“Today we use the term ‘the world’ with what amounts to brash familiarity. Too often in speaking of such things as the world food problem, the world health problem, world trade, world peace, and world government, we disregard the fact that ‘the world’ is a totality which in the domain of human problems constitutes the ultimate in degree of magnitude and degree of complexity. That is a fact, yes; but another fact is that almost every large problem today is, in truth, a world problem. Those two facts taken together provide thoughtful men with what might realistically be entitled ‘an introduction to humility’ in curing the world’s ills.”

— President Emeritus John Sloan Dickey,
1947 Convocation Address
The Editors of World Outlook would like to express gratitude to the John Sloan Dickey Center for its encouragement and assistance.
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About the Journal:
*World Outlook* is a student-run journal of international affairs that publishes papers written by undergraduate students. In addition, the journal features interviews with major global thinkers and opinion pieces written by our own staff. Our name and missions are motivated by the words of late Dartmouth President John Sloan Dickey. Please visit our website at http://sites.dartmouth.edu/worldoutlook.

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Editors’ Note

The years 2022 and 2023 have witnessed a remarkable series of events that stand to reshape the realm of international affairs. From Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Finland’s admission into NATO, India’s surpassing of China in terms of population, the Sudanese civil conflict, China’s modernization of its navy, and the growing importance of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the world is truly at a historic crossroad.

This edition of World Outlook focuses on two interrelated themes. First, it features scholarship studying how acts of aggression could impact the Western-led world order, including the fate of the United Nations. And second, it highlights scholarship that discusses how foreign policy decision-making could have been improved.

In *How Nehru's Optimism Led to the Internationalization of the Kashmir Issue*, Jahnavi Sodhi argues that Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s decision to take the Kashmir issue to the UN was a grave mistake, as the UN turned what was a bilateral dispute into an international issue. However, as Mission Chief of Staff for the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Nick Birnback indicates in an interview with World Outlook, the UN is one of the most well-accomplished organizations in world history and will continue to act as a paramount force in resolving disputes.

Further, this edition dwells on several pertinent questions related to foreign policy. Will an increasingly powerful U.S. Navy, further built-up in response to fear of Chinese aggression, secure new routes to facilitate trade? Or will increasing naval force impede trade flows, as Harrison Hawkins argues in *Naval Forces: Truly Indispensable to Global Trade Flows*? Likewise, how could the U.S. learn from its prior military operations to structure its naval and armed forces if a future U.S.-China conflict was to break out? In *How Interservice Rivalry Led to Divided Command in the WWII Pacific Theater*, Eleanor Sullivan argues that U.S. policymakers could pursue a strategy of interservice rivalry by utilizing a divided command structure but at the possible costs of delayed decisions and weakened coordination.

Should Western countries utilize third-party security agreements and reinforce liberal norms? In *Commitment Problem and the Tragedy of the Rhodesian Bush War*, Emily Hendrich argues that a third-party security guarantee could have averted Zimbabwe’s civil war in 1964. Similarly, in *Russia’s Use of Subversion in its Near Abroad: A Critical Analysis*, Jahnavi Sodhi suggests that the U.S. should take Russian subversion seriously, improve the defense capabilities of the countries targeted by Russia, and redefine global norms that mitigate effectiveness of subversion.

Should international powers devote their resources to improve transparency between disputing actors? In *Unpacking the Role of Perceptions and Misperceptions in the 1962 Sino-India War*, Arpita Wadhwa argues that the root causes of the 1962 Sino-Indian War were (mis)perceptions of narratives, stories, and realities. Arpita Wadhwa’s paper implies that some future conflicts might be averted by combating misperceptions that elicit unnecessary fear.

We have greatly enjoyed reading, reviewing, curating, and editing this edition of World Outlook. The papers we feature offer seminal contributions to the study of international affairs, and we hope that our readership will enjoy reading these articles.

Sincerely,

Adam Salzman ’24 and Sri Sathvik Rayala ’24
Editors-in-Chief
Interview with Chief of Staff of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara Nick Birnback

The John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding hosted Nick Birnback at Dartmouth on April 24, 2023. World Outlook staff Adam Tobeck '25, Victor Lago '26, Adam Salzman '24, and Daphna Fineberg '26 conducted an interview with him. The interview was edited for clarity and content.


VL: I’m Victor Lago, a ‘26.

AS: I’m Adam Salzman, a ‘24.

DF: I’m Daphna Fineberg, a ‘26.

AT: Today we are honored and excited to be joined by Nick Birnback. Just a little bit of an introduction Nick Birnback has served the United Nations for 25 years, currently as Chief of Staff of MINURSO, the United States mission for the referendum in Western Sahara. Prior to this, he served as chief of Public Affairs for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York and has worked in a number of capacities, both in the field and at headquarters in Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and many others. Mr. Birnback has a BA in International Relations from Tufts University and a master’s degree in public policy from Princeton University. So we’re very happy to have you here.

NB: Happy to do it.

AT: So I will start off with the first question. As I just said, you serve as MINURSO’s Chief of Staff, where you were just a little over a week ago. For those who don’t know much about the UN or MINURSO, or are not familiar with the mission, What does your role entail?

NB: Sure. Well, MINURSO itself was established in 1991 to try to facilitate a referendum for the Saharawi people to decide if they wanted to be a part of the Kingdom of Morocco or be independent. We haven’t been able to have that referendum and our mission has evolved over the intervening 30 years; now what we do is observe and monitor, report and investigate. We are essentially functioning as a political tripwire for the international community and looking at what could very easily be a regional conflict. So, while the initial function that we were asked to perform all those decades ago has changed, the utility of having peacekeepers in an area that could start a regional conflict is without a doubt an important thing for us to try to continue. As the Chief of Staff, my job is to try to help to manage the mission and all its components.
There’s three components to my mission, the force, the mission, support, and the political. I run the political pillar, and our job is to provide our boss good analysis of what’s happening on the ground and to make sure that our reporting back to the international community and looking at what could very easily be a regional conflict. So, while the initial function that we were asked to perform all those decades ago has changed, the utility of having peacekeepers in an area that could start a regional conflict is without a doubt an important thing for us to try to continue. As the Chief of Staff, my job is to try to help to manage the mission and all its components. the there’s three components to my mission, the force, the mission, support, and the political. I run the political pillar, and our job is to provide our boss good analysis of what’s happening on the ground and to make sure that our reporting back to the international community in New York is informed by those data and that analysis.

**VL:** In the past week, the situation in Sudan between the RAF and the SAF has worsened from a political crisis into violence. This conflict right now has had immediate humanitarian consequences and four UN workers have died. So based on your experience, in these immediate weeks or days, from these crises, how does the UN respond? And also what is the proper role of the UN in trying to solve these crises?

**NB:** Sure, yeah. I mean, the situation right now in Sudan is unimaginably tragic. The UN system is of course actively engaged on a number of different levels, dealing with the humanitarian crisis to dealing with migration of populations, but also trying to help to negotiate and broker a ceasefire that is durable. And then to move the whole thing back to a situation of dialogue versus a situation of conflict and while it’s heartbreaking to watch what’s happening in Sudan now and what the UN has consistently done is to call on both sides to immediately stop fighting and go back to the table and start talking about it. You may have seen that the United Nations pushed a convoy today through from Khartoum to port Sudan with some 60 vehicles or thereabouts and to try to make sure that our workers are safe, as you pointed out, there were some casualties and you know, the whole situation remains unimaginably tragic. I know the Secretary General is directly engaged, the head of our mission there is directly engaged and we will continue to do everything we can through political good offices and any other means that we can, to try to help be a part of a peaceful solution to this crisis.

**VL:** Does the humanitarian necessities like helping the local population with food and hospitals, does that take precedence over trying to mediate the conflict or trying to find maybe a military solution – is that the immediate responsibility of the UN?

**NB:** Yeah, so I mean, first of all, any decision to take any kind of peace and security driven action would be for the Security Council to decide. The Council is, I believe, having an extraordinary meeting on Sudan tomorrow. The question as to whether we sequence political engagement and humanitarian work is — I really think that they have to be concurrent and not sequential. If we’re in a situation that’s as immediate
as Sudan, we have to do both. We have to figure out whatever political leverage we can bring to bear on the situation, and to try to promote dialogue to try to promote some form of return to a negotiated settlement instead of the use of violence. But at the same time, the situation has generated dire if not catastrophic, humanitarian consequences, not just for people in Khartoum, and not just for people in Sudan, but increasingly for the whole region. So we have to engage in that and I know that agencies, funds, and programmes of the United Nations are doing just that as we speak.

DF: So, the UN has 193 Member States, obviously, the world’s a very big place, and it’s definitely difficult to be constantly tracking events in every country. So, what are the issues that are most salient for you and that you particularly like to pay attention to?

NB: Well, the UN sort of breaks into a couple of broad categories. In shorthand, there’s the peace and security side, the humanitarian side, the development side, and the individual rights side. I work on the peace and security side, so I tend to track those issues and that’s not to suggest that there’s a judgmentalism inherent in that, I don’t do that because I think they’re more important. That’s my part of the patch. One of the great advantages of the UN is that the UN deals with the entire panoply of needs based engagement. We have an entire agency called UN Women that deals with that. We’ve got the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs which deals with that. We have refugees, we have human rights, we have a whole range — World Food Programme and others — a whole range of of entities and offices that have been created to try to draw attention to and find solutions for all of the problems that confront current humanity and to do so in a way that is fundamentally cooperative and multilateral. Whether that is burden sharing economically or burden sharing in terms of political engagement, the UN’s approach is always collective because our view is that we do a lot better when the entire world is trying to address these problems, rather than letting it be addressed individually or even at a smaller level.

AT: Switching to your prior experiences, I mentioned that you worked in New York. How was the transition from working between missions on the ground and moving to UN Headquarters? And then, what are some lessons that might be learned from those in New York from those on the ground and even vice versa?

NB: That’s a great question. I think that in general, the UN is at its best when it is driven by the needs that it confronts in the field. And that’s just my opinion. I tend to think that the UN is ultimately an organization that is driven by where the international community can most meaningfully engage to try to make people’s lives better. And for that to happen, there needs to be a strong headquarter for sure. But there is something immediately and personally satisfying about working directly in a field-driven organization, and that means that working in the field, you see the direct results of what you’re doing, whereas work and headquarters can be a little bit more
AS: Thank you for that. You just spoke a lot about the direct results from working in the field. So on that note: a lot of people know about the United Nations and what it does, but they don’t really know the practical implications. The UN has for their daily life, or that it serves various humanitarian and other capacities. So I’m just wondering: if you had to make the case with a few examples about the material impact of the UN, where did it have a tangible impact? What would you say to that person?

NB: There’s a lot of different things. I mean, each bit of the UN system, whether it’s peace and security or the humanitarian side or the development side or the rights driven side would undoubtedly argue for their great accomplishments within their own sort of individual paradigm. My sense is that what the UN has done without any argument in my view, over the last 75 years, is provided a single place where the entire international community can get together to discuss the great issues of the day (1) in discussion form and (2) to decide collective courses of action. That’s everything from pushing through the environmental statutes, to any of the many rights based things including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to helping resolve conflicts, including in places where UN peacekeepers had to be deployed, to on the development side, trying to make sure that we are not only addressing crises as emergencies, but we’re trying to build a sustainability model so that going forward, countries are more resilient and have the possibility of actually addressing themselves and when there’s been a tremendous amount of work that’s been done there as well. My sense is that ultimately what the UN brings is a collective response to issues that increasingly affect the entire planet. And that the individualized responses are actually quite important too. But driving that through the collective agenda that is in front of the UN through all of its subsidiary organs and bodies, is an approach that if it didn’t exist, we’d have to invent it. And my sense is that while the UN is, as all of humanity is, without a doubt, flawed in any number of ways, it still is the great hope of how we collectively can address problems that will be easier to solve for the entire planet pushing it rather than if it’s addressed on a on a unilateral basis.

VL: You were just talking about working with the entire planet — when you’re working in New York or in Western Sahara, are your co-workers or colleagues, are they from everywhere around the world? Or is it in America, you are working more with Americans?

NB: No, we’re from all over. In fact, traditionally, the United States is an underrepresented country in the United Nations. It doesn’t mean there aren’t a lot of Amer-
icans but the way that that works is you get the number of staff that generally are the amount that you pay, and since the UN pays — the US pays a huge amount of the US budget — there’s an expectation that it would thus have more staff. So we’re traditionally underrepresented, actually. I work in a small mission in a place called Western Sahara. I’m the Chief of Staff and I’m an American — my boss is the Special Representative of the Secretary General, he’s from the Russian Federation. The head of our support side of our mission was born in Rwanda, though she’s a naturalized American citizen now; our force commander is from Bangladesh. My deputy is from the United Kingdom. It’s one of the great strengths of the UN, when I say it represents the world, it’s not intellectual. It’s quite, quite practically that. It’s not that you only serve all over the world, it’s that you get to work with people, from all over the world. And one of the particular satisfactions that I’ve been fortunate enough to have in my career is that I began working for the UN in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which at the time could compete for the title of worst place in the world. And both those places now deploy forces to United Nations peacekeeping missions. I’m quite proud of having been a part of that.

AS: On that note, I found that the Western Sahara conflict is particularly interesting because it does not get a lot of international news attention. I’m just wondering if you can discuss what’s going on in Western Sahara? I know a lot’s going on, but very briefly, what’s the deal with the Moroccan occupation, the Sahrawis, etc. what are the steps going forward?

NB: I think one has to be really careful about how you characterize the conflict and I certainly wouldn’t agree as a MINURSO official with the concept that there’s a Moroccan occupation, for example. The conflict was exacerbated in November of 2020, when there was a breakdown in the ceasefire, which had largely held since 1991. Since then, Western Sahara has existed in a state of low intensity conflict with drone strikes occasionally from one side, exchanges of fire and a variety of other things in the situation is, at best, can be quite tense. I’m happy to report that the number of drone strikes over the last couple of months have gone down, and that’s a good thing. But nonetheless, as the Secretary General says in his report to the Security Council on this, it is a low intensity conflict — it’s a conflict. And that means that all of the ills associated with a conflict are things that we have to address and look at. MINURSO was created to try to do a couple of things: to do demining, to push forward confidence building measures between the parties, and to conduct a referendum. The to decide for the people of Western Sahara whether they wish to be a part of the Kingdom of Morocco or become independent. The referendum hasn’t happened. I’m happy to say that demining, which was paused after the breakdown of the ceasefire in November 2020, is likely to resume in the coming weeks. That’s a good thing, not just for the for because of the importance for local populations, but removing explosive remnants of war will have long term positive consequences for people that happen to live there. And in terms of confidence building measures, the actual Confidence Building Mea-
sures that we started with had been suspended for a period of time. What the mission
does is work with what’s called the personal envoy of the secretary general who’s a
man named Staffan de Mistura, and trying to work with the parties to try to promote
political settlement to the crisis under the auspices of a UN-driven project. We just
briefed the Security Council last week on this. There have been some developments
over the last couple of months that I would characterize as positive. We certainly hope
that those continue, hope that the low intensity conflict continues to pause, gratified
that the number of drone strikes has reduced, and trust that we will continue to be
allowed to to execute the important functions that we have contributing to peace and
stability in the entire region.

**AT:** Thank you, I thinkturning to, again, some of your prior experience, I think you
were spokesperson for the UN Mission in East Timor. I’m curious about how this
role fits into the hierarchy at the mission and what sorts of challenges you might have
faced communicating the UN’s message or maybe interacting and interfacing with
stakeholders on the ground. What does being a spokesperson entail that might be
different from the special representative?

**NB:** So the communications architecture that a public information/public affairs per
son is responsible for varies from mission to mission quite dramatically. In Western
Sahara, where I work now, there isn’t a whole lot of public diplomacy. We do quite a
bit behind the scenes with the parties, but we try as much as we can to avoid making a
great deal of public pronouncements. That’s not necessarily the case in other missions,
where we have a more robust communications profile. Thinking about our mission
Central African Republic, but you could have just as easily said Mali as well, and
others too. And in Western Sahara. It’s not the role of MINURSO, or our mission to
push public diplomacy. Our role is to report and to advise and to try to create better
analysis for decision makers and things like that. So we try to avoid having a public
profile, but we do find ways using our social media platforms for example, to tell sto-
ries of people, individual stories of people working within the MINURSO context to
show what it is that they’re doing. So we try to do a lot of image driven storytelling
there about people. And when I say people, I mean those that work for us, not local
populations. That’s dramatically different in other missions. In other missions, fre-
quently we will talk about impact tangibly on the ground. We’ll cover quick impact
projects that mission might be undertaking; we’ll focus on local populations and tell
their stories as well. It has to be calibrated based on this particular mission that you’re
in. The one commonality that I think I would phrase though having fairly recently
been in headquarters working in a communications capacity before I took this posi-
tion, is the importance of making sure that you are engaging in the digital space. We
don’t for example, in MINURSO, we try to avoid being news-driven. That’s not our
role. You will find a Twitter feed for us that talks about what we think about latest
developments; that’s not what we do. But what you will find is a brand new Instagram
account that we just launched. That has some nice pictures on it, that has good stories
on it, that has reels; you’ll find a new Flickr gallery that we just put up. Likewise, image driven. You will find a website that’s been recently, dramatically revamped and that has fresh content on it that highlights what it is that we do there on the ground, and that tries to continuously make the point of how important our mission is, in terms of observing, monitoring, reporting, and investigating but also promoting security not just in the territory of Western Sahara, but in the entire region.

AT: Thank you. I think turning to the more domestic side, there’s maybe growing but definitely salient isolationist tendencies or blocks and the United States that don’t necessarily believe that we should be participating on the global stage, who sort of lack confidence in the UN. We pulled out the World Health Organization, under the Trump administration. I’m curious about misconceptions that maybe you have seen about the United Nations. What should people know that they don’t already and if you want to have an opportunity to push back at some of the wrong ideas that might be out there?

NB: I’m actually reasonably optimistic about this issue. My experience is that every country goes through revolutions and how they think about multilateral bodies, and that’s up to them. How, and if you participate in international organizations is ultimately a sovereign decision and we fully respect that. Having said that, my personal opinion is that a strong and robust United Nations is in the United States’ interest. That’s my opinion. I’d point out that the United States pays a huge percentage of the UN’s budget and an even higher percentage of the UN peacekeeping budget. We have American officials leading major parts of the UN organizations, special funds, and programmes. In my mission we have not just not just me as the Chief of Staff, but indeed the Force Chief of Staff as a full American colonel serving there as well. The Americans have been super engaged on that file. My sense is that in general, for what it’s worth, again, my personal opinion is that the American system flourishes in an atmosphere of stability and predictability and a rules-based approach to how we engage with the rest of the planet. And I think that the United Nations plays an important role in promoting just that. So I would argue that a strong UN which was not just founded in the United States, but has always been affiliated with, identified with the US, is in Americans’ interest and in the interest of the American policy establishment, regardless of what party they come from. I’m optimistic that that will continue to be the case, regardless of whether or not the administration is of one party or the other.

VL: You’ve obviously had a career abroad, in East Timor, Western Sahara, all over the world. I was wondering if you could speak on if somebody’s interested in a career abroad, what that entails, the cultural differences, what the new life is like.

NB: Yeah, I mean, I think I’ve been incredibly fortunate. I’ve sort of been in the UN for a really long time now, for over 25 years. I’ve been incredibly fortunate to have the experiences that I’ve had. In many ways, my most memorable experiences have
all been overseas and all been in places that I’ve been deployed, like Liberia or Sierra Leone and Timor, Bosnia and Eritrea, Somalia. Being able to be a part of the tangible demonstration of the international community, trying to make things better is inspiring. I mean, we work for an organization, we in the UN, we work for an organization that’s purposed, purpose-driven, but also promotes international norms, standards, and fairness, and any number of things that I think you know, really motivated me. I am conscious of being incredibly lucky and privileged to have been able to work in all of these contexts and sure, like anything it has its frustrations; you’re far from home and you miss family members and things like that. But on the other hand, it is also a really remarkable career and a remarkable opportunity to try to make a difference tangibly, and not just to not just to talk about it, but to actually be doing it. So I consider myself incredibly fortunate.

**AT:** We’ve mentioned that you’ve served in the UN system for 25 years and the vast majority of that was peacekeeping, security operations. So I’m curious how you have seen peacekeeping, peacekeeping change over your career at the UN, and how you anticipate it might change in the future. Maybe the situations in which the Security Council authorizes action, where it hasn’t, what you’ve seen over your time.

**NB:** It’s a good question and one that I think about quite a bit. Peacekeeping missions are a product of the Security Council. And when the Security Council is divided and polarized as unfortunately it is many times right now, many of our files the Council can’t really seem to agree on a lot right now. When that’s the case, then it affects how we do what we do and it affects our ability to engage. We are only as good as our political masters. That’s kind of like a truism for us. My sense is that the Council understands the relevance of peacekeeping. We still are a big chunk of the UN’s budget, they understand how important it is to have that tangible demonstration not just of the commitment of the international community, but from all over the world, so that when you go to a peacekeeping mission, and you see troops from across an ocean engaging in a in a conflict — that that sends the message that the entire world and that then the international community, as reflected through the UN, has made a decision to do that. That manifestation sends a clear and unambiguous signal. But I think that for the council, everything is part of the same equation. And so when the relations between, for example the permanent members, are difficult for a variety of reasons, it reflects on their ability to not just make decisions but to be tangible about those decisions, for them to approve new missions or what have you. I think that in peacekeeping itself, the trend right now is towards smaller missions, not large, generally infantry-driven missions that we’ve had previously. Sometimes this gets called ‘boutique missions,’ but there are a couple of things that are reasonably consistent through them. An intention towards protection of civilians’ issues, for example, is something that you see in most mandates now that you didn’t previously. That’s important, but I think that peacekeeping is in a constant state of evolution. And in a constant state of trying to be innovative and to make sure that all of our missions are not cookie cut-
ter — that we don’t say because something worked in Mali, it’ll work in the Central African Republic. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, we had something called the Forced Intervention Brigade, which had a separate mandate, a more offensive mandate to go after armed groups that were destabilizing Eastern Congo — only for that mission. In the Central African Republic, we had something called the urgent temporary measures, which were only for that mission, which gave us essentially executive authority, powers of arrest and things like that. In Mali, we have a combat convoy escort company that was deployed only for Mali that escorts our supply convoys from one particularly dangerous place to another because they were constantly getting hit. All of those are operational approaches to addressing specific problems in an individualized context. And to me, that’s an example of peacekeeping kind of at its best — how each mission has its own peculiarities, but also its own problems that need to be addressed, and we should, at our best, create these individualized fit for purpose solutions to address those problems instead of looking at it as a whole. I think that there’s an understanding now in the UN peacekeeping community that that’s the future: increasingly fit for purpose missions that address specific aspects of a process and that don’t try to do absolutely everything.

**DF:** And just kind of to wrap up, do you have any advice for anyone going into any careers with government diplomacy and specifically, being in the field versus being at the headquarters seeing as you’ve done both?

**NB:** Learn foreign languages is the first thing. My experience has been that it’s very easy in the United States to get by speaking just one language. Maybe that’s not true in certain places in the United States, but it’s my experience and as soon as you leave our borders that diminishes. The expectation of you being able to communicate in a range of languages is one thing I would flag to people considering a career. Another is, there is in my opinion, no substitute for field work. That working at headquarters is necessary and useful. But being out on the ground where the needs are the greatest and being able to see the tangible manifestation of and the impact of what you’re doing brings a level of satisfaction that I think is something that I would flag to any young person thinking about going into this field of work. It’s great to be at a strategic headquarters, the work of the United Nations and of the multilateral system it represents is in the field and is driven by the needs of the field. So being a part of that, particularly when you’re young is, in my opinion, indispensable.

**AT:** Thank you. We’ve loved having you here, and we really appreciate your time, Mr. Birnback.

**NB:** Thank you. It’s been my pleasure.
HOW INTERSERVICE RIVALRY LED TO DIVIDED COMMAND IN THE WWII PACIFIC THEATER

Eleanor S. Sullivan

In March 1942, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established divided command between the Army and the Navy in the WWII Pacific theater. Army General Douglas MacArthur commanded the Southwest Pacific area, and Navy Admiral Chester Nimitz commanded the Pacific Ocean area. The three leading schools of thought on this issue involve the JCS attempting to increase chances of victory against Japan, personality problems between military officers, and interservice rivalry. I argue that interservice rivalry was the primary reason the JCS divided command. I support my argument by demonstrating that the JCS was in a position to know that divided command would hurt chances of victory, illustrating how personality problems may have arisen from interservice rivalries, and showing that neither the Army nor the Navy would accept unified command from the other service.

INTRODUCTION

In March 1942, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established divided command between the Army and the Navy in the WWII Pacific theater. Army General Douglas MacArthur commanded the Southwest Pacific area, and Navy Admiral Chester Nimitz commanded the Pacific Ocean area. Throughout the war, divided command resulted in duplication of effort, delayed decisions, and inefficient allocation of resources (Morton 1961, 250).

This paper examines why the JCS adopted an inefficient command structure in the Pacific. The three leading schools of thought on this issue involve the JCS attempting to increase chances of victory against Japan, personality problems between military officers, and interservice rivalry. I argue that interservice rivalry was the primary reason the JCS divided command. Prior work on this subject has not attempted to assign importance to each of these three explanations. My argument will contribute to this scholarship by claiming that interservice rivalry was more important than the other two explanations. I support my argument by demonstrating that the JCS was in a position to know that divided command would hurt chances of victory, illustrating how personality problems may have arisen from interservice rivalries, and showing that neither the Army nor the Navy would accept unified command from the other service.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Scholars in the rationalist school of thought argue that the JCS adopted divided command in the Pacific to increase U.S. chances of victory against Japan. For example, Phillip Meilinger argues that divided command increased flexibility for the commanders and U.S. war planners (Meilinger 2010, 156). Meilinger also argues that divided command put MacArthur and Nimitz in competition with each other, incentivizing

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Both leaders to exert more effort (Meilinger 2010, 156). Meilinger claims that divided command did not undermine coordination in the Pacific because Nimitz and MacArthur were still able to communicate about strategy.

Other scholars argue that personal conflicts between military officers led to divided command. For example, Kyle Beckman claims that General MacArthur, the leading candidate for commander of the Pacific in 1941, had a personality that infuriated many people (Beckman 2002, 20). MacArthur had a reputation for being egotistical and difficult to work with. John Gordon argues that JCS member Admiral King and many other military officers had personal problems with MacArthur (Gordon 2011, 315). During the 1941 Philippines defense, many perceived MacArthur as immature and antagonistic. Proponents of this school of thought argue that Admiral King and many other officers were unwilling to see him as the unified commander of the Pacific due to their personal problems with the General. Thus, the JCS split command between Nimitz and MacArthur to appease those who had personal conflicts with MacArthur.

Other scholars argue that divided command was the result of interservice rivalry between the Army and Navy. For example, Raymond W. Thorne points to the long-standing rivalry between the Army and the Navy as a reason neither service was willing to subordinate itself to the other (Thorne 1991). Instead, they reached an interservice compromise (Drew 1997, 2). Many scholars point to how specific service interests caused both the Army and the Navy to seek command in the Pacific. Ronald H. Spector and Thomas B. Buell argue that the Navy needed to maintain its superiority in the Pacific theater, and could not accept subordination to Army command. Leonard Mosley argues that the Navy especially could not accept subordination after the humiliation of Pearl Harbor (Mosley 1982, 485). Scholars such as Grace Person Hayes and Michael Stephen Sherry argue that the Army also could not accept subordination to the Navy, as they wanted to establish credibility in the Pacific theater and preserve control over their resources (Hayes 1982, 96). William H. Bartsch argues that the Army had an interest in proving themselves after their defeat in the Philippines (Bartsch 2012).

**Rationalist School of Thought**

While proponents of the rationalist school of thought claim that divided command increased flexibility and competition, I argue these outcomes were still possible under unified command. Proponents of the rationalist school of thought argue that by not choosing a single commander, U.S. planners were flexible to choose which commander would lead the offense later in the war. They argue this flexible command structure forced Japan to defend itself from offenses in both the South Pacific and Eastern Pacific. Meilinger argues this flexibility was an advantage for the U.S., as the Americans had more resources to fight multiple offenses than the Japanese did to defend against
multiple offenses. Meilinger also argues that divided command increased the commanders’ efforts in the war, as both commanders wanted to claim their command was responsible for defeating Japan. However, establishing a single supreme commander in the Pacific would not preclude the JCS from establishing sub-commanders to encourage flexibility and competition. These sub-commanders could still launch multiple offenses against Japan. For example, Admiral Nimitz was the supreme commander of the Pacific Ocean areas, but he oversaw three sub-command areas.

Proponents of the rationalist explanation also emphasize that the divided command structure did not preclude coordination between the commanders. Nimitz and MacArthur were encouraged to cooperate (Meilinger 2010, 153). The JCS established themselves as ‘supreme commander’ in the Pacific. The JCS were able to direct a coordinated strategy in the Pacific and resolve disagreements between the two commanders. The set-up for the European theater effectively modeled how coordination between different commanders was possible. Prior to the war, leaders of the Allied countries established the Combined Chiefs of Staff to develop a strategy for the war and designate specific tasks to commanders. Mellinger argues coordination between the commanders in the Pacific was easier than in Europe, as the United States had sole authority over the Pacific theater, and only had to coordinate with itself, rather than coordinating with Allies.

Contrary to the rationalist school of thought, I argue that decision-makers should have foreseen that divided command would weaken coordination of information. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Army and the Navy operated with divided command in the Pacific (Thorne 1991, 9). The Pearl Harbor attack came as a surprise to the military in part because of lack of communication between Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii. Army commanders assumed the Navy was conducting long-range reconnaissance, while Navy commanders assumed that the Army’s aircraft warning systems were activated (United States Government Printing Service 240-241). Both of those assumptions were inaccurate, but neither commander checked with the other one. This lack of information-sharing was likely to be repeated during the war, as the divided command structure also divided intelligence and logistics services for each commander (Garvin 2017, 32). One of the JCS members, General Marshall, recognized the implications of Pearl Harbor for command in the Pacific theater. “I am convinced that there must be one man in command of the entire theater,” he told the other JCS members after the attack on Pearl Harbor (Morton 1961, 160). Pearl Harbor also alerted President Roosevelt to the dangers of divided command, causing him to recommend to the JCS that they select a single commander for the Pacific theater (Hayes 1982, 93).

The JCS should have anticipated that divided command would reduce chances of victory against Japan by causing inefficient allocations of resources. Division of command also resulted in division of administrative work for allocating resources to the Pacific (Garvin 2017, 30). The Army and the Navy each had different systems for resource acquisition and supply in the beginning of 1942. The Navy’s supply sys-
tem was decentralized, and made decisions that were often impossible to calculate in advance. In contrast, the Army’s supply system was larger and more centralized. The Army and Navy utilized different shipping routes and ports. There was no channel in place for administrators in the Army and Navy to communicate about their supply shipments, creating redundancies in supplies and duplication of effort.

The JCS should have also anticipated that divided command would delay key decisions during wartime. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had four members. There was no head of the JCS, so all decisions had to be reached through lengthy debates attempting to find agreement among all members (Morton 1962, 250). The JCS supervised nine other committees including the Joint Intelligence Committee and Joint Strategic Survey Committee, limiting the amount of time they could devote to decision-making in the Pacific (Morton 1962, 231-232). The JCS was aware of how long they took to make decisions prior to the Pacific war. JCS member Admiral King refused to even send his initial draft of the proposal for divided command to the JCS because he thought deliberations would take too long (Hayes 1982, 99). He remarked that he wanted to “save the time that might be lost through the possibly prolonged discussions of the Planning Staff.” It took the JCS five weeks to make the final decision to utilize divided command in the Pacific (Morton 1961, 248). Delayed decisions would diminish the U.S.’s chances of victory, as Japanese forces advanced quickly. Japan captured the Admiralty Islands, Buka, Bougainville, Lae, and Salamaua in the five weeks before the JCS made the decision to divide command (Barlow 1994, 77).

**Personality Conflicts School of Thought**

While the personality conflicts school of thought correctly identifies personal problems between MacArthur and other military leaders, many of these conflicts arose from interservice rivalries. Most of General MacArthur’s conflicts arose between him and the Navy. For example, Naval Admiral Hart grew frustrated with MacArthur during the Philippines campaign because MacArthur repeatedly made false reports, and the Navy refused to support him (Gordon 2011, 315). Hart remarked that “Douglas [MacArthur] is no longer sane.” Similarly, Navy Lieutenant commander Knoll described MacArthur as “condescending” to the Navy throughout the Philippines campaign. The Navy was further offended by MacArthur’s refusal to grant any awards to Marine units that fought in the Philippines as he claimed, “the Marines had enough glory in World War I” (Thorne 1991, 47). MacArthur also insulted the Navy by claiming that “the term fleet cannot be applied to the elements of your command” (Thorne 1991, 10). Outside of the Navy, MacArthur was a popular figure. In WWI, the New York Times described MacArthur as “one of the ablest officers in the United States Army and one of the most popular” (Manchester 88). General Marshall respected MacArthur’s leadership (Mosley 1978, 485). Marshall remarked, “I don’t think I ever said an adverse word about General MacArthur” (Mosley 1978, 193). When MacArthur arrived in Australia in early 1942, he was met with a large celebration.

While personality problems likely influenced the JCS, historically, the Army
and Navy still divided command in instances when there were no personality conflicts. As far back as the American Civil War, there was divided command between the Union Army and Navy (Thorne 1991, 2). During World War I, military leadership proposed unifying Army and Navy command in Hawaii, but the proposal was rejected (Jablonsky 2010, 12-13). Again, in the interwar period, there were discussions of placing control of the Army and Navy under a single board, but these proposals were never adopted. Official doctrine outlining joint operations between the Army and the Navy prior to WWII called for cooperation between commanders rather than unity of command (Holzimier 2005, 102).

**Interservice Rivalry School of Thought**

The Army and the Navy had a long-standing rivalry. The War and Navy departments had been separated since 1798 (Sherry 1975, 30). The Army and Navy competed for budgets every year. Interservice rivalry was evident in major American military operations throughout history. In 1864 in the American Civil War, the Union Army, and the Navy blamed failed attacks on each other’s incompetence. During the Spanish-American War in 1898, Army commanders refused to engage in joint operations with the Navy. In WWI, leaders from each service had multiple disputes, as each service felt that their contributions to the war had not been adequately recognized.

The interservice rivalry between the Army and the Navy escalated in the years leading up to WWII. First, competition over budgets increased after WWI. A series of fiscally conservative presidents cut the budget, increasing competition for resources between the services (Huntington 1961, 40-52). President Calvin Coolidge, for example, cut the defense budget from over $1 billion to only $750 million (Huntington 1961, 40). National sentiment against increased militarization after WWI caused further restrictions on the services (Sherry 1975, 3). Budget cuts were especially difficult for the services in this time period, as the United States military was beginning to increase its global presence in the first half of the twentieth century (Daso 2014, 60). Second, the increasing importance of military aircraft during and after WWI escalated interservice rivalry. Both the Army and the Navy had their own air force divisions and wanted to emerge as the leading air power. Budget limitations meant that there was not enough money to modernize the air force of both the Army and the Navy (Wildenberg 2014). Throughout the interwar period, the Army and Navy had multiple disputes over which service’s air power should be prioritized.

Interservice rivalry within the Joint Chiefs of Staff contributed to their decision to divide command. The JCS was composed of two Army officers and two Navy officers (Drew 1997, 8). While JCS members were supposed to be neutral about their services, they regularly showed favoritism towards their own service (Porter 1978, 326). JCS members’ rank was based on the support of their service. If they acted in ways displeasing to their service, they could be removed. Service favoritism within the JCS was evident in their proposals to fight German submarines in early 1942. Naval Admiral King was a strong advocate of using the navy to conduct anti-submarine war-
fare (Thorne 1991, 37). Army Generals Marshall and Arnold, on the other hand, were strong advocates of using the Army’s air power to strike German U-boats. The JCS exhibited similar service biases when selecting commanders for the Pacific. Marshall was a strong advocate for MacArthur as the sole commander of the region, while King advocated for a Navy commander (Drew 1997, 2).

The Navy was unwilling to cede their preeminent position in the Pacific by subordinating themselves to an Army commander. The Pacific theater had traditionally been viewed as a “special preserve” of the Navy (Spector 1985, 206). From the 1920s, the Navy led strategic planning for a “primarily naval” war against Japan (Hayes 1982, 4). Japan was an island nation, thus any major offense against it had to involve amphibious warfare (Barlow 1994, 77). The Navy argued that only their commanders had sufficient technical knowledge of amphibious warfare to adequately lead the Pacific campaign. After twenty years of preparation for a naval war in the Pacific and claiming that only the Navy had the expertise to lead, ceding the entire theater to Army command would undermine the Navy’s credibility (Buell 1980, 173).

The Navy especially needed to maintain preeminence in the Pacific after their humiliation at Pearl Harbor. The Navy lost eight of their nine Pacific battleships and over 2,000 men during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The Navy perceived this attack a humiliation for their service (Beckman 2002, 6). The Navy was further humiliated by the blame placed on them after the attack. President Roosevelt chose to turn the Navy into a scapegoat for the attack, rather than the Army (Mosley 1982, 184). Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Kimmel received most of the blame for the attack (Drew 1997, 10). He was fired and replaced by Admiral Nimitz. Admiral King was especially bitter about the firing of Kimmel. He remarked that if Kimmel were to be fired, Marshall and the Army commanders would also have to be fired. Public newspapers reported that the Navy’s incompetence was responsible for the attack (Thorne 1991, 16). The Navy wanted to lead the war against Japan both to enact revenge for Pearl Harbor and to prove themselves against the Army (Beckman 2002, 6).

The Army also could not cede the Pacific theater to the Navy without damaging its credibility. MacArthur was the senior commander in the Pacific (Hayes 1982, 96). The Army did not want to subordinate themselves to a lower-ranked commander. Moreover, Army commanders resented that the Navy treated the Pacific theater as their own “rightful domain” (Thorne 1991, 45). The Army led war planning for a land-based defense of Australia and other South Pacific allies after WWI (Hayes 1982, 4). Thousands of Army troops had already been placed in the South Pacific, and the Army did not want to switch their command to a Naval officer (Morton 1961, 10). The Army needed to regain credibility in the Pacific after defeat in the Philippines in 1941 and 1942. Despite multiple reports citing deteriorating conditions in the Philippines in 1940, General Marshall made the decision to continue the military’s defense of the Philippines (Bartsch 2012, 12). MacArthur committed the U.S. military to defend the entire Philippines, rather than just the forces at Manila Bay. In February
of 1942, it became clear to many military and governmental officials that the U.S. would suffer defeat in the Philippines (Gordon 2011, 190). MacArthur, however, refused to withdraw. MacArthur’s decision not to evacuate the Philippines resulted in the loss of hundreds of Americans and thousands of Filipino lives (Manchester 1978, 233). MacArthur pledged that he would return to liberate the Philippines (MacArthur 2012). To follow through on its commitment and regain credibility after its defeat, the Army wanted to lead the campaign to liberate the Philippines from Japan (Hayes 1982, 99). When drafting the zones of control, Marshall explicitly asked that the Philippines be included in MacArthur’s sphere.

The Army also wanted a command in the Pacific to protect its resources. Army officials resented that the Navy had a larger budget almost every year (Sherry 1975, 23). To expand their post-war budget, Army officials wanted to prove that they were as vital to national security as the Navy. They especially wanted to prove their capabilities as an air power to justify post-war expansion of aviation budgets. Army leaders feared that they would be forced to hand over their B-17s, their most valuable form of air power, to the Navy if the Navy had command (Morton 1961, 10). Army leaders also feared that Naval command would result in more casualties for the Army. Navy commanders’ strategy was to take Pacific islands and have Army forces hold the islands. This strategy would cost the Army resources and soldiers (Thorne 1991, 48).

**CONCLUSION**

One weakness in my argument is that it does not account for the role President Roosevelt played in the decision to adopt divided command. While the JCS drew up the proposal for divided command, President Roosevelt signed it off (Cook Jr 1978, 55-61). The JCS was influenced by interservice rivalries due to its structure, but President Roosevelt was largely insulated from the rivalries. Thus, it is puzzling why he agreed to this command structure. Future research can investigate possible explanations for President Roosevelt’s decision to agree to divided command.

My argument has two implications for future decision-makers. First, future war planners must keep in mind how service allegiances may cause them to act against the national security interests of the United States. While some degree of interservice rivalry is inevitable, decision-makers must be able to set aside service favoritisms in situations critical to American national security. The United States was still able to win in the Pacific WWII theater with a divided command structure, but delayed decisions and weakened coordination cost U.S. soldiers their lives and resulted in a more costly war. Second, decision-makers should investigate reforms to reduce interservice rivalries. These could include unifying some of the leadership of the Army and Navy, increasing joint training, and finding ways to reduce competition over budgets and weapons. In future wars, if decision-makers continue to prioritize service biases over national security, interservice rivalry may prevent the United States from winning.


How Interservice Rivalry Led to Divided Command in the WWII Pacific Theater


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Russia’s Use of Subversion in its Near Abroad: A Critical Analysis

Jahnavi Sodhi

Russia heavily relies on subversion as a tool of statecraft to respond to the threat of Western expansionism, as well as to restore its status as a great power. It uses a variety of methods to subvert its targets, including military attacks, disinformation campaigns, and cyberattacks. Subversion allows Russia to violate the sovereignty of its targets at a low cost, while maintaining plausible deniability. While Russia’s use of subversion has not always been successful, it still poses a serious threat to US strategic interests, and the US must not ignore it as it pivots towards Asia.

Introduction

Although the Cold War ended in 1991, Russia continues to view its position in the global order as one that is threatened by Western expansionism. This realist worldview significantly shapes Russian foreign policy today, especially in its near abroad. Over time, one of the tools Russia has grown to rely heavily upon to achieve its objectives is subversion, or the act of interfering in the domestic politics of another state without its consent (Wohlforth and Kastner 2021, 119). By doing so, it violates their sovereignty and coerces them into pursuing policies that align with its interests. In this paper, I will argue that Russia uses subversive tactics in its near abroad primarily in response to what it perceives as the threat of Western expansionism, along with an overarching desire to regain its great power status.

What Drives Russian Subversion?

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia sought to integrate the post-Soviet states within new structures such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), to counter growing Western expansionism, and restore its great power status in the process, especially once it became evident that the US would not allow Russia a place in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Tsygankov 2019, 105-116). Today, it assesses an operational environment in which US-backed regime change threatens its security and requires active or extended defense, not just deterrence (Kofman 2020). Thus, Russia’s policy towards its near abroad involves a zero-sum calculus that calls for the spread of its spheres of influence in the region, and the establishment of buffer zones against NATO (Kofman 2020). Stemming from its self-image as a providential power that must act as a conservative leader in its neighborhood, Russia also seeks to revive its fading status as a great power (Kofman 2019). Therefore, it is in pursuit of these objectives that Russia employs the use of hostile measures in the post-Soviet space.

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Nonetheless, alternate explanations of Russia’s use of subversion are worth consideration. At the domestic level, Russian subversion is often equated with a desire to divert attention from its failures at home (Götz 2017, 228-253). However, this does not explain why Russia tends to pursue an aggressive policy abroad at times when its economy is recovering and the popularity of its leadership is booming, or why it would risk sanctions and isolation when it seeks regime security in the long-run (Götz 2017, 235). Alternatively, the individual level of analysis prioritizes Putinism as being the primary driving force of Russian foreign policy (Götz 2017, 230). Yet again, this explanation falls short as Putin is not free from domestic decision-making pressures (Götz 2017, 231). Additionally, Russia’s active measures in its near abroad did not begin with Putin—different policymakers in Russia have advocated for similar courses of action (Götz 2017, 232). Thus, I would argue that Russia’s geostrategic environment, and its desire for great power status, provide the most compelling explanation for its actions, with other factors being only supplemental at best.

However, scholars critical of the realist lens when examining Russian subversion contest that it does not explain Russia’s policies towards China, which is likely to pose a greater threat to Russia than NATO, given its geographical proximity and economic influence (Götz 2017, 240). However, I would argue that NATO and the EU pose a more immediate threat to Russian legitimacy in its neighborhood, and that Russia is more secure in its relations with China than with the West. While China is a major trading partner for many post-Soviet states, the EU is still a more lucrative prospect for them. Similarly, NATO remains the world’s strongest and most powerful alliance (SHAPE, n.d.). Moreover, China does not seem to pose as much of a threat to Russia as it does an opportunity to divert the West’s attention and allow Russia to pursue its malign activities abroad (Wohlforth 2022). Another line of criticism involves Russia’s rather muted response to NATO’s invitation to the Baltic states in the late 1990s, and their subsequent accession in 2004 (Wohlforth 2022). However, Russia’s lack of overt action does not indicate a flaw in the realist argument, for Russia was only responding in a manner reflective of its economic and military capabilities at the time (Wohlforth 2022). In fact, this episode only further incentivized Russia to use subversion.

Similarly, those unconvinced by the ideational explanation of Russia’s near abroad policy question why it has differed over time in its assertiveness, if it is indeed driven by matters of status and prestige (Götz 2017, 235). However, I would argue that the desire to restore Russia’s great power status has been a fairly consistent theme in Russian politics, and the variations in its policy can merely be attributed to differing interpretations of its desired status, and appropriate ways of achieving the same underlying objective (Tsygankov 2019). For example, both the Westernizers and the Statists sought to shape Russia’s role in the world as a relevant power after the breakup of the USSR, but only the latter saw an important role for Russia’s near abroad in achieving the same (Tsygankov 2019, 68). Others question the logic behind why Russia would continue to use subversion in its near abroad as a means of regaining its status when
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Russia’s actions merely reflect a path dependency that does not take away from the ultimate motive behind its policy.

**How Does Russia Deploy Hostile Measures?**

Russia has used multiple tools to carry out subversion in its near abroad. The oldest of these includes the use of military means. For example, in 2013-2014, Russia used its intelligence agencies like the GRU, along with non-governmental proxies like the Wagner Group, to crackdown on protests after the ousting of Viktor Yanukovych (Radin, Demus, and Marcinek 2020, 9). It also tried to coerce Ukraine into federalizing by launching a raid in Donbass, in a bid to reverse its move towards integrating with the West (Kofman 2016). Another tactic it has used frequently involves backing political movements abroad that either explicitly support the Russian agenda, or align closely with it (Radin, Demus, and Marcinek 2020, 11). Since 1994, Russia has used its intelligence agencies and proxies to carry out disinformation campaigns, along with providing direct support for candidates in Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine (Way 2018). It has even implemented regime change—in 2010, Russia gave the green signal for the removal of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev in Kyrgyzstan, after he reversed his stance on removing the US military presence at Manas airport (Starr and Cornell 2020).

Russia also uses its economic influence in the region as leverage to assert its dominance as a great power. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited most of its industrial infrastructure, making many post-Soviet countries dependent on it for their energy supplies. Thus, it has used both “carrots” and “sticks” as levers, to offer lucrative subsidies and withdraw access to oil resources respectively, as and when required. For example, in 2006, Russia cut off oil supplies to Lithuania when it decided to sell the Mazeikiai refinery to a Polish company (Radin, Demus, and Marcinek 2020, 12). Similarly, in 2014, Russian energy giant Gazprom was suspected of supporting anti-fracking protests in Moldova (Higgins 2014). Russia has also deployed the use of cyberattacks against its neighboring states. In 2007, it targeted government owned entities like banks and state media in Estonia, and in 2015 a Russian group was attributed with directing an attack on a Ukrainian power grid (Radin, Demus, and Marcinek 2020, 15). These tools are often used in conjunction to achieve maximum effect—in 2014, Russia exerted diplomatic pressure on Ukraine, supported armed separatists, unleashed a large-scale false information campaign, and raised gas prices (Radin, Demus, and Marcinek 2020, 16).

**Russia’s Cost-Benefit Analysis**

For Russia, there are significant benefits to using subversion, as opposed to more overt forms of warfare, which explain its reliance on this measure. Primarily, subversion is a relatively low-cost tool, and Russia’s economic and military strength is waning relative to the US. It is also less risky than conventional warfare, as it can be adjusted fairly
rapidly in response to external developments (Wohlforth and Kastner 2021, 123). Most importantly, however, subversion is “less visible, which reduces the likelihood of detection. And when it is detected, ambiguity permits plausible deniability” (Lee 2019). This explains why Russia has been able to use subversion in its neighborhood without suffering detrimental consequences.

However, there are real costs associated with subversion as well for Russia. It can lead to escalation, especially when certain red-lines are crossed, while also reducing trust among powers, thereby exacerbating the security dilemma (Lee 2019). Hostile measures are also especially controversial, as they infringe upon the sovereignty of the nation being attacked—Russia’s actions have repeatedly invited international scrutiny in the form of sanctions and exclusion.

**Subversion: Successful or Not?**

Russia’s experience with the use of hostile measures has yielded mixed results. It has achieved tangible success in terms of coercing its neighbors—for example, after the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Armenia sought full membership of the Eurasian Union (Gill & Young, 322). To an extent, it has also been successful in preventing further NATO expansion. Nonetheless, where Russian subversion has failed to a great extent is in making Russia a regional power. Its use of hostile measures has pushed some of these post-Soviet countries further away from it, towards seeking NATO protection instead, even if they can no longer realistically become members: after 2014, Ukraine increasingly sought closer ties with NATO (until 2022 when Russia traded the use of hostile measures for direct warfare). Additionally, while Russia focused on keeping its neighbors away from Western institutions, they formed alternative institutions guided by democratic values like the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development for Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, and the Community of Democratic Choice and the Eastern Partnership, which brought the EU and these former Soviet republics closer, contrary to Russian efforts to assert its dominance in the region (Ofitserov-Belskiy and Sushenstov 2018, 283).

**Policy Recommendations**

Russia has evidently become more aggressive in its policy towards its neighborhood. The very nature of subversion as a covert tool of statecraft enables Russia’s boldness—Russian-backed cyberattacks in Estonia show that it is not deterred by collective defense arrangements when it comes to the use of subversive tactics, given the flexibility they afford the attacker. It has also been willing and able to extend the use of subversion beyond its neighborhood—in 2016, Russia shocked the world by interfering in the American presidential elections (Abrams 2019). Thus, there is no guarantee that it will not get even bolder if the US were to remain silent. Moreover, ignoring Russia’s use of subversion is dangerous because it is clear that at times this tool can only be a stepping stone for Russia, and it is willing to escalate matters as far as it thinks is required—the ongoing Ukraine war is a case in point. And, of course, Russia’s actions
have been extremely de-stabilizing to the world order America has spent years creating and defending.

Given this assessment, I propose a three-pronged strategy for the United States to follow to address the challenge of Russian subversion. Firstly, America needs to take the consequences of its actions seriously. It is evident that Russia scales up its use of subversion whenever it perceives an increased threat of Western expansionism. For example, NATO’s 1994 “Partnership for Peace” program and the US’ opening of military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan after 9/11 evoked negative reactions from Russia (Omelicheva 2018, 326). Another example includes Russia’s switch from subversion to direct war against Georgia less than six months after the 2008 Bucharest Summit, when NATO proclaimed Georgia and Ukraine would soon become members (Dickinson, 2021). Similarly, in 2021, NATO’s shipment of weapons and exercises with Ukraine threatened a confrontation with Russia (Mearsheimer 2022). According to prospect theory, if the West continues to isolate and humiliate Russia by excluding it from the post-Cold War European security structure it has sought to be a part of for so long, while seeking to integrate other post-Soviet states, Russia’s perceived losses will only push it towards taking greater risks. This implies that America has to be extremely strategic in the way it shapes NATO’s open-door policy, given that “major powers, regardless of their ideological bent, don’t like it when other major powers stray into their neighborhoods” (Kupchan 2022). Thus, while NATO can incorporate nations important to its strategic interests, “it should not make countries strategically important by extending them security guarantees” (Kupchan 2022). It is important to note that an American policy aimed at correcting the West’s record of provoking Russian aggression is not necessarily a concession. Rather, it reflects an accurate assessment of Russia’s behavior and will allow for an effective counter-strategy.

Following this acceptance, the US must aim at improving the defensive capabilities of these countries, rather than arming them with conventional weapons, which will only worsen the offense-defense distinguishability. Such measures would include investing in cybersecurity infrastructure, media literacy, and finding alternative sources of oil and gas supplies for these countries, which can be used as a backup in case of Russian aggression, as well as accelerating energy transitions to sustainable sources—a process in which Russia can be incorporated as a partner to minimize threat perceptions (Miriam et al. 2021; Kupchan 2022). Russia is able to exert its economic leverage given that it knows its neighbors are highly dependent on it and lack alternate sources of supply – it is this asymmetry the US needs to correct. However, such alternate supply lines must not seek to completely replace Russia as a trading partner for these nations.

And finally, the US must work towards addressing the ambiguity surrounding the use of hostile measures. It must concentrate on formulating global norms that clearly define and identify subversion as a tool of statecraft, allow for rapid attribution, and establish red-lines, in order to reduce the scope for plausible deniability that subversion affords to the aggressor, and discourage its unfettered use (Radin, Demus, and
CONCLUSION

Russia is increasingly relying on subversion as a means of responding to what it perceives as Western expansionism in its neighborhood, and to regain its status as a great power. In doing so, it is violating the sovereignty of its neighbors – one of the most important tenets of international relations today. Not surprisingly then, Russia’s actions have become extremely de-stabilizing to the liberal world order America has a strategic interest in protecting. There has been a tendency in the recent past to overlook Russia’s actions, given the decline in interstate conflict with the prevalence of nuclear deterrence (Lee 2019).

However, according to the stability-instability paradox, the more stable the nuclear deterrence between the US and Russia, the more likely it is that the latter will engage in indirect forms of warfare, including hybrid or subversive tactics. Hence, despite Russia’s flawed track record with subversion, it would be highly naive for America to undermine this threat to its strategic interests in Eurasia. Therefore, as the US seeks a pivot towards Asia amidst the rise of China, it cannot afford to be distracted by Russia.
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SHAPING NEW REALITIES:
UNPACKING THE ROLE OF PERCEPTIONS AND MISPERCEPTIONS IN THE 1962 SINO-INDIA WAR
Arpita Wadhwa

The craft of nation building is often tasked with the frictions of territorial conflicts. To establish the legitimacy of a nation, control over its borders becomes rather crucial. The 1962 war between India and China is one such example of territorial conflict that shaped Indo-Sino relations. Much of International Relations (IR) scholarship has examined the role of socio-political and economic developments—such as the role of political leaders, civil-military relations, and domestic actors—as the primary causes of the war. Stemming from political psychology, this paper takes a rather unconventional approach in arguing that the key causes of the war were shaped by the perceptions and misperceptions held by the states about each other and themselves. Through a theoretical analysis of historic texts on Indo-Sino relations, the Tibet issue, and domestic actors, the paper brings to spotlight concepts of ‘uncertainty’, ‘misperceptions’, and ‘unpredictability’ in shaping up the war.

INTRODUCTION
At the heart of Sino-Indian relations lies the question of territorial disputes. Marked by the memories of 1962, academic spotlight on India and China has extensively engaged in trying to unpack the causes that made this war inevitable. Much of the scholarship holds the notion that socio-political and economic developments such as the role of political leaders, civil-military relations, as well as domestic actors were the causal factors underpinning the war. It is this notion that this paper seeks to puncture. By rooting its analysis in political psychology, this paper shifts the focus to how developments in Indo-China were ‘perceived’ and argues that the key causes of the 1962 war were a result of the perceptions and misperceptions that the states held about each other and themselves. To argue so, the paper has been divided into three broad sections. First, by analysing the historical roots of India and China, it will highlight the role of their colonial past in resulting in misperceptions about the other. Second, by focusing on the Tibet issue, it will bring out the role of unpredictability and uncertainty about the other’s actions as being the breeding ground for misperceptions that make war inevitable. Lastly, the paper will conclude by analysing the role of domestic actors in shaping as well as being influenced by such misperceptions, resulting in actions that shaped new realities which ultimately lead to the outbreak of war.

I. POST-IMPERIAL IDEOLOGIES AND VICTIMHOOD: MISPERCEPTIONS DUE TO COLONIALISM
The imperative step to understand the war of 1962 is to trace it to its past. Marked by the experiences of colonialism, both nations had memories of humiliation and sufferings of imperial rule. While India stepped into the international order with a crippled

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political and economic system, the Chinese echoed these sentiments and considered themselves to be out of the Japan’s “bainian gouchi” (century of torture) (Miller 2009, 216). Manjhari Miller, in Recollecting Empire, argues that the implications of such memories of the colonial past give rise to Post-Imperial Ideologies (PIIs) whose characteristics are two-fold. The first level is the perception of the self. On entering the international order, exhibiting striking scars of the colonial past, both India and China attached notions of victimhood to themselves. Nehru argued that there was an urgency in carving out ways for “relating as equals to the richer powers,” and in a similar vein, multiple Chinese accounts emphasised on their “consciousness of suffering” as being the binding glue that brings them together (Miller 2009, 225). The immediate result of this self-victimisation was the increased focus on territory. As post-colonial states, India and China faced territorial loss, leading to actions after the independence that aimed at either preserving newly carved territories, or maximising the territorial reach. Such actions were further accentuated by the template of the Westphalian State which prescribed sovereignty and bounded territory as being the key components of any modern state (Guang 2004, 408). Mirroring this template, both the states could be seen to affirm their sense national-identity by tightening the grip on their territories. Several accounts of the PRC from the 1960s reflect such a post-imperial ideology by insisting on the role of statehood and bounded territory as being the marker of its national identity (Guang 2004, 408).

The second implication of the memories of the colonial past can be conceptualised at the level of the (mis)perception of the ‘other’. Brewing from the victimisation of the self, post-imperial ideologies target the existence of any ‘other’ as a threat to its existence. Such misperceptions are rooted in a ‘worst-case analysis’ framework (Posen 1993, 29). This framework suggests the identification of the other in terms of the worst possible offence, depending on their capabilities of military strength, political and economic prowess. The implementation of such a framework can be seen in developments much earlier than the 1960s. John Garver, in his analyses of the 1962 war, echoes this framework by highlighting the misperception by China of the 1951 Indo-US agreement. Despite being just a “mutual defence assistance” that transferred military supplies to India, China misperceived the agreement in terms of the worst-case analysis and painted it as a proof for India’s alliance with the US (Garver 2004, 17). Such misperceptions, rooted in the worst-case possible framework continued to increase the misperception of India as being the ‘threat’—and thus, became the foundational reason that spiralled into the ultimate misperception in 1962—wherein China misperceived India’s mere intransigence on the border issue as being a threat to its very identity and existence, resulting in the launch of an attack.

While memories and information about the past play an integral role in shaping perceptions and forming new realities, it is also often the case that the lack of information about other states causes friction, resulting in misperception of the other as a threat and making war inevitable. The Tibet issue is a stellar example of how misperceptions can be formed due to the lack of information.
II. THE CASE OF TIBET: MISPERCEPTIONS DUE TO LACK OF INFORMATION

Published in the 1990s, Chinese Studies of the 1962 war argue that the root cause of China’s attack can be traced back to the issue of Tibet and India’s stance vis-à-vis the Chinese occupation of it (Garver 2006, 89). India’s approach to Tibet was rather complex and unclear. On the one hand, it offered a helping hand to China’s efforts in establishing control. By refusing to sponsor a Tibetan plea to the United Nations in 1950, instead persuading the Dalai Lama to negotiate with the Chinese government and even officially recognising Chinese control, it painted a picture of allegiance and commitment to China (Garver 2006, 89). On the other hand, India also covertly supplied arms to the Tibet government, protested against Beijing’s occupation, and upheld the rights of Indians in Tibet such as those on telecommunication and trading missions (Garver 2006, 91). During the Lhasa uprising in 1959, despite the insistence of Chinese officials that India refrain intervening in the region, India did not wash its hands from the matter and was even actively engaged in supporting so-called “anti-Chinese activities”—including granting asylum to the Dalai Lama and thousands of other Tibetians seeking refuge, permitting public and critical commentary about the Tibet issue within the Indian parliament, and refusing to quash negative coverage of China by Indian media (Garver 2006, 89).

It is imperative to note that, while India’s initial support for the Chinese government’s actions was rooted in the assumption that it would eventually respect Tibetan autonomy, India’s inconsistent actions resulted in a general lack of clarity and misrepresentations regarding what India really stood for. It is this misinformation and lack of clarity over India’s position that resulted in the misperception that India was a threat to China. Janice Stein, in Threat Perception in International Relations, employs the concept of ‘signals’ to describe the role of clarity (or the lack thereof) in making states go to war (Stein 2013, 2). Her concept suggests that, when actions are undertaken using information that is unclear (or, in this case, inconsistent), they act as incomplete signals that can be (mis)perceived as a threat by the agent receiving the information because incomplete information constitutes within itself every possibility—even that of an attack (Stein 2013, 4). In the case of the Sino-India dispute, India’s lack of clarity was misperceived as being a ‘signal’ of India’s intention to overpower China. The penultimate result of this misperceived threat was the wrongful perception of India and its leaders (e.g., Nehru) as the “complete successors” of the British who aimed to colonise or control Tibet (Garver 2006, 88). This misperception was bolstered by the implementation of the Forward Policy, which cemented the image of India as a threat to China’s existence, resulting in further escalation under uncertainty.

At this juncture, it is important to consider one argument against the applicability of the framework of perceptions and misperceptions to determine the causes of war: that it conveniently strips agency from high-ranking officials and leaders who in fact have massive influence in shaping the developments leading up to war. While drawing on the role of leaders and their actions in shaping state behavior, Stein
describes domestic and bureaucratic actors as capable of producing pathologies that shape their problems in a way that advances their own interests (Stein 2013, 5). One such process of domestic actors shaping their problems in a self-serving way is ‘projection.’ As outlined by John Garver, projection is the process of transferring responsibility from one individual onto another, highlighting the difficulty and discomfort of dealing with the consequences of one’s actions (Garver 2006, 89). Puncturing the strength of the perception-misperception framework, the concept of ‘projection’ could thus be used to argue that the Tibet issue was a mere projection on India by Chinese leaders who had their own anxieties and fear regarding their inept control over Tibet, ultimately resulting in the construction of India as a threat to China that could have only been mitigated through war.

However, to establish the strength of the perception-misperception framework, especially vis-à-vis domestic actors, it is imperative to trace the actions of these domestic actors across both sides of the border—to assess whether the rationale that underpinned their decisions was a function of projection or misperceptions.

III. The Role of Domestic Actors: Projection or (Mis)Perception?
To understand the robustness of the perception-misperception framework in explaining the outbreak of war, the following two considerations are necessary. First is understanding that domestic actors (e.g., bureaucratic leaders, high-ranking officials) do not exist in a vacuum, but are in fact deeply embedded and influenced by their context. Second, due to this embeddedness of actors within their contexts, the actions of highly influential domestic actors (e.g., China’s Mao) are not isolated from misperceptions due to colonialism or a lack of information but are instead reflective of such phenomena. John Garver, while laying out the causes of the 1962 war, focuses on the tendency of Mao to ‘perceive’ his opponents (especially Nehru) as having malevolent intentions (Garver 2004, 11). Such an attribution, which incorrectly ascribes individuals’ actions to their perceived ‘intentions’—as opposed to the characteristics of the situations in which they are placed—is a form of ‘fundamental attribution error’ culminating in misperception (Garver 2006, 88). Mao’s misperception of Nehru led to him falsely concluding that Nehru was seeking to seize or colonise Tibet was one of these fundamental attribution errors; Mao erroneously perceived Nehru’s critique of China’s occupation of Tibet as reflective of Nehru’s interest in the territory as opposed to the situation in which Nehru was placed.

The story of misperceptions can be seen playing out in India as well, specifically in terms of their (mis)calculations of Chinese actions. In one example of its fundamental attribution error, the Indian leadership did not ascribe actions of attack, and violence to China because it failed to attribute China’s actions to the situation in which it was placed. Rather, India attributed it to China’s shift leftward on the political spectrum and its weak grounds on the use of violence to believe that China would never retaliate against India’s forward policy (Niu 2005). Had this misperception and miscalculation of the fundamental attribution error not occurred, the “surprise at-
“tack” that India ultimately faced on the 20th of October could have been predicted in early-September through a proper analysis of Peking’s behaviour and the situation at hand (Whiting 1985, 803-804).

V. CONCLUSION: NAVIGATING MISPERCEPTIONS AND CARVING PATHS OF COOPERATION

To believe that states ‘perceive’ the developments around them in objective terms would be a false claim. By unpacking the key causes of the Sino-India war in 1962 under the framework of perception-misperceptions, this paper argued that the way states perceive themselves, and (mis)perceive others shapes narratives, stories, and realities that push for actions like that of the war in 1962. As rising powers, the cooperation of India and China is essential for regional as well as global stability. As this paper suggests, misperceptions that prevent cooperation have their roots deep in history that trace back to colonialism. While that implies that misperceptions may remain conspicuously present, it is imperative to carve out areas of reducing the anxieties it germinates through dialogue, policies and initiatives that are aimed at navigating our way out of the web of misperceptions.
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HOW NEHRU’S OPTIMISM LED TO THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE KASHMIR ISSUE

Jahnavi Sodhi

In January 1948, India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, decided to take the issue of Pakistan’s support for armed tribesmen invading Kashmir to the United Nations (UN). This decision remains controversial till date, given that it internationalized a bilateral dispute. One explanation that has been proposed for Nehru’s behavior is that it was mainly a result of Mountbatten’s influence. Another possible explanation is that the decision resulted from a rational cost-benefit analysis. However, in this paper, I show that while Mountbatten’s influence was important, it was not the deciding factor for Nehru’s decision and that the decision by itself was not a rational one to begin with. I proceed to argue that Nehru approached the UN because he was overly optimistic about India’s chances of success, a function of his naivety.

INTRODUCTION

In October 1947, armed tribesmen backed by Pakistan invaded the then-independent princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Following this, the Maharaja of the State acceded to India, in exchange for the Indian army’s assistance in driving out the invaders. As the situation deteriorated, Nehru decided to take the issue of Pakistan’s support for the raiders to the UN, instead of attacking their bases in Pakistan, even though there was no guarantee that the UN would support India and condemn Pakistan. In doing so, Nehru internationalized a bilateral dispute for years to come.

In this paper, I will analyze Nehru’s decision to take the Kashmir issue to the UN. While some scholars attribute Nehru’s decision primarily to Lord Mountbatten’s influence, a more rationalist explanation for Nehru’s actions focuses on the appeal as a reasonable gamble. However, I will argue that Nehru took the Kashmir issue to the UN because he overestimated the chances of India’s success. I will support my argument by explaining that Mountbatten’s role, while important, was not the deciding factor; by showing that Nehru was in a position to know that appealing to the UN would not maximize India’s strategic interests in Kashmir; and by demonstrating that it was Nehru’s naivety that led him to overestimate India’s chances of success.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Historically, scholars have attributed Nehru’s decision to take the Kashmir issue to the UN primarily to Mountbatten’s influence. For example, Sarvepalli Gopal claims that “Mountbatten succeeded in persuading [Nehru] to refer the Kashmir problem to the United Nations” (Gopal 1979, 21-23). Similarly, C. Dasgupta and Naren-
dra Singh Sarila argue that Nehru “reluctantly agreed” to a compromise in the face of Mountbatten’s non-cooperation and threats to leave India (Dasgupta 2006, 372). Finally, Amiya and B.G. Rao claim that Mountbatten “had a way with Nehru” and that Nehru dismissed the views of his colleagues, who doubted the decision to take the dispute to the UN, in favor of Mountbatten’s requests (Rao and Rao 1974, 271). Nehru shared close relations with Mountbatten, with the latter having been described as Nehru’s “intimate friend and trusted advisor” (Brecher 2015, 240-261). Additionally, Mountbatten had a vested interest in avoiding an inter-dominion war at all costs, for it would go against British interests in the subcontinent, and raise doubts about his competency as Governor-General. Therefore, according to these scholars, it was Mountbatten who played the most crucial role in Nehru’s decision-making process, given his personal relations with Nehru and his interest in the conflict.

It can also be argued that Nehru decided to take the Kashmir issue to the UN because he believed the benefits of doing so justified taking the gamble. Nehru wanted to avoid war with Pakistan at all costs. He did not believe any war between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, despite India’s military superiority in absolute terms, would be favorable to India given its limited lines of communication, the winter climate, and the mountainous terrain. As Nehru explained, “[India’s] main objective in the Kashmir State at present is to rid it of the invader and to establish peace, law, and order” (Gopal 1979, 306). Moreover, India’s appeal to the UN stressed “the special urgency of the Security Council taking immediate action on their request” given how rapidly the military situation in Kashmir was changing (Gopal 1979, 383). Nehru believed that the UN could promptly condemn Pakistan for its aggression and pressurize it to stop supporting the invaders, hence averting war (Kennedy 2012; Gopal 1979, 171). Thus, he considered approaching the UN as a means to exhaust all peaceful options, and the “best course” of action available (Dasgupta 2002, 100; Gopal 1979, 392).

Lastly, it has been argued that Nehru decided to appeal to the UN because he overestimated India’s chances of India’s success at the UN. For example, Andrew Kennedy argues that “it is clear that [Nehru] lodged the appeal with considerable optimism,” and attributes Nehru’s optimism not to circumstantial considerations but to his belief in India’s moral efficacy, his confidence in India’s diplomatic abilities, and his faith in the UN as an organization (Kennedy 2012, 176, 179). Similarly, Srinath Raghavan argues that Nehru’s decision was prompted by his confidence in India’s ability to convince the international community. The decision to go to the UN was ultimately Nehru’s, and one he made despite significant domestic opposition. Therefore, Nehru’s naivety concerning the UN as an organization, India’s diplomatic abilities and its image, and the realpolitik of the time would explain his optimism regarding India’s prospects at the UN despite having no guarantee of success.

**Argument**

**Mountbatten’s Role**

Nehru’s decision to refer the Kashmir issue to the UN cannot primarily be attributed
to his friendship with Mountbatten. Nehru had consistently stood his ground against Mountbatten in the discussions leading up to the appeal to the UN. For example, when Mountbatten repeatedly tried to widen the scope of the reference and insisted that India and Pakistan invite the UN to supervise an impartial plebiscite in Kashmir in December 1947, Nehru was vehemently opposed to the proposal. He said that “[India] would not add this to [its] reference” as it was “entirely a separate matter and much would depend on developments” (Gopal 1984, 383, Volume 4). He also maintained that the raiders must first be driven out of Kashmir, and only then could anything else follow, despite Mountbatten’s insistence to link the issue of the plebiscite with India’s appeal (Dasgupta 2002, 84).

Similarly, when Mountbatten proposed a joint Indo-Pak reference to the UN, Nehru refused. Instead, he found the idea of a unilateral reference by India more appealing, arguing that “an agreed reference would make it a collusive one without any force” (Gopal 1984, 402, Volume 4). Mountbatten also indicated that Nehru should send the draft of India’s appeal to Liaquat Khan before it was sent to the UN (Gopal 1984, 385, Volume 4). Nehru responded by saying that while India would do so, “it could not possibly be a joint reference” and that “it would be for Pakistan to reply to it and for the Security Council then to take action” (Gopal 1984, 385, Volume 4). Moreover, Nehru resisted Mountbatten and Attlee when they argued that India would not have the right to take military action in self-defense once it had referred the matter to the UN, stating that it was well within India’s legal and constitutional rights to defend itself (Dasgupta 2002, 105, 101). Thus, while Mountbatten may have had some influence on Nehru’s decision, his role was not the decisive factor.

A Rational Decision
Although Nehru was not solely motivated by Mountbatten, his decision was not the result of a rational cost-benefit calculus either, as he was aware that it would not maximize India’s interests, and the costs would not justify taking the gamble. Even if the UN agreed to condemn Pakistan, the chapter under which India had filed its appeal meant that any resolution passed on the matter would not be enforceable. The legal ambiguity surrounding the binding nature of UN resolutions under Chapter VI had already come up in Greece’s appeal against Balkan aggression in 1946 – Greece eventually had to explicitly bring up the need for enforceable UN action under Chapter VII (United Nations 1948). Thus, Pakistan could easily ignore the UN’s request without facing any serious consequences, and continue to maintain plausible deniability. Although it could be argued that such an appeal would be beneficial for India in that it would apply considerable political pressure on Pakistan, even if a resolution on the matter was not enforceable, or help boosts India’s international standing, it does not explain how a simple condemnation would help India achieve its immediate interests in the matter – driving the raiders out of Kashmir as soon as possible. Given that approaching the UN was seen as India’s last resort, if Pakistan did not comply, India would have been compelled to take military action (Gopal 1984, 383, Volume 4) in Pakistani territory, as the situation in Kashmir was progressively deteriorating (Gopal
1984, 375, Volume 4), which would inevitably have led to war – a possibility Nehru wanted to avoid in the first place.

Moreover, in approaching the UN, Nehru was compromising India’s right to act militarily in Pakistan in self-defense. This meant that even if the UN condemned Pakistan, India could no longer legally justify any military action it may have been compelled to take in the future in response to Pakistan’s non-compliance. When Nehru finally decided to take the Kashmir issue to the UN, he did so contingent on the preparation of a military plan that would allow India to take military action if absolutely necessary (Dasgupta 2002, 103). However, Article 51 of the UN charter states that “nothing...shall impair the right, the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security” (UN Charter, Article 51). As a result, once the United Nations Security Council seized the matter, India’s claims of self-defense would be greatly weakened (Malvina 1996). Even Mountbatten and Atlee had explicitly warned Nehru that such an action would be wrong juridically (Gopal 1984, 420, Volume 4). While this may not have been a huge constraint for a more hawkish leader, given how Nehru had expressed his anxiety “to act in conformity with the letter and the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations” with respect to Kashmir, it is evident that he would be limiting his options by virtue of his appeal (Kennedy 2012, 180). He had even said earlier that it was “prima facie improper for two members to come into direct conflict with each other without reference to the UN” (Gopal 1984, 387, Volume 4; Kennedy 2012, 180).

Lastly, once the UN was involved in the Kashmir issue, the question of the plebiscite was bound to come up, and Nehru was well aware of this possibility (Gopal 1984, 185, Volume 5). However, Nehru had been determined to keep the issue of the plebiscite separate from the immediate question of Pakistani aggression (Gopal 1984, 383). He had maintained that the future of Kashmir was crucial to India’s very existence (Dasgupta 2002, 48) and had said that the possibility of a plebiscite would depend on how things progressed in Kashmir (Gopal 1984, 383). Even then, Nehru was only open to the idea of UN supervision of a plebiscite, not the UN conducting one itself. Although India insisted that the issue of conducting a plebiscite in Kashmir was internal, by 1948, there was significant historical precedence of international bodies and conferences having considered plebiscites as being international in nature (Dasgupta 1984, 108). As it turned out, all members of the United Nations Security Council besides the USSR and Ukraine agreed that the issue of the cessation of hostilities could not be separated from that of the plebiscite (Dasgupta 1984, 106).

**Nehru’s Optimism**

In light of the evidence presented above, I would argue that Nehru decided to take the Kashmir issue to the UN because he simply overestimated the chances of India’s success. He had been sufficiently warned by his advisors that previous appeals
to the UN of a similar nature had yielded “unsatisfactory results” for the aggrieved party (Kennedy 2012, 177). For example, in December 1946, Greece had brought its dispute with Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, for supporting guerilla warfare in its borders, to the United Nations Security Council for resolution under Article 35. However, in September 1947, after the failure to pass any resolutions on it, the issue was removed from the list of matters under consideration in the Council, and the United Nations failed to stop the Balkan states from aiding the guerillas (United Nations 1948, 352; Sfikas 1993). The opposite argument can be made, that cases where the UN had supported the aggrieved party would make Nehru’s decision appear more rational. However, it was unlikely for India to achieve success in the Security Council without the backing of the veto powers and, as I will discuss in detail below, it did not have this. Yet, Nehru decided to make the appeal because he was optimistic about India’s chances of success – a function of his naivety.

Nehru had extreme faith in the United Nations, despite the fact that the UN was a relatively nascent body in 1948 and did not have the most successful track record in the settlement of disputes. He had called it a “force for peace” (Gopal 1984, 477, Volume 1) and had proclaimed that the UN was “an organization which ha[d]...some element of hope in it of pulling [the] world out of the morass in which it ha[d] sunk” (Gopal 1984, 591-592, Volume 4). He was confident in the UN’s abilities to act as a “world parliament” (Malone, Mohan, and Raghavan 2015, 95), as he wrote to the UNSC in 1947, under Chapter VI, arguing that the Dutch invasion of Indonesia threatened international peace and security and required the UN’s attention (Gopal 1984, 378, Volume 3). However, the resolution passed in August called for both parties to cease hostilities, and did not condemn the Netherlands (United Nations 1948, 363). Nonetheless, Nehru continued to maintain his trust in the organization. In a speech he made in India’s Constituent Assembly in March 1948, Nehru called India’s appeal to the UN an “act of faith, because [it] believed in the progressive realization of a world order and a world government” (The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India 1961, 451).

Nehru’s belief that the UN would take “prompt action” on Kashmir also reflected his naivety, given that he was aware of the historical delays in its decision-making process (Gopal 1984, 171, Volume 5). In the past, appeals made to the UN under Article 35 had been followed by the establishment of a commission to investigate matters further (United Nations, 1948). Nehru was aware that the UN may send a commission to India (Gopal 1984, 393, Volume 4). Given historical precedence, once a commission had been sent to India, the likelihood of the Council making its recommendation quickly was low. For example, the commission established following Greece’s appeal took four months to make its recommendations, and its report was not considered in the UN until two months after it was released (United Nations 1948, 338-339).

Not only did Nehru display extreme naivety in his assessment of the UN itself, he was also unrealistically optimistic about India’s diplomatic abilities to convince
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The UN of its arguments. For example, Atlee and Mountbatten warned Nehru that any military action India may pursue in self-defense after the appeal was lodged in the UN would not only be inconsistent with international law, but would also “gravely prejudice” India’s case, and the UN might even outlaw it (Patel 1971, 221). However, Nehru refuted their claims, saying that he was confident in India’s ability to “adduce the facts which [would] satisfy world opinion, as well as any impartial international body, of the correctness of [India’s] view” (Gopal 1984, 420, Volume 4).

Part of Nehru’s optimism regarding India’s chances to make its case as the victim was naively shaped by how he thought the world conceived of India. Nehru saw India as playing the role of a “peacemaker” in the UN, and as giving “moral tone and backing” to the United Nations Security Council (Gopal 1984, 591-92, Volume 4). To this end, on January 15th 1948, when the Kashmir issue was still at the UN, Nehru agreed to release the 550 million rupees cash balance that India had earlier been withholding from Pakistan among fears of it being used against India in Kashmir. In his speech, Nehru said that India had come to this decision “in the hope that the generous gesture, in accord with [its] high ideals…[would] convince the world of [India’s] desire for peace and goodwill” (The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India 1961, 450). Moreover, while arguing for India’s right to self-defense with Mountbatten and Atlee, Nehru said that India in its freedom struggle, had “convincingly demonstrated [its] faith in peaceful methods as a means of resolving political differences” and this would help India make its case (Kennedy 2012, 181).

Nehru’s optimism was also based upon his conviction that since Kashmir had acceded to India, Pakistan’s aggression entailed a violation of India’s sovereignty. Thus, the UN would see it the same way, India’s appeal to the UN explicitly mentioned Kashmir as part of Indian Dominion territory, and hence Pakistan’s actions as “aggression against India” (“Letter from the Representative of India addressed to the President of the Security Council,” 1948). Hence, when the UNSC ignored this aspect, India explicitly expressed its indignation (Korbel 1954, 180). However, this was extremely naive, as Kashmir’s accession had taken place under extraordinary circumstances for which there was a lack of precedence for the international community to go by. As Noel Baker had predicted, the SC would not have condemned Pakistan as an aggressor because “it [would] not rule out events before the accession of Kashmir to India . . . misconduct of the Maharaja’s Dogra troops of his Muslim subjects which inflamed the tribemen.” (Ankit 2013, 277) Moreover, when the ruler of Junagadh, considered the “mirror image” of Kashmir given its Muslim ruler and Hindu-majority population, acceded to Pakistan, India itself refused to accept the legality of this accession and sent troops into the state to take control of it forcibly (Ankit 2016). Although Nehru acknowledged that the question of Junagadh’s accession would inevitably come up in the UN (Patel 1971, 116), he failed to properly account for the implications of this.

However, I would argue that Nehru’s naivety is most apparent in his decision
to approach the UN despite being aware of the realpolitik of the time. Any resolution condemning Pakistan could not be passed without British and American support; however, the chances of them antagonizing Pakistan were extremely slim, given its strategic value vis-à-vis the Communist threat and the Arab world (Nanda 1975, 52). Even before Partition, the British Chief of Staff had highlighted the strategic importance of Pakistan given the threat of expanding Soviet influence (Ankit 2010, 50). Thus, in December 1947, the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) maintained that Britain must back Pakistan on Kashmir “in the interests of Imperial Defense,” and a pro-Pakistan camp had already emerged in London that included Noel-Baker, Britain’s delegate to the UN (Ankit 2010, 51). Additionally, Britain’s abandonment of its mandate in Palestine in 1947 led to immense distrust of the Arab world (Dasgupta 2002, 111). Anxious of losing access to Middle Eastern oil, the CRO cautioned that, if Britain were to side against Pakistan, it would risk antagonizing “the whole of Islam”—a warning included in Atlee’s instructions to the British delegation to the UNSC (Dasgupta 2002, 111-114). Even Gandhi, who had advised Nehru against appealing to the UN, noted that “considerations of international power politics rather than merit would determine the attitude of countries towards the Kashmir issue” (Fisher 1962, 527; Rao and Rao 1974, 275).

Nehru was aware of the lack of support for India in Britain and the US at the time. When Nehru warned Atlee of the invasion of Kashmir and the Maharaja’s plea for assistance, Atlee asked Nehru to refrain from sending in troops (Jha 1996, 97). After Kashmir’s accession to India and the Indian troops’ subsequent entry into the State, Nehru again sent a telegram to Atlee explaining India’s actions, but he received no sympathy. Atlee refused to approve of India’s actions: “I do not think it would be helpful if I were to comment on the action which your government has taken” (Jha 1996, 97). Additionally, in a letter to Ayyangar (head of the Indian delegation to the UNSC), Nehru mentioned that America had been pursuing a policy of supporting Middle Eastern states “in [the] hope that they would…assist America in event of hostilities with U.S.S.R.” (Gopal 1984, 189, Volume 5). He also spoke about how Pakistan had the “geographic advantage of contiguity to Islamic states of the Middle East” and how its “religious affinity with [those] states [was] a psychological asset,” which America would not want to lose by favoring India (Gopal 1984, 189, Volume 5).

Yet it appears that Nehru naively ignored such realist considerations when making his decision. In a letter he wrote to his sister in February 1948, he said that “could not [have] imagine[d] that the Security Council could possibly behave in the trivial and partisan manner in which it functioned” (Gopal 1984, 218, Volume 5). Similarly, in his letter to Menon, Nehru wrote that the UNSC business greatly “depressed and distressed him” and that he “could never have imagined” that the UN would “behave so irresponsibly” (Gopal 1984, 218-219, Volume 5). He also claimed that the UK and the US had “played a dirty role” (Raghavan 2010, 126) and that he was “sick and tired” of the British and the American governments’ attitude in the UN.
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(Gopal 1979, 62). Moreover, not only did Nehru expect support in the UNSC, he also expected the British service chiefs in the Indian army to abide by his decision to prepare military contingency plans, despite being aware of Mountbatten and Atlee’s vehement opposition (Dasgupta 2002, 100). Nehru’s naivety here is especially surprising given that India, being newly independent, did not yet have full control over its army and the loyalty of British officers was ultimately to Britain—they could only serve Indian interests as long as these did not clash with British ones (Dasgupta 2002, 109). As it turns out, General Bucher, the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian army, ensured that no such plans were ever made (Dasgupta 2002, 109).

**Conclusion**

By approaching the UN, Nehru made a grave mistake. He internationalized the Kashmir issue for generations to come, allowing external involvement in what would otherwise have been a bilateral dispute between India and Pakistan. Moreover, once the issue was in the grip of the UN, the question of the plebiscite became centralized rather than Pakistan’s aggression (Shankar 2018, 46). The resolution the UN eventually passed on the matter did not condemn Pakistan and placed equal responsibility on both sides to ensure the fighting stopped, consistent with previous UN judgements on international disputes at the time. It also called for a plebiscite to be held to determine the future of Kashmir (UN Security Council 1948). However, the resolution was not enforceable and the fighting in Kashmir continued, eventually leading to an all-out war between India and Pakistan—the very thing Nehru had sought to avoid by referring the matter to the UN. Eventually, the conflict in Kashmir became a frozen one and till date remains central to Indo-Pakistan tensions.

Nehru’s mistaken decision to take the Kashmir issue to the UN also holds broader lessons in terms of the importance of encouraging dissenting viewpoints within governmental decision-making. Following India’s independence, Nehru assumed the responsibilities of both Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs and completely dominated Indian foreign policy-making to the extent that he ignored the advice of many of his colleagues regarding his reference to the UN while making leaders like Patel reluctant to actively challenge his decision (Kennedy 2012, 184). Therefore, had Nehru not maintained such a singular grip over India’s foreign policy in his years as Prime Minister, he could have been made more aware of his own naivety regarding India’s uncertain prospects at the UN.
Works Cited


Kennedy, Andrew Bingham. “Nehru’s Foreign Policy: Realism and Idealism Conjoined,” in David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan (eds), The Oxford Hand-


The U.S. Navy considers itself a protector of the global commons, indispensable to a global commercial system in which the majority of trade travels by sea. But as Congress debates where to allocate American defense funds, it is important to consider what drives the utility of naval forces. This paper investigates the extent to which global trade flows actually depend on naval force presence. Using a standard regression model based on the naval power of maritime countries over time, I find that force presence may actually be detrimental to trade flows, throwing doubt on the widespread notion of the importance of naval presence in securing trade routes. The presented analysis supports the theory that global trade is highly robust, and that reductions in naval presence may not end up negatively impacting the continued flow of commerce. Because of this seemingly counterintuitive result, the paper then proceeds with robustness checks of the initial findings and concludes with a discussion of important attendant policy considerations for the American taxpayer.

I. Introduction and Literature Review
Delve into any *Foreign Affairs* issue these days and it is likely you will read some commentary on what the rise of increasingly belligerent states like China could mean for global relations. Included in this discussion is how hostile action might affect global trade flows. Specifically, and in consideration of deteriorating relations between China and Taiwan, many analysts fear the outbreak of war across the Taiwan Straits could have devastating effects on trade in East Asia. Given President Biden’s commitment (in line with past presidents) to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, the United States has a direct stake in this conflict beyond just how war may affect trade. Furthermore, because of the geography of East Asia, naval forces will likely play a prominent role. However, from the halls of Congress to the academic fields of military analysis, the utility of naval forces continues to be a hot-button issue. As other geopolitical threats emerge to strain the resources of the United States military, it will be important to consider what role the U.S. Navy will have in this rapidly changing environment.

This paper will investigate one traditional role of naval forces, protecting sea lanes. Alan Beattie at the *Financial Times* points out that “even in calmer geopolitical times, the US’s military contribution to civilian trade is easy to overlook,” and that “the most obvious example is the American navy’s decades-old role patrolling sea lanes used by commercial shipping” (Beattie 2023). Although this quote is U.S.-centric, it requires no great stretch of the imagination to see that every navy has a vested interest in defending its country’s civilian trade.

The U.S. Navy considers itself a protector of the global commons, indispens-
able to a global commercial system in which 90 percent of global trade travels by sea. But to what extent do trade flows actually depend on naval force presence? For a topic of such importance to the world of policy, and as Congress debates where to allocate American defense funds, it is surprising that the economics research on the linkages between naval force presence and trade flows is so thin. Most of the academic discussion on trade and force is sprinkled within commentary pieces in newspapers like the Financial Times (Beattie 2022) or in think tank reports from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (Friedman 2022). Articles from the former tout the perils to trade posed by an increasingly belligerent China, while Benjamin Friedman, a policy director at CSIS, assures his readers that the robustness of global supply chains and the fuzzy logic of naval deterrence means assuming global trade depends on the navy is a “bad idea.”

To date, no economist has attempted to examine the issue, although some previous papers have sought to determine the relationships between some closely related phenomenon. Anderson and Wincoop, in their broad-spanning paper on trade costs, break down the constituent pieces of trade prices into transportation and distribution, but leave out any kind of military dimension when thinking about the costs of trade flows (Anderson and Wincoop 2004). Additionally, Morabito and Sergi use a gravity model based on the trade flows of southeast Asian countries to estimate the impact of piracy on trade volumes, but again there is no mention of the potential roles of the regional navies (Morabito and Sergi 2018, 255-265). Danzell et al. (2021, 179-200) get closest to the topic by using a binomial regression model to determine if naval force presence, instrumented by regional naval bases, can decrease the likelihood of piracy, but lacks any dimension related explicitly to trade.

As such, the time is ripe to precisely seek an accurate representation of the relationship between naval force presence and trade flows over time. This paper attempts to do just that, using a standard regression model based on the naval power of maritime countries over time to quantify the impact of naval patrols on global trade flows in the post-war period.

This paper makes three primary contributions. First, this analysis presents the initial explicit econometric investigation into the relationship between trade and naval force presence, ideally paving the way for future research in the field. Second, the analysis offers the seemingly counterintuitive result that force presence may actually be detrimental to trade flows, throwing doubt on the widespread notion of the utility of perpetual naval presence in securing trade routes. Third, because of the attendant considerations of the results, this analysis will contribute to important policy debates about the future of navies in general, and the United States Navy in particular.

Section II discusses my data sources and provides some summary statistics. Section III follows with the economic theory and empirical methodology underpinning my regressions, while Section IV presents these results. Section V speaks to the robustness of my findings, and Section VI concludes.

II. DATA
This paper is based on compiling two separate original datasets. The first is an index of naval power compiled by Brian Crisher and Mark Souva at Florida State University, presenting 147 years of naval data on all the world’s navies between 1865 and 2011 (Crisher and Souva 2014). Compiled in 2014 explicitly for use in further research, the data is organized by country-year and details the total aggregate tonnage of naval ‘capital’ ships for that country-year pair. In this sense, Crisher and Souva define a ‘capital’ ship as a ship “capable of using kinetic force to inflict damage on other structures or peoples” (ibid.). To sum the total tonnage, the data also necessarily includes the quantities of capital war ships for a given country-year pair, such as number of submarines, battleships, aircraft carriers, and so forth. The entries of interest for my research are the approximately 5,000 observations of total naval tonnage for a given country-year pair.

The second dataset is the CEPII Gravity database, the highly useful repository of all information necessary to estimate gravity equations between any given pair of countries from 1948 to 2020 (Conte, Cotterlaz, and Mayer 2022). For my purposes, I specifically used CEPII’s approximately 1 million observations on trade flows compiled by the IMF, as reported by destination country. Reconciling these two datasets will take up the bulk of Section III.

III. Empirical Methodology

To quantify the impact of naval patrols on global trade flows, there must exist a reasonable source of variation within some measurement of naval forces. Through the Crisher and Souva dataset, I was able to produce a constructed right-hand-side variable, referred to in this text as Neighbors’ Navy (NN), which uses the total tonnage of all countries to create a sum of naval power allocated to a given trade route between two countries, with this sum weighted by distance of a ‘third’ country to the trade route in question. Within this part of the paper, the first subsection will walk the reader through the construction of this independent NN variable, and the second subsection will introduce the basic regressions of trade on the NN variable.

Constructing the Independent Variable

The overarching theme of constructing the NN variable was reconciling the Crisher/Souva naval data with the CEPII gravity database, then using this new database to calculate the weighted distances that would compose the gravity-style NN variable. As such, the first step in this construction was cleaning the naval dataset. This consisted of removing all observations prior to 1948 (and thus not covered by the trade data), replacing country IDs to match the identifications used by CEPII, and finally merging the CEPII country codes with the Chrisher/Souva naval data.

Second, using the CEPII country codes, I generated a ‘triad’ dataset. The triad refers to origin country, destination country, and a third ‘neighbor’ country, with the latter referring to all other countries of the world. This triad dataset consisted of approximately 4.5 million observations, reflecting every possible triad combination among all the countries in which CEPII provided data. More importantly, because
this dataset was constructed from the information already available in CEPII, it already consisted of the next variable of interest: the distances between each of these three countries (that is, distance between origin and destination, origin and third country, and destination and third country). To make future calculations with these distances computationally less difficult, I then dropped all country triad entries in which distances between countries were either zero or missing.

With the dataset constructed, I then went about calculating the weighted distances for the NN variable. This calculation can be thought of broadly in two parts. First, finding the actual distance of any third ‘neighbor’ country to a given trade route. Second, comparing these distances across every neighbor to generate a weight based on those distances, with larger weights assigned to neighbors closer to the trade route.

To calculate actual distance to the trade route, I treated the entire country triad relationship as simply one large triangle, with the distance between origin and destination (in other words, the distance of the trade route) as the base of this triangle. The distances between origin and neighbor country, and destination and neighbor, thus comprised the other two sides of the triangle. Therefore, the distance between the third neighbor country and the trade route can be thought of as simply the height, or altitude, of the triangular representation. Figure 1 depicts this relationship graphically. One way to calculate triangular altitude is simply dividing two times the area of the triangle by the base, as shown in Equation 1.

Equation 1: \[ h_b = 2 \frac{A}{b} \]

As evident by the equation, a necessary input is the area of the triangle. Calculating area based on side distances is depicted by Equation 3, which uses ‘s,’ a necessary input reflecting the total side length of the triangle, as shown by Equation 2.

Equation 2: \[ s = a + b + c \]

Equation 3: \[ A = \sqrt{s \times (s - a)(s - b)(s - c)} \]

With these equations in place, it was simply a matter of plugging in the distance data available in the dataset to calculate the areas and altitudes of every country triad.

Next was using the altitude (the distance of the neighbor to a given country pair’s trade route) to create a system of weights. Each triad was assigned a weight by dividing one by the respective altitude entry. This computation assigned to each neighbor country a list of weights based on the distances of that third country to each trade route. So, if these weights were summed across all trade routes for a given third country, the sum would be close to one, with higher weights assigned to closer trade routes. With about 3.5 million observations, the triad dataset was complete,
and so I next merged the naval data onto the triad data using a many to one merge, with the third (neighbor) country as the key.

Finally, with all necessary inputs generated, the NN variable could be calculated. Organized by an origin/destination trading pair, the NN variable is essentially a double summation; across all years present in the trade and naval data (1948-2011), and across all available countries, the previously calculated weights are first divided by the sum of all weights for that trade route that year to create a ‘true weight’, which is then multiplied by the total naval tonnage present across all neighbor countries. This calculation is depicted by Equation 4.

Equation 4:

Looking from right to left, the multiplication of the true weight by total naval tonnage reveals what raw magnitude of a given neighbor country’s navy is used to protect and patrol that particular trade route that particular year. This tonnage is then summed up for all ‘third’ neighbor countries, resulting in the final NN value for that year and that route. Then, this process is repeated for all years between 1948 and 2011, providing a raw NN number for all years and trade routes in the data.

The final step in this construction was then merging the CEPII gravity data with the NN (triad) dataset, achieved by sorting the entire CEPII gravity database by origin, destination, and year, then merging many to one with the triad dataset using those same variables as keys. This last step provided the final dataset, consisting of all needed gravity data and constructed NN variables for a given country pair (trade route) for every year. This set forms the basis for the regressions described in the next subsection.

Figure 2 graphically depicts the relationship between the constructed NN variable and trade flows, by plotting the average of the NN variable between 1948 and 2011 with the average trade flow across all routes for the same period. Perhaps counterintuitively, but as evident in the figure, total naval tonnage has declined even as trade flows have increased since 1948. Figure 3 more closely examines how the NN variable has changed over time. Panel A depicts the density of observations of the variable in the year 1950, while Panel B depicts the same observation density for the year 2000. As shown, since the end of World War II, the navies of the world have gotten smaller and lighter, with fewer countries boasting large quantities of naval tonnage.

**Regressions**

My primary analysis regresses trade flows \((\ln X_{ijt})\) on the constructed neighbors’ navy variable \((NN_{ijt})\), using standard ordinary-least-squares (OLS) with many levels of fixed effects. As shown above, NNijt is an independent variable reflecting the sum of total naval tonnage of all other countries, weighted by proximity to the trade flow.
This regression is shown by Equation 5.

Equation 5: \[ \ln \ln X_{ijt} = \beta \ln NN_{ijt} + \delta_{it} + \delta_{jt} + \epsilon_{ijt} \]

The unit of observation for this regression is trade flows, constructed from a weighted sum of origin and destination trade flows as reported by the IMF, in thousands of current USD. Beyond the two independent and dependent variables, the gammas in the above equations refer to fixed effect coefficients. Listed in order, these gammas refer to an origin fixed effect over time, a destination fixed effect over time, and an origin-destination fixed effect. The primary coefficient of interest is the beta \( \beta \), which captures the effect of the neighbors' navy RHV on trade flows, or more specifically, the estimated elasticity of trade flows with respect to naval force presence. At first glance, and if one believes the existing literature from the navy pundits out there, this coefficient should be positive; increased naval presence should contribute to safer sea lanes and increased trade flows.

To briefly discuss the plausible exogeneity of my constructed NN variable, the variable can be reasonably expected to be uncorrelated with any omitted factors present in the residual which could be influencing trade flows. Because the variable takes into account the naval tonnage of all counties from which there is data, it is unlikely to be prohibitively influenced by regional outbreaks of conflicts or other events which could affect trade flows. Further, simply looking at the naval presence of say, the origin country, would be problematic, because the origin country could (and probably is) making trade and military decisions simultaneously, with obvious trade-offs (no pun intended) between the two. Another example of a potential RHV with obvious correlation with the residual would be some kind of construction reflecting the presence of threats to trade, such as Somali pirates. More pirates likely means both more naval ships in the area and less overall trade. For more on the identification assumption of my RHV, see Section V.

As such, the NN variable, constructed from the Chrisher/Souva dataset provides a strong jumping-off point for investigating the relationship between navies and trade. The results of the basic regression depicted by Equation 5 and related regressions across varying time periods are presented and discussed in detail in the following section.

IV. RESULTS

As Table 1 depicts the results from the first three regressions of the experiment. Column 1 corresponds to the basic regression for the interaction between NN and trade across the entire dataset period. The result is a highly significant (-1.953). Because the regressions contain logs on either side of the equal sign, this coefficient means a one percent increase in naval presence, represented by NN, is associated with about a 1.9 percent decrease in trade flows. Columns 2 and 3 refer to similar regressions. The former depicts the basic regression when just including the recent past,
meaning the 2000-2011 time period. When looking at this period, the coefficient becomes a more negative (-4.227); a 1% increase in NN is associated with a 4.2% decline in trade flows. Column 3 depicts the regression when looking at the pre-2000 period, and results in a (-0.484) coefficient. All results are highly statistically significant. Table 1 shows that when looking at any post-war time period, the relationship between trade and naval power is solidly negative but has become increasingly negative since 2000.

This change in the regression coefficient over time becomes even more apparent when breaking down the basic regression over the 1948-2011 time period, as depicted by Figure 4. The trade/navy relationship remained consistent between 1948 and 1980 but became rapidly negative during the late eighties and early nineties. This period not only corresponds roughly to the collapse of Soviet Russia and the end of the Cold War, but also a time characterized by rapid globalization and an increasingly integrated global economy. The decline of naval tonnage in this period as depicted in Figure 2, combined with the trade-flow increases from nineties-era globalization, meant fewer ships and more trade, and thus explains the rapid fall in the trade elasticity coefficient for this period shown in Figure 4.

It is worth noting that the way in which the regressions were organized (taking into account origin, destination, and combined time fixed effects which might have location-specific trade impacts) speaks well to the robustness of the regressions. If the results remain consistent even when produced under fixed effects which have imposed additional constraints, the results are expected to be reasonable and accurate depictions of the relationship between the variables of interest.

V. ROBUSTNESS

As clear in the previous section, the presented results do not support the seemingly intuitive hypothesis that trade should respond positively to increased naval presence, because that naval presence presumably keeps the sea lanes protected and safe.

One obvious issue that could complicate the results of the model is conflict, which can impact trade flows by effectively shutting down certain parts of the world and limiting the continued and consistent flow of goods. One way to investigate the potential effects of the presence of conflict is by imposing conditions on the basic regression. Figure 5 provides a graphical depiction of this robustness check, revealing how the trade coefficient changes in response to shock conditions represented by imposing conditional leads and lags on the model. The figure specifically incorporates leads two years after the present and lags two years prior to the present. When these time conditions are imposed, the coefficient at year 0 (the present) flips signs and becomes positive, and all results become noisier with larger standard deviations (although no result returns a p-value larger than 0.42). Interpreting these results, this graph suggests that when incorporating leads and lags into the model, trade actually benefits from increased naval presence. Further, a high naval presence in prior years is good for trade today (because the coefficient in the lags is positive), while a high
Naval presence in the immediate future is very bad for trade today. These results make intuitive sense. A high naval presence two years ago could suggest the existence of conflict two years ago and a resulting decline in trade in that period and shortly after. Two years later, if the conflict has simmered down, trade can be expected to “rebound” and recover. On the flip side, a high naval presence two years from the present could suggest that international relations are deteriorating today, and trade is expected to decline in the future. Taken together, these results suggest the model is highly conditional on time considerations and reflects the ability of conflict to influence trade flows. Therefore, an important consideration to the entire policy debate that influenced this research is the ability of naval forces to manage conflict. In light of an increasingly assertive Chinese Navy within the economically important waterways of East Asia, if U.S.-led naval forces are able enough to deter aggression on commerce and ensure the continued free flow of goods, that would be enough to justify their continued existence, even considering the analysis above that looks exclusively at the historical relationship between trade and force presence. For example, any outbreak of war will probably lower the trade flows of the involved parties, but it is not unreasonable to assume that these values would decline by even more without the presence of naval forces. The important question is by how much?

The model can be further tweaked to estimate the impact navies have on protecting the trade of their global trading partners. Specifically, by dropping the trade flows of the world’s largest navies from the dataset and re-running the regressions, the results will describe how the smaller countries of the world benefit from the presence of large navies around the globe. This gets at the question of how America’s trading partners, which lack their own formidable navies, benefit from the presence of U.S. warships near their trade routes. Do non-global players benefit from the presence of global navies?

Table 2 depicts what happens when the regressions are run after any entries that include the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, or China as either the origin or destination country are dropped by the dataset. As evident by the table, the basic results from Table 1 do not change any remarkable amount but remain highly statistically significant. Across the entire time period and the 1948-2000 period the results get even more negative and become only slightly less negative in the post-2000 period. In the entire period, a 1% increase in naval presence is now associated with a 2.2% decline in trade flows. If the year-by-year coefficients were plotted like in Figure 4, the trends would appear exactly the same as the earlier basic regression inclusive of all navies, but with values shifted slightly further down the y-axis. So, even when global players are omitted from the regression, trade continues to respond negatively to force presence.

VI. Conclusions
The results of the analysis suggest that when put to the econometric test, there exists a negative relationship between trade flows and naval force presence. As the first explicit
investigation into this relationship, these results offer important considerations for a consequential but understudied topic. However, as discussed previously, the presented results are highly conditional to time considerations and are possibly affected by conflict. One area for future research would be testing how the trade flows respond when using both the NN variable and a new weighted instrument considering if a country in a given country pair is at war. Unfortunately, a dataset like this that stretches back to the period identified in the IMF trade data does not yet exist. If the regressions from this data suggest a negative relationship between trade and conflict, then an important aspect of the policy conversation would be how effectively naval forces can manage conflict. A further area for future investigation is assessing if the general results can be interpreted across particular geographies. Specifically, do the results change if looking at trade between countries within certain continents, regions, or oceans? Answers to these questions could help temper the general conclusions to the results presented by this initial analysis.

But if even after further research the general results presented here hold, this analysis offers important policy considerations. As pointed out by Friedman (2022), “the notion that naval presence is vital to global trade is very expensive.” Further, according to the Congressional Budget Office, one-sixth of federal spending goes to national defense (Congressional Budget Office 2022). To continue to maintain readiness and cost-effectiveness, all the while dealing with an ever-increasing national debt, a rethinking of U.S. Navy missions and force composition will become increasingly important in policy debates. The presented analysis supports the theory that global trade is more robust than it gets credit for; reductions in naval presence may not end up negatively impacting the continued flow of global commerce. Although these results may present a bitter pill for the Navy to swallow, this transformation in thinking is already underway (Work 2021). If the U.S. Navy can accept that continual presence may no longer be needed, the service may be able to refocus its priority on core military missions (such as enforcing sanctions, antiproliferation, and gaining control of sea lanes), combat its readiness problems, and reduce its burden on the American taxpayer.
WORKS CITED


**Tables and Figures**

Figure 1:

**Distance** $(h_b)$ from third country $(t)$ to the trade route (distance $b$)

$$h_b = 2 \frac{A}{b}$$

$h_b = \text{height from intersection of } ac \text{ to } b$

$A = \text{Area}$

$b = \text{distance between origin } (o) \text{ and destination } (d); \text{(base)}$

Figure 2:

**Naval Tonnage Declined even as Trade Flows Increased**

Notes: Plots the average of the constructed neighbors’ navy variable (sum of all other countries naval tonnage, weighted by distance to origin’s trade route) across countries per year (left-side) and the average trade flows, in 1000 USD, across all countries for the same time period (right-side). Trade flows come from the IMF, reported by destination country.
Naval Forces: Truly Indispensable to Trade Flows?

Figure 3:

**Naval Power Index (NN) in 1950**

*Notes:* Density of observations from constructed NN index in the year 1950.

Figure 4:

**Naval Power Index (NN) in 2000**

*Notes:* Density of observations reported from constructed NN index in the year 2000. Since 1950, the navies of the world have gotten smaller and lighter.

**Impact of Navies on Trade becomes increasingly negative over time**

*Notes:* Regression coefficients of the NN variable on trade, produced from OLS regression with many fixed effects, plotted over the 1948-2011 period. All results are negative and highly significant (P-value < 0.001).
Notes: Plots regression coefficients of the NN variable on trade, produced from OLS regression with many fixed effects, but conditional on leads and lags. Specifically, plots the effects of constructed NN on trade flows conditional on two years before the present, one year before present, the present effect, one year after the present, and two years after the present. Conditional on leads and lags, the sign of the baseline regression at year 0 becomes positive, and the results become noisier, but no result boasts a p-value larger than 0.42.

Table 1:

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<th>Dependent Variable: (log) Trade Flows</th>
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<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>(0.0488)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(log) Neighbor Navy (1980-2011)</td>
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<td>(0.246)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(log) Neighbor Navy (1980-1999)</td>
<td>-4.484***</td>
<td>(0.8977)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Describes the output from regressing trade flows on the constructed NN variable. Column (1) reports the output over the entire timeframe (1948-2011). Column (2) depicts the relationship in the years 2000-2011, and Column (3) displays regression results when just looking at the pre-2000 period. The regressions come from OLS regression using many fixed effects (origin-year, destination-year, and origin-destination-year). The second regression produces a larger standard error of 0.85, but all results are highly statically significant.

Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: (log) Trade Flows</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
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<tr>
<td>(log) Neighbor Navy (1948-1999)</td>
<td>-0.393***</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Describes the output from regressing trade flows on the constructed NN variable, but after omitting the world’s largest navies from the data, which refers to the United States, Russia/USSR, and China. Like Table 1, Column (1) reports the output over the entire timeframe (1948-2011), Column (2) depicts the relationship in the years 2000-2011, and Column (3) displays regression results when just looking at the pre-2000 period. The regressions come from OLS regression using many fixed effects (origin-year, destination-year, and origin-destination-year). The second regression produces a larger standard error of 0.85, but all results are highly statically significant.
Commitment Problems and the Tragedy of the Rhodesian Bush War

Emily Henrich

The Rhodesian Bush War, or the Zimbabwe Liberation Struggle, was a civil war that lasted from July 1964 until December 1979 (Kriger 2019, 244-262). The civil war pitted the white-minority-led Rhodesian incumbents against two rebel groups: the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). The rebels launched sporadic guerrilla attacks with the hope of achieving black-majority rule (Kriger 2019, 242). In this paper, I seek to explain why the white-minority incumbents, outnumbered 22-to-1 in the Rhodesian population and in the face of intense international pressure, chose to descend into a fifteen-year-long civil war instead of compromising on black representation (Sebenius et al. 2016, 1). In explaining this conflict, I dispel two common explanations for the Rhodesian Bush War: (1) that the war was an all versus all conflict inspired by ethnic hatreds and (2) that the war was simply fought by recruited non ideological and unorganized thugs and criminals. Instead, the Rhodesian Bush War can best be explained as a rational bargaining failure, in which the white minority government and the ZANU/ZAPU rebels faced a credible commitment problem. Understanding the conflict under this lens offers important policy implications. As a commitment problem, Britain could have stepped in as a third-party guarantor for negotiations and prevented 15 years of violent intergroup warfare.

Literature Review

One prominent school of scholarship on the Rhodesian Bush War argues that the war was driven by widely-shared ethnic hatreds. In this perspective, the only way to understand the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and the subsequent outbreak of war is through the lens of identity conflict. On November 11th, 1965, the Rhodesian Cabinet declared the country as independent and sovereign from Britain colonial rule, because the UN and England pushed for ethnic power-sharing in Rhodesia (Watts 2012, 1). The Rhodesian Front (RF) “was so obsessed with this fear [of black government] that it allowed it to dictate its course of action… It mobilized all its resources and energy and time to make it impossible for a black government to emerge” (Mungazi 1981, 41). Authors in this tradition of ethnic hatred scholarship point to political rhetoric as evidence of a “religious” zeal for white supremacy (Mungazi 1981, 44). For example, Clifford Dupont, President of Rhodesia at the time of UDI, famously proclaimed, “I call on all Rhodesians who wish to see this African domination prevented to unite and fight. We have a war to win a war of survival.” (“Rhodesia’s Drive to Independence” 1973, 70) Similarly, widely-distributed black nationalist literature at the time wrote, “All whites must be killed. We are to free Zimbabwe with bloodshed. Zimbabwe is for blacks, and not for whites... Kill Smith and his running dogs”(Mungazi 1981, 95). Thus, both sides viewed the conflict as a war of ethnic survival (Bowman, 150). Finally, the hypothesis that commonly-shared ethnic

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hatred drove the Rhodesian Bush War is supported by the 1965 election of Ian Smith. Smith campaigned for Prime Minister of Rhodesia on an extremist, white supremacist platform vehemently against black government. Smith offered no opportunity of compromise or interethnic power-sharing. Smith defeated David Butler, the candidate from the moderate Rhodesia Party (RP), who favored an end to racial discrimination in Rhodesia (Novak 2013, 41). Smith's party, the Rhodesian Front (RF), swept all fifty white Parliament seats in the 1965 election against RP, signaling that the majority of whites shared Smith's bigotry (Leys 1960, 119). Based on this school of literature, the electorate favored extremism because of deep-seated, intergroup ethnic hatred.

A second school of scholarship argues that the Rhodesian Bush War was not driven by generations of society-wide, pent up ethnic hatred. Instead, the violent conflict was carried out by a small band of opportunistic marauders, who were recruited and guided by political leaders (Anti-Apartheid Movement 1979, 17-46; Gann and Henriksen 1981). They simply viewed ethnicity as an ordering device, not a crucial motivating factor. This scholarship falls under the tradition of John Mueller. In the piece “The Banality of ‘EthnicWar,’” Mueller posits that the whole concept of all versus all “ethnic warfare” is fallacious (Mueller 2000, 42-70). Instead, “Recruited and encouraged by leading politicians, and operating under a general framework of order provided by the army, a group of well-armed thugs—or skinhead or redneck or soccer hooligan or Hell’s Angels types—would emerge in an area where former civil order had ceased to exist or where the police actually or effectively were in alliance with them”(Mueller 2000, 53). In Rhodesia, the white infantry has been characterized as the “rugby-playing, beer-drinking kind,” not a far cry from the soccer hooligans of Mueller’s description (Gann and Henriksen 1981, 33). Scholars within this tradition point to the high rates of recruitment for the urban unemployed to join the Security Forces (Beckett and Pimlott 1985, 173-175). Pay was on average about 50% higher in the security forces than for standard labor in Rhodesia (Hoffman et al. 1991, 12). Even black Africans joined the Rhodesian Security Forces for the salary. Many unemployed black Africans were recruited into plainclothes Crime Prevention Units (CPUs) in which they were armed by the RF and “operate[d] in the townships as unsupervised gangs of thugs” (Anti-Apartheid Movement 1979, 17). Finally, the Rhodesian Security Forces recruited criminal foreign mercenaries, who became particularly notorious in units such as the Selous Scouts and Grey's Scouts, “where lack of supervision and disciplinary control gives ample scope for individual ‘initiative’ and indiscriminate brutality”(Anti-Apartheid Movement 1979, 42). Cross-racial recruitment indicates that militia men were not motivated by ethnic hatred. Instead, regardless of ethnicity or country of origin, politicians recruited and motivated sadistic thugs and criminals to carry out their political aims.

**Argument**

Despite the intuition to point to racism as the motivating factor, ethnic-based explanations are insufficient to explain the incidence of civil war in Rhodesia. These ex-
Commitment Problems and the Tragedy of the Rhodesian Bush War

Planations speak little of actual opportunities for groups to rebel. Rhodesia had been subjected to white minority rule for decades before the outbreak of civil war. In 1891, Rhodesia came under administration of the British South African Company (BSAC) and thousands of white settlers poured into the region. The white colonists declared a self-governing colony and maintained political and material domination over the African population for the next 70 years. In the 1923 Constitution of Rhodesia, the white-minority government wrote prohibitions against fraternization into the statutes. Furthermore, they enacted a voting requirement of “an income of £100 per annum or occupied property or buildings worth £150 or owned a mining claim.” This disenfranchised many black Africans. Further, as an act of intentional material deprivation, the 1930 Land Apportionment Act divided land between white and non-white Rhodesians; the white settlers legally claimed ownership of the most fertile and mineral-rich land. The black majority was relegated to the outskirts of society and deprived of basic legal rights. However, undermining the hypothesis that ethnic hatreds drove the Rhodesian Bush War, the rebel groups did not resort to violent guerrilla attacks until the 1960s.

The second school of literature, in which thugs and criminals are motivated by political entrepreneurs, is also insufficient to explain the causes of the Rhodesian Bush War. This hypothesis fails to capture how well-trained, organized, and ideologically-motivated both the rebel groups and the Rhodesian Security Forces were. First, the ZANU and ZAPU rebels benefited from training, uniforms, and weapons from Cold War communist countries. For example, to spread their ideology and control, the Chinese established training camps in neighboring African countries for the ZANU militants, such as Itumbi in Southern Tanzania. Eight Chinese instructors worked at Itumbi, including Comrade Li, the infantry expert; they evolved ZANU insurgent strategy towards a “Maoist’s People’s War.” The Chinese instructors integrated the basic teachings of Mao Tse-tung’s On Guerilla Warfare, including maintaining the support of the population while building up military capabilities. The rebel groups were motivated by nationalist sentiments and trained on strategic guerrilla warfare. Similarly, the Rhodesian Security Forces were organized beyond the shallow motivations and framework of the thugs and criminals hypothesis. Smith’s regime maintained a highly coordinated mix of air and ground forces, including helicopters and dakotas. The RF distributed Joint Operations Commands (JOCs) throughout the country, which centralized and synchronized the efforts of the five separate entities responsible for Rhodesian defense, including the police, the Special Branch, the Army, the Air Force, and the Internal Affairs Department. The armed services met daily throughout the war to determine tactical operation decisions through a process of consensus. With a cohesive security force, they could effectively adapt to threats from rebel insurgents. For example, in response to prevalent and highly dangerous landmines placed along key roads
by ZANU rebels, the Rhodesian security forces innovated their vehicles. They filled their tires with water and air, and mounted special V-shaped capsules on chassis to dissipate the explosions. These measures reduced mine-related casualties by 90% and injuries by 20% (Johnson 2015). The Rhodesian Security Forces were intelligent and organized enough to innovate and collaborate on strategies. Thus, they were much harder to combat than simple criminals.

Instead of deep-seated ethnic hatreds or sadistic thugs and criminals, the Rhodesian Bush War can better be understood through a more unitarily rational explanation of war. The white minority government and the ZANU and ZAPU rebels descended into extremely costly warfare because they faced a commitment problem. Commitment problems occur when actors agree on relative capabilities and can identify a compromise by which they would be willing to avoid warfare (Arbuckle 1979, 27). However, the groups are unable to compromise because they do not trust the other side to carry out the agreement. In Rhodesia, politically institutionalized power-sharing would have been mutually preferable to war. About 20,000 people died in the conflict, including roughly 10,000 guerrillas and 1,361 Rhodesian security force members (Moorcraft and McLaughlin 2008, 417). Had they compromised sooner, black Africans could have increased representation, and the Smith regime could have retained some political power without these dramatic costs. However, white Rhodesians distrusted compromise with Africans because they anticipated a power shift. Just 270,000 whites ruled over six million blacks (Sebenius et al. 2016, 1). Additionally, the black population was growing. In 1960, the population ratio of white to black was 1:16 (Brownwell 2008, 54). At the outbreak of the war in 1965, the disparity had grown to 1:20. By the end of the war in 1979, the population ratio was 1:28. These population disparities can better explain statements by white politicians of an “all-or-nothing” “war of survival.” The conflict was not inherently a war of survival because of primordial ethnic hatred. Instead, Smith and his white-minority government framed the conflict as a war of survival because they feared permanent political exclusion if the black majority seized political power (Brownwell 2008, 55). In Rhodesia, the mutually preferable bargain of constitutional power-sharing was unattainable because of an anticipated power shift in favor of black Rhodesians.

Additionally, because of a history of exploitation, the African nationalists were unlikely to trust any promises of the Rhodesian government; they, too, faced a credible commitment problem, as they expected the white minority to renege on any concessions. The African nationalists first revived under Joshua Nkomo and the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (ANC) in 1957 (Hull 1976, 149). The Southern Rhodesian ANC attempted to play a role in the Central African Federation, which “was heralded as a bold attempt to forge a multi-racial nation out of the British protectorates” (Hull 1976, 149). These attempts at multiracialism in the Rhodesian government were supported by Southern Rhodesia’s liberal Prime Minister Garfield Todd. However, Todd was forced out of his office by his Cabinet in February 1958, as his cabinet feared he was moving too close to majority rule (Hull 1976, 149).
Soon after, the ANC was banned in Southern Rhodesia. In 1961, Shona nationalists reorganized under the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) (Hull 1976, 149-151). Again, this political group was banned on September 20th, 1962. Thus, any attempts to forge cooperation or political autonomy were crushed by the white minority. Despite being outlawed, these early groups represent coordinated political action beyond the scope of opportunistic marauders. Additionally, the groups’ frequent attempts at ethnic power-sharing undermine the hypothesis that the Rhodesian Bush War was caused by widespread ethnic hatred. Instead, facing a history of exploitation, arrest, and disenfranchisement, the ZANU/ZAPU groups confronted a commitment problem and were unlikely to trust the white Rhodesians to uphold any agreements.

The credible commitment problem of the ZANU/ZAPU nationalists and the Rhodesian government manifested itself in two key moments: (1) the 1961 Constitutional Conference and (2) the 1962 election. These two watershed events provide important micro case studies for analyzing the cause of the Rhodesian Bush War, because these developments contributed most significantly to the outbreak of war.

The 1961 Rhodesian Constitutional Conference process represents the first important manifestation of the enduring commitment problem. Leading up to the 1961 Constitutional process, the majority government, Edgar Whitehead’s United Federal Party (UFP) made some multi-racial concessions, indicating a reasonable effort to create a cooperative settlement (Brownell 2010, 473). Most notably, amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act allowed multi-racial trade unions and the partial repeal of the Land Apportionment Act (LAA) (Brownell 2010, 473-475). Thus, Africans were playing an increasingly active role in Rhodesian national affairs. This indicates that the white Rhodesian government was not motivated by primordial ethnic hatred, as the prior hypothesis supposes. Instead, many politicians and Rhodesian officials viewed progressive concessions as an effective means of combating growing African nationalism (Msindo 2007, 274). Despite these concessions, the UFP assured its constituency that it would not lower voting qualifications. Instead, the 1961 Constitution cemented two rolls: A-roll for those with higher voting qualifications (white Rhodesians) and B-roll for those with lower voting qualifications (black Rhodesians) (Good 2015, 40). Eligibility for A-roll required an income of 792 pounds per annum and the possession of immovable property worth 1650 pounds (Mutiti 1974, 266-267). Eligibility for B-roll required an income of 264 pounds per annum and the possession of immovable property worth 275 pounds (Mutiti 1974, 267-268). Fifty members of Parliament were elected from the A-roll and only fifteen were elected from the B-roll. Black Rhodesians who were historically materially deprived by the Land Apportionment Act (LAA) were largely relegated to the B-roll (Mutiti 1974, 268). The 1961 Constitution failed to build confidence in the different groups that their rights and interests would be safeguarded, thus representing a credible commitment problem. The Constitution did not address the discriminatory laws and high property requirements for one to qualify to vote (Mutiti 1974, 268-269). Black Africans were unable to trust that the Rhodesian government would not renege
on their meager concessions, so they chose a more radical course of action. At the last meeting of Congress before the convention, Joshua Nkomo and the NDP promised a bloody revolution until universal suffrage was realized (Hull 1976, 187). The 1961 Constitution was a notable opportunity to achieve power-sharing; instead, because of credible commitment problems, it set forth the progression toward civil war.

The Constitution and its conservative power-sharing agreement were viewed as direct attacks on the survival of black Rhodesia. Thus, as a second crux of commitment problems, the African nationalists protested the 1962 elections. They put up no black candidates for election, called upon all Africans to refuse registration, and encouraged those who were already registered not to vote (Barber 1967, 462). This call to boycott had a huge impact on electoral turnout. No more than one-fifth of those entitled to a B-roll vote had registered; of those, only one-fourth had cast ballots. In 1962, only 91,913 Africans voted in the B-roll—a turnout rate of just 2.6% (Lemon 1978, 512-514). Such a coordinated effort of collective political protest represents deeper political motivations than unorganized thugs and criminals. Black Rhodesians desired rights to just representation in government, much more than the simple desire to loot and pillage. Meager B-roll turnout rates in the 1962 election reflect broader commitment problems; even when black Rhodesians were given some increased electoral power, they did not trust that they could enter into power sharing agreements with the white minority controlling government.

In addition to black Rhodesians protesting the election, the white electorate became increasingly conservative in the 1962 election. This extremism was likely due to credible commitment problems induced by anticipated power shifts under the new Constitution. Growing extremism became evident in the 1962 election, which brought the white supremacist Rhodesian Front (RF) to power. The RF won 35 of 50 A-roll seats in Parliament over the more moderate United Federal Party (UFP), who had pushed for multi-racial concessions at the Constitutional Conference the year prior (Lemon 1978, 41). According to RF leader Ian Smith, in response to the interethnic concessions of the 1961 Constitution, many white Rhodesians felt “that the hour had come and if they did not arouse themselves they were going to lose their country altogether” (Olsson 2011, 37). Thus, an increasing portion of the electorate came to oppose integration and viewed violent struggle as the only means of political preservation (Olsson 2011, 19).

The 1962 election of the RF is notable in the progression towards civil war, as the party pushed the country towards greater division and extremism. By 1965, the RF swept all 50 A-roll seats and declared independence from Britain (Brownwell 2008, 476-478). The first engagement of the Rhodesian Bush War, the Battle of Sinoia, took place just five months after UDI; seven ZANLA insurgents and two civilians were killed in the fight against the Rhodesian Security Forces (Binda 2008, 48-50). Earlier attempts at power-sharing and political cooperation were ineffective because of credible commitment problems. After these commitment problems manifested themselves at (1) the 1961 Constitutional Conference and (2) the 1962 election
protest, the descent towards civil war became almost inevitable.

**IMPLICATIONS**
The understanding of the Rhodesian Bush War as the result of credible commitment problems has important policy implications. The outbreak of war could have been mitigated by a third-party security guarantee (Walter 2002, 26-27). Third-party intervention is an important solution to the prevention of civil wars, in which a trusted foreign supporter can act as a guarantor to enforce cooperation between groups and ensure that cheating on the alliance would be costly. In the study of all civil wars between 1940 and 1990, Barbara Walter determined that if a third-party agrees to enforce the terms of a peace treaty, negotiations always succeed regardless of ethnic divisions (Water 1997, 335). Without a credible third-party security guarantee, the combatants’ vulnerability during demobilization remains dangerously high and often allows conflicts to ignite.

In the example of Rhodesia, Britain had both the reason and capabilities to enforce cooperation and power-sharing agreements between white Rhodesians and black nationalists. Anglo-Rhodesian negotiations were attempted four times between 1966 and the end of the war in 1979. Every attempt to negotiate failed except for the Lancaster House Accords, which ended the Rhodesian Bush War on December 21st, 1979 (Walter 2002, 140-141). The Lancaster House Accords were successful because Britain vowed direct military and political involvement; Britain promised to commit peacekeepers, cease-fire observers, and election monitors on the ground to carry out the negotiated settlement (Walter 2002, 113-114).

This eventual assurance of Britain as an enforcer of negotiations could have been accomplished before the outbreak of 15 years of war. Britain had significant reason to intervene before the announcement of UDI and the outbreak of violence in Rhodesia. Beginning in early 1962, various organs of the United Nations passed resolutions calling upon Britain inter alia to convene a new constitutional conference for Rhodesia and solidify majority rule (Good 2015, 43). Even in April 1965, just seven months before Rhodesia’s UDI, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling on Britain “to employ all necessary means, including the use of military force” to stop Ian Smith’s illegal UDI (Mungazi 1981, 62-63). These resolutions show that the international community knew UDI was a real and present risk; thus, with earlier intervention, the Rhodesian Bush War was an avoidable tragedy. The most notable opportunity to intervene was after the 1961 Constitutional process. Joshua Nkomo, the first president of the NDP, warned Britain at the last Congress before the Constitutional Conference, “There are only three methods possible —negotiations, economic breakdown or bloody revolution. I warn Britain that if she does not act now I will quit the present nature of politics that we have been following” (Mungazi 1981, 67). By not placing boots on the ground during negotiations, the British signaled to Ian Smith and his regime that they were not committed to protecting the rights of black Rhodesians (Good 2015, 45). Thus, without a third party guarantor, the white-minority
government was further empowered to consolidate power.

Using the Lancaster Accords as an example, an effective third-party security guarantee would involve direct military intervention from Britain. At the time, the military budget of Britain was 400 times that of Rhodesia, so intervention should not have been too costly to the colonial power (Good 2015, 57). Initial military intervention would involve a coup de main, or a sudden air invasion involving a few companies of paratroopers (Good 2015, 58). Troop estimates for a mission like this range from three brigade groups up to two divisions. Thus, it would take approximately 15,000 to 25,000 men to secure Rhodesia (Good 2015, 58). These troops could be supplemented by the United Nations. However, with a land force of 317,000 in 1960-61, maximum estimates of Commonwealth troop presence would only be ~8% of the British army (Commons 1961, 636). After disarming the country, Rhodesia could be effectively monitored by peacemakers while a political treaty was enacted, including the implementation of fair and equal elections for black Africans (Walter 2002, 140-141). Proper prescription is necessary to the prevention of civil war. By diagnosing the commitment problems plaguing negotiations in Rhodesia, Britain could have acted as a trusted enforcer. Thus, the Rhodesian Bush War was an entirely avertable tragedy.
WORKS CITED


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