Reducing Affective Polarization Does Not Affect False News Sharing or Truth Discernment

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Abstract

Why do people spread false misinformation online? Previous studies have linked affective polarization with misinformation sharing and belief. Contrary to these largely observational findings, however, we show that experimentally improving people's feelings about opposing partisans (versus members of their own party) has no measurable effect on people's intentions to share true news, false news, or the difference between them, known as discernment. By contrast, we find evidence that a reminder of accuracy can modestly improve truth discernment among people who report sharing political news. These results suggest the need for a reexamination of the role of affective polarization in the dissemination of misinformation online.

Introduction

Though its prevalence is often overstated (Budak et al. 2024), false and untrustworthy news is widely shared online, spreading inaccurate claims about political parties, candidates, and events (e.g., Grinberg et al. 2019; Guess, Nagler, and Tucker 2019). Understanding why people engage in this behavior is an important research topic that can inform efforts to counter the spread of misinformation, which can have harmful consequences for society and democracy on topics ranging from COVID-19 to the 2020 U.S. presidential election.

We specifically consider the role of affective polarization — a notable and widely studied concern (e.g., Druckman and Levy 2022) — in misinformation sharing. Polls show that affective polarization, which is defined as the gap between people's feelings toward their own party and their feelings toward the opposing party, has been growing in the United States in recent decades (Hetherington and Rudolph Forthcoming). At the individual level, affective polarization has been linked to belief polarization (Druckman et al. 2021), including belief in misinformation (Garrett, Long, and Jeong 2019; Jenke 2024) and biased evaluations of politicized facts (Voelkel et al. 2024). In particular, Osmundsen et al. (2021, 108) find that negative evaluations of the opposing party (the component of greatest interest in the affective polarization measure we use) are strongly associated with sharing false news, concluding that "partisans share politically congenial news, primarily because of hostile feelings toward the out-party" and they typically "pay more attention to the political usefulness of news rather than the information quality."

However, available evidence to date is largely correlational; little is known about the causal effects of affective polarization on misinformation sharing or belief. Most notably, Broockman, Kalla, and Westwood (2023) find that several manipulations which substantially reduce affective polarization have no measurable effect on a range of outcome measures to which affective polarization has been linked in observational data. Its effects on misinformation sharing have not been tested, however.

The most relevant evidence to date comes from an experiment conducted after our own in which Jenke (2024) also uses the Broockman, Kalla, and Westwood (2023) experimental design to test its effects on misinformation belief (not sharing). Using a structural model, Jenke (2024) estimates the effect of treatment-induced changes in reported affective polarization on misinformation belief and concludes

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that reducing affective polarization reduces misinformation belief. However, this finding is not robust to more than "moderate" violations of the identifying assumptions of the model (Jenke 2024, 882).[1] Moreover, the direct effect of treatment in the Jenke data on misinformation belief, by contrast, is null (see Table B6 in Online Appendix B).

We therefore designed an experiment testing if hostile feelings toward the opposition party cause people to share false news. Our study contrasts this account with a competing theory of cognitive inattention, which instead suggests that people share false news because they do not sufficiently attend to accuracy in deciding what news and information to share (Pennycook et al. 2021). One way to combat such inattention is an accuracy prompt, which reminds users to consider whether the posts they see are true. Previous research indicates that these nudges increase people's ability to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate information in both sharing intentions and behavior (e.g., Pennycook and Rand 2022). By measuring the relative effects of interventions targeting these two factors (affective polarization and inattention to accuracy), we can learn both about the most important causes of sharing false news as well as the most effective approaches to preventing fake news sharing and improving truth discernment. We also evaluate how these factors relate by testing whether high levels of affective polarization reduce the effects of accuracy prompts.

In the study reported below, we employ a 2×2 between-subjects design to estimate the separate and joint effects of accuracy salience and affective polarization in a news sharing task using relevant true and false headlines from the 2020 U.S. election campaign. Consistent with previous research, we find suggestive evidence that making accuracy considerations more salient increases discernment between true and false headlines. By contrast, we find that reducing affective polarization does not measurably change the sharing of false news headlines or improve truth discernment in sharing. These findings suggest that efforts to prevent the spread of false news should not focus on reducing affective polarization.

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[1] Per Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto (2010), mediation models have to satisfy a sequential ignorability assumption that is almost never known to be satisfied in practice. In this case, for instance, it is highly likely that unobserved confounders are strongly associated with both affective polarization (the mediator) and misinformation belief (the outcome).

Hypotheses

We specifically tested the following preregistered hypotheses and research questions.

First, given the association between negative feelings toward partisan opponents and news-sharing behaviors observed by Osmundsen et al. (2021) and similar correlational findings reported in the literature (Druckman et al. 2021; Garrett, Long, and Jeong 2019; Jenke 2024; Voelkel et al. 2024), we expected participants in the positive experience condition of the affective polarization manipulation to express reduced intentions to (a) share false news headlines relative to true news and to (b) share news headlines that are congenial to their partisanship regardless of veracity when compared to participants in the negative experience condition.[2]

Second, based on the findings reported in Pennycook and Rand (2022), we expected exposure to an accuracy prompt to reduce the intention to share false news relative to true news.

Third, we expected the positive experience condition in the affective polarization manipulation to increase the effect of exposure to an accuracy prompt on intentions to share false news relative to true news, especially for congenial false news relative to uncongenial false news, when compared to the estimated accuracy prompt effect in the negative experience condition.

Finally, we posed two research questions for which we had weaker theoretical expectations. We consider whether the effects of the accuracy prompt intervention are lower among people who are high in a trait called Need for Chaos that measures a general apolitical dissatisfaction with the political system and a desire to destroy it (Arceneaux et al. 2021). People high in Need for Chaos have been found to be more likely to share false information — seemingly out of a desire to promote disorder (Petersen, Osmundsen, and Arceneaux 2023). We also consider whether effects are diminished among people who strongly identify with their party (Osmundsen et al. 2021).

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[2]After our study was fielded, Broockman, Kalla, and Westwood (2023) tested the results of both the positive and negative conditions against a control condition and found that the difference between them is driven by a decrease in affective polarization in the positive experience condition relative to baseline. To express our best understanding of this mechanism, we therefore present our hypotheses and results as estimating the treatment effect of the positive experience condition relative to the negative experience condition. This change alters the wording of these hypotheses from our preregistration (https://osf.io/snxe2/?view_only=8af338addef24785b802c63ca455b1e0) but the quantities we estimate are identical (i.e., we estimate the treatment effect of being assigned to one experience condition versus the other).

Methods

Sample characteristics

Our study was conducted among participants recruited from the Prolific survey platform. After a soft launch with 50 participants who identified as Democrats or Republicans, we recruited a quota sample of 1,000 U.S. adult residents cross-stratified by sex, age, and ethnicity. All respondents provided informed consent to participate in this research, which was approved by (REDACTED FOR PEER REVIEW). To counterbalance the Democratic tilt of this sample (64% identified or leaned Democrat), we then recruited an additional 1,000 participants using qualifications for self-identifying as a Democrat or a Republican but adjusted the sample sizes for each (319 Democrats, 736 Republicans) to target a final sample of approximately 1,000 Democrats and 1,000 Republicans before exclusions. Data was collected from May 7–20, 2021.

To enter the experiment, participants had to pass at least one of two pre-treatment attention checks (Berinsky et al. 2021) and successfully answer two pre-treatment questions demonstrating their understanding of the behavioral game used in the affective polarization manipulation on their first or second try (Broockman, Kalla, and Westwood 2023). Those who did not were terminated from the survey.

Our study sample also reflects the following exclusions. First, following our preregistration, we exclude participants who indicated they were pure independents — i.e., do not lean towards either party — from the final sample because they would not be affected by the affective polarization manipulation. Second, we include only participants who use Facebook or Twitter and who report sharing political content following Study 1 in Pennycook et al. (2021). We examine the effects of the treatments on this set of participants to maximize comparability with prior research and because we are most interested in their effects on people who actually share political news on social media.[3]

Finally, we make several additional exclusions that were not specifically noted in our preregistration:

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[3]This exclusion represents a deviation from our preregistration, which stated that we would exclude participants who do not report using any form of social media and who indicated that they would not share any kind of news with friends or family members electronically. Results using this broader sample, which are fully reported in Online Appendix C, show no effect of the accuracy prompt on truth discernment — a finding that is less consistent with prior research. We attribute this difference to the inclusion of participants who do not share political news under any circumstances and are thus describing hypothetical behaviors. As we show in the exploratory analysis in Table B5, the positive accuracy prompt effect on truth discernment is only significant for respondents who share political news, not other types of content.

participants who dropped out of the survey prior to the experimental randomization; those who were ineligible due to taking part in a pretest; and a single participant who dropped out after rating a single news headline (making it impossible to calculate the mean headline ratings we use in our analysis below).

After these exclusions, we are left with a final study sample of 785 participants (slightly smaller than Study 2 from Pennycook et al. 2020, which tests similar manipulations). In total, 45% of our participants are male, 28% identify as nonwhite, and 62% have obtained a bachelor's degree or higher. Their median age is 35–44. Finally, 57% identify with or lean towards the Democratic Party and 43% identify with or lean towards the Republican Party.

Experimental design

We conducted a 2×2 between-subjects experiment in which participants were first independently randomized with equal probability to either have a positive (p = 0.5) or negative (p = 0.5) experience in a trust game manipulating affective polarization (Broockman, Kalla, and Westwood 2023; Westwood and Peterson 2020). After participants played the trust game for two rounds, they were randomized to receive a accuracy prompt with probability 0.5 asking them to consider the accuracy of a single news headline (Pennycook et al. 2020, 2021). Respondents then completed a news-sharing task.

Procedures and materials

Participants completed the study on the Qualtrics online survey platform. All question wording and stimuli are provided in Online Appendix A.

After providing informed consent and completing a pre-treatment questionnaire, participants took part in a modified trust game used in Westwood and Peterson (2020) and Broockman, Kalla, and Westwood (2023) to provide exogenous variation in affective polarization by creating positive or negative interactions with members of the opposite party. We follow their design verbatim except participants played two rounds of the game rather than three due to survey time constraints. In the game, participants played as Player 2. They were told that they were playing with a person from the opposite party (Player 1) and that the other player would decide how much money to allocate to them. The amount would be then tripled, and Player 2 would need to decide how much to give back. The remaining amount would

be used to calculate the bonus payments they would receive (with a 0.03 multiplier) in addition to their baseline payment of $1.50.

In reality, Player 1 was a fiction. The survey was pre-programmed to make allocation decisions based on whether participants were randomized to have a positive or negative experience with an ostensible outpartisan. In the positive experience condition, participants were told that they were allocated $8 by the Player 1 in both rounds. In the negative experience condition, participants were told that they were allocated $0 by Player 1 in both rounds. In both versions, participants were told that Player 1's reason for their allocation is Player 2's political party in round 1 and political party and income in round 2. The positive experience condition was expected to mitigate participants' negative feelings toward the opposite party, reducing affective polarization; the negative experience condition was expected to do the opposite (though see Broockman, Kalla, and Westwood 2023, who find the difference in affective polarization between them is driven by the positive experience condition).

Participants were then randomized with probability 0.5 to receive a prompt asking to consider the accuracy of a news headline. Participants in the accuracy prompt condition were shown one of four randomized headlines and asked "To the best of your knowledge, is the above headline accurate?" (the exact manipulation used in Pennycook et al. 2020). Participants then indicated whether they believed the headline was accurate. The participants received the prompt following the trust game but before the news-sharing task. Per prior research, it is intended to make accuracy considerations salient when participants subsequently consider whether to share news headlines or not. Participants who did not receive the accuracy prompt continued to the news-sharing task immediately after the trust game.

In the news-sharing task, which mirrors Pennycook et al. (2020), participants were shown six false and six real news headlines in randomized order in a format that mirrored Facebook article previews. Three of each type (i.e., false and real) were selected to be congenial to Democrats and the other three were selected to be congenial to Republicans.

The false headlines were published from June 2020–May 2021 and were largely adapted from Coppock et al. (2023), who drew them from the fact-checking website PolitiFact. The true news headlines were selected to mirror the topics and partisan congeniality of the false headlines as closely as possible but to be factually accurate. However, we made two changes to the headlines after filing our preregis-

tration. First, we replaced the false, Democrat-congenial headline, "Report: Trump Responsible for All Covid Deaths" with "USPS Reported Failed to Deliver 27 Percent of Mail-In Ballots in South Florida" because we could not locate the source of the former headline. Second, we excluded ratings for the headline "Biden: 'A Black Man Invented the Lightbulb, Not a White Guy Named Edison' " from our analysis. We previously coded this headline as false and congenial to Democrats, but Joe Biden did utter the (false) sentence and was accurately quoted in the article shown. In addition, the headline could potentially be interpreted as congenial to either party depending on how a respondent feels about Biden and whether they believe his claim. We therefore concluded that the truth status of the headline and the party for which it is congenial is unclear.[4]

The primary dependent variable is sharing intention. We measure participants' intention to share each news headline on a six-point Likert scale ranging from "Extremely unlikely" (1) to "Extremely likely" (6). These ratings were then averaged at the participant level to produce mean sharing intentions for true headlines, false headlines, and the difference between them, which we refer to as "truth discernment" (the same outcome variables used in Pennycook et al. 2020).[5] Although we concede that false news is of greater normative concern and that the intention to share false news can also be a viable dependent variable, we use truth discernment as our primary dependent variable as it accounts for the willingness to share false news *relative* to true news.

After the news-sharing task, we administered manipulation checks measuring the perceived importance of accuracy in sharing news articles on social media and feelings toward Democrats and Republicans (both people who are members of the parties as well as politicians and elected officials). The latter measures were used to calculate post-treatment affective polarization.

All respondents were debriefed about the trust game and the veracity of the news headlines after

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[4]Two of our headlines were arguably hyperpartisan rather than false in that they offer hyperbolic and arguably misleading paraphrases of actual news reports ("D.C. Passes Bill to Immunize Children Without Parental Knowledge, Consent" and "Report: Biden Admin May Use Private Firms to Spy on Unsuspecting Americans"). We therefore conduct an exploratory analysis in which we report findings excluding these items in Online Appendix D as a robustness check. Results are generally similar to those reported in the main text, but the effect of the accuracy prompt on discernment becomes positive and significant for respondents in the positive experience condition (Tables 3 and D3) and the prompt × high NFC interaction is no longer significant (Tables 4b and D4b).

[5]While participants did not have the opportunity to actually share the news headlines presented to them in the study, Mosleh, Pennycook, and Rand (2020) shows that content that people say they would share more is actually shared more on Twitter and Arechar et al. (N.d.) shows that people who say they would share false news more in surveys are more likely to actually do so on Twitter.

completing the study.

Results

We evaluate the results of our experiment using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors. Unless otherwise noted, the analysis below follows our preregistration (see `https://osf.io/snxe2/?view_only=8af338addef24785b802c63ca455b1e0`). The reported p-values below do not account for multiple comparisons. If we instead perform an exploratory false discovery rate correction using the two-step procedure created by Benjamini, Krieger, and Yekutieli (2006), we find that none of the reported estimates for treatment effects or marginal effects of interventions on preregistered subgroups are significant. We qualify our interpretation of our findings accordingly below.

We first consider whether the affective polarization and accuracy prompt manipulations worked as expected using our preregistered manipulation checks.

We find that the affective polarization manipulation worked as intended. Relative to the negative experience condition, respondents in the positive experience condition reported significantly lower levels of affective polarization when asked about Democrats and Republicans in general and about politicians from the parties (partisans: -4.672, $p < .05$ [d=-0.15 s.d.]; politicians: -5.103, $p < .05$ [d=-0.17 s.d.], respectively; see Table B2). Using the formulation from Broockman, Kalla, and Westwood (2023), the reductions in affective polarization induced by the manipulation are equivalent to "rewinding" 6.9 years of the over-time trend in affective polarization toward the public in the United States and 5.8 years for political elites. These figures derive from the measurements of affective polarization against party and political elites respectively from 1980 to 2020 (Tyler and Iyengar 2024).

By contrast, the accuracy prompt manipulation had no measurable effect on the self-reported importance of accuracy considerations in sharing (-0.057 on a five-point scale, $p > .05$; see Table B2). This null result mirrors Study 4 in Pennycook et al. (2021), which finds that an accuracy prompt changes sharing intentions (as we find below) despite having no measurable effect on the perceived importance of sharing accurate news online.[6]

We now turn to evaluating the results of our hypotheses starting with the main effects of the treat-

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[6]Future research should reconsider what manipulation check would be most suitable for this intervention.

Table 1: Main effects on news sharing intentions

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	0.072	-0.068	0.140*
	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.063)
Positive outpartisan experience	0.109	0.117	-0.009
	(0.076)	(0.083)	(0.065)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
N	782	783	782

OLS with robust standard errors; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Sharing intentions for true and false news headlines were measured on a six-point scale. The positive outpartisan experience variable estimates the effect of assignment to that condition relative to the negative outpartisan experience condition (the reference category). Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college degree (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about sports, celebrities, science, and business). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

ments, which are reported in Table 1. Consistent with our expectations, exposure to an accuracy prompt significantly increased discernment in sharing real news versus false news. As Figure 1 illustrates, the accuracy prompt led to increased intention to share true and decreased intention to share false news of substantively similar magnitudes (0.072 and -0.068, respectively). Though neither effect was itself significant, we can reject the null of no difference in discernment (0.140, $p < .05$).[7] These results support prior research finding that exposure to an accuracy prompt increases truth discernment.

By contrast, we found no support for our expectation that exposure to the positive experience condition in the affective polarization manipulation would reduce intentions to share false news. Instead, exposure to the positive experience condition did not measurably change intention to share true or false news relative to the negative experience condition (0.109, $p > .05$, 95% CI: -0.04, 0.26; and 0.117, $p > .05$, 95% CI: -0.05, 0.28; respectively; see Table 1). As a result, we could not reject the null of no effect on the difference in sharing intentions between true and false information.

Finally, contrary to our expectations, there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that affective polarization influences the extent to which exposure to an accuracy prompt reduces the intention to share false news. As Table 3 indicates, we are unable to reject the null of no difference for the interaction

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[7]However, as we note above, this finding is not robust to imposing exploratory controls on the false discovery rate to account for multiple comparisons.

Figure 1: News sharing intention by accuracy prompt condition and headline type

Mean sharing intention on a 1–6 scale ("Extremely unlikely" to "Extremely likely") with 95% confidence intervals. See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

term for true news headlines, false news headlines, or the difference between them. Results are identical when we disaggregate congenial and uncongenial headlines (see Tables B3 and B4 in Online Appendix B) — we also find no evidence that affective polarization changes the effect of accuracy prompts more for congenial versus uncongenial false news headlines.

Finally, we investigate our two research questions. First, given the importance of partisanship to sharing of false information online (Osmundsen et al. 2021), we ask whether the effectiveness of the accuracy prompt varies for strong partisans. Per Table 4a, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effect of the accuracy prompt does not vary between strong partisans and partisan leaners for sharing of true news, false news, or the difference between them. Mean sharing intentions by prompt condition and partisanship strength are presented in Figure B1 in Online Appendix B.

Before administering the treatments, we also measured respondents' Need For Chaos using an eight-item scale from Petersen, Osmundsen, and Arceneaux (2023) and divided them into terciles of low, medium, and high NFC. We then estimated how the effects of the accuracy prompt vary by level of Need for Chaos. The results, which are provided in Table 4b, indicate that exposure to an accuracy prompt

Table 2: Affective polarization manipulation effects on news sharing by partisan congeniality

	True news	False news	True – false
Congenial headline	0.955***	1.004***	-0.049
	(0.067)	(0.076)	(0.080)
Positive outpartisan experience	0.073	0.220*	-0.146
	(0.080)	(0.090)	(0.081)
Positive outpartisan × congenial	0.073	-0.192	0.264*
	(0.092)	(0.108)	(0.115)
Accuracy prompt	0.072	-0.071	0.144*
	(0.075)	(0.079)	(0.061)
Congenial/uncongenial difference: Positive outpartisan	1.028***	0.811***	0.215**
	(0.063)	(0.077)	(0.083)
N	1564	1564	1563

OLS with standard errors clustered by respondent; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Observations represents average sharing intention for congenial or uncongenial news, which were measured on a six-point scale. The positive outpartisan experience variable estimates the effect of assignment to that condition relative to the negative outpartisan experience condition (the reference category). Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college completion (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about sports, celebrities, science, and business). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

increased truth discernment among low-NFC respondents (0.319, $p < .005$) but had no measurable effect on discernment among high-NFC respondents (-0.089, $p > .05$, 95% CI: -0.30, 0.12). We can reject the null of no difference in accuracy prompt effects between high- and low-NFC respondents (-0.409, $p < .01$).[8] These results are illustrated in Figure B2 in Online Appendix B.

Conclusion

Results from an experiment conducted among a large sample of social media users who share political news online indicate that reducing affective polarization does not affect sharing intentions for false or congenial news headlines. By contrast, we found evidence that making accuracy considerations salient increases discernment in sharing between true and false news headlines. The effects of an accuracy prompt did not vary measurably when affective polarization was exogenously reduced nor among strong

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[8]However, as noted above, this finding is not robust to imposing exploratory controls on the false discovery rate to account for multiple comparisons.

Figure 2: News sharing intention by affective polarization condition and headline type

Mean sharing intention on a 1–6 scale ("Extremely unlikely" to "Extremely likely") with 95% confidence intervals. See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

partisans. However, the prompt's effects seemed to be strongest among people who are low in Need for Chaos, a dispositional factor associated with sharing hostile political rumors.

These findings contribute first to the literature on the consequences of affective polarization and the causes of misinformation sharing and belief. Affective polarization is often discussed as a potential influence on misinformation sharing and belief (Garrett, Long, and Jeong 2019; Jenke 2024; Osmundsen et al. 2021). We instead find that improving people's feelings toward the opposition party relative to one's own has no measurable effect on intentions to share false news. This finding underscores the importance of experimentally testing observed correlations between affective polarization and antinormative behaviors like sharing false news, which may be spurious (Broockman, Kalla, and Westwood 2023; Voelkel et al. 2023). Moreover, our findings build on and extend existing research from Broockman, Kalla, and Westwood (2023) showing that manipulating affective polarization affects interpersonal attitudes but not other types of political attitudes and behavior. We similarly show that affective polarization is less influential on false news sharing than expected, lending credence to the claim that its harms to democracy are less than the field has typically assumed.

Table 3: Joint effects of accuracy prompt and affective polarization manipulation on news sharing

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	-0.013	-0.137	0.124
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.090)
Positive outpartisan experience	0.025	0.048	-0.024
	(0.107)	(0.114)	(0.088)
Accuracy prompt × positive outpartisan	0.165	0.133	0.030
	(0.149)	(0.160)	(0.128)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Prompt effect: Positive outpartisan	0.153	-0.003	0.154
	(0.099)	(0.113)	(0.089)
N	782	783	782

OLS with robust standard errors; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Sharing intentions for true and false news headlines were measured on a six-point scale. The positive outpartisan experience variable estimates the effect of assignment to that condition relative to the negative outpartisan experience condition (the reference category). Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college degree (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about sports, celebrities, science, and business). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

In addition, our findings provide new insights into the role of (in)attention to accuracy in false news sharing. The accuracy prompt had no measurable effect on the self-reported importance of accuracy in news sharing online, but it still improved discernment between true and false headlines in sharing. In addition, these effects were not measurably affected by either the affective polarization manipulation or whether the respondent identified as a strong partisan. These results suggest that accuracy prompt effects are largely cognitive and possibly subconscious — the most important factor is making accuracy salient, not whether people say accuracy is important in sharing or not.

However, several limitations should be noted. First, we measured sharing intention in a hypothetical context. Mosleh, Pennycook, and Rand (2020) and Arechar et al. (N.d.) find that such measures correspond well to real-world behaviors, but future research should ideally measure effects on actual sharing behavior. Second, our results were collected using a non-representative U.S. sample with stimuli that were salient at the time the study was fielded; future replications with a representative sample and/or non-American respondents using different sets of stimuli would be desirable. Finally, the effects of the

Table 4: Moderators of accuracy prompt effects

(a) Strength of partisanship

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	0.135	0.046	0.090
	(0.224)	(0.244)	(0.215)
Not strong partisan	0.409*	0.234	0.176
	(0.181)	(0.207)	(0.175)
Accuracy prompt × not strong partisan	-0.296	-0.288	-0.011
	(0.260)	(0.286)	(0.240)
Strong partisan	0.413*	0.100	0.313
	(0.168)	(0.191)	(0.167)
Accuracy prompt × strong partisan	0.053	-0.040	0.092
	(0.243)	(0.264)	(0.232)
Positive outpartisan experience	0.115	0.115	-0.001
	(0.075)	(0.083)	(0.065)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Prompt effect: Not strong partisans	-0.161	-0.242	0.079
	(0.134)	(0.147)	(0.103)
Prompt effect: Strong partisans	0.188	0.006	0.182*
	(0.097)	(0.104)	(0.084)
N	782	783	782

(b) Need for Chaos

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	0.074	-0.246	0.319***
	(0.128)	(0.138)	(0.107)
Medium Need for Chaos	0.234	0.105	0.129
	(0.135)	(0.143)	(0.103)
High Need for Chaos	0.273*	0.065	0.208
	(0.129)	(0.134)	(0.107)
Prompt × medium NFC	-0.094	0.046	-0.138
	(0.189)	(0.203)	(0.158)
Prompt × high NFC	0.052	0.461*	-0.409**
	(0.178)	(0.186)	(0.151)
Positive outpartisan experience	0.090	0.096	-0.007
	(0.076)	(0.083)	(0.064)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Accuracy prompt effect: Medium NFC	-0.020	-0.201	0.181
	(0.138)	(0.150)	(0.117)
Accuracy prompt effect: High NFC	0.125	0.214	-0.089
	(0.123)	(0.126)	(0.105)
N	782	783	782

OLS with robust standard errors; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Sharing intentions for true and false news headlines were measured on a six-point scale. Partisan leaners are the excluded category for the not strong partisan and strong partisan indicators. Indicators for Need for Chaos refer to the second and third terciles of mean responses on an eight-item scale. The positive outpartisan experience variable estimates the effect of assignment to that condition relative to the negative outpartisan experience condition (the reference category). Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college degree (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about sports, celebrities, science, and business). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

trust game on affective polarization in our sample were smaller than those found in Broockman, Kalla, and Westwood (2023) (-4.7 and -5.1 points for the public and politicians versus -14.3 and -9.8 points, respectively). These effects are still substantively meaningful (-0.15 and -0.13 standard deviations, respectively) and do not diminish the validity of our findings, but it would nonetheless be valuable to replicate the study using manipulations that generate larger effects.

Nonetheless, our results provide important new evidence that the effects of affective polarization on the spread of misinformation may be overstated. Further research is needed to determine which harms it causes (if any) beyond interpersonal hostility and to develop more effective approaches to countering false news sharing that take these findings into account.

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Online Appendix A: Survey instrument and experimental stimuli

[Consent form and Prolific ID]

Thank you for your time. This research survey will take less than fifteen minutes to complete, and your participation is entirely voluntary.

We take your confidentiality extremely seriously, and any answers you provide in this research survey will be completely confidential. The data from the study will be stored securely on password-protected university computers. We know of no risks to you from participation. We cannot and do not guarantee or promise that you will receive any benefits from this study.

The purpose of this survey is to learn about how people process information and how their feelings towards other people affect this information processing.

You may be eligible for a bonus as part of this research.

The information collected will be recorded anonymously. Questions about this project may be directed to:

[REDACTED FOR PEER REVIEW]

You may refuse to answer any particular questions. You are free to end your participation at any time by closing this window (although any answers you have already entered may still be submitted).

By clicking the "yes" button below you agree to participate in this confidential research study.
-Yes
-No

[participants who did not provide consent were excluded at this point]

Before you begin, please switch off external distractions so you can focus on the short tasks ahead.

[Participant attributes]

Please enter your Prolific ID below.

How old are you?
-Under 18
-18–24
-25–34
-35–44
-45–54
-55–64
-65–74
-75–84

-85 or older

[participants who indicated they are under 18 were excluded at this point]

First, we have a few questions about you.

Which of these types of content would you consider sharing on social media? (Please select all that apply.)
-Political news
-Sports news
-Celebrity news
-Science/technology news
-Business news
-Other (please specify)
-None

What type of social media accounts do you use?
-Facebook
-Twitter
-Snapchat
-Instagram
-WhatsApp
-Other (please indicate)
-None

Which of these types of content would you consider sharing through text or email? (Please select all that apply.)
-Political news
-Sports news
-Celebrity news
-Science/technology news
-Business news
-Other (please specify)
-None

[participants who indicated they do not use any social media platform and would not consider sharing any type of news through text or email were excluded from data analysis per our preregistration]

In what state do you currently reside?

What is your gender?
-Male
-Female
-Nonbinary/Two spirit
-Other
-Prefer not to say

Please check one or more categories below to indicate what race(s) you consider yourself to be.
-White
-Black or African American
-American Indian or Alaska Native
-Asian/Pacific Islander
-Multi-racial
-Other

Are you of Spanish or Hispanic origin or descent?
-Yes
-No

What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?
-Did not graduate from high school
-High school diploma or the equivalent (GED)
-Some college
-Associate's degree
-Bachelor's degree
-Master's degree
-Professional or doctorate degree

Please indicate the answer that includes your annual income in 2020 before taxes.
-Less than $10,000
-$10,000 to $19,999
-$20,000 to $29,999
-$30,000 to $39,999
-$40,000 to $49,999
-$50,000 to $59,999
-$60,000 to $69,999
-$70,000 to $79,999
-$80,000 to $89,999
-$90,000 to $99,999
-$100,000 to $149,999
-$150,000 or more

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?
-Republican
-Democrat
-Independent
-Something else

[if participant selected Independent or Something else]
Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?
-Closer to the Republican Party
-Closer to the Democratic Party

-Neither

[if participant selected Democrat]
Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?
-Strong Democrat
-Not very strong Democrat

[if participant selected Republican]
Would you call yourself a strong Republican or not a very strong Republican?
-Strong Republican
-Not very strong Republican

Generally, how interested are you in politics?
-Extremely interested
-Very interested
-Somewhat interested
-Not very interested
-Not at all interested

Do you approve or disapprove of how Joe Biden is handling his job as president?
-Strongly approve
-Somewhat approve
-Neither approve nor disapprove
-Somewhat disapprove
-Strongly disapprove

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each statement below.
-People convicted of murder should be given the death penalty
-World War I came after World War II
-Gays and lesbians should have the right to legally marry
-In order to reduce the budget deficit, the federal government should raise taxes on people that make more than $250,000 per year
-The Affordable Care Act passed by Congress in 2010 should be repealed

Response options:
-Strongly agree
-Agree
-Neither agree nor disagree
-Disagree
-Strongly disagree

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each statement below.
-I get a kick when natural disasters strike in foreign countries.
-I fantasize about a natural disaster wiping out most of humanity such that a small group of people can start all over.
-I think society should be burned to the ground.

-When I think about our political and social institutions, I cannot help thinking just let them all burn.
-We cannot fix the problems in our social institutions, we need to tear them down and start over.
-I need chaos around me — it is too boring if nothing is going on.
-Sometimes I just feel like destroying beautiful things.
-There is no right and wrong in the world.
-The number two is greater than the number one.

Response options:
-Strongly agree
-Agree
-Neither agree nor disagree
-Disagree
-Strongly disagree

[participants who failed both attention check questions above were excluded at this point]

[participants who do not lean toward either party skipped the behavioral game below and were excluded from the data per our preregistration]

[Affective polarization manipulation]

For our next study, we are going to ask you to play games with other survey participants.

You will participate in two economic tasks called "games" over the next few minutes.

You will be assigned to a different partner (someone else completing this survey) for each game.

You will receive some basic demographic information on each partner, but you will not be able to identify this person, nor will he or she be able to identify who you are (not now, nor after the survey is over - the game is strictly anonymous throughout). You will work with money for each game. We will pay you an amount based on your final total.

Instructions

This game is played by pairs of individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 and a Player 2.

Game steps

We will give $10 to each Player 1. Player 1 then has the opportunity to give a portion of his or her $10 to Player 2. Player 1 could give some, all, or none of the $10. Whatever amount Player 1 decides to give to Player 2 will be tripled before it is passed on to Player 2. Player 2 then has the option of returning any portion of this tripled amount to Player 1. Each Player has 20 seconds to act.

Payment

Player 1 receives whatever he or she kept from their original $10, plus anything returned to him or her by Player 2. Player 2 receives whatever was given to him or her by Player 1, tripled, but then minus

whatever they returned to Player 1.

Note: We will multiply the final totals by 0.03 and give you a bonus for this survey of that amount. For example, if you win $20, we would pay you a bonus of $20 * 0.03 = $0.60. Please pay careful attention to these instructions. We will ask practice questions to ensure you understand.

We will now run through 3 examples to show you how the game might be played.

Example 1 As always, Player 1 starts with $10. Imagine that Player 1 then gives $4 to Player 2. We triple this amount, so Player 2 gets $12 (3 times $4 equals $12). At this point, Player 1 has $6 and Player 2 has $12. Then Player 2 has to decide whether to give anything back to Player 1, and if so, how much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return $3 to Player 1. At the end of the game Player 1 will have $9 and Player 2 will have $9.

Example 2 Imagine that Player 1 gives all $10 to Player 2. We triple this amount, so Player 2 gets $30 (3 times $10 equals $30). At this point, Player 1 has $0 and Player 2 has $30. Then Player 2 has to decide whether to give anything back to Player 1, and if so, how much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return $15 to Player 1. At the end of the game Player 1 will have $15 and Player 2 will have $15.

Example 3 Imagine that Player 1 gives $3 to Player 2. We triple this amount, so Player 2 gets $9 (3 times $3 equals $9). At this point, Player 1 has $7 and Player 2 has $9. Then Player 2 has to decide whether to give anything back to Player 1, and if so, how much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return $0 to Player 1. At the end of the game Player 1 will have $7 and Player 2 will have $9.

Practice questions
(You have two attempts to get both questions right.)

Question 1: Player 1 starts with $10. Suppose that Player 1 gives $7 to Player 2. How much money will Player 2 get?
-$7
-$14
-$21

Question 2: After getting the money, what can Player 2 do with the money?
-Keep all the money
-Give some of the money to Player 1
-Give all of the money to Player 1
-All of the above

[practice questions repeated if prior questions not both answered correctly]

Please try again. You must answer all questions correctly before you can continue.

Question 3: Player 1 starts with $10. Suppose that Player 1 gives $2 to Player 2. How much money will Player 2 get? -$0 -$2 -$6

Question 4: After getting the money, what can Player 2 do with the money?

-Keep all the money
-Give some of the money to Player 1
-Give all of the money to Player 1
-All of the above

[participants who failed to answer both questions measuring their understanding of the game correctly for a second time are excluded]

You have been randomly assigned to play as Player 2. You will play as Player 2 for two rounds.

Each Player 1 will see the following information about you. They will use it to decide how trustworthy you are.

Age: [the response option for age previously selected by participant]
Gender: [the response option for gender previously selected by participant]
Income: [the response option for income previously selected by participant]
Political party: [the party that the participant indicated supporting (including leaners)]

[Positive experience condition; randomized (p=.5)]

Round 1

You are Player 2.

Player 1 can give you some, all, or none of the $10. We will triple any amount Player 1 allocates to you. You are under no obligation to give anything back.

Information about who you are playing with (Player 1):
Age: [randomized integer from 25–54]
Gender: [randomized as male or female
Income: [randomized as $30,000-$39,999, $40,000-$49,999, $50,000-$59,999, or $60,000-$69,999]
Political party: [opposite party from participant]

Please wait while Player 1 decides your allocation. Player 1 has 20 seconds to act.

Results. Player 1 allocated you $8. We have tripled this to $24. You can now return some, all or none of this money to Player 1. Put the number of dollars you wish to keep in the box labeled "Player 2." Put the dollars you wish to go to Player 1 in the box labeled "Player 1."

Player 1 is awaiting your decision. You have 20 seconds to act.
Player 1: [text box; numeric entry]
Player 2: [text box; numeric entry]
Total: [sum of allocations]

[results must add up to $24; participants were given up to three attempts]

You gave $[X] back to Player 1. Which factors, if any, were part of your decision making process?

-Age
-Gender
-Income
-Political party
-Something else

Player 1's reason for their allocation to you: Political party

Round 2

You are Player 2.

Player 1 can give you some, all, or none of the $10. We will triple any amount Player 1 allocates to you. You are under no obligation to give anything back.

Information about who you are playing with (Player 1):
Age: [randomized integer from 25–54]
Gender: [randomized as male or female
Income: [randomized as $30,000-$39,999, $40,000-$49,999, $50,000-$59,999, or $60,000-$69,999]
Political party: [opposite party from participant]

Please wait while Player 1 decides your allocation. Player 1 has 20 seconds to act.

Results. Player 1 allocated you $8. We have tripled this to $24. You can now return some, all or none of this money to Player 1. Put the number of dollars you wish to keep in the box labeled "Player 2." Put the dollars you wish to go to Player 1 in the box labeled "Player 1."

Player 1 is awaiting your decision. You have 20 seconds to act.
Player 1: [text box; numeric entry]
Player 2: [text box; numeric entry]
Total: [sum of allocations]

[results must add up to $24; participants were given up to three attempts]

You gave $[X] back to Player 1. Which factors, if any, were part of your decision making process?
-Age
-Gender
-Income
-Political party
-Something else

Player 1's reason for their allocation to you: Political party, Income

Game Summary.

Round 1: Earnings: $[X].
Factors about you that Player 1 used when deciding how much money to give: Political party.

Round 2: Earnings: $[Y].
Factors about you that Player 1 used when deciding how much money to give: Political party, Income.

Your total earnings: $[X] + $[Y]

[Negative experience condition; randomized (p=.5)]

Round 1

You are Player 2.

Player 1 can give you some, all, or none of the $10. We will triple any amount Player 1 allocates to you. You are under no obligation to give anything back.

Information about who you are playing with (Player 1):
Age: [randomized integer from 25–54]
Gender: [randomized as male or female
Income: [randomized as $30,000-$39,999, $40,000-$49,999, $50,000-$59,999, or $60,000-$69,999]
Political party: [opposite party from participant]

Please wait while Player 1 decides your allocation. Player 1 has 20 seconds to act.

Results. Player 1 allocated you $0. We are unable to triple this amount.

Player 1's reason for their allocation to you: Political party

Round 1

You are Player 2.

Player 1 can give you some, all, or none of the $10. We will triple any amount Player 1 allocates to you. You are under no obligation to give anything back.

Information about who you are playing with (Player 1):
Age: [randomized integer from 25–54]
Gender: [randomized as male or female
Income: [randomized as $30,000-$39,999, $40,000-$49,999, $50,000-$59,999, or $60,000-$69,999]
Political party: [opposite party from participant]

Please wait while Player 1 decides your allocation. Player 1 has 20 seconds to act.

Results. Player 1 allocated you $0. We are unable to triple this amount.

Player 1's reason for their allocation to you: Political party, Income

Game Summary.

Round 1: Earnings: $0

Factors about you that Player 1 used when deciding how much money to give: Political party.

Round 2: Earnings $0
Factors about you that Player 1 used when deciding how much money to give: Political party, Income.

Your total earnings: $0

[Accuracy prompt; randomized (p=.5)]

We would like to pretest an actual news headline for future studies. We are interested in whether people think it is accurate or not.

We only need you to give your opinion about the accuracy of a single headline. We will then continue on to the primary task.

Note: The image may take a moment to load.

[one of four images shown; randomized (p=.25 for each)]

ABCNEWS.GO.COM
Scientists discover the 'most massive neutron star ever detected'

To the best of your knowledge, is the above headline accurate?
-No
-Yes

ABCNEWS.GO.COM
'Seinfeld' is officially coming to Netflix
"Seinfeld" will begin streaming worldwide on Netflix in 2021.

To the best of your knowledge, is the above headline accurate?
-No
-Yes

CNN.COM
Social media use may harm teens' mental health by disrupting positive activities, study says

To the best of your knowledge, is the above headline accurate?
-No
-Yes

NBCNEWS.COM
Hit YouTube channel Ryan ToysReview accused of deceiving kids into watching sponsored content

To the best of your knowledge, is the above headline accurate?
-No
-Yes

[News headline sharing task]

For this study, you will be presented with a set of news headlines and from social media (12 in total).

We are interested in the extent to which you would consider sharing them on social media if you had seen them there.

Note: The images may take a moment to load.

[headline order randomized]

[congenial to Democrats; true]

If you were to see the above on social media, how likely would you be to share it?
-Extremely likely
-Moderately likely
-Slightly likely
-Slightly unlikely
-Moderately unlikely
-Extremely unlikely

[congenial to Democrats; true]

If you were to see the above on social media, how likely would you be to share it?
-Extremely likely
-Moderately likely
-Slightly likely
-Slightly unlikely
-Moderately unlikely
-Extremely unlikely

ABC.NET.AU

Michigan Governor accuses Trump of encouraging 'sick and depraved men' in kidnapping plot

[congenial to Democrats; true]

If you were to see the above on social media, how likely would you be to share it?
-Extremely likely
-Moderately likely
-Slightly likely
-Slightly unlikely
-Moderately unlikely
-Extremely unlikely

FOXNEWS.COM

Democrats, trying everything, fail to derail Amy Coney Barrett confirmation

[congenial to Republicans; true]

If you were to see the above on social media, how likely would you be to share it?
-Extremely likely
-Moderately likely
-Slightly likely
-Slightly unlikely
-Moderately unlikely
-Extremely unlikely

HUFFPOST.COM

GOP Congressman: We Need The Senate To Investigate Hunter Biden

[congenial to Republicans; true]

If you were to see the above on social media, how likely would you be to share it?
-Extremely likely
-Moderately likely
-Slightly likely
-Slightly unlikely
-Moderately unlikely
-Extremely unlikely

NBCNEWS.COM
Trump's gains among Latino voters shouldn't come as a surprise. Here's why.

[congenial to Republicans; true]

If you were to see the above on social media, how likely would you be to share it?
-Extremely likely
-Moderately likely
-Slightly likely
-Slightly unlikely
-Moderately unlikely
-Extremely unlikely

HILLREPORTER.COM

Trump Holds Bible Upside Down And Backwards During Press Conference, Enraging Bishop And The...

[congenial to Democrats; false]

If you were to see the above on social media, how likely would you be to share it?
-Extremely likely
-Moderately likely
-Slightly likely
-Slightly unlikely
-Moderately unlikely
-Extremely unlikely

CNSNEWS.COM

Biden: 'A Black Man Invented the Lightbulb, Not a White Guy Named Edison'

[congenial to Democrats; false]

If you were to see the above on social media, how likely would you be to share it?
-Extremely likely
-Moderately likely
-Slightly likely
-Slightly unlikely
-Moderately unlikely
-Extremely unlikely

POPCULTURE.COM
USPS Reportedly Failed to Deliver 27 Percent of Mail-In Ballots in South Florida

[congenial to Democrats; false]

If you were to see the above on social media, how likely would you be to share it?
-Extremely likely
-Moderately likely
-Slightly likely
-Slightly unlikely
-Moderately unlikely
-Extremely unlikely

CONSERVATIVEBRIEF.COM

D.C. Passes Bill to Immunize Children Without Parental Knowledge, Consent

[congenial to Republicans; false]

If you were to see the above on social media, how likely would you be to share it?
-Extremely likely
-Moderately likely
-Slightly likely
-Slightly unlikely
-Moderately unlikely
-Extremely unlikely

WESTERNJOURNAL.COM

Report: Biden Admin May Conduct Warrantless Spying on Americans Using Private Firms

[congenial to Republicans; false]

If you were to see the above on social media, how likely would you be to share it?
-Extremely likely
-Moderately likely
-Slightly likely
-Slightly unlikely
-Moderately unlikely
-Extremely unlikely

[congenial to Republicans; false]

If you were to see the above on social media, how likely would you be to share it?
-Extremely likely
-Moderately likely
-Slightly likely
-Slightly unlikely
-Moderately unlikely
-Extremely unlikely

[Manipulation checks]

How important is it to you that you only share news articles on social media (such as Facebook and Twitter) if they are accurate?
-Not important at all
-Slightly important
-Moderately important
-Very important
-Extremely important

Would you say that you were treated fairly or unfairly when playing the game earlier?
-Very fairly
-Fairly
-Unfairly
-Very unfairly

We'd like you to rate how you feel towards some groups on a scale of 0 to 100. Zero means very unfavorable and 100 means very favorable. Fifty means you do not feel favorable or unfavorable. How would you rate your feeling toward each of the following?

-People who are Democrats/Republicans [outparty]
-People who are Democrats/Republicans [inparty]
-Democrat/Republican politicians and elected officials [outparty]
-Democrat/Republican politicians and elected officials [inparty]

Any bonus will be paid within 14 business days, subject to a multiplier of 0.03 as noted.

Our records show that you earned a $[X] bonus. (This is $[X] won in game * the multiplier of 0.03.)

We sometimes find people don't always take surveys seriously, instead providing humorous, or insincere responses to questions. How often do you do this?
-Never
-Rarely
-Some of the time
-Most of the time
-Always

It is essential for the validity of this study that we know whether participants looked up any information online during the study. Did you make an effort to look up information during the study? Please be honest; you will still be paid and you will not be penalized in any way if you did.
-Yes, I looked up information
-No, I did not look up information

Do you have any comments on the survey? Please let us know about any problems you had or aspects of the survey that were confusing.

[text box]

Thank you for answering these questions. The purpose of this study is to understand how effective accuracy nudges are at countering misinformation.

Throughout the game you were told that you were playing with other players. This was not true. All data in the game, such as how much money the other player chose to give you, were randomly generated.

If you earned a bonus, you will still receive it.

Participants were then exposed to both true and false claims surrounding US political parties and figures.

The following news headlines are FALSE:
- D.C. Passes Bill to Immunize Children Without Parental Knowledge, Consent
- Report: Biden Admin May Use Private Firms to Spy on Unsuspecting Americans
- ANTIFA members implicated in Oregon wildfires
- Trump Holds Bible Upside Down And Backwards During Press Conference, Enraging Bishop And The Nation
- Biden: 'A Black Man Invented the Lightbulb, Not a White Guy Named Edison'
- USPS Reportedly Failed to Deliver 27 Percent of Mail-In Ballots in South Florida

The following headlines are TRUE:
- EXCLUSIVE: Fox News Passed on Hunter Biden Laptop Story Over Credibility Concerns
- Federal judges increase oversight of USPS to ensure ballots delivered on time
- Michigan Governor accuses Trump of encouraging 'sick and depraved men' in kidnapping plot
- Democrats, trying everything, fail to derail Amy Coney Barrett confirmation
- GOP Congressman: We Need The Senate To Investigate Hunter Biden
- Trump's gains among Latino voters shouldn't come as a surprise. Here's why.

If you have any questions regarding the content or intent of this research, please contact [REDACTED FOR PEER REVIEW].

Thank you again for your participation. Please do not share any information about the nature of this study with other potential participants. This research is not intended to support or oppose any political candidate or office. This research has no affiliation with any political candidate or campaign and has received no financial support from any political candidate or campaign.

Once you have read the above, please click the next button below to complete the survey!

Online Appendix B: Additional results

Table B1: Participant attributes by condition (proportions)

	Baseline	Prompt	Positive outpartisan	Prompt × positive	Total
Gender					
Male	0.55	0.55	0.56	0.54	0.55
Female/other	0.45	0.45	0.44	0.46	0.45
Education					
Less than a bachelor's	0.41	0.43	0.33	0.35	0.38
College graduate	0.59	0.57	0.67	0.65	0.62
Race/ethnicity					
White	0.73	0.68	0.74	0.74	0.72
Non-white	0.27	0.32	0.26	0.26	0.28
Age					
18-34	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.49	0.49
35-44	0.25	0.21	0.24	0.20	0.20
45-54	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.18	0.18
55-64	0.13	0.14	0.10	0.09	0.09
65+	0.04	0.05	0.07	0.04	0.04
Party					
Democrat	0.58	0.52	0.63	0.56	0.57
Republican	0.42	0.48	0.37	0.44	0.43
N	179	201	203	202	785

Party identifiers include leaners.

Table B2: Manipulation checks

	Accuracy importance in sharing	Partisan feelings difference (people)	Partisan feelings difference (politicians)
Accuracy prompt	-0.057	2.795	3.165
	(0.076)	(2.139)	(2.068)
Positive outpartisan experience	-0.158*	-4.672*	-5.103*
	(0.076)	(2.145)	(2.085)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
N	781	781	781

OLS with robust standard errors; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Accuracy importance in sharing is a five-point scale. Affective polarization measures are calculated as the difference between participant's ratings on a 0–100 feeling thermometer of the party that the participant supports and the other party. Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college degree (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about sports, celebrities, science, and business). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

Figure B1: News sharing intention by accuracy prompt condition and strength of partisanship

Mean sharing intention on a 1–6 scale ("Extremely unlikely" to "Extremely likely") with 95% confidence intervals. See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

Table B3: Effects of accuracy prompt and affective polarization manipulation on news sharing by partisan congeniality

(a) Uncongenial headlines

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	0.002	-0.072	0.074
	(0.113)	(0.123)	(0.115)
Positive outpartisan experience	0.051	0.232	-0.182
	(0.110)	(0.130)	(0.114)
Accuracy prompt × positive outpartisan	0.033	-0.008	0.044
	(0.155)	(0.176)	(0.159)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Prompt effect: Polarized	0.036	-0.080	0.118
	(0.109)	(0.125)	(0.110)
N	782	782	781

(b) Congenial headlines

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	-0.028	-0.180	0.153
	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.122)
Positive outpartisan experience	-0.001	-0.094	0.093
	(0.137)	(0.142)	(0.121)
Accuracy prompt × positive outpartisan	0.297	0.221	0.076
	(0.191)	(0.205)	(0.180)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Prompt effect: Positive outpartisan experience	0.270*	0.041	0.229
	(0.124)	(0.145)	(0.130)
N	782	782	782

OLS with robust standard errors; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Sharing intentions for true and false news headlines were measured on a six-point scale. The positive outpartisan experience variable estimates the effect of assignment to that condition relative to the negative outpartisan experience condition (the reference category). Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college degree (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about sports, celebrities, science, and business). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

Table B4: Joint effects of accuracy prompt and affective polarization manipulation on news sharing intentions by partisan congeniality

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	-0.007	-0.075	0.067
	(0.114)	(0.124)	(0.114)
Positive outpartisan experience	0.049	0.225	-0.176
	(0.111)	(0.129)	(0.113)
Congenial headline	0.961***	1.058***	-0.097
	(0.094)	(0.108)	(0.109)
Accuracy prompt × congenial	-0.011	-0.103	0.092
	(0.134)	(0.152)	(0.158)
Accuracy prompt × positive outpartisan	0.043	-0.010	0.056
	(0.157)	(0.176)	(0.159)
Affective polarization × congenial	-0.049	-0.312*	0.262
	(0.128)	(0.155)	(0.158)
Accuracy prompt × positive outpartisan × congenial	0.245	0.234	0.008
	(0.183)	(0.216)	(0.229)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
N	1564	1564	1563

OLS with standard errors clustered by respondent; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Sharing intentions for true and false news headlines were measured separately for congenial and uncongenial news on a six-point scale. The positive outpartisan experience variable estimates the effect of assignment to that condition relative to the negative outpartisan experience condition (the reference category). Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college degree (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about sports, celebrities, science, and business). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

Figure B2: News sharing intention by accuracy prompt condition and Need for Chaos

Mean sharing intention on a 1–6 scale ("Extremely unlikely" to "Extremely likely") with 95% confidence intervals. Need for Chaos groups refer to the first, second, and third terciles of mean responses on an eight-item scale. See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

Table B5: Main effects on true/false difference in news sharing intentions by self-reported type of news shared

	Political	Sports	Celebrity	Science/tech	Business
Accuracy prompt	0.140*	0.061	0.154	0.050	0.095
	(0.063)	(0.072)	(0.088)	(0.050)	(0.076)
Affective polarization	-0.009	0.052	0.040	0.054	0.019
	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.089)	(0.051)	(0.076)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	782	570	405	1091	583

OLS with robust standard errors; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Outcome variable is difference in sharing intentions for true and false news headlines as measured on a six-point scale. The positive outpartisan experience variable estimates the effect of assignment to that condition relative to the negative outpartisan experience condition (the reference category). Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college degree (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about politics, sports, celebrities, science, and business [outcome measure excluded]). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

Table B6: Average treatment effect estimates: Jenke (2024) replication data

Treatment	-0.002	0.007
	(0.019)	(0.014)
Constant	0.511***	0.160***
	(0.013)	(0.009)
N	840	840

OLS with robust standard errors; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Estimated using replication data from Jenke (2024).

Online Appendix C: Results with preregistered social media use exclusions

Table C1: Main effects on news sharing intentions (preregistered social media use exclusions)

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	0.145***	0.097	0.048
	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.036)
Positive outpartisan experience	0.104*	0.095	0.009
	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.036)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
N	1904	1905	1904

OLS with robust standard errors; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Sharing intentions for true and false news headlines were measured on a six-point scale. The positive outpartisan experience variable estimates the effect of assignment to that condition relative to the negative outpartisan experience condition (the reference category). Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college degree (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about sports, celebrities, science, and business). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

Table C2: Affective polarization manipulation effects on news sharing by partisan congeniality (preregistered social media use exclusions)

	True news	False news	True – false
Congenial headline	0.594***	0.634***	-0.039
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Positive outpartisan experience	0.047	0.130*	-0.082
	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.044)
Positive outpartisan × congenial	0.109*	-0.056	0.164*
	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.064)
Accuracy prompt	0.148***	0.094	0.054
	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.035)
Congenial/uncongenial difference: Positive outpartisan	0.703***	0.577***	0.125**
	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.048)
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.042)
N	3806	3806	3805

OLS with standard errors clustered by respondent; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Observations represents average sharing intention for congenial or uncongenial news, which were measured on a six-point scale. The positive outpartisan experience variable estimates the effect of assignment to that condition relative to the negative outpartisan experience condition (the reference category). Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college completion (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about sports, celebrities, science, and business). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

Table C3: Joint effects of accuracy prompt and affective polarization manipulation on news sharing intentions (preregistered social media use exclusions)

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	0.067	0.036	0.031
	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.050)
Positive outpartisan	0.025	0.034	-0.008
	(0.067)	(0.072)	(0.048)
Accuracy prompt × affective polarization	0.158	0.123	0.034
	(0.099)	(0.105)	(0.072)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Prompt effect: Positive outpartisan	0.224***	0.159*	0.065
	(0.069)	(0.075)	(0.052)
N	1904	1905	1904

OLS with robust standard errors; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Sharing intentions for true and false news headlines were measured on a six-point scale. The positive outpartisan experience variable estimates the effect of assignment to that condition relative to the negative outpartisan experience condition (the reference category). Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college degree (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about sports, celebrities, science, and business). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

Table C4: Moderators of accuracy prompt effects (preregistered social media use exclusions)

(a) Strength of partisanship

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	0.072	0.099	-0.027
	(0.134)	(0.148)	(0.116)
Not strong partisan	0.190	0.041	0.149
	(0.107)	(0.119)	(0.094)
Accuracy prompt × not strong partisan	-0.008	-0.014	0.006
	(0.154)	(0.169)	(0.128)
Strong partisan	0.328***	0.128	0.200*
	(0.103)	(0.116)	(0.094)
Accuracy prompt × strong partisan	0.155	0.007	0.148
	(0.152)	(0.167)	(0.128)
Positive outpartisan experience	0.111*	0.098	0.013
	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.036)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Prompt effect: Not strong partisans	0.064	0.085	-0.02
	(0.076)	(0.082)	(0.052)
Prompt effect: Strong partisans	0.227***	0.106	0.121*
	(0.072)	(0.077)	(0.054)
N	1904	1905	1904

(b) Need for Chaos

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	0.145	0.022	0.123*
	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.058)
Medium Need for Chaos	0.125	0.125	-0.000
	(0.079)	(0.087)	(0.057)
High Need for Chaos	0.365***	0.292***	0.073
	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.061)
Accuracy prompt × medium NFC	-0.058	-0.036	-0.023
	(0.115)	(0.124)	(0.088)
Accuracy prompt × high NFC	0.034	0.251*	-0.217*
	(0.119)	(0.126)	(0.086)
Affective polarization	0.092	0.083	0.009
	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.036)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Prompt effect: Medium NFC	0.087	-0.013	0.100
	(0.085)	(0.094)	(0.066)
Prompt effect: High NFC	0.179*	0.274***	-0.094
	(0.091)	(0.097)	(0.064)
N	1904	1905	1904

OLS with robust standard errors; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Sharing intentions for true and false news headlines were measured on a six-point scale. Partisan leaners are the excluded category for the not strong partisan and strong partisan indicators. Indicators for Need for Chaos refer to the second and third terciles of mean responses on an eight-item scale. The positive outpartisan experience variable estimates the effect of assignment to that condition relative to the negative outpartisan experience condition (the reference category). Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college degree (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about sports, celebrities, science, and business). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

Table C5: Effects of accuracy prompt and affective polarization manipulation on news sharing by partisan congeniality (preregistered social media use exclusions)

(a) Uncongenial headlines

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	0.043	0.031	0.012
	(0.070)	(0.076)	(0.062)
Positive outpartisan experience	0.002	0.107	-0.105
	(0.066)	(0.076)	(0.059)
Accuracy prompt × positive outpartisan	0.107	0.068	0.041
	(0.098)	(0.110)	(0.089)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Prompt effect: Positive outpartisan	0.150*	0.099	0.053
	(0.069)	(0.079)	(0.064)
N	1904	1904	1903

(b) Congenial headlines

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	0.091	0.056	0.035
	(0.086)	(0.091)	(0.067)
Positive outpartisan experience	0.049	0.001	0.048
	(0.084)	(0.088)	(0.069)
Accuracy prompt × positive outpartisan	0.208	0.130	0.078
	(0.122)	(0.129)	(0.102)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Prompt effect: Positive outpartisan experience	0.299***	0.186*	0.113
	(0.086)	(0.091)	(0.076)
N	1904	1904	1904

OLS with robust standard errors; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Sharing intentions for true and false news headlines were measured on a six-point scale. The positive outpartisan experience variable estimates the effect of assignment to that condition relative to the negative outpartisan experience condition (the reference category). Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college degree (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about sports, celebrities, science, and business). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

Table C6: Joint effects of accuracy prompt and affective polarization manipulation on news sharing intentions by partisan congeniality (preregistered social media use exclusions)

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	0.036	0.039	-0.003
	(0.071)	(0.077)	(0.062)
Positive outpartisan experience	-0.012	0.105	-0.118*
	(0.067)	(0.076)	(0.059)
Congenial headline	0.562***	0.629***	-0.067
	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Accuracy prompt × congenial	0.063	0.010	0.053
	(0.074)	(0.083)	(0.085)
Accuracy prompt × positive outpartisan	0.116	0.047	0.070
	(0.100)	(0.111)	(0.089)
Positive outpartisan × congenial	0.067	-0.109	0.176*
	(0.072)	(0.084)	(0.087)
Accuracy prompt × positive outpartisan × congenial	0.091	0.109	-0.020
	(0.105)	(0.122)	(0.128)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
N	3806	3806	3805

OLS with standard errors clustered by respondent; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Sharing intentions for true and false news headlines were measured separately for congenial and uncongenial news on a six-point scale. The positive outpartisan experience variable estimates the effect of assignment to that condition relative to the negative outpartisan experience condition (the reference category). Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college degree (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about sports, celebrities, science, and business). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

Online Appendix D: Results excluding two false headlines

Table D1: Main effects on news sharing intentions (headline exclusions)

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	0.072	-0.105	0.178**
	(0.075)	(0.082)	(0.065)
Affective polarization	0.109	0.163	-0.053
	(0.076)	(0.083)	(0.067)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
N	782	782	781

OLS with robust standard errors; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Sharing intentions for true and false news headlines were measured on a six-point scale. The positive outpartisan experience variable estimates the effect of assignment to that condition relative to the negative outpartisan experience condition (the reference category). Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college degree (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about sports, celebrities, science, and business). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

Table D2: Affective polarization manipulation effects on news sharing by partisan congeniality (headline exclusions)

	True news	False news	True – false
Congenial headline	0.955***	0.931***	0.024
	(0.067)	(0.088)	(0.090)
Positive outpartisan experience	0.073	0.232*	-0.158
	(0.080)	(0.096)	(0.088)
Positive outpartisan × congenial	0.073	-0.131	0.204
	(0.092)	(0.124)	(0.130)
Accuracy prompt	0.072	-0.113	0.187***
	(0.075)	(0.082)	(0.066)
Congenial/uncongenial difference: Positive outpartisan experience	1.028***	0.800***	0.228*
	(0.063)	(0.088)	(0.094)
N	1564	1563	1562

OLS with standard errors clustered by respondent; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Observations represents average sharing intention for congenial or uncongenial news, which were measured on a six-point scale. The positive outpartisan experience variable estimates the effect of assignment to that condition relative to the negative outpartisan experience condition (the reference category). Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college completion (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about sports, celebrities, science, and business). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

Table D3: Joint effects of accuracy prompt and affective polarization manipulation on news sharing intentions (headline exclusions)

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	-0.013	-0.116	0.103
	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.092)
Positive outpartisan experience	0.025	0.152	-0.128
	(0.107)	(0.115)	(0.093)
Accuracy prompt × positive outpartisan	0.165	0.021	0.146
	(0.149)	(0.163)	(0.133)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Prompt effect: Positive outpartisan	0.153	-0.094	0.249**
	(0.099)	(0.116)	(0.095)
N	782	782	781

OLS with robust standard errors; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Sharing intentions for true and false news headlines were measured on a six-point scale. The positive outpartisan experience variable estimates the effect of assignment to that condition relative to the negative outpartisan experience condition (the reference category). Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college degree (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about sports, celebrities, science, and business). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

Table D4: Moderators of accuracy prompt effects (headline exclusions)

(a) Strength of partisanship

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	0.135	-0.026	0.160
	(0.224)	(0.233)	(0.187)
Not strong partisan	0.409*	0.364	0.044
	(0.181)	(0.190)	(0.158)
Accuracy prompt × not strong partisan	-0.296	-0.234	-0.058
	(0.260)	(0.277)	(0.216)
Strong partisan	0.413*	0.261	0.152
	(0.168)	(0.176)	(0.149)
Accuracy prompt × strong partisan	0.053	-0.008	0.062
	(0.243)	(0.256)	(0.208)
Positive outpartisan experience	0.115	0.161	-0.045
	(0.075)	(0.084)	(0.068)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Prompt effect: Not strong partisans	-0.161	-0.260	0.102
	(0.134)	(0.147)	(0.106)
Prompt effect: Strong partisans	0.188	-0.033	0.222*
	(0.097)	(0.109)	(0.091)
N	782	782	781

(b) Need for Chaos

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	0.074	-0.199	0.272*
	(0.128)	(0.143)	(0.111)
Medium Need for Chaos	0.234	0.164	0.070
	(0.135)	(0.144)	(0.112)
High Need for Chaos	0.273*	0.054	0.220*
	(0.129)	(0.137)	(0.109)
Accuracy prompt × medium NFC	-0.094	-0.091	-0.003
	(0.189)	(0.209)	(0.166)
Accuracy prompt × high NFC	0.052	0.341	-0.284
	(0.178)	(0.190)	(0.155)
Positive outpartisan experience	0.090	0.147	-0.057
	(0.076)	(0.084)	(0.067)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Prompt effect: Medium NFC	-0.020	-0.290	0.270*
	(0.138)	(0.154)	(0.124)
Prompt effect: High NFC	0.125	0.142	-0.012
	(0.123)	(0.127)	(0.108)
N	782	782	781

OLS with robust standard errors; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Sharing intentions for true and false news headlines were measured on a six-point scale. Partisan leaners are the excluded category for the not strong partisan and strong partisan indicators. Indicators for Need for Chaos refer to the second and third terciles of mean responses on an eight-item scale. The positive outpartisan experience variable estimates the effect of assignment to that condition relative to the negative outpartisan experience condition (the reference category). Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college degree (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about sports, celebrities, science, and business). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

Table D5: Effects of accuracy prompt and affective polarization manipulation on news sharing by partisan congeniality (headline exclusions)

(a) Uncongenial headlines

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	0.002	-0.136	0.138
	(0.113)	(0.129)	(0.122)
Positive outpartisan experience	0.051	0.256	-0.206
	(0.110)	(0.143)	(0.129)
Accuracy prompt × positive outpartisan	0.033	-0.016	0.053
	(0.155)	(0.188)	(0.176)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Prompt effect: Positive outpartisan experience	0.036	-0.152	0.191
	(0.109)	(0.135)	(0.125)
N	782	782	781

(b) Congenial headlines

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	-0.028	-0.139	0.110
	(0.146)	(0.154)	(0.132)
Positive outpartisan experience	-0.001	0.028	-0.029
	(0.137)	(0.151)	(0.132)
Accuracy prompt × positive outpartisan	0.297	0.110	0.191
	(0.191)	(0.219)	(0.195)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Prompt effect: Positive outpartisan experience	0.270*	-0.029	0.301*
	(0.124)	(0.156)	(0.141)
N	782	781	781

OLS with robust standard errors; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Sharing intentions for true and false news headlines were measured on a six-point scale. The positive outpartisan experience variable estimates the effect of assignment to that condition relative to the negative outpartisan experience condition (the reference category). Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college degree (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about sports, celebrities, science, and business). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.

Table D6: Joint effects of accuracy prompt and affective polarization manipulation on news sharing intentions by partisan congeniality (headline exclusions)

	True news	False news	True – false
Accuracy prompt	-0.007	-0.126	0.118
	(0.114)	(0.132)	(0.122)
Positive outpartisan	0.049	0.246	-0.197
	(0.111)	(0.143)	(0.129)
Congenial headline	0.961***	0.944***	0.017
	(0.094)	(0.127)	(0.126)
Accuracy prompt × congenial	-0.011	-0.024	0.013
	(0.134)	(0.176)	(0.180)
Accuracy prompt × positive outpartisan	0.043	-0.028	0.075
	(0.157)	(0.189)	(0.177)
Positive outpartisan × congenial	-0.049	-0.207	0.158
	(0.128)	(0.183)	(0.182)
Accuracy prompt × positive outpartisan × congenial	0.245	0.152	0.094
	(0.183)	(0.249)	(0.261)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
N	1564	1563	1562

OLS with standard errors clustered by respondent; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < .005$ (two-sided). Sharing intentions for true and false news headlines were measured separately for congenial and uncongenial news on a six-point scale. The positive outpartisan experience variable estimates the effect of assignment to that condition relative to the negative outpartisan experience condition (the reference category). Preregistered control variables are Biden approval (four-point scale); party identification (Republican indicator); college degree (bachelor's degree indicator); gender (male indicator); race (nonwhite indicator); age group (indicators for 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65+); social media use (indicators for self-reported usage of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and WhatsApp); and sharing behavior (indicators for self-reported sharing of news about sports, celebrities, science, and business). See Online Appendix A for news headlines and question wording.