

Exploring Lack and Absence in the Body/Text: Charlotte Perkins Gilman Prewriting Irigaray

GEORGIA JOHNSTON

IN THIS article, I question the connection between psychology and women's texts. Using the French feminists' work, particularly Luce Irigaray's theories about *l'écriture féminine*, I analyze the representation of body as imaging woman's psychology. Charlotte Perkins Gilman's "The Yellow Wallpaper" shows that, indeed, this woman's text includes images of multiplicity that question Freudian theories about hysteria and "normal" psychology for women, particularly by replacing the Freudian concept of "lack" with Irigaray's concept of absence. Concentrating on texts, however, rather than psychoanalysis, my article argues that women authors may often create a text that would be termed hysterical if expressed in the body of the woman herself.

In this century, some theorists have hypothesized that personality is defunct, that the author is absent from a text: Roland Barthes ("The Death of the Author") and Michel Foucault ("What is an Author?") both insist that the text, a specular production, has taken over the author through a mask of its own. French feminists, concurrently, have theorized that the author is not absent from the text; instead, the *body* of the writer plays an important role in textual product. For instance, as Ann Rosalind Jones explains, the writings of Kristeva, Irigaray, Cixous, and Wittig resist phallogentric language and culture. All, Jones states, "agree that resistance does take place in the form of *jouissance*, that is, in the direct re-experience of the physical pleasures of infancy and of later sexuality, repressed but not obliterated by the Law of the Father" (87). When applied to texts, *jouissance* is that which pushes beyond boundaries, what Jacqueline Rose describes (using Freud and Lacan) as "the drive outside any register of need, and beyond an economy of pleasure. The drive [Rose continues] touches an area of excess" (Rose 57). It is orgasm — of

body and of text. With Cixous and Irigaray calling for new *écriture féminine* we see attempts to link sexuality/body to the text, to overturn a binary constructed between language and body, to show their overlap in the written itself, an expression of that *jouissance*.

But Jones also expresses a wariness of taking Irigaray's and Cixous' theories about the body's influence on text — *l'écriture féminine* — literally; instead, Jones emphasizes those theorists' awareness of language that takes them "beyond the body":

as Irigaray's eruditions and play with the speaking voice show (as do Cixous' mischievous puns and citations of languages. . .), they are doing so deliberately, on a level of feminist theory and literary self-consciousness that goes far beyond the body and the unconscious. That is how they need to be read. (98)

Thus, Jones continues, "American feminists can appropriate two important elements, at least from the French position: the critique of phallogentrism in all the material and ideological forms it has taken, and the call for new representations of women's consciousness' (98).

I quote Jones at length to show the pervasiveness of the arguments about defining textuality through language only or through the body only, not only in some theoretical works, but often in the scholarship that tries to explain the theories. Jones, in citing her two elements, emphasizes the political positions that, indeed, are inherent in the work of the French feminists, without recapitulating *jouissance* as a literal bodily representation. The body as an origin is replaced, for Jones, by language as a reflecting but structuring one. Of course, theories about a text must take language into account, since the text uses language as its medium. But, whether that text reflects the body of its author or how that body is reflected in the text are questions which may affect work by gender theorists, and they are questions that often combine concerns about psychology and politics.

Luce Irigaray's work emphasizes the literal importance of the body again and again by foregrounding woman's body while she theorizes about texts. When Irigaray theorizes about specularly, presenting the female genital organ as two lips, she focuses on questions of text and body. The concept of doubleness in the female body works, for her, metonymically, as possible description of the female writing act. This theory places the female writer in a different position than the male writer to her text. Instead of creating the vision of a unified, cohesive subject, the female writer can approach her text as a divided, but self-sufficient (w)hole. The discrepancy between whole and hole is a gap between a unified vision and an absence. The text can bridge the discrepancy, creating a vision, but creating a vision that does not present

cohesion. Within the text are the same discrepancies — or differences, to use a less perjorative word — as in the body. Examples might be found in the texts of many writers: for instance, Charlotte Perkins Gilman narratively (with her combination of narrator and creeping woman), Gertrude Stein stylistically (with her ever same yet changing repetition) and Virginia Woolf imagistically (through Miss La Trobe's dramaturgy of mirrors) refigure the gap between whole and hole, positing new kinds of conscious understanding.

In this article, I will explore one of these examples — that of Charlotte Perkins Gilman's "The Yellow Wallpaper" — to show how Gilman represents meaning — of the other, the outsider, the subjugated — as nonunified, many-sided, repeating and reflecting, changing. The story benefits from a coterminous reading of Irigaray's theory, partly because Gilman's text enacts Irigaray's theory about doubleness and the female body, especially since Gilman's woman character, herself, becomes a multiple, moving text within the wallpaper. Also, Gilman's text theorizes narratively about writing: the narrator feels compelled to write despite her husband-doctor's prescriptive pronouncements, and the narrator's writing produces for readers a doubly told narrative. In addition, both Irigaray and Gilman write in response to the psychoanalytic practice of their eras towards women, pointing out the misunderstanding and blindness which characterize(d) women's treatment.

Through an image of and validation of woman's body, Irigaray recalls Freud's insistence on the importance of the body, and she rewrites psychoanalysis for the woman. When Freud describes western culture's view of the woman as that of "lack", "atrophy," and "penis envy," he pinpoints the penis as the desirable sexual organ. Freud, however, presents this "lack" as the result of woman's recognition that the male has a penis; he asserts that woman envies man his organ, and, in her later life, in a reflection of the repressed envy of the penis and in a move to the signifier of that presence, the Phallus, the woman often envies the man his social and intellectual position. The lack, then, depends on *woman's* recognition and *woman's* envy ("Femininity" 110–111).

Through satiric examinations of Freud's theories of female sexuality, Irigaray counters Freud's assessments of girls' place in the economy of the castration complex. She disputes Freud's theory that women "lack," and suggests that "penis envy" comes, not from an essentialist position, but from society's training and patriarchal conditioning. She overwrites Freud's theories, asserting that they deliberately disseminate the theory of penis envy in order to give the male more power in society. "[O]ne might begin by being surprised, being suspicious, that it should be necessary to *become* a woman — and a 'normal' woman to boot — and that this evolution should be 'more

difficult and more complicated' than becoming a man" (*Speculum* 22). Irigaray's questioning assessment suggests that *women* did not recognize the lack of a penis and envy the possessor; that Freud's theory, instead, *positions* women as lackers and enviers. As contrast, Irigaray puts forth an alternative to women's valuing the Other's real but unattainable penis/phallus; instead women can perceive their bodies, not as lacking a penis but as containing all the parts needed for sexual satisfaction without mediation — two lips that can touch each other (*This Sex* 24).

Irigaray, then, capitalizes on the way "lack" differs from absence; lack implies that something should exist in order to create an organic, privileged, and available whole (Freud's understanding of women's desire for the lacked penis), while absence, still defining a negative, signifies a nothing, not something envied. Irigaray's image of two lips, instead of privileging the unity and originary wholeness that Freud posits women as lacking, prioritizes multiplicity and reflection and the gap between them. Through her reimagining of the female body, and, thus, her constructing of that body differently in culture, Irigaray presents a way in which language (the realm of Lacan's symbolic) can refigure the body. The body, here, seems, equally, to refigure language.

Using Irigaray's reconceptualization of the woman's body, we can read "The Yellow Wallpaper" as a text that also prioritizes multiplicity and reflection. Gilman's story, of a writing woman who becomes hysteric, presents a theory about hysteria, which, in some ways, resembles Freud's but, like Irigaray's theories, makes readers question Freud's theories about the illness. Gilman's presentation of the hysteric contradicts Freudian theory, partly, because Gilman narrates instead of forming a theory around the narration of the hysteric and, partly, because Gilman tells the story from a woman's point of view. By presenting the hysteric from the woman's point of view, Gilman necessarily places her narrator in the place of the patient, rather than in the role of doctor and analyst. The story presents a viewpoint that we have been taught to distrust, since the "I" is implicated in her experiences already. How CAN the patient tell her story, if she is unreliable? — this is the question that Freud would like us to ask continually, allowing him to be the master-interpreter. Freud's co-optation within the power structures of patriarchal Victorian society, however, is questionable. Freud, and other analysts, though they would like to seem objective, and in fact create that objective position for themselves, are implicated just as much as the hysteric in the structures of economics and powers. Jacqueline Rose sums this up nicely:

The case of Dora illustrates only too well that the question of female sexuality brings with it that

of psychoanalytic technique.[†] Thus by insisting to Dora that she was in love with Herr K., Freud was not only defining her in terms of a normative concept of genital heterosexuality, he also failed to see his own place within the analytic relationship, and reduced it to a dual dimension operating on the axes of identification and demand. (59)

And Claire Kahane accuses Freud more strenuously: “as brilliant as Freud was in constructing a narrative of Dora’s desire, he essentially represented his own” (20). Irigaray insists that woman needs to take back the position of interpreters. Rather than just accept the labels and definitions of a patriarchal economy, she must revalorize her body and, as a result, herself; otherwise, “woman is well and truly castrated from the viewpoint of this economy” (*Speculum* 33).

As do Irigaray’s theories, Gilman’s story questions the position of woman within the patriarchal subject/object economy. On surface, Gilman seems, like Freud, to create her character as victim. For instance, the hysterical I has the role of patient within her society, particularly with John, her husband-doctor. Society, in its attempts to rehabilitate her, positions the woman only as object; the doctor-husband positions himself as authority in his wife’s treatment, “policing his wife” (Feldstein 271). Simultaneously, the wife is unable to communicate with the husband. Focusing on the story’s view of how the woman interacts with her husband, Annette Kolodney describes the story as “an exploration, within itself, of the gender-inflected interpretive strategies responsible for our mutual misreadings, and even horrific misprisons across sex lines” (459). “The Yellow Wallpaper” shows miscommunication and misinterpretation between characters — husband and wife — as the fictional wife narrates them to readers.

Gilman does not leave the wife as victim, however. She shows, instead, how experience can differ radically from what another (the doctor–husband here) perceives. Through the narrator, she shows how the woman creates herself as text. Through her body and her authorship, the woman becomes the subject, instead of patient. *She* sees the woman in the wallpaper and binds her with the rope, and *she* (or some narrator who positions herself with the I) creates herself for us by creating this written text. She has a subject position. In addition, Gilman stylistically undermines the subjectivity of doctor: “the narrator constructs representational strategies that privilege the spatial image over its analysis” (Feldstein 271).

I see “privileg[ing] the spatial image over its analysis” when Gilman questions medical practice by parodying the scientific method of observation. The narrator observes the wallpaper “stripped off . . . in great patches . . . as far as I can reach” (1150); the gardens through the windows (“I always fancy I can see people walking in these numerous paths and arbors” — 1151); the

mark on the bedroom wall, “a long, straight, even *smooch*, as if it had been rubbed over and over” (1158); the gnawed bedstead (“This bedstead is fairly gnawed”); and, of course, the woman behind the bars of wallpaper. In all these objective observations, the narrator herself, by the end of the story, becomes implicated. She has stripped the paper, has crawled in the garden, has rubbed the mark onto the wall, has gnawed the bedstead, and is the woman in the wallpaper. Her subjectivity constructs her world from which, without knowledge of herself, she is often divided.

The woman also creates herself when, as an alternative to the Freudian talking-cure, this text questions, not only Freudian-like authority, but Freudian methods. Instead of describing memories and dreams, the woman-hysteric describes wallpaper, itself “like a bad dream” (1156). To understand her illness, the narrator writes instead of talking, and, instead of writing about her illness, the narrator writes of wallpaper, consistently leaping from her condition to the house as if the house were a referent for the condition.

I sometimes fancy that in my condition, if I had less opposition and more society and stimulus — but John says the very worst thing I can do is to think about my condition, and I confess it always makes me fell bad.

So I will let it alone and talk about the house. (1149)

Later she leaps directly to the paper:

. . . but he says he would as soon put fireworks in my pillow-case as to let me have those stimulating people about now.

I wish I could get well faster.

But I must not think about that. This paper looks to me as if it *knew* what a vicious influence it had! (1151)

When the house/paper becomes the *cause* of her condition, it influences her writing:

. . . the interminable grotesque seems to form around a common center and rush off in headlong plunges of equal distraction.

It makes me tired to follow it. I will take a nap I guess.

I don't know why I should write about this.

I don't want to.

I don't feel able. (1154)

And finally, the distinction between the wallpaper and illness collapses: John

laughed a little the other day, and said I seemed to be flourishing in spite of my wallpaper.

I turned it off with a laugh. I had no intention of telling him it was *because* of the wallpaper. . . (1157)

This is one place in this story where boundaries between the sign and referent break down. The woman's condition and the wallpaper reverse their meanings, and the referent becomes the sign. It is here that Gilman's text parallels current feminist theory about the place of women within language. Irigaray, for instance, states "the feminine must be determined . . . within the signs or between them . . . [in the] hinge bending according to their [father's and husband's] exchanges" (*Speculum* 22). And Alice Jardine, in *Gynesis*, goes further, asking whether "the modern question put to the literary text" is not one with "that asked about women." Referring to Lacan, she concludes, "Writing is that letter which escapes discourse as its 'effect'" (168).

The referent again becomes the sign when the woman narrator becomes the woman behind the wallpaper. We read the gap closing and reopening, closing and reopening as the boundaries collapse and reassert themselves:

. . . she is always creeping, and most women do not creep by daylight.

I see her in that long shaded lane, creeping up and down. I see her in those dark grape arbors, creeping all around the garden.

I see her on that long road under the trees, creeping along, and when a carriage comes she hides under the blackberry vines.

I don't blame her a bit. It must be very humiliating to be caught creeping by daylight!

I always lock the door when I creep by daylight. I can't do it at night, for I know John would suspect something at once. (1159)

Here the gap collapses — the creeping woman becomes the narrator in a pronoun substitution, as if I and she were, after all, only arbitrary signifiers for the same signifieds.¹ The full switch, however, doesn't appear until the end of the story, when the narrator performs functions of both creeping woman and observing, binding scientist — she, tied with the rope she has placed on herself, creeps around the room.

It is in this process of collapsing referents that I think the use of narrative, rather than explanation, gives an alternative view to Freud's theories of women and his positioning of the hysteric. Freud uses indirect discourse, not allowing the hysteric to speak for herself without his control. Because he interprets the hysteric's illness as originating in lack, Freud positions woman as either normal (lacking) or abnormal (repressing desire for what she lacks). Freud viewed the hysteric this way because he saw her body, not as source of "illness" but as the site for expression of the ills: "Freud equally returned to the body, no longer considering it as explanatory *source* but as the place in which were carried out the expressive *aims* of the wish" (Starobinsky 364). In contrast, by collapsing the observer and the hysteric as Gilman does, readers go back to the body as source; Gilman allows us to seem interpreters, and the hysteric, rather than being positioned as an object in the abnormal separated

from the normal woman, functions, through narrative, as the double of the narrator. She does not function as the expression of lack. One woman, the narrator, constructs herself through language and one woman creates herself from absence (in a double, here, of the woman's body). Unlike Freud, Gilman does not step in as interpreter, although she could have stepped in, as Freud does with Dora's words, to interpret. Instead, she allows the pattern — the wallpaper, the writing, the act of narration — to hold the conception of the woman.

Gilman's woman-narrator/hysteric, this "hinge" that Gilman presents through narration, represents, to me, what Helene Cixous labels *l'écriture féminine*, both within Cixous' economic metaphor for the process and through the metaphor of language. In Gilman's piece, we read a woman combining herself with another woman — who is herself, rather than acquiescing to an exchange made by men. Gilman's woman/narrator also writes about the two bodies that, finally, collapse, through the mediation of a diary-like tract through which she, ostensibly, avoids her illness and, instead, observes the house and bedroom. The narrator/hysteric writes a new self, by collapsing what she envisions and what she is, in a way that seems to predict Cixous' theories:

By writing herself, woman will return to the body which has been more than confiscated from her, which has been turned into the uncanny stranger on display. ("The Laugh of the Medusa" 312)

Cixous' terminology "uncanny stranger on display" recalls the hysteric, both literally — Charcot's displays — and metaphorically — Freud's interpretations. Gilman's narrator, by creating the hysteric as a multiplying image out of absence, and merging the observing and observed selves, creates a writing that is of the body, that takes back the woman's body but is also of the observer — narrated through language. In this sense, I think it helpful to posit, however reductively, the stripped wallpaper as established patterns² (like the "male writing," "marked" "by a libidinal and cultural . . . economy," that Cixous lambasts, which separates the "normal" woman constructed through language from the woman, absent — as yet unconstructed, linguistically — of the body). Gilman's (and the narrator's) texts become replacements that allow the narrator to communicate (through language) and to create herself (out of absence — not lack).³

For me, Gilman, like Irigaray, positions hysteria as a disease encompassing both woman and the societal system. Through a metaphoric and symbolic discourse, particularly through emblems of house, garden, light, smell, and of

course, the wallpaper, she shows us how the patterns in society, even any kind of writing, implicate the supposedly unbiased viewer. Male constituted language, not just language about sex, but language reflecting the male-hierarchy, male power, is what Gilman's narrator fights against.

Since language is a sign system, since it is a pattern that does not refer to a direct referent, since it is arbitrary, it must be interpreted — its consumption is not a natural association of signifier and signified. Its production depends on what Foucault calls the “system of alliance” (112), the system of the dominant power not controlled by powerful individuals but in league with them; those in power retain power partly because they support a system that supports them. In contrast — and this is another quality of language — the signifying system can not represent people who are not constituted within it.

When the narrator in Gilman's story begins to turn from the patient/object position that her husband has placed her in to a position of subjectivity and control, the two battle through laughter. John

laughed a little the other day, and said I seemed to be flourishing in spite of my wallpaper.

I turned it off with a laugh. I had no intention of telling him it was *because* of the wallpaper . . . (1157)

It seems important that this parry and riposte take place in terms of the laughs, rather than speech. A laugh comes from the body, and, while a laugh has reference to a controlled system of power, it has no direct signification in terms of the language system. However, it seems important, too, to note that the man follows his laugh with speech but that the woman follows hers with silence.

Helene Cixous's laugh, “The Laugh of the Medusa,” describes a utopia that demythologizes repression of women by advocating a new method of writing. “The Laugh of the Medusa” advocates change, particularly in the way women think about themselves and their bodies and their writing. Cixous's readers are women; she urges them to write. “And why don't you write? Write! Writing is for you, you are for you; your body is yours, take it! (309). The connections Cixous makes between bodies, writing, and taking in this command pin together Cixous's concept of *l'écriture féminine*. Writing links self-identity and power. Women no longer participate as consumed objects.

I think *l'écriture féminine* — the taking and writing the body to *deconstruct* a system — problematizes Lacan's presentation of the mirror stage, particularly his emphasis on the *distinction* of the image and infant. “We have only to understand the mirror stage *as an identification*,” Lacan asserts, “in the full sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes

place in the subject when he [sic] assumes an image — whose predestination to this phase-effect is sufficiently indicated by the use, in analytical theory, of the ancient term *imago*" (2). For Lacan, when the child identifies the other in the mirror, the vision the child receives is one of *unity*, a *cohesive* self, rather than fragmented or multiple self. This is the kind of self that looks to the other for a relationship to the negative because it sees itself as the positive. "The Yellow Wallpaper" suggests that, for the hysterical woman at least, the process is reversed: the woman in the wallpaper is multiple, cut apart, grotesque. The woman watching never imagines the woman in the wallpaper as herself; she finds it *is* herself. In other words, the mirror image is not imagined in terms of the Self; rather, the Self is imagined in terms of a mirrored *Other*-self. Instead of identification, identity.⁴

This analysis suggests that, instead of reversing from hysteric to normal, the female writer must reverse herself from "normal" to hysteric. She does this through her writing, constructing a self out of absence (not lack), and, then, merging that absent-now-constructed self (the hysteric) into her own self that has been constructed within patriarchy. For me, this is what Cixous calls writing through the body — *l'écriture féminine* — imagining that part that is not visible to her within a patriarchal system of language. It is what Gilman's narrator does in "The Yellow Wallpaper" — the writer writing a new self into existence, a powerful self that merges with the linguistic self that perceives the absent/imaginable self.

Freud describes a process opposite from the one in which woman writers would move from subjective unified self to multiple "hysteric" self. Through the talking cure, Freud "cures" hysterics, propelling them into taking the stance of unified "normal" self. The women remember repressions that, because repressed and unexamined and uninterpreted in terms of male culture — the culture of the one, unified penis — cause hysteria. Freud imposes a structure of abnormality/normality. For him, the absent does not exist, only lack. He cannot treat the absent as the hysteric's somatic expression. Freud projects sickness, not a gap between absent and language-constructed.⁵ Freud poses hysteria as disease under the curable *control* of man.

In my conception of *l'écriture féminine* the writer places hysteria under the control of the hysteric. Hysteria becomes a function of that *process* of writing. The woman writer creates her world from the inside — she expels a world, presenting what was absent. In Gilman's text, for instance, the creeping woman becomes the text of the narrating woman. She expresses herself through this body text, though the text has no words. The body has become a representation (as with hysterics and their somatic symptoms) along with "The Yellow Wallpaper," the text of words. Author, then, of text, and author

of body, though separate, are juxtaposed. As Richard Feldstein comments, readers question the multiple subject positions in “The Yellow Wallpaper”; readers must question the identity of narrator and, even, wonder if an author exists: “we are left to *identify* with the object of our choice: with the protagonist, whose loss of boundaries causes us to experience a similar loss of identity, with the narrator, whose prose writes itself as a presence absent from most critics’ deliberations, with both or neither of these narrative constructs. We configure our own fictions” (278).

Like Irigaray’s image of two lips, the varieties of the self that the woman sees and that the text presents can never create one unified totalizing whole. The text leaves us with a writing that undermines any valorization of the phallic “Coming” to unity and closure. Instead, the body and language — both present — refuse to capitulate one to the other. Each present, each asserting a subject, repeat and double each other.⁶

NOTES

1. Here, Gilman’s text parallels the Lacanian understanding that “the ‘I’ with which we speak stands for our identity as subjects in language, but it is the least stable entity in language, since its meaning is purely a function of the moment of utterance” (Rose 54).
2. Critics often interpret the wallpaper as creations of the male regime. For example, Susan Stanford Friedman connects the wallpaper with “hideous patterns of society” (47). She sees the woman behind the wallpaper as “a projection of her own sense of entrapment in the roles of wife and mother” (46–47).
3. I would like to suggest, with some trepidation, that all writing is produced out of this interchange. I think it interesting to recall the traditional femaleness of the Muse. See, if interested, an assessment of current writing being done on female poets accepting this female Muse (Gregory 528).
4. In Lacan’s mirror stage “the subject arrives at an apprehension of both its self and the other — indeed, of its self *as other*. This discovery is assisted by the child seeing, for the first time, its own reflection in a mirror. That reflection enjoys a coherence which the subject itself lacks” (Silverman, emphasis in text, 157).
5. In contrast, when Catherine Clément defines the hysteric by comparing her historically with the sorceress, she defines through a kind of absence: language is satanic, a mediation like the midwife, which must, according to Clément, be institutionalized and reified. The possession opposes the confinement of demons, the demon recalled becomes, for the scientific community, the demon called up. Clément’s descriptions suggest a spiritualization of the “illness,” giving it divine sanction, while Freud secularizes hysteria. (see *The Newly Born Woman*.)
6. I would like to thank David Toias, Marianne Cave, Elin Diamond, and Robert Shelton for early, supportive readings of this paper.

WORKS CITED

- Cixous, Helene. "The Laugh of the Medusa." *Critical Theory Since 1965*. Eds. Hazard Adams and Leroy Searle. Tallahassee: Florida State UP, 1986. 309–320.
- Clément, Catherine and Helene Cixous. *The Newly Born Woman*. Trans. Betsy Wing. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1986.
- Feldstein, Richard. "Reader, Text, and Ambiguous Referentiality in 'The Yellow Wall-Paper.'" *Feminism and Psychoanalysis*. Eds. Richard Feldstein and Judith Roof. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1989: 269–279.
- Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction*. Trans. Robert Hurley. NY: Vintage, 1980.
- Freud, Sigmund. "Femininity." *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. Ed. and Trans. James Strachey. NY: Norton, 1965. 99–119.
- Friedman, Susan Stanford. "Women's Autobiographical Selves: Theory and Practice." *The Private Self: Theory and Practices of Women's Autobiographical Writings*. Ed. Sheri Benstock. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1988: 34–62.
- Gilman, Charlotte Perkins. "The Yellow Wallpaper." *The Norton Anthology of Literature by Women*. Eds. Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar. NY: Norton, 1985. 1148–1161.
- Gregory, Eileen. "Rose Cut in Rock: Sappho and H.D.'s *Sea Garden*." *Contemporary Literature* 27.4 (1986), 525–552.
- Irigaray, Luce. *Speculum: Of the Other Woman*. Trans. Gillian C. Gill. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985.
- . *This Sex Which Is Not One*. Trans. Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985.
- Jardine, Alice A. *Gynesis: Configurations of Woman and Modernity*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985.
- Jones, Ann Rosaline. "Writing the Body: Toward an Understanding of *l'écriture féminine*." *Feminist Criticism and Social Change: Sex, Class and Race in Literature and Culture*. Eds. Judith Newton and Deborah Rosenfelt. NY: Methuen, 1985.
- Kahane, Claire. "Introduction: Part Two." *In Dora's Case: Freud-Hysteria-Feminism*. Ed. Charles Bernheimer and Claire Kahane. NY: Columbia UP, 1985.
- Kolodny, Annette. "A Map for Rereading: Or, Gender and the Interpretation of Literary Texts." *New Literary History* 11.3 (Spring 1980): 451–467.
- Lacan, Jacques. *Écrits: A Selection*. Trans. Alan Sheridan. NY: Norton, 1977.
- Rose, Jacqueline. *Sexuality in the Field of Vision*. London: Verso, 1986.
- Silverman, Kaja. *The Subject of Semiotics*. NY: Oxford UP, 1983.
- Starobinski, Jean. *Fragments for a History of the Human Body, Part 2*. Eds. Michel Feher with Ramona Naddaff and Nadia Tazi. NY: Urzone, Inc., 1989.

Copyright of Women's Studies is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.