

Rebuilding Gaza: Transforming Tragedy into Opportunity for  
a Brighter Future

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## INTRODUCTION

After 15 months of the war in Gaza—the most prolonged conflict to ever occur there, overshadowing the 51-day war of 2014, which is now the second longest—the signing of a ceasefire deal between Hamas and Israel, facilitated by the mediators Qatar, Egypt, and the United States had stopped the death of many Gazans from the Israelis, in the same time stopped the attacks coming out of Gaza on Israel. Still, it had opened a new era of grief in the West Bank.

In Gaza, a collective punishment mission, a genocide<sup>1</sup>, has temporarily concluded, resulting in over 47,000 fatalities, more than 110,000 injuries, destruction and/or damage of 596,000 housing units<sup>2</sup>, and reopening a wound of ongoing polluted air and water environmental crises—problems that have been developing for decades before the Oct. 7th war<sup>3</sup>. It's normalized nowadays to hear about many buildings being destroyed in Gaza due to the continuous destruction of its buildings; Ergo, the most suitable way to be able to realize the amount of damage Gaza is suffering from is by comparing its current damage to the 2014 war. In 2014, 96,000 housing units were destroyed, and the estimated repair mission costs exceeded 5 billion in a plan to rebuild the damaged buildings over 20 years. Now, we have six times the number of structures destroyed in the 2014 war; consequently, six times the estimated funds needed to rebuild the destroyed housing units in 2014 required to rebuild Gaza with its current damages. This gives you a brief understanding of the extent of the destruction that befell Gaza.

All these figures are subject to change due to the difficulties of counting losses during wartime. This dire situation has raised numerous concerns about Gaza's future. Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, '48 Palestinians, and those in the diaspora must lead the discourse regarding what will follow the collective punishment inflicted by Israel. Withdrawing from such discussions would mean placing our collective future in the hands of those who have sought our erasure for decades. The rebuilding efforts must be conducted with the active involvement of Palestinians, offering solutions by Palestinians for Palestinians. There's a substantial number of elite Palestinians who are eager to contribute to Palestine yet remain uncertain about how to do so. Inclusive dialogue is the key to addressing these uncertainties and moving forward.

Who will lead Gaza in this next phase? Who is willing to rebuild it? These are just a few questions that will shape Gaza in the coming months. Uncertainty about Gaza's future is palpable and will continue to be a significant factor.

As it stands, we cannot definitively answer these questions. Debris has buried Gaza under nearly 50 million tons, trapping buildings, schools, and people. The question of who will lead Gaza in this next phase remains unanswered. The uncertainty about the new leader in Gaza, the individual or entity who will take charge of affairs and represent a united people, underscores the need for a clear and comprehensive plan for Gaza's future.

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<sup>1</sup>(INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 2024)

<sup>2</sup>(United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2025)

<sup>3</sup>(Hall et al., 2024)

## ANALYSIS

Across Israeli and Palestinian media outlets, opinions about the wins and losses of Hamas and the IDF have varied, leading to two distinct narratives being shared globally. This situation creates ambiguity among individuals, discouraging realistic thinking and fostering wishful thinking, which is unhelpful when real people—Palestinians and Israelis—are involved on the ground.

Two days after the launch of Hamas's mission on October 7th, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated, "We are going to change the Middle East."<sup>4</sup> Witnessing the region 15 months after the brutal war, it had changed radically in the direction planned by Netanyahu's government; its missiles reached the heart of Iran, Tehran, eliminated Hezbollah's capabilities in Lebanon, and nullified its peace treaties with Syria due to the fall of Bashar Al-Assad.

The fall of Bashar Al-Assad has led to the occupation of the Al-Sheikh Mountains and the southern Syrian water sources, and all of this is aside from Gaza. Regarding Gaza, Netanyahu's government has reduced its area by approximately one kilometer. It has diminished Hamas's ability to stage a mission similar to the "Battle of al-Aqsa Flood" anytime soon. However, Netanyahu had several objectives he aimed to achieve, which he did not, including his plan to displace Gazans to the Sinai desert and ultimately eliminate Hamas's presence in Gaza, where Hamas's fate remains uncertain for now.

A key element of the IDF's operations in the war was the use of sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI) systems to detect and hit targets in Gaza. An inquiry by +972 Magazine revealed that the Israeli military employed an AI system called "Lavender" to create lists of individuals believed to be connected with Hamas or other militant groups. This system, which reportedly marked tens of thousands of Gazans as potential targets, operated with minimal human oversight, relying on algorithms to assess risks and prioritize strikes<sup>5</sup>.

The use of AI in military operations represents a significant shift in modern warfare, enabling unprecedented precision and scale in targeting. However, it also raises profound ethical and humanitarian concerns. The Lavender system's reliance on algorithmic decision-making has faced criticism for its lack of transparency and accountability, particularly in densely populated areas like Gaza, where the risk of civilian casualties is exceptionally high. Reports indicate that the AI system often flagged individuals based on broad criteria, such as their association with specific organizations or locations, without confirming their involvement in militant activities. This approach has contributed to the widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure and the staggering loss of life documented during the conflict.

For Palestinians, the situation is even more desperate. The only possible event to mark their first benefit in this war would be signing a peace treaty with the Israeli government. In contrast, there are currently no achievements to report. Gazans had lost their homes, jobs, and, most

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<sup>4</sup>(Askew & Carbonaro, 2023)

<sup>5</sup>(Iraqi, 2024)

importantly, a spirit for life. Nevertheless, the cost of Palestinian life in the global media has become even cheaper than ever, where it wouldn't matter if 100 or 200 Palestinians were killed in one day; it has become a normalized thing, and indeed, this is not beneficial for the Palestinians.

With a record of achievements from Prime Minister Netanyahu's government, this does not overlook the wave of disagreement towards Netanyahu himself from his right-wing party. Prime Minister Netanyahu's management of the Gaza war has fractured his coalition, revealing profound ideological divides within his government. While Netanyahu has claimed tactical victories—such as diminishing Hamas's military capabilities<sup>6</sup>—his failure to articulate a postwar vision for Gaza, along with rising casualties and international condemnation, has eroded support from even his most loyal allies.

Itamar Ben-Gvir, the leader of the far-right Otzma Yehudit party and National Security Minister, resigned from Netanyahu's government in January 2025 in protest of a U.S.-brokered ceasefire agreement with Hamas, which he condemned as a “surrender to terrorism.”<sup>7</sup> Ben-Gvir accused Netanyahu of “capitulating to Hamas” by agreeing to a truce that halted military operations in Gaza before achieving the stated goal of dismantling Hamas entirely. His withdrawal stripped Netanyahu's coalition of its parliamentary majority, signaling a collapse of support from far-right factions that had previously backed the government's hardline policies.

Ben-Gvir's resignation underscored a deepening ideological rift within Netanyahu's coalition. Otzma Yehudit and its allies had demanded a permanent reoccupation of Gaza and the mass displacement of Palestinians as conditions for supporting the war effort. Instead, Netanyahu's acceptance of the ceasefire—which included concessions like allowing limited humanitarian aid and pausing airstrikes—alienated his far-right base, who viewed these steps as a betrayal of their ultra-nationalist agenda.

Meanwhile, Bezalel Smotrich, the Finance Minister and leader of the Religious Zionist Party, has threatened to follow Ben-Gvir's example unless Netanyahu adopts Smotrich's radical proposals<sup>8</sup>. Smotrich's ultimatum reflects the precarious situation of Netanyahu's coalition, which now has to balance far-right demands for escalation against growing public anger over the war's toll. Polls indicate that 63% of Israelis believe Netanyahu should resign, citing his failure to prevent Hamas's October 7 attack and his mishandling of hostage negotiations<sup>9</sup>. This internal instability has hampered decision-making on crucial issues such as Gaza's governance and reconstruction. With Ben-Gvir out and Smotrich's loyalty in doubt, Netanyahu's capacity to unite his coalition—much less lead Gaza's postwar recovery—is becoming increasingly untenable.

From the students' perspective, Tel Aviv University surveyed Arab and Jewish Israelis<sup>10</sup>, and the findings revealed a significant divide in their opinions. When asked to assess the negotiations

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<sup>6</sup>(Ravid, 2024)

<sup>7</sup>(LIDMAN, 2025)

<sup>8</sup>(Reuters, 2025)

<sup>9</sup>(The Times of Israel, 2025)

<sup>10</sup>(Tel Aviv University, 2024)

for peace between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, 40.2% of Jewish students were “very opposed,” while 50.5% of Arab students were “very in favor.” Meanwhile, regarding whether the IDF is using enough force in Gaza, 43.4% of Jewish students believed that the IDF is employing “too little force.” In contrast, Arab students held a different view, with 55.3% of students believing that the IDF is “using too much force.”

This illustrates that the environment, even in educational institutions in Israel with many Arab students, faces a clash regarding public opinions. Opinions opposing the surrounding environment can lead to discrimination; as a result, on October 8th, Bayan Khatib shared an Instagram story of a skillet of shakshuka she had prepared, captioning it, “Soon We’ll eat victory shakshuka.” Khatib’s fellow students widely disseminated the post and called for her punishment. On October 25, Khatib was arrested on suspicion of incitement<sup>11</sup>. This incident highlights the enforced silence experienced by Arabs living in Israel, where their existence is a reality, yet they are forced to feel as though they have no other options.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not only fought on the ground but also through the strategic use of language and propaganda. A striking example of this can be seen in the banners displayed in Ofer Prison<sup>12</sup>, which conveyed different messages depending on the language used. In English, the banner read: “The eternal nation does not forget. I will pursue my enemies and overtake them!” In Hebrew, it echoed a similar sentiment: “The eternal nation does not forget. I will chase my enemies, and I will get them.” However, the Arabic version took a far more aggressive tone: “The eternal nation does not forget. I will chase and catch my enemies and won’t return until I destroy them.”

This deliberate discrepancy in messaging reveals a calculated effort to tailor rhetoric to different audiences. The banner conveyed resilience and determination for English and Hebrew readers, aligning with Israel’s self-defense narrative. However, the message was overtly violent for Arabic readers, emphasizing the intent to eliminate enemies. This duality in language serves multiple purposes: it reassures international audiences of Israel’s restraint while simultaneously intimidating Palestinian prisoners and their communities with threats of annihilation.

The banners at Ofer Prison highlight the role of psychological warfare in the conflict, where language serves not only to communicate but also to control and manipulate. This tactic exemplifies a broader strategy to shape perceptions and reinforce ideological divides, further complicating efforts to promote dialogue and reconciliation. For Palestinians, such messaging intensifies feelings of vulnerability and distrust, while for Israelis, it sustains a narrative of existential threat and moral justification.

Going back to Palestine, the Palestinian Authority is not faring well either. During the war, the West Bank cities of Jenin and Tulkarm have been raided numerous times, with no protection for the citizens living in these areas from the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority participated in those raid missions into the camps in these cities. This has harmed the

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<sup>11</sup>(Farah, 2023)

<sup>12</sup>(Sky News Arabia, 2025)

reputation of the Palestinian Authority, breaking the trust between the Palestinians and their governing body.

In the West Bank, the presence of Hamas or Fateh in cities is not the main issue. Instead, members of Palestinian communities have established their militant groups, linking their methods to a broader community, which often aligns with Hamas.

During the Hamas-Israel war in the West Bank, members of the militant group “Arīn Al-’Asūd” (Lions' Den) and its military branch, “Katibat Ġinīn” (Jenin Brigades), served as the first line of defense against the Israeli Defense Forces' violations in the region. They have faced raids bi-weekly throughout the war, which escalated almost daily after the signing of the ceasefire deal in Gaza, allowing the IDF to intensify their operations in the West Bank. This has created an unstable situation for Netanyahu’s government in the territory. Consequently, the Palestinian Authority has become involved in assisting the IDF in apprehending wanted individuals by employing human assets that are willing to provide information and utilizing the military resources available in the West Bank.

This has heightened the distrust among Palestinians, particularly those who work for the Palestinian Authority or have any connections to it. Nowadays, Palestinians in the West Bank are facing occupation from both the Israelis on the outside and their government from within.

In the West Bank, the ratio of individuals involved in the Palestinian Authority’s military system to the population is 1 to 48, one of the highest ratios in the world<sup>13</sup>, distributed across 17 security personnel. The former Secretary of the Islamic Jihad Movement, Ramadan Shallah, stated: “If you open your window, the Palestinian Preventive Security will look in at you; if you open your door, you will find the Presidential Security Service; if you go out into your garden, you will encounter Military Intelligence, and if you go out into the street, you will meet General Intelligence.”<sup>14</sup> This obsession is also reflected in the funding allocated to these systems’ budgets, with 22% of the Palestinian Authority’s balance sheet devoted to personnel systems, amounting to approximately 1 trillion dollars.

In Gaza, a different narrative unfolds. Throughout the 15 months of the war, the people of Gaza have held varying opinions about their circumstances, influenced by current events, such as a survey conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research from September 2023 to September 2024. In December 2023, support for a two-state solution in Gaza was 35%, rising to 62% in March 2024 before dropping to 32% in June 2024<sup>15</sup>.

The unexpected rise in support for a two-state solution in March 2024 was particularly pronounced when Nasser Hospital was first besieged and then stormed by Israeli forces, leaving hundreds of staff and patients trapped under heavy fire. Aid trucks were hit by Israeli gunfire,

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<sup>13</sup>(AlTarter, 2017)

<sup>14</sup>(Mawlana, 2024)

<sup>15</sup>(Press Release: Public Opinion Poll No (92), 2024)

and the UN Agency for Palestinian Refugees reported that it could no longer provide services in the northern region of Gaza<sup>16</sup>.

Nevertheless, Ramadan arrives in mid-March, when many Gazans desperately search for ways to obtain food and water for themselves. The state of mental health and ongoing events shape opinions, particularly for Gazans, who have no control over their environment. Yet, all they can do is witness this moment filled with bittersweetness.

Moreover, during the same period in March 2024, when the Gazans were seeking a two-state solution, support for Mahmoud Abbas's resignation diminished. In December 2023 and June 2023, the percentage of Gazans calling for Abbas's resignation resulted in a rounded value of 81% to 83%. But, when questioned about who to vote for if a new presidential election occurred, 48% of Gazans in March 2024 favored Ismail Haniyeh. In contrast, statistics averaged around 39% for December 2023 and June 2024.

This delicate balance of not undermining Mahmoud Abbas while backing Hamas's governance in Palestine poses essential questions: Do Gazans support Mahmoud Abbas's leadership of the Palestinian Authority while also favoring Hamas's negotiation tactics with Israel?

Moreover, this evolving relationship highlights the importance of a two-state solution while decreasing the demand for Mahmoud Abbas's resignation in favor of Ismail Haniyeh from Hamas for the presidency. This state underscores the urgent need for new leadership and perspectives to navigate the Palestinian political landscape domestically and internationally. It's essential to remember that residents of Gaza in March 2024 may hold these insights from a vulnerable position. The conditions were neither humane nor livable, making individuals particularly susceptible.

The political and governmental landscape is fascinating and complex. Politically, Gaza is administered by the Municipality of Gaza, which is part of Hamas. Meanwhile, all governmental and interior tasks, including issuing ID cards, passports, and judicial duties, are sent from Gaza to Ramallah and vice versa. This being said, the majority of Gazans still see themselves as Hamas/Hamas-methodology supporters; in a survey by the PCPSR, Hamas had won the majority of supporters in Gaza, with an average of 38% of Gazans supporting Hamas from September 2023 to June 2024, where on the other hand, Fateh had the total of 23% over the same period.

As a Gazan, I carry the weight of existing in a fractured reality. We are excluded from the rhythms of daily governance familiar to nations worldwide—no cohesive systems, no unified leadership to anchor us. The divide between Gaza and the West Bank has carved a chasm in governance, leaving us uncertain. Without a government that truly represents us, our streets echo with chaos, our lives stripped of the fundamental dignity of self-determination. I grew up never knowing a president who saw my face in the crowd and fought for my people's future.

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<sup>16</sup>(Al Jazeera, 2024)

How can we belong to a land where no figurehead embodies our collective voice? This limbo isn't just political—it's a wound to our identity.

When individuals feel no connection to their homeland and have no stable government to guide them or control their future, chaos grows. Gaza's endless displacement weakens our sense of nationhood. To love a country means working to improve it—growing its economy, protecting its independence, and investing in its future. But when leaders are divided and patriots are ignored, purpose fades. Without pride, hope, and a united dream, Palestine's tomorrow remains uncertain—a fading promise, a homeland stuck between ruin and renewal.



## THE NEXT DAY

The next day's question in Gaza prompted numerous discussions, briefings, and thought pieces that presented various proposals for Gaza's future. At best, these discussions offer only token participation from Palestinians—however, most of the research was conducted without their engagement. Many Palestinians, whether in Palestine or the diaspora, have the capacity and ability to contribute, yet excluding them from these conversations does more harm than good.

On the following day in Gaza, many aspects of the community and the life of a Gazan should be altered more radically; Gaza has faced numerous attacks throughout history. However, in the most recent war, Gaza, as I see it, acts like an empty canvas where Palestinians with a sense of nationhood can contribute to creating a better Gaza.

A decade ago, seated at a desk in my UNRWA-run school, we were taking a class on Human Rights, where we used to learn about Human Rights through a book provided by the UNRWA. To my shock, the book doesn't mention anything related to the Palestinians or their stories in Nakba. It wasn't an honest error in my book when I was in the 5th grade; that was the nature of all the books on human rights educational books. I have learned many stories about individual defenders of human rights and prominent figures in this field. Yet, the book overlooks the sacrifices and suffering of the Palestinians, even failing to mention their plight during the Palestinian Nakba and their forced expulsion from their land.

I thought to myself that I was learning about human rights and how sacred they are, and at the same time, I was reflecting on the value of a human being as presented in the human rights book. However, I had never experienced any of the rights mentioned in the book; it was disheartening not to see my story as a Gazan being told within the context of the UNRWA human rights book. Ergo, in education, a curriculum that tells the stories of Palestinians from a humane perspective that advocates for growing up as a community no matter the past is required, where no politics to be involved since it mainly talks to children and young students.

Whereas in history books, I would look back at the past Israeli-Palestinian-Swedish collaboration to promote coexistence through education in 2010. Even though the updates regarding the book have vanished, that does not mean a similar step should be taken. As to the Israeli media, the Palestinian and UNRWA history school books do not mention Israel as an existent entity but even include hate and antisemitic sentiments<sup>17</sup>. Yet in Israel, when the same book that tells the narrative from both a Palestinian and an Israeli perspective was used in the Sderot area high school, the principal was summoned by the Israeli Education Ministry, where he was instructed not to use such a book<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>17</sup>(*UNRWA Textbooks Still Include Hate, Antisemitism Despite Pledge to Remove* — Watchdog, 2022)

<sup>18</sup>(Kashti, 2010)

The Palestinian narrative in UNRWA history and geography textbooks has been fading each year, following instructions from the curriculum directors; this did not restrain teachers from teaching pupils the Palestinian narrative; hence, during my history class in the 7th grade.

As Palestinians look toward the future, the importance of language and communication cannot be ignored. The banners at Ofer Prison, featuring different English, Hebrew, and Arabic messages, are a stark reminder of how rhetoric can be weaponized to divide and intimidate. For Gaza to move forward, there needs to be a commitment to honest and inclusive dialogue that transcends the divisive narratives of the past. Only by addressing the psychological and emotional scars left by such tactics can Palestinians start to rebuild not just their homes but also their sense of unity and hope.

This linguistic duality reflects a broader strategy of shaping narratives to manipulate perceptions. For international audiences, the message emphasizes resolve and self-defense; for Palestinians, it communicates a promise of annihilation. Such tactics deepen the psychological divide between communities, reinforcing fear and distrust. For Gaza's future to rise above this cycle of violence, Palestinians must reclaim control over their own story—not just in classrooms but in every forum where their identity and aspirations are challenged.

Just as language shapes identity, the physical landscape shapes possibility. The reconstruction of Gaza demands more than repairing buildings; it requires dismantling the systems of control that normalize erasure. The damages caused by war are estimated in the breakdown table<sup>19</sup>:

Housing	\$13,298,711,000
Commerce, Industry, and Services	\$1,655,486,000
Agriculture	\$628,780,000
Health	\$553,666,000
WASH	\$502,711,000
Environment	\$411,300,000
Transport	\$357,972,000
Education	\$341,240,000
Cultural Heritage	\$319,397,000
Energy	\$278,522,000
ICT	\$90,225,000
Municipal Services	\$19,647,000
Finance	\$8,174,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$18,465,831,000</b>

<sup>19</sup>(World Bank / European Union / United Nations, 2024)

With these enormous costs, the question remains: Who is willing to support Gaza? Many proposals offered a better urban structure for Gaza, but the donors' unwillingness to provide aid halted the implementation of these plans. The critical issue persists: Who are the entities ready to assist in rebuilding Gaza? Without guarantees to protect the rebuilt structures and the new facilities on the ground, fearing a new war in the long term, there would be no incentive to support Gaza's reconstruction efforts.

Therefore, a Community Support Committee should be established to assure donors of the region's stability, ensuring that contributions won't be destroyed by war as they have in the past. The idea of a Community Support Committee alongside a Technocratic government has been presented to Fateh numerous times, but Fateh has consistently declined. In an interview, Dr. Jihad Al-Harazin, a Fateh official, remarked that "the Palestinian Authority already exists; thus there is no need for a Community Support Committee,"<sup>20</sup> overlooking the reality reflected in public polls, which indicate that the majority in Palestine oppose the Palestinian Authority.

The Palestinian landscape's lack of collective dialogue between representatives from Gaza and the West Bank has created a space for the exchange of opinions and reinforced the divergence of views. A group of elite Gazans who can represent Gazans abroad in the West Bank and internationally is more than needed.

Leveraging the elite Palestinians, whether from Gaza, the West Bank, or those living within the borders of 1948, particularly those who are patriots willing to rebuild Gaza despite political differences, would signify a turning point in the Palestinian political and economic landscape. Utilizing these strengths for the nation's benefit through innovative projects, engaging Palestinian investment banks to revitalize Gaza, and harnessing the skills of youth—most importantly, their patriotism and love for the homeland—are essential steps forward.

That creates a prominent, promising, and sustainable nation of Palestine.

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<sup>20</sup>(AlHadath, 2025)

## CONCLUSION

I can't imagine Gaza becoming the promised Middle Eastern Singapore, the idea Shimon Peres advocated for<sup>21</sup>. In Peres's vision, the conservative nature of Palestinians was generally overlooked when it was proposed. Gaza has been disconnected from the world since the Hamas takeover in 2005/2006. Gazans have had to leverage local resources to grow as a cohesive community. Even though the ongoing destruction from each war has never extinguished the spirit of resilience within Gazans, this war is different. After two to three years of minor confrontations with Israel, during which Gazans felt a semblance of stability—regardless of how small that hope was—this war has radically altered the way Gazans think about life in general.

While crossing Netzarim and listening to voice notes from my mother, she and other Gazans were focused entirely on survival as they traveled south from the north. At that time, I found limited information online about the violations committed by Israelis against Gazans trying to flee south through Netzarim, a few of them calling on the infringements of inhumane treatment and beatings<sup>22</sup>; however, I heard my mother's voice notes about a missile striking an entire family right in front of them. My family was mere meters away from death, and this was not the first time an angel had protected my family from death.

Treating Gazans as objects willing to accept any solution—such as turning Gaza into Singapore—forces them to endure inhumane conditions. Like many individuals from various nationalities, Gazans have the right to mourn their losses, exercise self-governance, and manage their affairs. Furthermore, Gazans should have the freedom to contribute to their families and fellow Gazans on the ground without restrictions or excuses, such as the calculation of calories entering Gaza to pressure political groups within it between 2007 and mid-2010<sup>23</sup>.

The limits and blockade imposed on Gazans in Gaza are not just a current issue; they also affect the generation that is growing up. I have always understood that Gaza is wholly isolated from the world; this realization has prompted me to compare myself to others my age in different countries, examining their rights alongside my own as a Gazan. The conditions in Gaza, even without wars, are so inhumane that they make you feel less than human.

*“If the strong do not win, they are defeated, and the weak, if not defeated, is victorious.”* Gazans can maintain their spirit of life amidst death, innovate new ways to survive, and adapt to reality. If Gazans were given to self-rule, I can assure you, dear reader, miracles would happen; throughout the past Gaza rebuilding campaigns, Palestinians were marginalized most of the time, not every time; nowadays is the time to give Palestinians, especially Gazans, their chance to draw on the canvas the way they want to see Gaza.

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<sup>21</sup>(DORI, 2025)

<sup>22</sup> (Khattab, 2024)

<sup>23</sup> (Associated Press, in Jerusalem, 2012)

I would finish this paper with another poll conducted by the PCPSR when prompted “support for various measures to break the stalemate in the political,” From September 2023 until June 2024, the average support to join an international organization scored 60.5%, while the support of dissolving the PA have gathered 57.25% of the votes.

We have the numbers: our people in Palestine and the diaspora, those who are patriots and are looking for a better building of Palestine, are awaiting the chance to contribute back to their homeland and nation.

*“The best and noblest ideas can lead to disaster, and some vile and unjust ideas can end up protecting against greater evils.” – Where are you going, Egypt? Ezzedine C. Fishere.<sup>24</sup>* The war has caused the Gaza canvas to lose its colors and abstracts; however, we can find many blank areas to enhance its appearance. The proposed solutions to address the situation in Gaza may not be the most promising course of action, yet in times when Gazans have lost everything, the only thing left for them is genuine hope.

I’m looking forward to seeing a better Gaza. I left Gaza knowing I wouldn’t be able to return, not by choice, if it had remained the same. I lost my home, where I grew up, along with friends, relatives, and the essence of life; even during the war, I felt like an insider while experiencing the intimacy of being an outsider. Gaza’s grief pains me as it does every Gazan, and I look forward to returning to Gaza when it transforms into the Gaza we all dream of— community-oriented and as beautiful as every Gazan hopes it will be.

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<sup>24</sup>(Fishere, 2024)

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