusses the concerns among the scientific community that President Trump will hurt the legacy of U.S. science diplomacy if he continues not to rely on scientists and scientific evidence when making governing decisions. Scientists have played a key role informing U.S. policy through the State Department, working on difficult national security issues such as climate change, disaster responses, and nuclear proliferation. Witze argues that scientists' analytic nature and ability to weigh evidence rationally is of great importance, however, Trump's isolationism and withdrawal from international organizations threaten the future of scientific cooperation. The world has always admired the scientific research community of the United States. Withdrawal from the world stage could slow down action on pressing issues while at the same time allowing other countries to surpass the U.S. as the leader in science.

**Berman, Ilan. [“Trump puts US Public Diplomacy on Notice.”](#) *The National Interest*. April 2020.**

**Key Concepts:** VOA, attacks on U.S. public diplomacy

This article discusses President Trump's recent attack on Voice of America and the overall public diplomacy apparatus of the United States. The Trump administration argues that while VOA exists to effectively promote American policy interests overseas, it has not been accountable. The administration claims that VOA does not work in line with the interests of the United States, and has “amplified Beijing's propaganda about its role in the spread of COVID-19.” Trump's move to replace the director of VOA, which has come with political backlash. Overall, Berman explains that the United States needs a strong public diplomacy plan to ensure that its policies are communicated effectively across the globe in the complicated “authoritarian media environment” of many countries, including Russia and others in the Middle East. Some argue VOA has been unable to accomplish this goal.

**Duo, Eva and Johnson, Carolyn. [“The Global Race for a coronavirus vaccine could be this nation's Sputnik moment.”](#) *Washington Post*. June 2020.**

**Key concepts:** soft power, China, science diplomacy

This article from the Washington Post describes a “race” for the coronavirus vaccine, one that has the potential to serve as a political tool, providing both “bragging rights and health protection.” Both the United States and China have been indirectly

competing to be the first country with a coronavirus vaccine, starting trials with the goal of gaining credibility and being the first to re-open their economy. Chinese public diplomacy efforts have lately been focused on portraying themselves as an “alternative ally” to the United States in the developing world. If China is able to produce a successful vaccine, they can ensure that developing countries have access—a potential political and diplomatic tool that could make up for previous missteps. The authors of this article address the potential risks of this competition, the risks of “vaccine nationalism” and protectionism (i.e. Trump withdrawing funds from WHO), which could disrupt medical supply chains and slow the process of vaccine development. Regardless, the authors suggest that the U.S. and China are likely to cooperate because this is a global issue that disrupts the global economy, and multiple vaccines are necessary for success. If China were to get one first, however, it symbolically closes the biomedical research gap through which the United States has maintained an advantage. China would gain soft power.

**Brown, TM and Ladwig, S. [“COVID-19, China, the World Health Organization, and the Limits of International Health Diplomacy.”](#) *The American Journal of Public Health*, vol. 110, no. 8, pp. 1149-1150. 2020.**

**Key Concepts:** WHO, China, Health Diplomacy

This article discusses the role of the WHO in the global response to COVID-19, arguing that the organization’s failures are not simply a matter of leadership, but are structural in nature. Brown and Ladwig explain that while China was not forthcoming with information about the novel coronavirus, there is not much that the WHO could have done about it. Not only is the organization underfunded, but International Health Regulations were negotiated in a way that gives the WHO *no real power* to sanction or pressure states to comply with their regulations. States maintain the power to self-report and investigate outbreaks, and there is no real accountability measure to ensure transparency. The authors believe that the intense spread of COVID-19 should not just be blamed on China for their lack of transparency, but the entire world for not creating a better mechanism to protect itself from global public health emergencies. The WHO and the International Health Regulations need to be renegotiated, Brown and Ladwig argue.

**Carville, James. [“James Carville on Why Foundation CEOs Need to Fund a 'Wartime Communications' Force \(Opinion\).”](#) *The Chronicle of Philanthropy*. 26 March 2020.**

**Key Concepts:** war time communication, messaging

In this article, Carville calls upon ten of the country's largest foundations—including the Gates Foundation and the Charles Koch Foundation and Institute—to provide funding and leadership for a new “Wartime Communication Force,” one similar to the Committee on Public Information during WWI. Credible sources have been sharing accurate information on how to combat the COVID-19 virus, however, if the people who need to hear it don't read those sources, it is essentially useless. Carville believes that “we need to enlist [these foundations] to create a messaging machine [that can reach] the furthest corners of America with coherent messages about what to do and what not to do” during this pandemic. He explains that we must analyze what messages are effective, what speakers resonate with different audiences, and establish a dream team of Hollywood leaders, psychologists, advertising experts, etc. to make sure that “every micro-slice” of the population hears accurate information. Carville argues that journalists can't do that alone at this moment.

**Agadjanian, Alexander and Horiuchi, Yusaka. [“Has Trump damaged the U.S. image abroad? Decomposing Policy Messages on Foreign Public Opinion.”](#) *Political Behavior*, vol. 40, pp. 581-602. 2020. *Springer Science+Business Media***

**Key concepts:** Trump, public opinion, political psychology

This research article poses the following question: when President Trump addresses foreign audiences, do they react more to *him* or the ideas he's discussing? President Trump has, in many cases, centered his foreign policy around animosity toward other countries. This study surveys members of the voting age population of Japan—a U.S. ally with a public that generally disapproves of Trump (roughly 25 percent approval)—to understand the importance of *message content* vs. *message source*. Those who took the survey responded to various statements that differed by source (Trump or random Congressperson), policy content (cooperative or uncooperative), and issue salience (national security or educational exchange). The findings of this research indicate that a “significant negative source cue effect” only exists when the statement made by President Trump is uncooperative—those that are cooperative, in general, are not responded to negatively. This implies that Japanese respondents are more focused on policy over personality. This serves as an indication that Trump's rhetoric may not be damaging U.S. credibility among foreign publics to the extent many believe. This gives hope that the international reputation of the United States is recoverable.

**Agarwalla, Yashna. [“Public Diplomacy Challenges for the U.S.”](#) *Modern Diplomacy*. July 2020.**

**Key Concepts:** soft power, increased use of public diplomacy

In this article, Agarwalla argues that an effective U.S. public diplomacy strategy is essential, especially in the current political climate. Though the United States has relied on its soft power for decades, public opinion toward the U.S. since the start of the War on Terror has consistently declined, made worse by domestic missteps (such as the COVID-19 death toll, racial tension) and the alienation of our allies (diverting crucial shipments to allies, withdrawing from the WHO). Agarwalla emphasizes the urgent need for a long-term public diplomacy strategy, one that emphasizes effective dialogue and global engagement. Both the domestic and diplomatic activities of the United States as of late have sparked global outrage, and it is more essential than ever that the United States use its public diplomacy tools to restore its soft power.

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#### SECTION IV: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

**Milam, Lacey & Johnson Avery, Elizabeth.** [“Apps4Africa: A new State Department public diplomacy initiative.”](#) *Public Relations Review*, vol. 38, pp. 328-335. ELSEVIER.

**Key concepts:** Africa, technology, twenty-first century

This article discusses “Apps4Africa,” an initiative sponsored by the U.S. State Department in 2010. This initiative aimed to showcase regional tech talent in Africa, promote socially beneficial tech applications, and highlight the importance of technology as a tool of improvement in Africa. Furthermore, the U.S. aimed to grow regional private sector partnerships and mutual understanding. Mobile technology is no longer limited to industrialized nations, and technology use in Africa has skyrocketed in recent years, displaying a great amount of unleashed potential in terms of tech development. For this contest, citizens submitted “problems” that could be addressed with new technology, and—through Facebook, Twitter, SMS, or the Apps4Africa website—developers submitted apps that could address these problems. Several projects received recognition, including the first place winner, a mobile application that allows dairy farmers to track and monitor cow nutrition and breeding periods, created at the request of a farmer in Kenya. The 21st Century Statecraft Initiative, introduced by Secretary Hillary Clinton, focuses on getting civil society and private organizations more involved in U.S. public diplomacy and emphasizes relationship building among ordinary people across the globe. Apps4Africa is viewed as relatively successful, due to the fact that it combined action with communication and partnerships, and was created with an organized vision that resonated with the target audience while remaining in line with State Department initiatives. Its main success is due to its partnerships, which included Appfrica Labs, iHub, and SODNET. These partners were well positioned to promote the initiative. Social

media responded well to this contest both through the number of impressions and the words that were shared. This article also discusses “new public diplomacy” which focuses on *reputation* and mutual enlightenment through person-to-person contact. “Apps4Africa succeeded primarily because it responded to the changing dynamics of the 21st century.”

**Cull, Nicholas.** [“A region speaks: Nordic public diplomacy in historical context.”](#) *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, vol. 12, pp. 152-159. 2016.

**Key concepts:** Nordic region, comparative, history

This article discusses the history of public diplomacy and propaganda in the Nordic region, comparing both its past and present public diplomacy with that of the United States. Cull discusses the four elements of public diplomacy and their connection to Nordic history: listening, cultural diplomacy, exchange, and advocacy. To explain these elements, Cull cites many historical examples, from Swedish King Charles XI’s listening tours (listening) to the creation Swedish Institute (cultural diplomacy) to “Gesta Danorum,” or “Deeds of the Danes,” a written policy explanation meant for foreign consumption in the 12th century (advocacy). While public diplomacy efforts have certainly taken a large role in Nordic diplomatic history, there are examples of propaganda, which include their use of a flag “sent down from the heavens,” to more recent reception of pro-Nazi propaganda. To better understand Nordic public diplomacy, however, Cull uses the United States as a “benchmark” of comparison. He argues that the United States focuses much more on advocacy rather than listening, and overconfidence has created a disinclination to learn from others. Furthermore, he notes that the United States tends to amplify public diplomacy during times of crisis. Nordic countries generally follow the opposite path, and are less advocacy driven with public diplomacy actors given more freedom to listen, experiment and exchange. Furthermore, Nordic countries do not follow the American model of “unitary” public diplomacy, a singular effort by the government. Nordic countries see a greater disaggregation of actors in the public and private sphere. One of the major differences that Cull uses to compare Nordic countries and the United States is the global “consequence” they pose. Nordic countries are generally “filling an empty glass rather than changing the content of a nearly full one,” and are required to participate in global partnerships to gain and maintain relevance. New Public Diplomacy, as Cull describes it, is no longer bipolar, and contains various actors. One of the unique challenges that Nordic countries face in the era of New Public Diplomacy is forging partnerships and participating globally (science expos, the UN, etc.) to “pay rent” on their positive reputations.

Potter, Evan. [“Canada and the New Public Diplomacy.”](#) 2003 *International Journal*; Toronto, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 43-64. 2003. *ProQuest*.

**Key Concepts:** Canada, soft-power, globalization, national image

This article analyzes Canadian public diplomacy and emphasizes the importance of soft power and national image as tools to maintain relevance in the globalized world. Potter argues that “in the absence of substantial military or economic weight, most countries are the image or ‘words’ they project abroad.” As a middle-power and exporter, Canada fits that description. While Canada is a modern, diverse, advanced nation with strong institutions and a highly educated population, there is a large gap between the way Canada sees itself and the way the rest of the world sees Canada (as a more natural, pristine not-high tech environment). Potter cites the many reasons why Canada has a ‘branding problem’. These include the under-funded public diplomacy instruments, such as cultural, exchange, and broadcasting programs, “invisibility” in global television through the deliberate lack of “Canadian” branding, and the country’s overall federal structure. Globalization has allowed for provinces to develop international relationships, yet provincial messaging to global publics has remained uncoordinated. Furthermore, a key tool of public diplomacy is international broadcasting, and the lack of strong federal coordination between the provinces in both broadcasting and communication has led to a cacophony of voices each presenting only a partial image of Canada. Potter includes a description of the “Think Canada” program in Japan to emphasize Canada’s efforts to make the world view them as a modern, high-tech society. In this program, the Canadian Embassy in Japan launched a series of cultural, business, science, and technology events to brand Canada as a sophisticated and diverse society. This series was well received, and emphasized the value of a well coordinated, strategic approach to public diplomacy that broadcast the image of Canada as they wished to portray it. Overall, Potter emphasizes that in the globalized world, where the public demands more transparency, global and domestic lines are blurred, and countries are competing for the greatest influence: branding and public diplomacy are at the forefront of diplomacy as a whole. In order to stand out, the strategic use of media and public diplomacy are *essential* for building relationships with foreign and domestic publics and for exerting influence on the world stage.

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## SECTION V: NON-STATE ACTORS AND THE DOMESTIC DIMENSION

La Porte, Teresa, [“The Impact of ‘Intermestic’ Non-State Actors on the Conceptual Framework of Public Diplomacy.”](#) *Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, vol. 7, pp. 441-458. 2012. *Brill*.

**Key concepts:** Non-state actors, domestic, international

In this article, La Porte discusses the increasing relevance of non-state actors in public diplomacy, and the blurred lines between domestic and international interests: “intermestic.” She argues that while the nation-state has typically been the main actor in public diplomacy, autonomous non-state actors with clear international political interests can initiate public diplomacy. Despite the previously understood notion that the state is the only actor, non-state entities such as NGOs and corporations have their own political agendas and the potential to influence legislation. She differentiates between the subject and the object of public diplomacy, arguing that the practice of public diplomacy is not simply determined by who is taking action, but what kind of action is taking place. La Porte cites scholar Bruce Gregory’s assertion that regardless of the actor, the ‘core concepts’ of public diplomacy are understanding, engagement, planning, and advocacy. Non-state actors can be considered actors in public diplomacy if they have clear objectives and leadership, and are acting to defend their international political interests. (Examples include NGOs and trade unions but not movements such as “Occupy Wall Street”). One of the main questions La Porte raises is the idea of legitimacy. She addresses questions over the legitimacy of non-state actors to conduct public diplomacy without the authority of a democratic election. These actors gain legitimacy, she argues, through effectiveness, transparent and consensual action, and shared goals. While these leaders are not elected, they are legitimized through the public’s perception of honesty and proficiency, often received through the results they offer. The efficacy of non-state actors (the ability to communicate, gain support, etc.) in situations such as disaster relief and tech innovation are often beyond the capacity of a state, emphasizing that legitimacy is rooted in tackling the concerns of citizens, not necessarily democracy. ‘Intermestic’ actors can more easily communicate with foreign publics through communication technology, and generally require great deliberation throughout their processes. Despite this, the role of the state is by no means weak, and generally it is the main actor in public diplomacy. States can also partner with ‘intermestic’ actors to utilize their strengths and build trust among adversarial foreign publics that may be skeptical of action directly sponsored by a government.

**Torras-Villa, Joan and Fernandez-Cavia, Jose. [“DIPLOCAT’s public diplomacy role and the perceptions towards Catalonia among international correspondents.”](#) *Place Brand Public Diplomacy*, vol. 14, pp. 213-222. 2018.**

**Key Concepts:** Sub-state public diplomacy, Catalonia

This paper analyzes the role of DIPLOCAT, the Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia, and its role in influencing the global reputation of Catalonia’s independence

movement. DIPLOCAT was established to influence public opinion and internationalize the independence movement of Catalonia, a region of Spain that has for years sought autonomy. This organization is a consortium created in 2012 “with the aim of coordinating and facilitating dialogue between around 30 public and private institutions.” The authors of this paper aim to understand if the work done by DIPLOCAT can be considered public diplomacy, whether the consortium accurately represents Catalonia, and if their strategies are successful in influencing foreign public opinion. To answer these questions, Torras-Villa and Fernandez-Cavia surveyed international correspondents from the most influential countries in the Western world (UK, USA, France, and Germany) that have had previous contact with DIPLOCAT. This survey sought to understand their perceptions toward Catalonia. These international correspondents were surveyed to account for the “importance of journalists in shaping the world’s reality,” acknowledging that foreign correspondents have the power to shape the image of a country in the eyes of foreign viewers. The results of the questionnaire found that correspondents have a “unanimous, positive opinion about Catalonia.” Furthermore, the respondents noted that when searching for information about Catalonia, they typically seek sources that DIPLOCAT is “committed to providing,” highlighting the strength of DIPLOCAT’s public diplomacy apparatus. The authors argue that the organization’s collaborative and diverse nature have allowed for an accurate portrayal of Catalonia, and achieved success through a triangular strategy, targeting the academic sector, the foreign press, and foreign political bodies. They were able to internationalize the debate, expand global exchange and knowledge of the region and use digital diplomacy to spread a positive and accurate image of Catalonia “stimulat[ing] conversation between Catalan and foreign stakeholders.” This article articulates the ability of sub-state entities to successfully conduct public diplomacy and influence the global perception of a region through the digital sphere.

Uysal, Nur. [“The Rise of Diasporas as Adversarial Non-State Actors in Public Diplomacy: The Turkish Case.”](#) *Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, vol. 14, pp. 272-292. 2019. Brill.

**Key concepts:** Diaspora, non-state public diplomacy

This article aims to understand the role of diaspora communities, specifically the Turkish diaspora community, in public diplomacy as effective non-state actors. Traditionally, public diplomacy has been state centric (initiated by the state, aimed at foreign publics). In the case of the Turkish diaspora, however, that notion was challenged. In 2016, there was a failed military coup attempt against Erdoğan’s government in Turkey, blamed on Turkish cleric Fethullah Gülen’s controversial ‘Hizmet’ religious movement. Hundreds died, thousands were injured, and thousands fled Turkey or were forced out due to suspicion of supporting Gülen. In this case a domestic

support group became an adversarial non-state actor with an interest in challenging the state. Gülen's followers in the United States organized the Alliance for Shared Values (with over 3,500 members) and used social media and the mainstream media to challenge the Turkish government's framing of the coup. Uysal discusses the Entman cascading activation model of framing, in which information generally flows top-down from the government. More recently, however, digital media has enabled rogue actors to serve as "pump-valves" with the ability to frame the conversation. Uysal notes that through the analysis of articles and op-eds in major newspapers, the AfSV was very successful in their framing of their issue against President Erdoğan. The group used "culturally congruent" frames such as moderate Islam and universal human rights to describe their movement and to gain support from western audiences. This support was reflected in media coverage, which was generally negative toward Erdoğan. This group successfully launched a public-centric public diplomacy initiative to advance their own goals with a shifted locus of power from the state to a non-state actor. This notion reflects the fact that non-state entities, specifically diaspora communities, are able to gain the legitimacy and resources necessary to confront their home state through the "in between advantage" of being both connected to the home country with no allegiance to it. Furthermore, diaspora communities make formerly domestic problems international, transforming from publics to non-state actors. Overall, diaspora communities are in a unique position, quickly transitioning audiences of public diplomacy to actors.

**Kelman, Ilan; Davies, Megan; Mitchell, Tom; Orr, Iain. ["Island Disaster Para-diplomacy in the Commonwealth."](#) *The Round Table*, vol. 95, no. 386, pp. 561-574. 2006. *Routledge*.**

**Key Concepts:** para diplomacy

This article discusses the idea of sub-state diplomacy and para-diplomacy. The authors analyze non-sovereign island jurisdictions (referred to by the author as SNIJs), to understand their will to conduct diplomacy themselves. SNIJs are often far from their governing state's capital both culturally and geographically, creating a more complex and often less-responsive organization structure when dealing with natural disasters such as hurricanes. A para-diplomacy (sub-state) option that has been available, and potentially useful, is the direct engagement between SNIJs, foreign governments, and international organizations. The authors emphasize that while there have been many opportunities for SNIJs to use this para-diplomacy option, its use has overall been infrequent. Firstly, there are differing legal questions as to what extent certain islands can directly seek "external assistance." Furthermore, not only is disaster para-diplomacy a less effective method of sustained contact than tourism and other cultural contact, but SNIJs in many cases are not in favor of sovereignty, and use other options to alleviate natural disasters while not

acting autonomously, such as the use of the media to pressure their government to act. Overall, while disasters have the potential to create political contact, they are generally not the source of sustained diplomatic contact, nor are SNIJs generally in favor of using disasters to do so.

Cooper, Andrew F. [“Adapting Public Diplomacy to the Populist Challenge.”](#) *Hague Journal of Public Diplomacy*, vol. 7, pp. 441-458. 2012. Brill.

**Key concepts:** populism, domestic public diplomacy, anti-diplomatic impulses

This article discusses the impact of populism on public diplomacy and seeks to understand how to handle it. Cooper explains that populism is a vertical struggle between the “elite” and “the people,” whereas nationalism is focused on citizens and “others.” Populism generally denotes an “aversion toward interests beyond the national.” While the author notes that populism is not a new phenomenon, it has typically remained in the ‘periphery’ of global politics. Recently, however, it has taken center stage, as seen through Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, Modi in India, Bolsonaro in Brazil, and other equivalent leaders in many of the most internationally consequential nations. Populism has created a strong backlash toward public diplomacy, because the field is accused of being disconnected from domestic publics, with listening only taking place “beyond the water’s edge”— i.e. lacking an internal dimension. On a larger scale, populist leaders are typically suspicious of diplomats and diplomatic culture, believing they are self-serving, more often favoring a personal approach to diplomacy. Furthermore, populist leaders such as Donald Trump see public diplomacy as a transactional, winner-takes-all action that can be publicized, challenging the traditionally understood goal of listening and stabilizing goodwill. Populism also has the potential to exist beyond the state. Cooper describes the “disintermediation dilemma” as the “disconnect between the priorities of a worldly elite as opposed to a localist public.” This dilemma exists through the “cult of personality” and increasing support of celebrities who through communication technology are able to go around traditional structures and speak “on behalf of the people.” While diplomats are seen as out of touch, Cooper believes it is up to them to address current concerns and increase their role while doing so. He states that new public diplomacy should have a greater inward-facing dimension focused on the domestic public, and should also include more transactional components to alleviate the concerns that domestic citizens express over not seeing any results. In short, Cooper explains that public diplomacy is under threat but is not dead; it can be transformed according to current concerns.

Morello, Carol. [“Senators propose enlisting governors and mayors in international diplomacy.”](#) *Washington Post*. August 04 2020.

**Key Concepts:** municipal diplomacy, relationship building

In this article, Morello discusses a piece of legislation proposed by Senators Chris Murphy (D-CT) and David Perdue (R-GA) called the The City and State Diplomacy Act. This bill seeks to create an Office of Subnational Diplomacy in the State Department, led by an ambassador at large. This bill seeks to replicate the Beijing model of influence, and would involve mayors, governors, and other local/state officials to “get out in the world and talk to their counterparts.” This bill emphasizes the importance of more “people to people” diplomacy, which could be helpful in the development of relationships among countries that have low trust in the U.S. government. Beijing has successfully made deals and relationships at the local level in many U.S. cities, expanding its influence, and this bill seeks to use that blueprint. This article could pair well with a more extensive reading on municipal public diplomacy.

**Feargal, Cochrane.** [“Irish-America, The End of the IRA’s Armed Struggle and the Utility of Soft Power.”](#) *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 215-231. 2007. *Sage Publications*.

**Key concepts:** soft power, non-state actors, diaspora communities, Ireland

This article discusses the soft power role the Irish-American diaspora played in both the internationalization of the Northern Ireland struggle and the ultimate ceasefire. The author argues that in this case, soft power was able to achieve “what hard power could not for over a generation.” In the early phases of the Northern Ireland conflict beginning in the late 1960s, the struggle was seen as an internal matter for the United Kingdom, avoided due to the U.S.’s strong alliance with the U.K. This changed, however, because the sheer size of and strong organization of the Irish-American diaspora presented a loud voice against British interference. Furthermore, public stances against British interference by prominent Irish-American politicians and elites such as Senators Tip O’Neill and Edward Kennedy helped to internationalize the conflict. While these people never spoke in favor of armed conflict, their messages were used by republicans to justify violence. John Hume and Sean Donlon of the Irish SDLP argued that a constitutional approach could compel the U.S. Executive to take this on directly. They convinced groups of well-connected Irish-Americans, including the Americans for New Irish Agenda, to shift their tone toward peace. This group distanced themselves from militant organizations (such as Noraid and INC) and even lobbied President Clinton to bring non-partisan policy options regarding the conflict to the front of his foreign policy agenda. The Clinton Administration welcomed Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein to the White House, and over time through the soft power organization of Irish America, Sinn Fein

shifted away from its militant goals and began to focus on peaceful solutions and a strengthened relationship with the United States. They even opened an office in Washington D.C. despite initial disapproval by the United Kingdom. In recent years, support for an armed struggle in Ireland has further weakened, receiving less support from U.S. politicians due to the nation's strict anti-terrorism stance. On this note, Cochrane discusses that in the present day, the nature of the Irish diaspora has changed. Ireland is a well-developed nation, and many concerns have simply been answered. Through incremental soft power initiatives, Irish-America has become an insider in the political process, becoming more heterogeneous and less "grievance-driven." All of these factors combined have led to a decreased interest in this border conflict in recent years. Overall, Cochrane argues that while large diaspora communities typically have the resources and will to fund armed conflict, the "political capital of Irish America" and soft power initiatives enacted by groups such as ANIA were much more substantial than financial donations. Irish-American lobbying helped to internationalize the Northern Ireland conflict, and encouraged U.S. politicians to bring the item of a peaceful resolution to the front of the American foreign policy agenda. Whether through the ceasefire or the adoption of the MacBride principles in the United States, this article emphasizes the strong soft power role that diaspora communities, powerful non-state actors, have the potential to play.

**Zaharna, R.S. ["Western Assumptions in Non-Western Public Diplomacies: Individualism and Estrangement."](#) *Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, vol. 14, pp. 216-223. 2019. Brill.**

**Key concepts:** West, Non-west, individualism, public diplomacy goals

In this article, Zaharna notes that "the lens for viewing diplomatic relations at present is skewed towards an individualist perspective." (223) She argues that though public diplomacy has typically been defined by western perspectives, in order to expand our understanding of the field it is essential not only to focus on separateness but "relationality" that exists in many parts of the globe. Western public diplomacy assumes an *identifiable actor* with *identifiable goals* will take action purely to achieve these goals. Relations are typically viewed as "instrumental," or the means to achieve a goal—rooted in power. Zaharna argues that this is not a universal outlook. The idea of "estrangement" simply isn't prevalent in many cultures, where relationships are formed not for transactional reasons but "for relationship sake." Unless this dynamic of relationship building is adequately considered by academics, public diplomacy as a field of academic discourse will not be whole.

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## SECTION VI: SOFT POWER AND CULTURE

**Leight, Naomi.** [“Essays on Faith Diplomacy.”](#) *USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School*, pp. 69-79. 2011. *Figueroa Press*.

**Key concepts:** Faith diplomacy, Islam, rational actor model

In the essay “Enriching Post-Secular Discourse on Faith Diplomacy,” Darrell Ezell discusses the idea of “post-secularism.” From the twentieth century onward, many western scholars assumed that religion would be replaced with secularism and rationalism in the conduct of global affairs. This theory, however, has been proven untrue. Religion, specifically Islam, has “held its own.” In recent decades, and the U.S. has continued to face the unexpected challenge of addressing political Islam. Ezell argues that the U.S. should take a non-secular approach to public diplomacy, especially when addressing the Muslim world, because typical nation “branding” and vague one-way communication that (arguably) works in Europe has failed to resonate among Muslims. Ezell says that a misunderstanding of the Establishment Clause and a fear of approaching religion among U.S. foreign policy officials has led them to discount religion and avoid the topic completely when conducting public diplomacy. This has led them to misread the “social terrain” and develop inappropriate communication techniques. U.S. diplomats should engage with non-elites, religious leaders, and moderate religious principles such as peace and anti-violence, Ezell argues. He further notes that Muslim voices are important in the global market of ideas, and it is essential that U.S. public diplomacy is not only a two-way dialogue, but “complementary,” with a willingness from both parties (secular and non-secular) to accept each others’ values and not dismiss religion as “archaic.” I believe this essay could be paired very well with the speech made by Barack Obama to the Muslim World in Cairo. He mentions his experience with Islam and connects the principles of the religion to those of the United States. Link below: <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html>

**Demir, Mehtap.** [“Music as a Cultural Diplomacy between Israel and Turkey \(2008-2016\).”](#) *İdil Sanat ve Dil Dergisi*, vol. 6, no. 32, pp. 1225-1240. 2017.

**Key concepts:** cultural diplomacy, soft power, art

Demir discusses cultural diplomacy, which is defined as a “two-way process of dialogue between different foreign societies to improve the image and values of a nation and to try to understand the cultures, values and images of other countries and peoples.” He argues that due to increased interdependence caused by globalization, no government can truly provide its own security (from piracy, cross-border crimes, pollution, terrorism, etc.) Demir explains that to combat this new reality, a country’s strength is determined

by its level of integration with other countries, or its ability to foster mutually beneficial relationships. One way to build relationships, he explains, is through the exchange of culture, specifically music. To develop this idea, he cites the relationship between Israel and Turkey from 2008 to 2016. During these years, the relationship between Turkey and Israel became quite strained after the Israeli military attacked a Gaza-bound Turkish flotilla in 2010 as part of their offensive to wipe out Hamas terrorists from the area, a campaign fiercely criticized by the Turkish government. Turkey described this act as terrorism, ended all military and security ties with Israel, and demanded an apology and compensation. Their requests for compensation and an end to the blockade of Gaza were accepted in 2016, and Demir argues that the normalization of relations was significantly impacted by the people-to-people relationships fostered through music diplomacy. Musicians such as the Israeli Yinon Muallem (who served as a cultural attache to Turkey), performed alongside Turkish musicians. Concert events hosted in Tel Aviv and Istanbul, and large scale cross-cultural music education proved effective in increasing cross-cultural understanding. These performances were among the first large scale events to unite the people in these two countries. The divide between these two countries is not only political, but cultural, between Judaism and Islam. Demir emphasizes that even during the most difficult moments of conflict between states, there is the potential to unite the masses through music.

**Martin, Michael and Berkely, Hugo** ["The Jazz Ambassadors': Cold War Diplomacy And Civil Rights In Conflict."](#) (Podcast and Transcript). May 2018.

**Key concepts:** Jazz, Cold War, music diplomacy

This is a ten minute NPR interview (transcript included) between journalist Michel Martin and filmmaker Hugo Berkely conducted to discuss Berkely's new film "The Jazz Ambassadors." Berkeley discusses his new film, which follows various jazz musicians during the Cold War and describes their roles as cultural ambassadors of the United States. During the decolonization period of the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a concerted propaganda effort to encourage newly independent nations to join their side of the global binary power struggle. Congressman Adam Clayton Powell Jr. of Harlem, noting the uniqueness of jazz as an American art, encouraged the State Department to utilize this as a cultural resource around the world to spread American influence. Willis Conover of Voice of America produced a show called "Music USA," which successfully reached out to audiences across the globe. Some of the most important players, however, were the musicians themselves, generally African American and often open about their struggles with discrimination. In nations such as Ghana, the universality of their message was of great appeal. Though these artists were not treated equally in their home country, they still generally supported the United States due to the binary global condition, and sought to unite people internationally. Overall,

this interview explains the importance of jazz, a uniquely American art, as a form of cultural diplomacy with a message that resonated with global foreign publics during the Cold War.

**Karp, Myles.** ["The Surprising Reason that There Are So Many Thai Restaurants in America."](#) *Vice News*. 2018.

**Key Concepts:** gastrodiploamacy, food, cultural diplomacy

In this article, Karp explains why there is such a high ratio of Thai restaurants to Thai people in the United States. The reason is "gastrodiploamacy." While the Thai-American population is not nearly as large as the Mexican and Chinese American population, Thai restaurants pull their weight because many are paid for by the Thai government. The government of Thailand has "intentionally bolstered the presence of Thai cuisine outside of Thailand to increase its export and tourism revenues, as well as its prominence on the cultural and diplomatic stages," says Karp. The Thai government, mainly bureaucrats from the Ministry of Commerce's Department of Export Promotion, has set up prototype restaurants, loan infrastructure, and chef training. The Public Health Ministry even published a book called "A Manual for Thai Chefs Going Abroad" to provide information about recruitment, training, and [the] tastes of foreigners." These efforts have been successful. Thousands of Thai restaurants have opened in the United States and in various other countries. South Korea and Peru, have even tried to replicate the Thai model. This article represents the use of food as a soft power resource in countries seeking to gain relevance on the international stage.

**["Gastrodiploamacy."](#)** *Public Diplomacy Magazine*, vol. 11, pages 11-27. 2014.

**Key Concepts:** gastrodiploamacy, food, cultural diplomacy

This magazine includes a series of four features that discuss gastrodiploamacy in theory and in practice. These features highlight national image and "conflict cuisine," among other ideas. Gastrodiploamacy is described as a method of public diplomacy that "seeks to enhance the edible nation brand through cultural diplomacy" and promote awareness and understanding of national culinary culture among global foreign publics. Food is a "fundamental building block" of national identity, similar to a national anthem or a flag. Food has the potential to link cultures through familiar tastes, promote recognition, and serve as an emotional connection between foreign publics and home countries. As one feature explains, people bring culinary traditions with them no matter where they move. Gastrodiploamacy is often conducted by "Middle Powers" that aim to be recognized, however, great powers conduct gastrodiploamacy as well to highlight

regional cuisines. Overall, these features highlight the diversity and uniqueness of gastrodiplomacy, emphasizing its distinction from culinary diplomacy. Gastrodiplomacy focuses not on diplomats, but the connection that food can bring between normal people.

**Cull, Nicholas. [“Expo Diplomacy: Why the U.S. Needs to Go Back to the Future.”](#) *USC Center on Public Diplomacy*. 2019.**

**Key Concepts:** International expos, the future of public diplomacy, post-Cold War

In this blog post, Cull emphasizes the importance of a country’s reputation and image, suggesting that to “reassure, inspire, and rally” people around the vision of the United States, participation in global expos is almost essential. During the Cold War, the United States invested time and money in its participation in global expos that showcased the many aspects of American soft power: science, capitalism, film, etc. After the Cold War ended, however, the federal government saw little purpose in funding U.S. participation, expecting full corporate sponsorship. This led to limited U.S. involvement, and in some cases, separate corporate involvement. In recent years, countries such as China and South Korea have gotten attention for their participation, while the U.S. faded from the spotlight. While the Trump administration is aiming to increase participation in global expos, Cull argues that U.S. attendance is essential to capture the hearts and minds of a new generation of people that have not fully developed a perception toward the U.S. Showcasing the vision of the United States could be one of its strongest public diplomacy tools. “Visions of the future are more than one way to move beyond global crises; they are the only way to do so,” argues Cull.

**Ingenhoff, Diana and Segev, Elad and Chariatte, Jerome. [“The Construction of Country Images and Stereotypes: From Public Views to Google Searches.”](#) *International Journal of Communication*, vol. 14, pp. 92-113. 2020.**

**Key Concepts:** public, public perceptions, stereotypes

This article discusses one of the most important aspects of public diplomacy: country image. Through the analysis of Google search trends and a survey, the authors seek to understand the role of stereotypes in the foundation of a country’s image, using Switzerland as a case study due to its low news value but high level of recognition. The authors address the five dimensions of country image, which include: the natural dimension (beauty), the cultural dimension, the functional dimension (economy, resources, etc.), the normative dimension (values), and the emotional dimension (fascination), and compared results between countries near Switzerland (France, Italy,

Germany, UK) and far (USA, India, UAE). The survey results presented a clear indication that stereotypes were present in each of the cultural dimensions. Countries in closer proximity to Switzerland held “more diverse images *and* more stereotypes than did distant countries.” While neighboring countries focused on all five dimensions, respondents from distant countries mainly referenced Switzerland’s landscape. This suggests a few things. Firstly, countries in close proximity to Switzerland in general have a greater understanding of the country and the many diverse aspects of it; they are exposed to more Swiss news stories, markets, etc. due to their location. Furthermore, the fact that countries in closer proximity held a *greater amount* of stereotypes represents the notion that stereotypes not only fill in an information gap, but are useful in *breaking down a complex understanding* of a country that comes along with more diverse exposure. The authors also discovered that Google searches contained fewer stereotypes, considering they were more “action oriented” such as seeking information about a product or a hotel. Overall, this article explains that “even with the diversity of information available in the digital era, people still rely on, and perhaps need, heuristics, shortcuts, and stereotypes, mainly acquired during socialization processes.”

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## SECTION VII: DIGITAL DIPLOMACY & THE INTERNET

Adler-Nissen, Rebecca. [“Behind the Scenes of Digital Diplomacy.”](#) *TEDxCopenhagen*, 28 Jan. 2018.

**Key Concepts:** technology, digital diplomacy

In this Tedx Talk, Political Science professor Rebecca Adler-Nissen discusses the use of digital technology—and the involvement of the public—in diplomacy. It was predicted by many that the increased connectivity of the internet would reduce international tension and connect people under a common identity, however, as she explains, the three pillars of diplomacy—time, space, and tact—are explicitly challenged by social media. Social media often credits those who are loud and take credit rather than those who are more quiet negotiators; negotiators often focus more on their public image than the task at hand. Adler-Nissen suggests that the many proposed solutions, such as the removal of technology from the negotiating room or a handbook of conduct, are not plausible. She, however, believes that the best approach to alleviate this problem is for the public to demand a view below the surface: what goes on in the negotiating room (to an extent), who these people are, and “what lies between the updates.” Public involvement and interest in the bigger picture is essential to ensure that we are electing the right leaders. This discussion interestingly links traditional diplomacy and both foreign and domestic publics.

**Bjola, Corneliu and Cassidy, Jennifer and Manore, Ilan. [“Public Diplomacy in the Digital Age.”](#) *Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, vol. 14, pp. 83-101. 2019. Brill.**

**Key concepts:** non-state public diplomacy, technology, digitalization

This article discusses the many ways that digital technology is changing public diplomacy. As public diplomacy adapts to the rapid growth in data use worldwide, a new set of operating techniques is required. With more data comes the increased competition for attention and demand for filtering/interpreting data. To overcome the “information overload,” traditional forms of public diplomacy may be replaced with targeted, absorbable material. Additionally, digitalization has encouraged non-state actors and other traditionally marginalized voices to be involved in public diplomacy. Public diplomacy has typically been outward in practice, focusing on foreign publics, however, through the use of digital platforms, governments can gather domestic support for their diplomatic goals (treaties, deals, etc.), blurring the line between national and international politics. Similarly, large corporations are “growing in their capacity to engage in public diplomacy efforts (95).” While many still question *who* can conduct diplomacy, the tech-giants with the resources of nation states are engaging internationally to achieve their political goals. This challenges traditional notions of authority. Denmark has even appointed an “Ambassador” to Silicon Valley, and other nations have increased their presence in the area, due to their belief that access to data and technology is the *true definition of power* in the digital age. Overall, digital technology is changing the structure of public diplomacy. While in many cases it is positive change, including the ability to bring more people to the table, technology *enables* non-state actors to create false realities and ultimately disrupt diplomacy. Countries have worked to improve this by fostering dialogue online, targeting disinformation, and using algorithms to target specifically-framed information to certain publics. This entire issue is quite complicated, and until more knowledge is gained, it’s still not certain if countries will embrace this technology. But, as the authors note, states can either “define themselves or be defined” in the digital world.

**Bjola, Corneliu. [“The ‘dark side’ of digital diplomacy: Countering Disinformation and Propaganda.”](#) *Elcano Royal Institute*. 2019.**

**Key Concepts:** Countering disinformation, public diplomacy techniques

In this article, Bjola discusses the five strategic tactics that MFA’s can take to counter disinformation and propaganda on social media platforms. These methods include ignoring, debunking, using humor to trivialize disinformation, publicly discrediting sources, and mapping/disrupting networks that may share false information.

To decide which method to use, Bjola argues that different situations call for different responses. How can you maintain your moral ground? How can you capture the emotion of the audience? Would you be giving something trivial unnecessary oxygen, or is it essential that you call it out? Are your audiences open to factual information, or should it be framed differently? In the 2016 U.S. Presidential election Americans consumed Russian disinformation in some cases at a higher rate than they consumed evening news broadcasts. Powerful state and non-state actors have the ability to have a serious impact on the global order (Catalonia, U.S. Election, Brexit) and it's more important than ever to prevent the spread of digital disinformation.

**Nisbet, Erik and Kamenchuk, Olga. [“The Psychology of State-Sponsored Disinformation Campaigns and Implications for Public Diplomacy.”](#) *Hague Journal of Public Diplomacy*, vol. 14, pp. 65-82. 2019. Brill.**

**Key Concepts:** Disinformation, psychology

This article discusses a new approach to countering disinformation, one that addresses not just technology behind it, but the human factors driving its success. While bots and algorithms allow disinformation to flourish online, certain social/psychological mechanisms create human vulnerabilities to misleading information. The authors discuss three types of disinformation campaigns—identity grievance, information gaslighting, and incidental exposure—and how to combat them. The first, identity grievance, involves “activating polarized social identities (political, cultural, ethnic)” and undermining institutional trust. Information gaslighting is the “rapid proliferation” of disinformation, flooding the information sphere. The pollution of the information environment often leads to a sense of “learned helplessness,” and the lack of confidence to discern truth from fiction. Lastly, incidental exposure is the internalization of disinformation that one is consistently exposed to. Nisbet and Kamenchuk discuss the many ways to counter these disinformation campaigns, suggesting media literacy education, direct and consistent exposure to truthful information, and the presentation of information in a less partisan way, among many. Overall, this article takes a psychological approach to public diplomacy and disinformation, suggesting that public diplomacy actors focus on not only the spread of disinformation but the root of its acceptance among audiences. Public diplomacy actors need to not only target algorithms and bots, but seek to work around the psychological reality of cognitive dissonance when hearing factual information that counters one’s pre-existing notions of the world. Public diplomacy needs to “go beyond day-to-day efforts to counter disinformation campaigns and develop new online tools.”

Wharton, Bruce. [“Remarks on Public Diplomacy in a Post-Truth Society.”](#) *Can Public Diplomacy Survive the Internet?* Edited by Shawn Powers and Markos Kounalakis. *Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy*, pp. 7-11. May 2017.

**Key Concepts:** Disinformation, action, facts

In this short section, Bruce Wharton discusses the idea of a “Post-truth world,” where objective fact is ignored and public policy debate is framed largely by what “feels true and correlates with people’s pre-existing set of beliefs and prejudices.” While people often rely on emotion in their understanding of information, he emphasizes that one generally seeks the facts, and believes misleading information only if it is *believed to be fact*. Wharton discusses the many solutions to combat disinformation in a more technical sense. First, he emphasizes that audiences of disinformation should be consistently targeted with factual information, because constant exposure and first impression are very important. Furthermore, tactics of public diplomacy should be positively tied to action; an action oriented method is more likely to foster trust (i.e. greater belief in America after we actually got a man on the moon). Lastly, Wharton believes that we should not only find and work with credible partners across the globe to spread information, but promote a “healthy skepticism,” encouraging young people especially to evaluate the truthfulness of information they receive. Overall, this article discusses a firm belief that facts are still important, however, we must understand how to disseminate them effectively through partnerships, action, and education.