

“Today we use the term ‘the world’ with what amounts to brash familiarity. Too often in speaking of such things as the world food problem, the world health problem, world trade, world peace, and world government, we disregard the fact that ‘the world’ is a totality which in the domain of human problems constitutes the ultimate in degree of magnitude and degree of complexity. That is a fact, yes; but another fact is that almost every large problem today is, in truth, a world problem. Those two facts taken together provide thoughtful men with what might realistically be entitled ‘an introduction to humility’ in curing the world’s ills.”

— President Emeritus John Sloan Dickey,
1947 Convocation Address

WORLD OUTLOOK

AN UNDERGRADUATE JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
AT DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

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The Editors of World Outlook would like to express gratitude to the John Sloan Dickey Center for its encouragement and assistance.

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About the Journal:

World Outlook is a student-run journal of international affairs that publishes papers written by undergraduate students. In addition, the journal features interviews with major global thinkers and opinion pieces written by our own staff. Our name and missions are motivated by the words of late Dartmouth President John Sloan Dickey. Please visit our website at <http://sites.dartmouth.edu/worldoutlook>.

Opinions and articles published in this journal are those of the individual authors and do not reflect academic or intellectual positions of The John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth.

Subscription Information:

World Outlook (ISSN 0895-7452) is published bi-annually. Subscription requests should be directed to WorldOutlook@Dartmouth.edu.

Submissions:

World Outlook welcomes all current and former undergraduate students to submit papers relating to any aspect of international affairs. Papers to be considered for publication must be available in digital format. Papers should include references and bibliography consistent with the Chicago Manual of Style guidelines. Submissions must be original works with accurate citations. Submit your work for review to world.outlook@dartmouth.edu, and include your name, school, and class year. All submissions become property of *World Outlook*.

Submissions are read by several staff editors and at least one senior editor and the best articles are chosen for publication. Generally, the editorial staff tries to keep a balance of Dartmouth and non-Dartmouth articles, though this is subject to change based on the quality of submissions.

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WORLD OUTLOOK AT THE JOHN SLOAN DICKEY CENTER
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EDITORS' NOTE

With devastating conflicts raging in Gaza, Ukraine, Sudan, and Haiti, the future of the international order is at a turning point. Given the stakes at hand, the Spring 2024 issue of *World Outlook* includes a wide range of articles that shed light on the consequences of foreign policy actions and address human rights in the aftermath of war. From geopolitical tensions to gender-based violence, our contributors provide thought-provoking insights that challenge conventional wisdom.

The issue begins with an interview with Josh Paul, a US diplomat who resigned from the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs in October 2023 due to his disagreement with the Biden administration's decision to rush military assistance to Israel. Paul provides a fascinating look into the US government's culture of dissent, mechanisms of protecting civilians in the context of arms transfers, and reaction to student protests around the country, including here at Dartmouth. Ben Scharr-Weiner's article on *Azerbaijan, Israel, and Implications for Iranian Nuclear Policy* complements our selected interview by illuminating the complex, overlapping dynamics between countries and conflict zones in the Middle East and Caucasus that continue to shape US national security interests.

How do American policies continue to shape foreign realities, from intervention to immigration? *Band-Aid Border Control: Venezuela, Nicaragua, Haiti, Cuba, and the Perils of Partisanship* by Haronid León dives into the recently implemented parole process for Venezuelans, Nicaraguans, Haitians, and Cubans, advancing creative solutions to US immigration challenges amidst increasing political polarization. In a similar vein, Olivia Sasse navigates the legacy of American intervention in the Dominican Republic in her article *From Occupation to Autocracy: Trujillo's Ascent in the Aftermath of American Intervention*.

What role do governance structures play in achieving gender equality and transitional justice? Vicka Heidt's *The Relationship Between Power Sharing and Gender Equality: Examined through GBV Policies and Outcomes in Northern Ireland* advances that power-sharing can limit gender equality in post-conflict settings such as Northern Ireland.

We are proud to present this collection of works, each deepening our understanding of international relations. Reviewing, curating, and editing the Spring 2024 edition of *World Outlook* brought us great pleasure. We hope that these articles spark dialogue, challenge assumptions, and inspire further inquiry into the pressing issues shaping our world today.

Sincerely,
Julia Schwed '25 and Madeleine Shaw '25
Editors-in-Chief

INTERVIEW WITH JOSH PAUL, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE US DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS

The John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding hosted Josh Paul at Dartmouth College on May 2, 2024. World Outlook Podcast Editor Anika Mukker '26, Pranav Akella '27, Walker Wilson '27, and Himmat Grewal '27 conducted an interview with him. The interview was edited for clarity and content. The views expressed in this interview are solely those of the guest and do not reflect the opinions of Dartmouth College.

Anika Mukker: Hello and welcome to World Outlook's podcast, *The Outlook*. I'm Anika Mukker, a '26 and an editor of *The Outlook*. We're excited and honored to be joined by our special guest, Josh Paul.

Josh Paul resigned from the State Department in October 2023 due to his disagreement with the Biden administration's decision to rush lethal military assistance to Israel in the context of its war on Gaza. He had previously spent over 11 years working as a Director in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which is responsible for US defense diplomacy, security assistance, and arms transfers. He also worked on security sector reform in both Iraq and the West Bank, with additional roles in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, US Army Staff, and as a Congressional staffer for Representative Steve Israel (D-NY). Josh grew up between London and New York, and holds Masters degrees from the Universities of Georgetown and St Andrews, Scotland. He is currently a Non-Resident Fellow at the organization Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN) and a recipient of the 2023 Callaway Award for Civic Courage.

Thank you very much for being here with us today.

Josh Paul: Thank you, it's great to be with you all.

Anika: To start us off, we hoped you might be able to share with our listeners a bit about your journey from your undergraduate education into the world of international politics.

Josh: So I found myself in my senior year of college, not really sure what I was going to be doing next. One of my professors said to me "well, you know, there's a great International Security Studies program at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.. You should look into that." And I did—I went straight from undergrad into grad school.

The interesting thing about the way Washington works is that it's a very network-centric community. People think that the American government is all about the skills and merit that you bring, but it's not a merit-based system. It's very much a network-based system.

The good thing about going straight to grad school in D.C. is that I went into a class that was ⅓ kids straight out of college like myself, ⅓ military—you need a master’s degree in the US to become a Lieutenant Colonel—and ⅓ D.C. professionals, who were mid-career. So that built a great community and great network, many of whom I’m still in touch with today, that then led to all sorts of connections that got me my first job in D.C. and then continued to support me since then. So that was my path into the professional world in D.C.

Walker Wilson: What was your process of deciding to leave your job? Did your past experiences shape the way you reacted to the Biden administration’s decision to rush lethal military assistance to Israel?

Josh: The last job that I had for the past 11 ½ years was in the US State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. This is the part of the US government that is responsible for America’s defense diplomacy, including security assistance and arms transfers to partners around the world. Most people think that is done out of the Department of Defense, but it’s actually done out of the State Department because it’s a tool of foreign policy, because our security relationships build relations with partners and give us leverage with them.

It’s been curious in the last few months to see the State Department insisting from the podium that we don’t tell our security cooperation partners what to do or how to act. If that were the case, I would have spent the past 11 years working in the Department of Defense and the Department of Commerce. The fact that I’ve spent the past 11 years in the State Department is a testament to the fact that this is a tool of foreign policy, and it comes with advantages for American foreign policy if we choose to use them.

At the end of the day, one of the reasons that I left the State Department was because we have all this leverage and we’re refusing to use it. Instead, we are rushing arms into a conflict where American weapons, greatly funded by American taxpayers, have killed 35,000 in Gaza, including at least 15,000 children, and have caused so much devastation and suffering. At the time that I left in mid-October, it was already apparent that that was the case. There were already 3,500 dead in Gaza at the time that I resigned. Yet there was no willingness on the part of this administration to discuss whether we were pursuing a good policy, let alone a legal one.

I don’t think any of us at the State Department go into government to cause such visible, obvious harm. But the absence of this space for discussion, either within the Executive Branch or Congress, is an important issue. I think that a lot of Americans think it’s an important issue and we see that certainly on campuses around the coun-

try. In the absence of the ability to have those discussions in government, the only place to have them was in the public sphere. Of course, to do that, you have to leave government. That's why I resigned.

Pranav Akella: What was the culture of dissent like during your time at the State Department? Did you often engage in productive debate and discussion, and how did this change after the start of the latest Israel-Hamas conflict?

Josh: The State Department itself actually does have a really healthy culture of debate and discussion and significant space for dissent. The way it's even structured is that it's broken into about 29 different bureaus. Each of them has a different remit, which naturally puts them into conflict with each other. For example, there's my old bureau, Political-Military Affairs, which is sending out arms. Then there's the Bureau of International Security and Non-Proliferation, which is all about containing arms. Then there's the Bureau of Human Rights, etc. On any issue, the way the State Department works is that it throws the issue into the mix and forces all those different bureaus to negotiate until they come to a common conclusion.

On top of that, you have the civil service protections that exist in government. That means that once you're a tenured civil servant, you are secure in your job. You cannot be fired for expressing a difference in opinion. You can only lose your job for malfeasance, illegal activity, etc. That gives you a lot of space to debate, discuss, and raise concerns.

Even on top of that, you also have channels like the dissent channel at the State Department, which is a protected channel, meaning you can't be retaliated against for raising a dissent to the Secretary on a matter of policy. That doesn't mean that it's an effective channel, but it certainly shows that there is space for debate.

What was different here, and contrary to all of my previous experience, was that there was no space for debate. Even in the context of Israel, which is a sensitive subject as it has been for many years in government, there was still room to raise concerns about human rights or to have conversations about withholding certain arms to certain units. That all went away after October 7. I understand, in part, why that happened. I think there was a very emotional response to what was a horrendous attack on civilians, a war crime.

At the same time, it's not the job of the government to respond with passion; it's the job of the government to respond with reason, with logical thought, and to think about what are the best outcomes, purposes, and objectives. That certainly wasn't happening in the wake of October 7. It was this rush to arm, this directive of "whatever Israel requests, we will approve as quickly as possible," even though it was clear where

that was leaning and the impact that was having. So yes, as a general matter, I think the State Department in particular has a culture of dissent, much more so than, say, the Defense Department. But not in this case.

Anika: From the beginning of your government career until now, how has your view of the United States, and particularly the State Department's, role in the world changed?

Josh: That's a really interesting question. Having worked in the State Department, your understanding of how it works and how these mechanisms of policy debate and discussion occur certainly evolves.

One of the things I learned during my time at the State Department was how to manage and work within a bureaucracy. At the end of the day, it's not just about knowing what the law and policy say, but also knowing the process, the stakeholders, and the importance of personal relationships. A lot of people think that D.C. works on merit. We look at other cultures around the world, for example, the Middle East, we say that "look at this *wasta*, these pay-offs and networks," whereas really the same is true within the US government. Sure, we don't typically hire based on personal relationships if you're going into the Foreign Service. But we do have a significant class of political appointees who run government under every administration who are hired exactly based on personal connections. Understanding that there is more to the system than just the "org chart" and the laws and regulations is my biggest takeaway over the years.

Himmat Grewal: The US has a number of procedures in place to ensure that in theory, US arms should not be used to kill civilians. Could you talk about these mechanisms, and which you believe have been effective and ineffective?

Josh: There are two broad baskets to think about there. One is what we call "security assistance," which is US grant money—taxpayer money—that we give to countries to buy mostly US weapons. Then there's the transfer of weapons itself, whether it's funded through grant assistance or the partner countries using their own money.

The reason I mention that is because there are overlapping but different bodies of law that apply to both. Starting with the arms transfers, there's actually very little in US law that restricts the provision of arms to human rights violators. In fact, if you go back just a few years, the US supported the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, where there were significant human rights violations and a large amount of civilian harm as a result of US weapons. Most of the debate we're having now in Washington about the Leahy Law didn't apply there, because the Saudis were using their own money. And the Emiratis.

When it comes to the arms transfers themselves, there are some provisions in law that

you can only provide weapons that are going to be used for purposes for which they were furnished. I think it's pretty obvious that human rights violations, mass murder, are not purposes for which weapons are furnished. However, that doesn't explicitly say that you cannot provide weapons that will be used to commit war crimes—you'd think it would but it doesn't.

The part that drives much of the policy on arms transfers themselves is something called the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy. Every administration since Reagan has issued their own CAT policy. The Biden administration is actually the best so far. It was issued in February 2023 and, for the first time, it actually has direct language that says the transfer of arms shall not be authorized if it is more likely than not that those arms will cause violations of international law or harm to children. I think it's clear, based on what we're seeing in Gaza, that it is more likely than not that when we transfer a 2,000-pound bomb to Israel, it will cause a gross violation of human rights or some sort of war crime. I think we are just ignoring that policy. However, it's a policy, not law, so there's no legal consequences for ignoring it.

Where the law is really attached is on the grant assistance, taxpayer money side. That's where you have laws such as the Leahy Law, which says that you cannot provide military assistance to a unit of a foreign security force that is credibly alleged to be involved in gross violations of human rights. For almost every country in the world, we have a process where before we provide the assistance, we vet the unit. If there is a credible allegation of gross violation of human rights, the unit doesn't get the assistance.

In the case of Israel, we provide the assistance first and then we have a process to listen out for allegations. I was part of the Israel-Leahy vetting forum—the mechanism that exists to look at these allegations. In the four years that it has existed, there has never been an Israeli unit that has been prohibited from being provided with US military assistance because of gross violations of human rights, despite, I can tell you, multiple credible allegations. So that's another example of a law that I believe we are breaking.

There's also a law in the books under the Foreign Assistance Act that says we can't provide assistance of any kind to a country that is restricting US-funded humanitarian assistance. We know, because we have heard USAID, the National Security Advisor, and in fact Israeli officials say that they are restricting US-funded humanitarian assistance. So, by law, we should not be providing a single penny. And yet we continue to do so. That's just a couple of examples of the laws that are being ignored right now by the Biden administration.

Himmat: All around the country, Americans are protesting the Biden administration's response to the war in Gaza and unconditional support for Israel. Do you believe that these protest movements, particularly the uncommitted vote movement and ongoing

student demonstrations, are having an effect on President Biden's Gaza policy, especially given the upcoming election?

Josh: Today, as we sit here on May 2, President Biden gave remarks from the White House podium. At the end of those remarks, he was directly asked if the student protests are having an impact on his policy. He had one word: "No." So, I can't say more than what he himself says.

I do think that the student protests and particularly the uncommitted vote movement actually are having an impact. Not so much on his policy, which hasn't really changed, but certainly on the tone of the administration and on their willingness to say that they are concerned about civilian harm in Gaza, that they need more humanitarian assistance to go into Gaza. I think we are seeing a tonal shift, but I don't think it has yet resulted in an actual shift in policy.

On the contrary, what we see both from the Biden administration and from state governments, members of Congress, and university administrations around the country, is a purposeful attempt to misdescribe the protests, to say that they are anti-semitic when they are clearly not. In fact, in many cases, they are led by Jewish student groups. Also to describe them as violent—if we look at the UCLA incident, we know it was started by those who were pro-Israel.

In fact, having come here to Dartmouth, I can say that the protest I saw last night was inherently a peaceful protest. Tents, of course, represent tents in Rafah, where there are millions of displaced civilians now gathered in these tents, and students holding arms. I saw the use of force by riot police to drag students out of those protests. It's clear what the facts are here, and I don't think the misrepresentation that's occurring in the media, particularly cable news, is fooling anyone. I think all of us can see what the actual facts are.

Pranav: What would you say to university students who feel strongly about this conflict or other issues but are scared of the consequences of protesting?

Josh: I think you can be scared both because of the risk of being mislabeled and also being arrested, particularly if it's a career in government that you plan to go into.

I think that there is a role for everyone here. You don't have to be the person being arrested. You can be the person writing about the person being arrested. You can be people who are engaging directly with the college administration, so that when the President of the College puts out a statement saying that "we have a mechanism for you to understand our finances and how our investments work," those people can turn around and say "thank you, we've been doing that for the last two months and it has

led nowhere.” I think that everyone has a different role based on their capacity and what their concerns are. You don’t have to be the person on the front lines of a protest to have an impact.

Anika: How do you believe college administrations can strike a balance between protecting students’ freedom of speech and right to protest while also promoting productive discourse and maintaining safety, as they frame as their goals?

Josh: You know, I’d like to understand what their goals actually are. If the goal of college administrations like that at Dartmouth is to protect students and to advance debate and dialogue in a healthy way, that’s certainly not what we saw yesterday.

If their goals are to shut down the protests, that’s also not what we saw yesterday. I heard some students here say today that they don’t see eye to eye with the protesters, but that once you start arresting their friends, that’s a problem—they’re going to show up for the next protest. By that definition, the administration’s approach is an absolute failure.

I think we can take one or two things away from that. Either college administrations are seriously miscalculating and are just making foolish decisions, or this is not what their goals are. Their goals are actually not focused on the student interest, but focused on responding to pressure from donors and trustees.

Based on their behavior, I have to say that it seems more likely here that we are not seeing an effort by colleges and universities to provide safe spaces for debate, to have reasonable discussions, and to engage with their communities. Rather, we are seeing a response to outside political pressures that weigh on their careers as administrators or the finances of the universities. I think that’s a pretty dark place for American academia to be in because that’s not what we’re here to do; we’re here to be communities of education and learning, not to be driven by outside forces.

Pranav: What is the cause for this conflict being the “exception”? Is it the emotion from October 7th, or are there other reasons?

Josh: No, I think it was the exception before October 7th, too, in many ways. At the time I resigned, I didn’t think I’d be having these conversations this much later—not because I didn’t think the conflict would still be going, but because it was my perception and I think it is a reality that this is still very much a third rail. You cannot touch a criticism of Israel and expect to have a career in government in Washington.

We see that particularly at the political level, where, for example, the Biden administration came into office saying they were going to put human rights at the center of

foreign policy. Almost to this point, there was not an Assistant Secretary at the State Department for Human Rights, the person in charge of putting human rights at the center of foreign policy. Why? Because the person who was nominated for that position by the Biden administration, Sarah Margon, who had been director of Human Rights Watch, had once said something mildly critical of Israel. As director of Human Rights Watch, she has said critical things about just about every country in the world, including the United States, but it was speaking up on Israel that prevented the Senate from confirming her.

So I think there is something unique, and I think we can see that in the student protests, too. If the students were protesting about human rights in Iran or Saudi Arabia or Mexico, or America for that matter, I don't think we would see the militarized responses that we have seen on campuses. I think there is something unique about this issue, and I think that needs to change. What we have in America is not a policy problem; it's a political problem. That's what needs to be addressed.

Walker: What advice do you have for students who hope to pursue a career and make a difference in international politics?

Josh: There are a few things I'd say to that. First, I've had a passion for international relations for all my life. Everyone I've worked with in the State Department, if you pull them aside, will say "this is such a cool job." The same is true for other parts of the government—the intelligence community, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, etc. Know that you have that passion and that you'll find communities of people who share that passion, whether they are working in humanitarian aid agencies, international NGOs, or the UN, these are all people who want to make the world a better place. They don't always see eye to eye on how to do that, but they are in it because they want to serve and make things better. Throughout your career, you'll find commonalities but also a shared passion.

The second thing is to know your limits, certainly based on my own personal experience over the last few months and the point at which I left, is to know your limits. Depending on what you do in government, there are obviously different levels of moral challenge. I think if you are working for the EPA, those challenges are different by nature than if you are working on arms transfers. Know what your moral comfort levels are, that there will be some need to make compromises, that you have to learn the system, and that you have to work within the system, at least until you can't. Know what your red lines are. Know what your area of comfort is and know where its boundaries are. I think that that's also something that changes over time as you get to know yourself better and your career better, but always keep that in mind.

Anika: Thank you so much again for answering our questions very candidly. We really

appreciate you taking the time to talk with us today.

Josh: Thank you for having me, and I look forward to your generation's leadership.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POWER SHARING AND GENDER EQUALITY: EXAMINED THROUGH GBV POLICIES AND OUTCOMES IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Vicka Heidt

Power sharing was introduced as a proposal to provide democratic stability and peace in divided societies or states emerging from violent conflict, yet its outcomes are mixed. The scholarship, thus far, has centered on how power sharing impacts long-term democratization and peacebuilding, but there are growing questions about whether power sharing limits or advances gender equality. Gender equality, as examined through gender-based violence (GBV) policies and outcomes, is an indicator of democracy and peace in a state. Thus, this paper examines the extent to which there is gender equality, by studying GBV and GBV policies, in power-sharing states. This paper then asks, “Why does power sharing limit gender equality initiatives?” Referencing the case of Northern Ireland, my analysis illuminates that power sharing limits gender equality in states as power sharing broadly hinders democracy and peacebuilding. This paper first identifies that there is a positive correlation between gender equality, democracy, and peace. Next, the study finds that the Northern Ireland power-sharing government is largely ineffective, lacks local ownership, and faces issues of legitimacy—suggesting a hindrance to long-term democracy and peacebuilding. In examining gender equality in Northern Ireland, this paper finds a rise in GBV and a scarcity of gender equality policies since the initiation of power sharing. These findings offer valuable insights for policy formulation in Northern Ireland and broader global peace processes. Particularly, the study might advise caution in implementing power-sharing governments in post-conflict settings, especially those emerging from areas where sexual violence was prevalent during wartime.

INTRODUCTION

Power-sharing governments have emerged in several global contexts following conflict, from South Africa to Northern Ireland (Heidt 2023). While power-sharing systems are often proposed as solutions to support sustainable peace and democracy, their outcomes are mixed (Cederman, Hug, and Krebs 2010; Johnson 2020; Mousseau 2001). The scholarship, thus far, has centered on how power sharing impacts long-term democratization and peacebuilding (Jarstad 2008; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Sriram and Zahar 2009), but there are growing questions about whether power sharing advances or limits gender equality (McCulloch 2019; Ní Aoláin et al. 2011). Gender equality, as examined through gender-based violence policies and outcomes, is an indicator of democracy and peace in a state (Piccone 2017; Topuz 2017). As such, I specifically ask the question, “to what extent is there gender-based violence (GBV), and are there GBV policies in power-sharing states? Why does power sharing limit gender equality initiatives?”

This paper begins with a literature review, which introduces the term “power

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sharing” and core critiques about the efficacy of power sharing as a tool for democracy and peace. Next, the review explains the positive correlation between gender equality and democracy, and the negative correlation between gender-based violence and peace. I note that gender equality, which I plan to narrowly evaluate through the prevalence of GBV policies, is one way of assessing democracy in a state, and gender-based violence is one way of assessing peace in a state. Peace and democracy are two core goals of the power-sharing system (Lijphart 1977; Sisk 2003). Afterwards, I discuss current scholarship about the relationship between gender equality and power sharing.

Finally, I examine my hypothesis that power sharing undermines gender equality, as seen through a rise in gender-based violence and minimal GBV policies or initiatives. I reference the high GBV numbers and minimal GBV policies in the power-sharing state of Northern Ireland, citing power-sharing mechanisms that contribute to these outcomes. I theorize these gendered consequences exist in power-sharing governments, namely in Northern Ireland, because mechanisms of power sharing broadly hinder long-term democracy and peace (Jarstad and Sisk 2008).

LITERATURE REVIEW

Power Sharing

The concept of power sharing was first theorized by Arend Lijphart in the late-20th century (De Sousa Carvalho 2016; Lijphart 1977). Power sharing was introduced as a proposal to provide democratic stability in divided societies or societies emerging from violent conflict (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Horowitz et al. 2005; Pospieszna and Schneider 2013; Roeder 2005; Schneider and Wiesehomeier 2008). Lijphart defines power sharing as “a set of principles which, when carried out through practices and institutions, provide each significant group in society with representation and decision-making capacities in general affairs and a degree of autonomy on matters of particular importance to their group” (De Sousa Carvalho 2016). He hypothesized that the power-sharing model of governance, which accommodated and included political elites, would incentivize and promote moderation and restraint (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015). While there are no universally agreed upon portions of a power-sharing system, power sharing is traditionally premised on four conditions: a grand coalition government comprising the main groups, proportional representation of those groups, mutual veto for each on matters of critical importance to their community, and group autonomy (Lijphart 1977; Sisk 2003).

Power-sharing theories are popular with political scientists, scholars, and practitioners alike (Bochsler and Juon 2022). Even so, two core arguments about the efficacy of power-sharing governments have emerged in the scholarship (Azba 2021; Bochsler and Juon 2021). These arguments are fundamental for understanding power sharing in practice and the mechanisms of power-sharing that contribute to governance and peacebuilding outcomes.

Argument 1: Power Sharing Sustains Democracy and Peacebuilding

First, some researchers agree with Lijphart's theory that there is a causal connection between power sharing and lasting periods of democracy and peaceful stability (Lijphart 1977). Lijphart suggested that this relationship exists because power-sharing mechanisms provide minorities with assurances that they will not be permanently excluded from power or shut out of the policy-making process (Lijphart 1977). Through bolstering the security of each individual group, Lijphart theorized that power sharing increases the likelihood that opponents will remain committed to peace (Lijphart 1977; Sisk 2003). Scholars and practitioners have built off Lijphart's foundational ideas, stipulating that power sharing supports democracy through several means, such as fostering political pluralism and inclusiveness (Bormann 2014; Jarstad 2008; Bochsler and Juon 2021; Lijphart 1977; Sisk 2003). Political scientists also assert that power sharing builds stability, a necessary component of maintaining democracy, and makes transition possible for all parts of society (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Schneider and Wiesehomeier 2008).

Argument 2: Power Sharing Hinders Democracy and Peacebuilding

On the other hand, scholars contend that power sharing can worsen division and disagreement, hindering democratization and peacebuilding (Azba 2021; Dixon 2012; Jarstad and Sisk 2008; McCulloch 2018; Reilly 2001; Van Schendelen 1984). Researchers further argue that power sharing can negatively affect democratization by excluding moderate elites, lacking popular support, preventing local ownership of the political process, and freezing ethnic divisions by group representation (Jarstad and Sisk 2008). Broadly, critics of power sharing question whether power-sharing systems, which oftentimes confine political power and perpetuate ethnic polarization, can substantively support democracy and democratic progress (Dixon 2012; Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Political scientists also have concerns with "spoilers" in power-sharing systems who may utilize their capacity to spark violence (Gates and Strøm 2008; Stedman 1997). Critics of power sharing ultimately assert that power-sharing governments are ungovernable, unstable, and prone to collapse (McGarry 2017). As a whole, there are a plethora of scholars who have bolstered arguments about power sharing and how power sharing sustains or hinders democracy and peacebuilding.

Gender Equality Defined

An operationalized definition for gender equality notes that gender equality is a "social condition whereby women and men share equal rights," as seen through equitable access, equitable participation, and safety or freedom from violence (Piccone 2017; Rolleri 2012). Gender scholars agree that in order for gender equality to exist, equitable gender practices need to be in place (Piccone 2017; Rolleri 2013). Before examining current theories about how power sharing affects women's advancement, it is also imperative to note that scholars and international institutions have widely accepted that gender equality is a crucial portion of democracy and peace (Foster and

Markham 2021; Piccone 2017; United States State Department 2021; United Nations 2023; Espinosa 2020).

Gender Equality and Democracy

Research has, year after year, found that states with high levels of gender equality are more democratic (Azba 2021; Piccone 2017; United States State Department 2021). Political scientists and gender scholars have long agreed that democracy and gender equality are mutually reinforcing—higher levels of democracy typically come with higher levels of gender equality and physical safety for women (Beer 2009; Piccone 2017; Topuz 2017). The biggest point in contention for scholars is whether gender equality is a cause or consequence (or both a cause and a consequence) of stronger democracies (Ortiz 2023). Even so, gender equality is repeatedly used to assess democracy, because women's status in a country is correlated to the country's democratic health (Azba 2021; Ortiz 2023; Piccone 2017; United States State Department, 2021). This is seen in the widely referenced and annual publications of the World Bank's Gender Data Portal, the Georgetown Institute of Women, Peace, and Security Index, and the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development Gender Index (Cerspo-Sancho 2018; Ortiz 2023).

Gender Equality and Peace

Scholars generally accept that states with higher levels of gender equality are relatively more internally peaceful and peaceful with other states (Azba 2021; Piccone 2017; United States State Department 2021). International institutions like the United Nations and global scholars also recognize that gender equality is the number one predictor of a state's peacefulness, more so than its economic strength or level of democracy (Espinosa 2020; Hudson 2014; United States State Department 2021). Practitioners in the Women, Peace, and Security realm have further evidenced the notion that gender equality is associated with more peaceful and stable states (Ortiz 2023). For example, the World Bank Gender Data Portal and the Georgetown Institute of Women, Peace, and Security Index have repeatedly found that violence against women (VAW) and gender-based violence are predictors of whether a society is prone to violent conflict (Crespo-Sancho 2018; Ortiz 2023). Scholars and practitioners have found that higher levels of violence against women correspond with a greater use of military force to resolve disputes with other countries and a lack of compliance to international norms (Capioli 2000; Crespo-Sancho 2018; Hudson 2014).

Focusing on the Gender-Based Violence Dimension of Gender Equality

The field of gender studies welcomes gender equality as an expansive term and intersectional concept, which covers an array of social policies such as women's equitable access to voting and GBV prevention (Georgetown Institute of Women, Peace, and Security 2023; Piccone 2017; Roller 2012). Researchers thus agree that it can be hard to assess how or whether certain elements of gender equality might di-

rectly or indirectly correlate to higher levels of peace (Georgetown Institute of Women, Peace, and Security 2023; Piccone 2017). This is a gap in understanding in the scholarship that my paper must keep in mind. This is crucial in order to avoid drawing unjust conclusions about the relationship between particular dimensions of gender equality (i.e. economic empowerment) and peace.

One of the fundamental areas of gender equality is the security of women at individual, community, and societal levels (Georgetown Institute of Women, Peace, and Security 2023). Gender-based violence is distinct from other sections of gender equality as practitioners and researchers primarily accept the notion that GBV itself is a predictor of whether a society is prone to conflict (Crespo-Sancho 2018). Years of index reports and research have indicated that gender-based harm is critically linked to armed violence (Ortiz 2023). Further, scholars contend that GBV is an indicator of not only a country's internal peace, but also of its democratic health (Azba 2021; Piccone 2017). Even so, gender-based violence is infrequently used in isolation to assess peace and future conflict outcomes in states (Ortiz 2023). The scholarship is unclear as to why there is this divide. This places several limits on my paper. First, I will have less available data to reference in drawing connections between GBV and peace or democracy. Second, there is even less research about GBV, peace, and democracy specifically in power sharing states. Third, it is important that I refrain from definitively concluding the relationship between these differing elements (i.e. GBV, gender equality, democracy, peace, and power sharing), as this is still a burgeoning field with minimal scholarship about GBV and power sharing.

While there are several routes for examining gender equality, my paper about gender equality and power sharing will narrow its focus to the physical safety of women. This is per the findings of Rolleri, the United Nations, and others who note that gender-based violence is a clear indicator of gender equality, as well as peace and democracy in a state. Moreover, I restricted the breadth of my paper to accommodate for my own capacity and that of the already-sparse scholarship about my proposed topic. Narrowing my purview further, I will assess gender-based violence policies and outcomes in the power-sharing state of Northern Ireland. There is no shortage of data about GBV in Northern Ireland as the Northern Irish police produce an annual report with GBV statistics, and there are several in-state organizations and universities which provide up-to-date analysis about GBV in Northern Ireland.

It is important to note that gender-based violence does not solely affect women (Caprioli 2000; Hudson 2014). Although gender-related scholarship is beginning to address the role of men and boys as not only agents but also victims of gender-based discrimination and violence, I will focus on female-identifying victims of GBV (Piccone 2017). This is due to the scope of this paper and because factoring in men's experience would require additional and scarce qualitative and quantitative data (Piccone 2017).

Theories About Gender Equality and Power Sharing

There are developing dialogues about power sharing and specific minority groups' experiences within power-sharing systems (Jarstad 2008). One such argument is about the relationship between power sharing and gender equality (McCulloh 2020). Gender scholars have only recently begun examining how power sharing affects gender equality and gender equality initiatives (Azba 2021; McCulloh 2020; McCulloh 2018). Though the field is new, McCulloh (2018) notes that, "there appears to be an emerging consensus on the relationship between power sharing and gender inclusion, which suggest that power sharing . . . is bad for women." Several individuals have introduced reasoning to support this assertion, yet arguments by Azba and McCulloh are repeatedly and positively referenced by their peers. Both scholars also utilize gender equality as a route to illuminate how power sharing hinders democracy and peacebuilding.

Azba has two core ideas about gender equality and power sharing. First, Azba asserts that power sharing takes a gender-blind approach to conflict regulation and democracy. Azba (2021) supports this idea by explaining that, while power sharing seeks inclusion and cooperation, power sharing does not consider gender as a "stand-alone variable." As such, power sharing neglects to delegate sufficient energy to gender equality. Second, Azba raises concern with how the institutional design of power sharing perpetuates gender inequality. Azba stipulates that power sharing, aimed at ensuring stability and peace in multiethnic states, can embed patriarchal attitudes into its system. Azba flags analysis by Bell (2018) who remarks that power sharing partners "frequently find that one of the key areas they can agree on is the conservative retrenchment of women's rights, particularly reproductive services." Broadly, Azba finds that power sharing "sacrifices women's claims for equality in the interests of communal unity" (Hayes and McAllister 2012).

McCulloh agrees that power sharing is gender-blind but provides differing reasoning. McCulloh (2020) notes that power-sharing mechanisms, which reinforce ethnonationalism and fail to produce stability, are the key barriers to gender equality. McCulloh also stipulates that power sharing as "elitist, institutionalist, and overly focused on ethnonational communities" allows it to be dismissive of civil society and public demands. Since the bulk of women's political activism is located in civil society, this dismissal directly and negatively affects women (Kennedy, Pierson, and Thomson 2016; McCulloh 2020).

Azba and McCulloh both introduce avenues for further research. Azba (2021) primarily discusses a need for deeper and divergent work on the gendered implications of power sharing. McCulloh (2020) notes the need to diversify case studies being utilized and the need to open up new paths for exploration, since McCulloh believes that power sharing has been narrowly studied in terms of gender. This might include specifically studying GBV and power sharing, as my study proposes to do.

Gaps in Power Sharing Scholarship and Importance of Paper Topic

As previously noted, there is minimal research about the relationship between power-sharing government and gender equality (McCulloh 2018). While it is widely understood that gender equality and gender-based violence are correlated to democracy and peace, there are few scholars who study how power-sharing governments relate to the advancement of gender equality (McCulloh 2018). In turn, there are pressing concerns about generalizability, validity, and reliability of available research and data. This affects my own validity and reliability of research and is a core concern of writing my paper.

Bell and McCulloh also raise the issue of “single-case theorizing” about power sharing and gender equality. Northern Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina are the two core cases referenced by the handful of scholars who study gender equality and power sharing (Kennedy, Pierson, and Thomson 2016; McCulloh 2018). Even so, there is limited research about gender equality and power sharing in Northern Ireland (Bell 2018). After surveilling gender scholars and political scientists at the core universities in Northern Ireland, I was only able to find three working papers about this topic (Bell 2018; Hayes and McAllister 2012; McCulloh 2020). While this deficit has proven difficult to mitigate, it underscores the importance of this paper.

Lastly, there is minimal scholarship about gender-based violence in connection to power sharing. Largely, GBV has not been studied in relation to power sharing. After surveying several libraries and databases, I was unable to find more than a couple in-text references to gender-based violence in power-sharing systems (McCulloh 2018). None of these articles theorized GBV outcomes and policies as a route to gauge gender equality in a power-sharing state. This is widely appalling as gender and conflict studies explicate that GBV can be used to assess peace and democracy—two main functions of a power-sharing infrastructure (Azba 2021; Oritz 2023; Piccone 2017; United States State Department 2021; Georgetown Institute of Women, Peace, and Security 2023). The lack of scholarship is simultaneously a deterrent to and a motivating factor for this paper topic.

While outside of the scope of this paper, it should be noted that there are also gaps in broad power-sharing research (Bochsler and Juon 2022; Azba 2021). For example, most empirical research about power sharing focuses on negative peace (absence of conflict) instead of the establishment of positive peace and democracy (Bochsler and Juon 2022). These arguments are indirectly correlated to my argument, but they demand recognition as gender equality is considered positive peace (Galtung 1969).

CASE STUDY

Power Sharing in Northern Ireland

The power-sharing government in Northern Ireland was instituted by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) (Green 2023). This Agreement formally ended the Troubles, an ethno-national conflict which spanned over three decades, and

sought to achieve peace between the nationalists (those who favor unity with the Republic of Ireland) and unionists (those who seek to remain part of the United Kingdom) (O’Keefe 2017 O’Rourke and Swaine 2017). The GFA was further mediated by international actors, primarily the United States and Senator George J. Mitchell (USIP 2023). While the negotiations were largely secretive and elite-driven, the GFA gained majority support (71% of voters) in a referendum (Nagle 2017).

Northern Ireland’s power-sharing government is composed of two main bodies: the executive and the legislature (Landon and McBride 2023). The Northern Irish model has cross-community power sharing at both levels (Garry 2023). At the executive level, the government has a First Minister and a deputy First Minister—one unionist and one nationalist—who have equal power and cannot be in office without the other (Nagle 2017). Both leaders must agree to take up their positions in order for the government to be established (Garry 2023). There is also a multi-party executive cabinet which is made up of unionist and nationalist parties, decided by the d’Hondt proportionality system (Garry 2023). On the legislative side, there is proportional representation of nationalist and unionist Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) (Garry 2023). Each MLA must designate themselves as either nationalist, unionist, or “other” and then the D’Hondt system allocates legislative positions of power between the two key parties (Nagle 2017). By requiring that MLAs identify themselves and limiting intra-group voting, the power-sharing system further entrenches a divide—a core critique by scholars who note power sharing limits democracy and peace (Garry 2023; Jarstad 2008). In terms of voting in the legislature, certain decisions require cross-community support such as changes to the rules of the Assembly and budget allocations (Nagle 2017). This cross-community support does not stipulate majority support but instead demands the support of a certain percentage of nationalist and unionists. Under these circumstances, votes of “others” do not count on an equal basis to unionists and nationalists (Murtagh 2022). This directly limits the power of moderates, another critique by scholars who propose that power sharing causes democratic shortcomings (Jarstad 2008).

Power Sharing Hinders Democracy and Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland’s power-sharing government demonstrates several scholars’ argument that power sharing can make democracies ineffective and hinder sustainable peacebuilding. First, Northern Ireland’s power sharing model hinders democracy in the state, per Jarstad’s (2008) argument. The mechanisms of power sharing frequently contribute to the dissolution of the Northern Irish system of governance (Left 2002). The Northern Irish power-sharing system is largely viewed as ineffective, as seen by its regular collapses since its formation in 1998. When main parties fail to reach an agreement on power sharing, the government is formally suspended. The first long term suspension of the Assembly was between 2002 and 2007 when the unionist party refused to share power with the nationalist party (Left 2002). The government dissolved again between 2017 to 2020 and between 2022 to the present day. Collec-

tively, the Northern Irish Assembly has been suspended on over eight occasions and “for more than an estimated 40% of the time it could have been in operation” (Irish News 2023). During these periods of dissolution, England reimposes direct rule and Northern Ireland is run from London (BBC 2022). Recent data suggests that the Northern Irish Assembly has been markedly less productive over time with increasing levels of dysfunction and inactivity (Irish News 2023).

The repeated suspension of Northern Ireland’s power-sharing government obstructs democracy and demonstrates how power sharing is characterized by a lack of local ownership and legitimacy (Jarstad 2008). There are clear issues of ownership and legitimacy when Northern Ireland’s Assembly is suspended. During suspensions, the Assembly’s powers are transferred to the British Secretary of State who then manages Northern Irish affairs (Northern Ireland Assembly Education Service 2023). This British minister is not elected in Northern Ireland and, resultantly, Northern Irish citizens lack local ownership of their politics (Irish News 2023). Historically, power has been wielded to England for several years in which governance institutions are not accountable to the Northern Irish state as citizens have an insufficient voice in their legislature. The absence of elections during these lengthy periods of suspension also limits intergroup dialogue or discussion. While power-sharing systems often cement group lines as parties do not need to engage with their opponents for votes, this is more so true in Northern Ireland as campaigning is infrequent. Additionally, Northern Irish citizens are increasingly disengaged with democracy, likely due to the recurrent suspensions of the Assembly (Haughey and Loughran 2023). Quantitatively, the average voter turnout in the state is 52%, significantly lower than in England, Scotland, and Wales (DeSouza 2023). Alongside voter apathy, local polling in the summer of 2023 also revealed that only 17% of Northern Irish citizens trusted their executive government (Haughey and Loughran 2023). While it is unclear whether the elite-driven and international mediation of the GFA plays a role making power sharing ineffective, it is apparent that local ownership and legitimacy of power-sharing government in Northern Ireland is weak (Heidt 2023). Each of these repercussions from power sharing hinder democracy in Northern Ireland (Jarstad 2008).

Northern Ireland’s power-sharing system also hinders sustainable peacebuilding in the state as power sharing places emphasis on fractious identities and prevents the introduction of cross-cutting politics (Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Tull and Mehler 2005). This dynamic further leads to deepening polarization in post-conflict states instead of mediating or incentivizing intergroup political, or otherwise, discourse (Taylor 2006). Whereas other post-conflict governments may open up space for collaboration in building government, the power-sharing model solidifies a split between rivals (Jarstad 2008; Jarstad and Sisk 2008).

While power-sharing buffers between groups may soothe conflict on face-value, it does not promote substantive reconciliation and peacebuilding (Kerr 2005). This complicates the power-sharing narrative as, in the traditional sense of direct violence, Northern Ireland has experienced a decline in armed paramilitary violence

accompanied by the institution of power sharing (McGarry and O’Leary 2004). Yet, the documented decline in paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland following 1998 does not account for the fact that violence has not been entirely eradicated (Cowell-Meyers 2014; McAliskey and McCrory 2023). Gender and justice scholars note that “violence and crime simply took on different forms” in Northern Ireland (Green 2023). For example, gender-based violence has only increased since the institution of the GFA (International Socialist Alternative 2019).

Beyond violence statistics, scholars have noted the connection between power sharing and peace by studying the lack of grassroots peacebuilding (Ryan 2010). Power sharing was instituted in the absence of “interethnic reconciliation” in Northern Ireland, and this gap is best seen in communities (Kerr 2005). For example, the number of “Peace Lines” (instituted to divide Protestant and Catholic areas) have not been significantly minimized since the end of the Troubles. Out of the eighteen barriers during the Troubles, only five have been removed (Community Relations Council 2008). Further reports have found that levels of sectarianism and segregation have increased since the end of the Troubles (Hamilton et al. 2008). Young people in communities noted that paramilitaries were still active and that “conflict and violence impacted . . . their lives on most days” (Centre for Young Men’s Studies 2009). The alleged progress of power sharing to create peace does not transfer to the grassroots and demonstrates limited sustainable peacebuilding (Ryan 2010).

Power Sharing Limits Gender Equality in Northern Ireland

Since power sharing in Northern Ireland limits democracy and peacebuilding, it also limits gender equality initiatives as seen through a high number of GBV and minimal GBV policies in Northern Ireland. Monica McWilliams, a former member of the Legislative Assembly of Northern Ireland, poignantly remarked that “[w]omen in conflictual situations know that a cessation of military or political violence does not bring a cessation of all violence” (Green 2023). The start nor the end of the Troubles did not correlate with the end of all gender-based violence in the state (Ulster University, 2023). Following the Troubles, gender-based violence has rapidly increased since 2004 (International Socialist Alternative 2019). Police in Northern Ireland are called to domestic violence incidents every 16 minutes, yet there has been no comprehensive strategy to tackle gender-based violence in the state (Gordon 2023). In 2022, the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) published that women and girls are disproportionately affected by violence, abuse, and intimidation and account for 78% of sexual violence victims (PSNI 2022). The sexual violence offenses continue reaching new highs with each passing year (PSNI 2022). The PSNI statistics report that domestic violence has doubled since 2004, with roughly 39 domestic violence reports daily (PSNI 2022). Even so, prosecution was not pursued in over 83% of reports due to concerns that the case would not pass high standards of proof (O’Rourke and Swaine 2017).

In spite of the increase in gender-based violence in Northern Ireland, there

are minimal policies to support the safety of women. Policies on domestic violence have “responded weakly” to the prevalence of violence (Pierson 2018). While the Northern Ireland Office offered a 5-year plan to address domestic violence in 2005, it was not replaced due to the inactivity of the Northern Irish power-sharing structure and the interim devolved Assembly. The idleness to respond to domestic violence only increased from this point onward. In 2015, reports were released which exposed that a working group on domestic violence only met five times between 2008 and 2015 and stopped meeting after November of 2012 (Wilson 2016). When a new strategy was released in 2015, it was not given any funding. Though gender-based violence policies struggle without funding and commitment by the government, broader gender equality policies are entirely neglected. For example, the British Abortion Act was not extended to Northern Ireland as recently as 2018 and the Assembly repeatedly thwarted any changes to abortion laws in the state. This caused women in Northern Ireland to travel to England or illegally purchase abortion pills online, risking prosecution and leading to an increase in police raids on homes (Aiken et al. 2017).

The high number of gender-based violence and the limited number of gender equality initiatives likely stems from power sharing hindering democracy and peacebuilding. Gender-based violence correlates with peace in a state, and gender equality initiatives like GBV policies correlate with democracy. Beginning with GBV policies, the institution of power sharing in Northern Ireland has placed an emphasis on ethnic identity in politics and thus limited the ability of other groups, like women, to advocate for their needs (Pierson 2008). Further, the ineffectiveness of the power-sharing government, marked by several elongated periods of inactivity, has explicitly affected local ownership and thus gender equality policies in the state. Women are decreasingly running for office, citing the illegitimacy of the government and its inability to enact gender policies (DeSouza, 2023; McWilliams, O’Lynn, and O’Donnell 2023). The lack of local ownership for women became clear when the working group on domestic violence failed to become reinstated after a period of the Assembly’s suspension. Further the Assembly ceased to provide funding for GBV policies when signed into legislation, once again suggesting its illegitimacy. This is in direct opposition to gender equality initiatives in England, such as the 1967 British Abortion Act or the 2021 Domestic Abuse Act, which repeatedly passed in Parliament and received funding (Aiken et al. 2017).

While the minimal presence of GBV policies in and of itself suggests a higher level of GBV outcomes, we can also evaluate GBV in relation to power sharing. It is theorized that a neglect of deeper justice processes in post-conflict settings can contribute to a rise in GBV. Researchers of women’s experiences post-conflict note a link between violent masculinity and the ending of armed actions, which is responsible for this connection (Kostovicova, Bojicic-Dzelilovic, and Henry 2020). These scholars stipulate that when a violent masculine outlet, such as war, is removed from perpetrators, these actions transition into the household. Gender and justice scholars in Northern Ireland support this theory and also note that violence against women

in loyalist and republican communities is more similar than different (International Socialist Alternative 2019). Power sharing, an institution in favor of ending direct violence instead of enacting sustainable peacebuilding, neglects to include routes for reconciliation and accountability.

Additionally, the limited gender equality in Northern Ireland might be traced to gender-blind mechanisms in the power-sharing system. Beyond the ongoing peace versus justice debate in Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland's peace processes "are rarely evaluated with regard to gender equality or inclusion" (Gilmartin 2018). While beyond this paper, there is much room for research about power sharing and its inclusion or lack of inclusion of gender issues.

CONCLUSION

I sought to answer the following questions: To what extent does power sharing limit or advance gender equality initiatives, specifically gender-based violence policies? Why does power sharing limit gender equality initiatives?

The literature review established that there is a positive correlation between gender equality and democracy, and a negative correlation between gender-based violence and peace. Gender equality, narrowly evaluated through the prevalence of GBV policies, is one way of assessing democracy in a state, and gender-based violence is one way of assessing peace in a state. Peace and democracy are key goals of the power-sharing system (Lijphart 1977; Sisk 2003), yet power-sharing governments have mixed outcomes for peacebuilding and democratization (Bochsler and Juon 2021; Jarstad 2008).

In order to examine gender equality, I studied GBV outcomes and GBV policies in the power-sharing state of Northern Ireland. My hypothesis was, "power sharing undermines gender equality, as seen through a rise in gender-based violence and minimal GBV policies or initiatives. These gendered consequences exist in power-sharing governments because mechanisms of power sharing broadly hinder long-term democracy and peace." The ineffectiveness, lack of local ownership, and illegitimacy of Northern Ireland's power-sharing government suggests that power sharing hinders democracy and peacebuilding. The rise in GBV since the enactment of the GFA and the minimal GBV or otherwise gender equality policies in Northern Ireland suggest that power sharing limits gender equality.

Despite this connection between power sharing and gender equality, there is still much room for analysis about the relationship between gender equality and power sharing, as well as the dynamic between GBV and power sharing. Even so, this articulated analysis can better inform policy practices in Northern Ireland and burgeoning peace processes across the globe. For example, states emerging from violent conflict—namely in areas where rape was disproportionately utilized as a wartime tactic—should be particularly conscious of instituting a power-sharing government. The power-sharing system may, in turn, worsen harms of the conflict-era instead of seeking to redress them through sustainable democracy, peacebuilding, and overall

development. A wider and more culturally sensitive examination of gender equality and power sharing, particularly in regions beyond Europe, would greatly benefit policymakers and women in conflicted and post-conflict settings.

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BAND-AID BORDER CONTROL: VENEZUELA, NICARAGUA, HAITI, CUBA, AND THE PERILS OF PARTISANSHIP

Haronid León

This paper delves into the parole process for Venezuelans, Nicaraguans, Haitians, and Cubans announced and implemented by the Biden-Harris administration in January 2023, weighing its pros and cons against the ever-evolving immigration policies of the United States. The analysis provides a comprehensive understanding of the parole process, the historical and contemporary rationale behind the recipients as well as the political motivations behind the conditions. Strengths are included, but special attention is given to the flaws and weaknesses of the parole program, and their role in its inevitable failure. The article stresses the need for creativity and experimentation within immigration policy and law amid increasing political polarization.

INTRODUCTION

“This bill...that I will sign in a few minutes is the most comprehensive reform of our immigration laws since 1952” (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, n.d.). President Ronald Reagan was referring to the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which made millions of undocumented immigrants eligible for amnesty while punishing employers for hiring undocumented immigrants (NPR 2010). In his remarks, Reagan praised its bipartisanship, referring to the IRCA as “the product of one of the longest and most difficult legislative undertakings in the last three Congresses.” The bill was signed into law on November 6, 1986, and there has been no comprehensive reform of our immigration laws since.

Former President Ronald Reagan and current President Joe Biden face(d) similar challenges, despite their opposing politics. In 1986, Reagan balanced a Democrat-controlled House of Representatives and a Republican-controlled Senate (The Congress Project, n.d.). In 2023, Biden juggles a Republican-controlled House of Representatives and a Democrat-controlled Senate (Davis 2023). Both face(d) political polarization, Biden more so than Reagan. The divergence of political attitudes is an old phenomenon, but it has rapidly accelerated in the last four decades to the detriment of US domestic and foreign policy. Immigration has borne the brunt of political polarization, with legislative reform giving way to executive orders and obscure measures without the legality or longevity necessary for a solution. Venezuelans, Nicaraguans, Haitians, and Cubans are the most recent examples.

On January 5, 2023, the Biden-Harris administration announced a range of new border enforcement actions, including increasing the use of expedited removal, humanitarian assistance in Mexico and Central America, and a parole process for Venezuelans, Nicaraguans, Haitians, and Cubans (The White House 2023). The White

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House announced that “up to 30,000 individuals per month from these four countries, who have an eligible sponsor and pass vetting and background checks, can come to the United States for two years and receive work authorization” (The White House 2023). The four-country parole process builds upon a pre-existing process for Venezuelans, which was announced in October 2022.

VENEZUELA

It is no surprise that Venezuela was the first of the four countries to receive parole. Political turmoil and economic deprivation have combined to form “one of the worst humanitarian crises in the history of the Western Hemisphere” (Penfold and Arnson 2023). In June 2023, the International Criminal Court green-lit an investigation into human rights violations committed by the Nicolás Maduro government, citing “torture, arbitrary detentions, sexual violence, forced disappearances and extrajudicial executions” (Singer 2023). Inflation has skyrocketed in the last decade, reaching one million percent in 2019 (Rendon and Price 2019). These record-breaking numbers, which the International Monetary Fund has compared to 1920s Germany and 2000s Zimbabwe, have resulted in widespread hunger and starvation (Werner 2018). According to a Food Security Assessment conducted by the World Food Programme, “one out of three Venezuelans (32.3 percent) is food insecure” (ReliefWeb 2020).

In addition to political and economic hardship, US relations with Venezuela make Venezuelans the ideal test subjects for parole and immigration reform more broadly. The US and Venezuela are ideological polar opposites, whose democratic capitalist and authoritarian socialist systems are reminiscent of the divide between the United States and Cuba in the 1960s. In March 2023, President Biden referred to the situation in Venezuela as “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States” (The White House 2023). These hostilities transcend administrations; in February 2019, President Donald Trump stated that “in Venezuela and across the Western Hemisphere, socialism is dying and liberty, prosperity and democracy are being reborn,” language reminiscent of the Cold War (Caputo and Orr 2019).

Ideological conflicts have been relatively successful in stimulating immigration reform, as seen with Cuba during the Cold War, but Venezuelans’ three-month “head start” to the parole process can also be attributed to their educational and professional qualifications. According to the Migration Policy Institute, “in 2021, approximately 57 percent of Venezuelan immigrants ages 25 and older reported having a bachelor’s degree or higher, compared to 35 percent of [US citizens at birth] and 34 percent of immigrant adults” (Hoffman and Batalova 2023). Venezuelans also participate in the US civilian labor force at higher rates: 74 percent compared to 66 percent of US citizens at birth and 62 percent of other immigrant adults (Hoffman and Batalova 2023). These numbers have changed since 2021, but they provide insight into the parole process and its recipients. To qualify, parolees must have a sponsor in the US who is willing and able to “apply on behalf of the refugee and commit to

providing them with financial assistance while they're in the country" (Sullivan and Kanno-Youngs 2022). In addition to limiting the number of applicants, this requirement allows for self-screening; sponsors may be willing to support their parolees in the immediate aftermath of their arrival, but the parolees are expected to get a job and provide for themselves, a process made easier by educational and professional qualifications.

NICARAGUA

Venezuela and Nicaragua have much in common: both have self-proclaimed left-wing leaders, Nicolás Maduro and Daniel Ortega respectively; both leaders have accumulated executive power at the expense of political and civil liberties as well as economic welfare. Nicaragua has become one of the most authoritarian countries in the Western Hemisphere, with President Ortega relying on killings, extrajudicial detentions, disappearances, and torture to consolidate and maintain power. In 2018, anti-government protests were met with a brutal crackdown, which resulted in the deaths of at least 328 people (Freedom House 2023). Regarding economic welfare, Nicaragua is the second poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with anywhere from a quarter to two-thirds of the country living in poverty (Bermúdez and Robles 2022).

Ideology contributed to Nicaragua's inclusion in the parole process, just as it did with Venezuela. US foreign policy revolved around anti-communism and anti-socialism for much of the twentieth-century; the Cold War has since ended, but the US remains committed to these fights. In February 2023, the House of Representatives approved a resolution denouncing socialism. The resolution states that "many of the greatest crimes in history were committed by socialist ideologues," with Hugo Chavez and Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela, Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, and Fidel Castro of Cuba (three of the four countries eligible for parole) mentioned by name (Schnell 2023). The resolution concludes with "Congress denounc[ing] socialism in all its forms, and oppos[ing] the implementation of socialist policies in the United States of America" (Schnell 2023). The resolution passed in a 328-86-14 vote with 109 Democrats voting in favor (Schnell 2023). The US remains committed to anti-leftism, though its methods have shifted from military occupation and intervention to more subtle methods of subversion such as sanctions and parole processes.

HAITI

Haiti has no shortage of qualifying factors. The Caribbean country has been classified as a failed state; without a single democratically elected official, the country has fallen to gangs (Muggah 2023). Experts estimate that gangs control around 80 percent of Port-au-Prince, Haiti's capital (Coto 2023). On July 27, 2023, the US Department of State issued a Level 4: "Do Not Travel" advisory for Haiti, citing "kidnapping, crime, civil unrest, and poor health care infrastructure" (US Department of State 2023). In addition to societal collapse, Haitians face economic and health crises.

More than half of the population lives below the poverty line, a problem exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the earthquake of 2021, which killed over two thousand people (Roy and Labrador 2023). Poverty and natural disasters have resulted in widespread hunger and starvation. According to the United Nations World Food Programme, 4.9 million Haitians face acute hunger, with 1.8 million facing emergency levels of hunger (World Food Programme 2023). Haitians are also facing a cholera outbreak; “as of November 7, 2022, the [Haitian Ministry of Public Health and Population] reported over 600 confirmed cholera cases and over 6,500 suspected cases in the greater Port-au-Prince area” (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2023).

These conditions have made Haiti virtually unlivable, but there are other factors at play in the decision to include Haiti in the parole process. In the US, Haitians account for four percent of the 546,000 immigrants working as registered nurses as well as five percent of the 222,000 immigrant home health aides (Batalova 2023). These numbers seem small, especially in comparison to the 27 percent held by Filipino nurses and the 19 percent held by Dominican home health aides, but they are necessary to the US healthcare system (Batalova 2023). According to a news release by the US Department of Labor, “the US Bureau of Labor Statistics projects that more than 275,000 additional nurses are needed from 2020 to 2030” (US Department of Labor 2022). Home health aides are also in short supply, especially now that “some 17 percent of people living in the United States, or more than one in six, were 65 or older in 2020” (Searing 2023).

Haitian inclusion in the parole process can also be attributed to its long and dark history with the US. Haiti gained independence from France in 1804, but the US did not officially recognize its independence until 1862 (US Department of State 2023). However, recognition did not prevent exploitation; the US occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1936, one of the longest military occupations in American history (Hubert 1947, 278-279). Occupation allowed the US to take advantage of pre-existing systems of exploitation. The transferable nature of these systems is documented in “War and the Trade Orientation of Haiti” by Giles A. Hubert: “In return for French recognition of Haitian independence, the new republic was forced to pay a heavy indemnity of 60,000,000 francs (\$15,000,000 USD)...Haiti servic[ed] a heavy indebtedness to her former mother country until 1922, when the debt was refunded and transferred to United States investors” (Hubert 1947, 278).

US mistreatment of Haitians has continued into the twenty-first century and has become associated with the Biden-Harris administration. Human Rights Watch reported that from January 1, 2021 through February 26, 2022, the US expelled or deported 20,309 people to Haiti, despite its Temporary Protected Status (TPS). Daniel Foote, special envoy to Haiti under President Biden, resigned over these deportations, calling them “inhumane” and “counterproductive” (Jakes and Sullivan 2021). The Biden-Harris administration also drew criticism for video footage taken at the US-Mexico border; the footage showed Border Patrol agents on horseback using reins as whips in order to corral Haitian migrants (Alvarez 2022). US mistreatment of Haiti

and Haitians, historically and contemporarily, as well as the political and economic state of the island nation all contributed to its inclusion in the parole process.

CUBA

Cuba is a special case; of the four countries eligible for parole, it is the only one without TPS. Established by Congress in 1990, TPS “allows migrants whose home countries are considered unsafe the right to live and work in the United States for a temporary, but extendable, period of time” (Roy and Klobucista 2023). Cuba has never had TPS, but it was still included in the parole process, among temporarily protected Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Haiti. Its inclusion can be attributed to the “privileging of Cuban immigrants in the United States,” a controversial idea covered in *Cuban Privilege: The Making of Immigrant Inequality in America* by Susan Eckstein. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and subsequent administrations “hoped to convince the Cuban arrivals of the virtues of capitalist democracy” and “[sap] Cuba of its human capital,” all with the intention of “spur[ring] regime collapse” (Eckstein 2022, 2). Cuban immigrants “benefited” from these subversive policies, gaining unique benefits and entitlements such as “preferential access to limited immigration slots,” “special job training,” “special job placement services,” “special funding for university studies,” “immediate rights to welfare,” and most importantly, the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (Eckstein 2022, 13). The federal law “granted work authorization permits and lawful permanent residency (green card status) to any Cuban native or citizen who settled in the United States for at least one year” (The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966). No other nationals, either immigrants or refugees, have received such generous benefits and entitlements, contributing to the narrative that Cubans are “privileged” in the US immigration system.

Cubans benefit from “privileging,” but their inclusion in the parole process cannot be attributed solely to historical precedent. The *New York Times* reports that “deepening poverty and hopelessness have set off the largest exodus from the Caribbean island nation since Fidel Castro rose to power over half a century ago” (Augustin and Robles 2022). The numbers are staggering; in 2022 alone, “nearly 250,000 Cubans, more than two percent of the island’s 11 million population, have migrated to the United States” (Augustin and Robles 2022). Several factors are behind this mass exodus, both historical and contemporary. In February 1962, President John F. Kennedy imposed an embargo on trade with Cuba. The embargo has been in place for over 60 years and has crippled the Cuban economy, costing the island \$144 billion USD (Oliver and Venancio 2022). Recent events have exacerbated the situation; the economic collapse of Venezuela (Cuba’s closest ally and benefactor) and the COVID-19 pandemic have decimated the Cuban economy, which shrank by 11 percent in 2020 (Cuban Country Report 2022). Economic crisis has bred political turmoil; on July 11, 2021, Cubans took to the streets to protest “shortages of basic goods, economic difficulties, the government’s COVID-19 response, and a lack of fundamental freedoms” (Freedom House 2023). The Cuban government responded with repression,

arresting as many as 1,300 people. These conditions have culminated in a mass exodus from Cuba, and have contributed to its inclusion in the parole process.

Response from Both Sides of the Aisle

The parole process for Venezuelans, Nicaraguans, Haitians, and Cubans has received mixed reactions. The Center for American Progress issued its support, calling the process “orderly and humane” and encouraging the Biden-Harris administration to “continue to build upon its smart and successful parole processes” (Jawetz 2023). Opposition was expected, but backlash has come from both sides of the aisle. Bill Frelick, director of Human Rights Watch’s Refugee and Migrant Rights Division, attacked the parole process, calling it an affront to the welcoming poem at the foot of the Statue of Liberty (Frelick 2022).

Opposition came to a head on January 24, 2023, when twenty Republican-leaning states filed a lawsuit with the US District Court for the Southern District of Texas (Paxton 2023). The lawsuit alleges abuse of executive authority, with Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton accusing the Biden-Harris administration of forgoing the “usual notice and comment rulemaking process required by law” (Paxton 2023). The lawsuit sparked controversy; some defend it as a deterrent against executive abuse while others highlight its hypocrisy. The parole process for Ukrainians has admitted more refugees than the parole process for Venezuelans, Nicaraguans, Haitians, and Cubans, 271,000 (Ainsley 2023) compared to 210,000 (across four countries) (Lozano 2023), but was not met with a multi-state lawsuit despite its similar “abuse of executive authority.”

WEAKNESSES

Immigration is a complex issue with no clear solution and the parole process is no exception. Its requirements are restrictive; this is by design, intended to limit the number of applicants and the number of migrants arriving in the US, but it excludes those most vulnerable and in need of parole. Parolees must have a sponsor in the US— a citizen or permanent resident with the financial backing necessary to support a parolee. Low-income families rarely have the funds necessary to send a family member to the US, much less fund their residency or citizenship process. In addition to sponsorship, many Venezuelan, Nicaraguan, Haitian, and Cuban nationals struggle with documentation. According to the US Citizenship and Immigration Services, “the beneficiary must have a valid, unexpired passport” (US Citizenship and Immigration Services 2024). This puts Venezuelans and Haitians at a significant disadvantage; “the cost of a passport in Venezuela is \$200 USD, nearly ten times the country’s minimum wage” and Haiti teeters on the brink of societal collapse, making passport application and renewal nearly impossible (Kinosian and Sequera 2022).

The parole process has no shortage of flaws, but its greatest weakness lies in its enforceability or lack thereof. Both the White House and the US Department of Homeland Security steer clear of the words “federal law” and “executive order.” Evasion is understandable but makes multi-state lawsuits inevitable. The parole process lacks the

force of law but contains an important feature of legislation: trade-offs. The IRCA granted amnesty to millions of undocumented immigrants while punishing employers for hiring undocumented immigrants. The trade-off was controversial but allowed it to pass through a divided Congress. The parole process has expanded and expedited legal pathways for hundreds of thousands of migrants while expelling others to Mexico. According to the White House Fact Sheet, “individuals who irregularly cross the Panama, Mexico, or US border after the date of this announcement will be ineligible for the parole process and will be subject to expulsion to Mexico” (The White House 2023). Trade-offs are the necessary evils of partisanship, but the sacrifices call into question their ethicality and efficacy.

CONCLUSION

The parole process for Venezuelans, Nicaraguans, Haitians, and Cubans is inherently flawed, but its effort and experimentation are steps in the right direction. Reagan-era laws have dictated immigration for almost four decades. Reform attempts have been made, but partisanship has robbed them of the opportunity to succeed (or fail.) The parole process is no exception; Republican-leaning states gave Venezuelans three months and Nicaraguans, Haitians, and Cubans 19 days before filing a multi-state lawsuit. Twentieth-century legislation cannot account for twenty-first century immigration, but partisanship has stifled experimentation. The parole process would have been the perfect candidate: its inclusion of one Central American country, one South American country, and two Caribbean countries would have revealed fundamental truths about inter-American migration. Its consideration of political and economic factors as well as historical and contemporary injustices could have brought US immigration policy into the twenty-first century, but the lack of legality and longevity ensured that the parole process would be another casualty of partisanship.

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AZERBAIJAN, ISRAEL, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR IRANIAN NUCLEAR POLICY

Ben Scharr-Weiner

Azerbaijan has attained greater geopolitical influence in recent years, allowing it to leverage other states' energy needs and using its valuable position to induce states to turn a blind eye to its conflict with Armenia. Notably, Azerbaijan and Israel created a key, mutually beneficial partnership that provides Israel with access to Azeri air bases, thereby enabling Israeli air power to reach Iran. These airbases give Israel latitude to differ from America in terms of potential strikes against Iran, including preemptive strikes that would deter Iranian development of nuclear weapons. This deterrence ability is particularly impactful given the United States' relatively weak and politically variable deterrence regarding Iran's nuclear program.

INTRODUCTION

A small state in the Caucasus, Azerbaijan has gained a disproportionately powerful role in Middle Eastern and global politics. Azerbaijan gained its independence with the fall of the Soviet Union, and since then, has made itself indispensable to major regional and global powers: Europe relies on Azerbaijan for oil; Russia employs Azerbaijan to evade Western sanctions; Turkey views Azerbaijan as an extension of itself; and Israel utilizes Azerbaijan to threaten Azerbaijan's southern neighbor, Iran. Azerbaijan is in many ways a regional anomaly: a Shia majority country that is not allied with Iran and defines itself as secular. However, like much of the Middle East, Azerbaijan is a dictatorship, ruled by Ilham Aliyev from its capital, Baku.

Since a humiliating defeat by Armenia in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in 1994, Azerbaijan has plotted its revenge. After a lengthy period of relative stability, Baku took a more offensive stance. In 2020, Azerbaijan launched the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, recapturing much of its claimed territories. As of 2023, Azerbaijan successfully blockaded and subsequently ethnically cleansed the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, incorporating the area into Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan's success was partially the result of demographic changes. Due to the relative changes in population and wealth of the two countries, Azerbaijani military spending now more than triples Armenia's spending, despite being roughly equal to Armenia's in 1995 (World Bank). It also has received increased military assistance, including from Israel (World Bank). The remainder of this report aims to dissect the foreign relations of Azerbaijan, with a special focus on Israel and the role that Azerbaijan plays in Israeli deterrence against Iran's nuclear program.

ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN

Tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia began during the days of the So-

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viet Union and focused on Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous area surrounded on all sides by the territory of the Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) of Azerbaijan. Dating back to 1923, the Nagorno-Karabakh region had been designated an Armenian majority autonomous oblast. This changed in 1988, when, shortly before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Armenian majority within Nagorno-Karabakh requested that the oblast be transferred to Armenia; this appeal was rejected both by the Azerbaijan SSR and the central Soviet government in Moscow. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the two newly independent states, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, fought a war over the control of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia emerged victorious, gaining control over Nagorno-Karabakh as well as much of Southwestern Azerbaijan, while ethnically cleansing more than half a million Azeri inhabitants. Both sides engaged in ethnic cleansing before and throughout the fighting (Broers 2024). A Russian-brokered agreement achieved a fragile peace that additionally saw the birth of the Artsakh (Bolukbasi 2013). The Artsakh Republic was governed by the same system of network of elites as Armenia, with Armenia and Artsakh becoming deeply integrated (Broers 2024). Russia subsequently emerged as Armenia's protector, and the two retained strong ties until 2018, when during Armenia's "Velvet Revolution" much of Russia's influence in Armenia was swept away, with the young reformer, Nikol Pashinyan, replacing the Russia-aligned president Serzh Sargsyan (Horan 2023). Despite Pashinyan assurances to Moscow that Armenia's foreign policy had not changed, Moscow no longer trusted Armenia. This opened the door for Azerbaijan, which, holding a decades-long grievance against Armenia, invaded the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2020. Given worsening relations between Moscow and Armenia, Russia did not come to Armenia's aid, nor forcefully freeze the conflict until the conclusion of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (Horan 2023). The Russian-brokered ceasefire resulted in Azerbaijan reclaiming most lands taken from it during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War and the establishment of the Lachin corridor, patrolled by Russian peacekeepers, as a continued transit route into Nagorno-Karabakh (Council on Foreign Relations).

AZERBAIJANI FOREIGN POLICY

Azerbaijan's primary foreign policy objectives reflect their pursuit of national interests, including restoring their territory—specifically Nagorno-Karabakh—to their control, and expanding their international influence. Through their partnerships with other countries, they have been able to convert nations that once advocated on behalf of Armenia, such as Russia, the United States, and the nations of the European Union, into bystanders unable or unwilling to act against Azerbaijani interests. After the 2020 war, Russia's position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict continued to realign. In the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022, Azerbaijan became far more important to Russian strategy. Just two days before the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War, Russia formalized an alliance between itself and Azerbaijan. In addition, in December of 2022, Azerbaijani protesters, reportedly with state backing from Baku, occupied the Lachin corridor, blocking almost all traffic. The Russian

peacekeepers working to ensure the corridor neglected to act and a blockade ensued (Council on Foreign Relations). Azerbaijan positioned itself as a ‘middleman’ between Russia and the West, becoming essential to both sides while continuing its territorial ambitions within Armenia. A major exporter of energy, Azerbaijan became a supplier of European oil and natural gas following aggressive sanctions from many European nations in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, theoretically providing an alternative energy source to Russia. While Azerbaijan possesses major oil and gas fields and substantial production, when Azerbaijan signed a deal in July of 2022 that doubled natural gas exports to Europe, it lacked sufficient gas for internal use. As a result, this deal with Europe was followed by a deal between Azerbaijan and Russia that increased gas imports from Russia that Azerbaijan could then sell directly to Europe (Dhojnacki 2023). While Europe relies on Azerbaijan for “Russian Alternative” energy, Russia relies on Azerbaijan to sell its gas to the Europeans. Turkey similarly ‘whitewashes’ Russian energy. (Sabadus 2023).

Faced with the prospect of a prolonged war with Ukraine, Russia is seeking additional military resources from countries willing to provide it with arms, including Iran. To facilitate this, Russia aims to build a new corridor through Azerbaijan to reach Iran, providing a route through which Iran can provide more weapons and drones to Russia (Politico 2023). This proposed road would allow Russia and Iran a direct route to exchange goods with one another, thereby helping both countries effectively bypass Western sanctions as Azerbaijan has not been cut off from Western goods like Russia and Iran.

Azerbaijan even continued to receive millions from the United States, through at least 2022, due to George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and now Joe Biden (Politico 2023). The Freedom Support Act of 1992 authorized assistance to many newly created former Soviet countries to build free markets and encourage democracy. Section 907 bars American assistance to Azerbaijan unless Azerbaijan takes “demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.”

Despite closer relations with Russia, Azerbaijan has not created similar ties with Iran. This lack of rapprochement between Azerbaijan and Iran is a primary reason for the United States’ continued financial support of Azerbaijan, although a secondary motive may be that foreign aid represents leverage that can be used to promote Azerbaijan peace efforts with Armenia. Russia’s incentives have realigned; Europe requires alternative energy sources to Russia, despite this source being indirectly Russian; Russia will benefit from Azerbaijan as a regional hub that can evade sanctions; Turkey is allied with Azerbaijan, sharing heritage and animosity toward Armenia; and Israel is dependent upon Azerbaijan for deterrence. In short, none of these countries have the necessary leverage or care to force Azerbaijan to respect Armenia’s sovereignty. The exception may be Iran.

Iran and Azerbaijan have an extremely complicated relationship: one prone to distrust and hostilities. Azerbaijan and Iran’s mutual animosity primarily stems from

the First Nagorno-Karabakh War when Iran supported Armenia. This support in part reflected Iran's fears of Turkish power in the region; Azerbaijan and Turkey have always been strong allies mostly due to their similar background as Turkic peoples, similar culture, and somewhat mutually intelligible language (Mohammad and Nysani 2017). Iran also fears the Azeris within Iran, who comprise around 16% of Iran's population (Minority Rights 2023), causing concern that a strong Azerbaijan could promote movement towards unification between the Iranian Azeris and Azerbaijan. Iran in addition has long accused Azerbaijan of inciting separatist sentiment within Iran (Motamedi 2023), an ironic assertion as Iran supports the Huseynyun movement within Azerbaijan that calls for the overthrow of Azerbaijan's secular government (The Cradle). A highly secular state and society, Azerbaijan is far more likely to be immune to these Iranian proxies. Additionally, despite efforts, Iran has been unable to change the prevailing viewpoint within Azerbaijan that Armenia is the aggressor against Azerbaijan (Middle East Institute).

Although tensions are high, Iran and Azerbaijan have high economic interdependence, both have strong ties with Russia, and, more importantly, Azerbaijan relies on Iran to reach its exclave, Nakhchivan (Motamedi 2023). The geographic isolation of Nakhchivan, which is bordered by Armenia to the north and east and by Iran to the south and west and abuts Turkey at its northwest corner, has resulted in Azerbaijani pressure on Armenia to cede its southern border to Azerbaijan to allow Azerbaijan to open a road to the exclave. Referred to as the Zangezur corridor, this road would finally connect Azerbaijan with its ally, Turkey, and connect Turkey to Russia via Azerbaijan. The Zangezur corridor, however, would significantly damage Iran's interests in the region, as it would effectively disconnect Iran from Armenia and diminish any leverage that Iran maintains over Azerbaijan; accordingly, Iran is adamantly opposed to the corridor. Much as Russia uses Azerbaijan, Iran primarily uses Armenia to evade western sanctions, making this border imperative to Iran's economy. In fact, when Baku attempted to coerce Armenia into giving up the land, the deal did not transpire due to Iran's moving of troops to its northern border (Sofuoglu 2021). Both Europe's and Russia's dependence upon Azerbaijan have transformed the power structure within the region. Of note, this has not occurred in a vacuum as Iran's primary adversary, Israel, has used Azerbaijan's distaste for Iran to its own advantage.

AZERBAIJAN AND ISRAEL

Azerbaijan and Israel first established diplomatic relations in 1992 (AzeMedia 2023), and, since then, the two countries have crafted a complicated friendship, with President Aliyev of Azerbaijan in 2009 comparing the relationship to an iceberg "nine-tenths submerged" (Mammadli 2023). Israel and Azerbaijan share increasingly close ties: 65.1 percent of Israel's imported crude petroleum originated in Azerbaijan (The Observatory of Economic Complexity); between 2018 and 2022, Azerbaijan was Israel's second-largest destination for arms exports (Guliyev and Ilkin 2023); and Azerbaijan has access to Israel's Pegasus technology (Amnesty International 2023).

Pegasus is Israeli Cyberware routinely sold to countries that allows governments unprecedented access to their citizens' cell phones. It is typically used by authoritarian countries to monitor dissidents within their societies.

Azerbaijan, unlike the majority of the Middle East, has taken a different stance on Gaza. The authorities within Azerbaijan prevent public protests of Israel, and Azerbaijan's government has systematically persecuted the portion of society that is pro-Palestinian (Mammadili 2023). The American Jewish Committee, an advocacy organization based in the United States, has been advocating on Azerbaijan's behalf, working to counteract the large diasporic Armenian lobby that is present in America (AzeMedia 2023). Finally, Azerbaijan and Israel's partnership convinced Turkey to reconsider its longstanding opposition to Israel. With the 2020 Abraham Accords, the United Arab Emirates normalized relations with Israel. In response, Turkey threatened to cut off relations with the UAE. However, mediated by Azerbaijan, Israel and Turkey began collaborating on intelligence gathering efforts, and full relations were restored in 2022, as demonstrated by Israel and Turkey jointly thwarting an attack by Iran on Israeli tourists in Istanbul in 2022 (Muradov and Guliyev 2023). Israel and Azerbaijan share intelligence as well (AzeMedia 2023). As of April 2023, the two countries worked together to leverage the large Azeri minority within Iran for human intelligence gathering purposes (AzeMedia 2023).

The most overt way that Israel and Azerbaijan work together is Israel's significant weapon shipments to Azerbaijan. From 2017 to 2020, more than 60% of Azerbaijani weapons imports came from Israel, including a multitude of drones, missiles, missile interceptor systems, and mortars (Coppolecchia 2023). These weapons, as well as comprehensive digital mapping of Nagorno-Karabakh by the Israeli company, Elta Systems, played a significant role in Baku's success in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. This unexpected alliance also holds greater implications for the Middle East. The Middle East is increasingly shaped by the ongoing proxy wars pitting Iran and its proxies against the Persian Gulf States, Israel, and the United States, with Azerbaijan interwoven.

AZERBAIJAN, ISRAEL, AND IRANIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

Israel's partnership with Azerbaijan gives Israel access to Iran through proximity, enabling Israel to better conduct anti-Iranian operations. According to a Haaretz investigation in 2023, Azerbaijan enabled Mossad to set up a base of operations within Azerbaijan to monitor Iran; additionally, Azerbaijan gave Israel access to Azerbaijani airfields if an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities becomes necessary (Scharf and Yaron 2023). In fact, after Israel stole documents from the Iranian nuclear archive in 2018, operatives smuggled the documents to Israel via Azerbaijan (Scharf and Yaron 2023). The physical proximity of Azerbaijan and Iran can provide Israeli agents significantly easier access to Iran as well. Azerbaijan vehemently denies involvement with Israeli intelligence, with Azerbaijan's ambassador to Israel, Mukhtar Mammadov, telling the Jerusalem Post "Azerbaijan, from the start, has declared that it will not interfere in the

internal matters of other countries and will not allow its territory to be used against other countries” (Jaffe-Hoffman 2023). However these statements are unconvincing to Iran, who firmly believes that Israel poses a serious risk to Iran via Azerbaijani airspace and territory. (Jamestown 2023). Regardless of the validity of the Haaretz report, Azerbaijan has an interest in denying the claims of Mossad’s foothold in the country to avoid Iranian escalation.

Access to Azerbaijani air bases significantly changes the equation for Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear infrastructure. As Rasim Musabayov, an Azeri lawmaker, told Reuters in 2012, “Israel has a problem in that if it is going to bomb Iran, its nuclear sites, it lacks refueling” (Grove 2012). This is because Israel lacks planes capable of traversing the approximate 1200 miles (about the distance from Florida to New York City) to strike targets within Iran and return (Jaffe-Hoffman 2023). Israel owns 400 F-16s and 75 F-35s (Iddon 2023), but these jets have a combat radius of roughly 500 (DVIDS) and 590 (United States Navy) miles, respectively, therefore putting Iranian targets well out of reach of Israeli jets. Israel would either need to stop to refuel or obtain air refuelers from the United States. While Israel has contracted for four of these Boeing KC-46A air tankers, the first of these is not scheduled to be delivered until late 2025 (Frantzman 2022). In addition, Israel would likely not be permitted to use United States air bases in the region, as the use of these facilities would likely be perceived as an act of war on the part of the United States—the very thing that the United States would be trying to prevent if it chose not to aid Israel. Hence, if Israel felt it had to strike Iran, and the United States refused to help, Azerbaijan would serve a particularly key role as the only launching point Israel could use to enable it to strike Iran. Therefore, Azerbaijan and Israel’s alliance enables Israel to act against Iran without American cooperation.

Through these means, Israel has given itself increased independence, limiting efforts from American overseers who often dictate Israel’s policy regarding Iran. American interference occurred during the Iran Nuclear Deal, displayed by the brief pause in Israel’s attacks on Iran’s nuclear program following negotiations between Iran and Western powers becoming public in 2013 (Kaye 2023). This brief pause reflects American pressure on Israel, which, despite being adamantly opposed to the Iran Nuclear Deal, did not take any significant action during the deal (Robinson 2023). Only following the Trump administration’s rejection of the deal, and thereby a loss in its legitimacy, did Israel resume its strikes against the Iranian nuclear program. Additional examples of forcible United States oversight occurred during the Obama administration, when the United States convinced the Israeli government not to strike against Iran in 2012 (Staff 2015), and when the Bush administration vetoed Israel’s proposed strike on Iranian nuclear infrastructure in 2008 (Asa-El 2023).

Israel has maintained a preemptive strategy for more than 40 years. In 1981, Israel sent F-16 fighter jets into Iraq and destroyed Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactor, Osirak. At a press conference following this event, Prime Minister Menachem Begin announced to the world that Israel would “not allow any enemy to develop weapons

of mass destruction turned against us” (Katz 2022). In 2007, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert once again used military force, this time to destroy a reactor that the North Koreans were helping to build in Syria (Katz 2022). This line of thinking has set the stage for Israel’s numerous actions against Iran’s nuclear program, and Israel’s attacks on nuclear infrastructure it deems dangerous to Israel’s existence will continue. In both military attacks, Israel acted alone. Following Osirak, the United States was sufficiently upset about the attack that they voted in support of a unanimous United Nations Security Council resolution condemning Israel’s strike (Katz 2022). In Syria, Israel initially approached the United States about leading a strike but was rebuffed by President George W. Bush.

The United States and Israel are not always aligned and have vastly different priorities within the Middle East. Due to the United States’ superior wealth and power, as well as Israeli dependence on American military and financial support, Israel can be forced to adhere to United States’ demands. In recent years it has still chosen to stick to a policy of deterrence with clear red-lines, while engaging in covert operations aimed at blocking Iranian nuclear development. Given the priority Israel places on the Begin doctrine of preventing other nations from developing weapons of mass destruction, the location that Azerbaijan provides is so valuable that Israel can overlook the morally dubious actions that the Azerbaijanis undertake employing Israeli weaponry, spyware, and other technologies.

The primary reason Iran desires nuclear weapons is deterrence. Tehran seeks to be able to deter external attacks against itself primarily from Israel and the United States. But a nuclear-armed Iran would trigger a regional nuclear arms race. Saudi Arabia’s crown prince said that they would seek to develop nuclear weapons if Iran acquired them (Nader 2013). Turkey and the United Arab Emirates as well could seek to acquire them due to the security dilemma that an Iranian nuclear state creates. Israel fears that a nuclear Iran could place its proxy states under a nuclear umbrella, providing protection from Israeli retaliation. The RAND Corporation concluded that Iranian possession of nuclear weapons would create greater instability within the Middle East, as well as create a dangerous possibility for a nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran (Nader 2013). There are also fears that the nuclear devices could fall into the hands of terror organizations, wreaking havoc on the world. However, these fears all boil down to the fact that Iranian nuclear weapons would enable Iran to have significantly more ability to wield its power within the Middle East with fewer consequences through the new deterrent ability that it would acquire. Iran could even be emboldened to further increase its support for other proxy groups and encourage them to be less risk-averse (Nader 2013). Accordingly, even though its willingness to act may be less than Israel, the United States and Israel do share the belief that Iran cannot be allowed to obtain nuclear weapons.

Israel has a significantly more credible deterrence than the United States regarding Iranian nuclear development, thereby making Azerbaijan imperative to deter Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Effective deterrence is marked both by clarity

and credibility, in which Iran knows exactly what actions will result in retaliation and believes that the deterrer will act on its threats (Mandelbaum 2023). Israel has high clarity. In February 2023, Israel's ambassador to the United States, Michael Herzog, stated "I think the Iranians realize there are consequences to crossing certain thresholds, if they go to military-grade enrichment. And they are not far away. They are enriching to 60 percent, which is one notch below [weapons grade] (90 percent). But they realize that if they cross that threshold, then there will be consequences. Certainly, Israel is not going to be indifferent to such a development" (Lipin 2023). This clarity about Iran's uranium enrichment has remained remarkably consistent over the years, dating back to 2012 when Benjamin Netanyahu stood in front of the United Nations and held up a rudimentary diagram of a bomb. This bomb had two numbers written, but it was directly under 90 percent where Netanyahu drew a red line, firmly telling Iran what Israel would tolerate (McCarthy 2017). So even while Israel may not always have responded to Iran crossing various red lines in the past, this remarkable consistency demonstrates that, regarding this red line, the message has been received and understood (Allison 2012). According to a senior Israeli official, "The Iranians totally internalized our position and they know what our [red] line is" (Ravid 2023).

Israel's credibility meanwhile is rooted in the at least two dozen operations that Israel has undertaken within Iran since 2010 (The Iran Primer 2023). Israel assassinated many scientists working on the nuclear program, including Iranian engineer Ali Mahmoudi Mimand in the ballistic missile program; Ardeshir Hosseinpour, an electromagnetics expert working on uranium enrichment; physicist Massoud Ali Mohammadi; and particle physicist Majid Shahriari (Asa-El 2023). Assassinations such as the 2020 assassination of Mohsen Fakhrazadeh, Iran's top nuclear scientist, have the potential to severely damage Iran's nuclear program as these top nuclear scientists can represent key vulnerabilities to the nuclear program and many are irreplaceable (Pletka 2022). This is parallel to how the assassinations of Fathi Shikaki, the founder of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and of Hamas bomb-maker Yahya Ayyash deprived their respective organizations of critical leadership and bomb-making understanding (Pletka 2022). Assassinations were coupled with attacks upon the supply chain, attacks on Iran's nuclear program installations, and cyber-attacks. In 2021 for instance, an Israeli drone strike severely damaged an Iranian plant that made parts for centrifuges (Asa-El 2023).

Israel has both stated and demonstrated that it is willing and capable of following through on launching attacks against Iran, with Israeli leadership consistently reiterating that they would strike against Iran if need be (The Iran Primer 2023). Leaked Pentagon documents made public in 2023 support this, stating "Netanyahu probably calculates Israel will need to strike Iran to deter its nuclear program" (Klippenstein 2023). In short, Iran should be certain that actions that would place it sufficiently close to acquiring a nuclear weapon will result in a preemptive strike by Israel to prevent Iran from obtaining this weapon.

Israel's credible deterrence as well as its clarity, rooted in a willingness to act to

almost any degree to ensure Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon, is not matched by the United States. The United States instead practices a policy of strategic ambiguity regarding the situation. Whereas Israel has made it clear it will not tolerate weapons-grade uranium, the United States National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, stated in May 2023, “We have made clear to Iran that it can never be permitted to obtain a nuclear weapon” (Klippenstein 2023). Statements such as these do not pinpoint what it would take for the United States to strike and what exactly the United States would do, representing a consistent trend to ambiguity. Whereas Israel has made it clear that it will attack Iran if Iran crosses its red line, the United States has no such red line and hence has made what actions would invite a response and what this response would be shockingly unclear. The United States also regularly fails to follow through on threats. When the United States pulled out of the Iran Nuclear Deal in 2018, promising “maximum pressure,” Tehran did not capitulate to seek a new deal, and the economic pressure brought on by the extreme sanctions did not cause a collapse of the regime. More impactfully, the Trump administration did not follow through on its threats to strike Iran, despite the growing evidence of nuclear violations and attacks against American allies (Wintour 2020).

When the Biden administration in May of 2023 proposed to engage in joint military planning about Iran, a United States official stressed that this joint planning was “not about planning any kind of joint US-Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear program” (Ravid 2023). This is in stunning contrast to Israel’s outright admission by a top military official in 2021 that their funding and preparations for an attack on Iran’s nuclear sites had “dramatically accelerated” (The Iran Primer 2023). The United States refuses to even admit that they are planning a strike against Iran’s nuclear program, demonstrating their failure to provide effective credibility that they will strike Iran if necessary.

Without effective clarity and credibility, the United States lacks deterrence against Iran’s creation of nuclear weapons; however, Israel’s deterrence may be enough in and of itself. Iran fully understands that there is a very high likelihood of Israel striking Iran if Iran were to build nuclear weapons, but Israel also understands that if it were to strike Iran it could risk severe damage to itself due to the capabilities of Iranian proxy groups surrounding Israel. In the October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, Hamas showed its capability to commit mass harm, raining missiles down across Israel and bypassing their defenses resulting in more than 1200 civilians in Israel murdered, and hundreds more kidnapped and taken back into Gaza (Byman et al. 2023). However, in many ways, Hezbollah represents a greater threat to Israel. Hezbollah is thought to have about 150,000 missiles aimed at Israel (Sanger and Erlanger 2024) contrasting with the roughly 9500 missiles that Hamas fired at Israel from October 7-November 10, 2023 (Reuters 2023). The sheer number of Hezbollah’s total missiles could overwhelm Israeli air defenses, causing significant damage to Israel, including to major population centers (Robbins 2023).

The United States does possess and has been willing to demonstrate strong

deterrence against Iranian proxy groups attacking Israel. Following the October 7th attacks, the United States deployed two aircraft carriers nearby to Israel (Associated Press 2023), with the Biden administration making clear that if Hezbollah were to initiate an attack against Israel, the United States would involve itself on Israel's behalf (Magid 2023). This deterrence through both words and actions possesses both credibility and clarity, contrasting with the United States' response to the Iranian nuclear program. When the United States stated that it would militarily intervene to help Israel against Hezbollah it established clarity: a significant Hezbollah attack would result in American involvement. And with the United States' active support of Israel, Hezbollah becomes a much less substantial threat. The United States' credibility is rooted in the hundreds of billions of dollars the United States has given Israel over its existence, including the many weapons and bombs that the United States sent Israel following the October 7th attack; the significant bipartisan support inside the United States government; and the deployment of naval assets to the region (Harris 2023). This credibility was furthered by the high degree of military cooperation present between the United States and Israel and numerous statements from the White House about Israel's importance to the United States. The United States regularly blocks United Nations condemnations of Israel: 53 in the past 5 decades (Newton). In short, Iran knows the United States will go to great lengths to defend Israel from outside attacks and will ensure Israel's survival.

In June of 2023, the United States believed that it had arrived at a solution. In an agreement with Iran, Iran would cease lethal attacks upon American contractors in Iraq and Syria through its proxies, not sell ballistic missiles to Russia, and allow for increased oversight from international nuclear inspectors (Crowley et al. 2023). In exchange, the United States would not tighten sanctions, not seize oil tankers, and not seek new UN resolutions condemning Iran. The United States would also be required to unfreeze billions in Iranian assets (Crowley et al. 2023). This agreement, while meaningful on the surface, seems to have faced difficulty in the aftermath of the Hamas attack on Israel. Many Iranian assets were frozen after pushback from the American public (Pamuk et al. 2023). American forces in Iraq and Syria have come under attack 74 times between mid-October and November 30th (Iran International), and Russia moved forward with a plan to buy Iranian ballistic missiles (Faucon et al.). In short, American efforts to negotiate have once again failed.

CONCLUSION

Azerbaijan is an often-overlooked linchpin of international affairs, with Israeli deterrence, Western sanctions on Russia, Turkish influence, and countless other elements balanced on the role of this small nation with its own geopolitical interests. Israeli deterrence versus Iran in the absence of clear United States policy is only feasible because of Azerbaijani airbases. However, Israeli deterrence means far less when a war with Iran can cause considerable damage to Israel through Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah and comes at a steep price to both itself and the region, calling into

question whether Israel is willing to endure such enormous damage to its country. This question is answered with United States clarity, with the United States consistently asserting that it will protect Israel from Iranian proxies. Overall, this situation is extremely tenuous, with many scenarios that could result in a broader conflict. Israel might make a pre-emptive strike without US support in a scenario in which Israel is rapidly losing its ability to prevent Iranian nuclear weapons. Red lines for these scenarios would include measures taken by Iran that would hinder Israel's attack. An example of this is as simple as Russia delivering S-400 air defense systems to Iran that Iran has been seeking, diminishing Israel's ability to bomb Iran (The Jerusalem Post 2023), or completing construction of underground nuclear facilities that could withstand bunker-busting bombs (Crowley et al. 2023).

It is not hard to envision scenarios that result in a full-scale war in the Middle East, centered on the conflict between Iran and Israel, with many proxy groups and other states entering the battle. Making a full-scale regional war more likely, an Israeli strike against Iran could be accompanied by a preemptive strike on Hezbollah in Lebanon, destroying Hezbollah's missile stores before they can be fired at Israel in retaliation. Unfortunately for Israel and the United States, a preemptive strike against Iran's nuclear capabilities may have finite results, potentially only delaying nuclear weapon development for a maximum of two years, meaning that another strike would be necessary in the near future (Harel 2012).

Only credibility can counter uncertainty. To reduce the risk of war, the United States needs to step up by ensuring that Israel obtains the technology that it would need to conduct a unilateral preemptive strike on Iran's nuclear capabilities. More importantly, the United States must ensure that Israel believes in America's willingness to prevent Iran's nuclear weapons program. This means that the United States must explicitly inform Iran of its intent to prevent its nuclear program at all costs and create clarity by creating specific red lines. Finally, it is inevitable that, at some point, Israel will lose its ability to prevent Iranian nuclear acquisition; accordingly, the United States must make clear, ideally with a written agreement with potential triggers, that the United States will protect Israel in this scenario. With this credibility and clarity, the risk of a full-blown war with Iran would decrease substantially.

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Figure 1

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FROM OCCUPATION TO AUTOCRACY: TRUJILLO'S ASCENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION

Olivia Sasse

The US occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924 set the stage for Rafael Leonidas Trujillo's subsequent rise to power and his enduring autocratic regime. This paper examines the factors contributing to Trujillo's ascent, focusing on the legacy of the American intervention during an era marked by numerous American occupations in Latin America. By leveraging historiographies, political analyses, and firsthand accounts, this paper identifies the infrastructural and institutional frameworks established during the occupation as pivotal to Trujillo's successful consolidation of power. In particular, the formation of a robust national police force and the enhancement of nationwide infrastructure such as roads and telecommunications facilitated centralized governance and a unified national identity, two critical factors to the success of Trujillo's regime. This paper argues that while Trujillo's military connections, charismatic leadership, and the US Good Neighbor Policy played roles in his regime's strength and longevity, they were secondary to the foundational changes instigated by American intervention. The paper contributes to the broader discourse on the impacts of American imperialism and offers insights into the complexities of international development and its potential to empower dictatorial leadership.

INTRODUCTION

The US first occupied the Dominican Republic, an independent nation since 1844, from 1916 to 1924 during an era of American intervention in Latin America in which the US carried out 35 armed interventions in just 25 years (Pulley 1965, 161). The US exhibited an interest in maintaining its hegemony in the Caribbean with vague goals including taking control from Europe (in the case of the DR, especially Germany), and ensuring peace and stability (Hartlyn 1999, 36). During the occupation, the US implemented infrastructure projects, created and trained a national police force, and disarmed the public (Castor and Garafola 1974, 264). Marines taught thousands of Dominican policemen the law enforcement techniques of censorship and silencing dissenters (Suggs 2021). After US troops withdrew in 1924, the US adopted the Good Neighbor Policy which advocated for nonintervention and noninterference in Latin America.¹ After the American withdrawal, notorious dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo rose to power and exercised brutal authoritarian rule for the next 31 years. His regime was characterized by widespread human rights abuses, censorship, political repression, and the establishment of a cult of personality (Atkins and Wilson 1972).

This paper explores why Trujillo ascended to power and established a resilient and efficient autocratic regime. I have identified four main camps on the topic: those

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that believe Trujillo's success derived from the institutions put in place during the occupation, those that emphasize his military connections and knowledge acquired from Marines, those that highlight the Roosevelt administration's Good Neighbor Policy, and those that point to Trujillo's charisma and use of symbolic politics. In this paper, I use historiographies, analyses by political scholars, and firsthand accounts to demonstrate how the infrastructure put in place during the US occupation was most directly responsible for Trujillo's long and brutal reign. This paper highlights the repercussions of American imperialism and the potential harm of seemingly successful development endeavors in foreign nations. I emphasize the intricate challenges and unintended consequences of occupation and the attempt to engineer foreign development without adequately considering cultural dynamics and long-term effects.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The first framework for understanding Trujillo's rise to power emphasizes his interactions and relationships with occupying Marines. While rising through the ranks of the American controlled police force, Trujillo cultivated influential alliances and acquired indispensable expertise in military governance. Micah Wright states that Trujillo was able to "maintain support from the US military even after" being written off as a "public relations liability" by the State Department (Wright 2015, 21-33). Military figures like Colonel R. M. Cutts advocated for American recognition of the Trujillo regime even when many were against it (Hartlyn 1999, 172). Raymond Pulley points out that Trujillo was shown exactly how to successfully repress citizens and dismantle threatening groups by occupying regimes (Hartlyn 1999, 49; Pulley 1965, 185). Calder and García-Peña highlight Trujillo's use of Marine-taught techniques for censorship and suppressing intellectualism to maintain his power (Calder 1985, 51-67; García-Peña 2016).

Although Trujillo obtained military knowledge and connections from working with the US, this school assumes that he could not have obtained similar knowledge and tools elsewhere. Additionally, for this argument to succeed, one must presume that Trujillo's military connections advocated for him because of their personal connection. Lastly, one must believe that his interactions with Marines played a crucial role in facilitating Trujillo's rise to power.

The next camp believes Good Neighbor and subsequent American support was the most significant explanation for Trujillo's power and "crucial in the denouement of his regime" (Hartlyn 1999, 45). Given Roosevelt's staunch endorsement of Good Neighbor, as tyranny surfaced in Latin America, the US government displayed a vested interest in minimizing the scale of upheaval and aligning with "'useful' dictators" who promoted American foreign policy objectives (Roorda 1996, 301-319). Historians of Hispaniola and Haiti point to the American-facilitated rebranding of Trujillo's various human rights violations as actions that quelled protests and prevented other actors from speaking out (Frankema and Masé 2014, 128-148; Roorda 1996, 312-324). One Roosevelt biography points to the many times the adminis-

tration publicly celebrated “achievement[s] of the Trujillo regime” (Pederson 2011, 543-564). This rhetorical support quieted potential outcry against his rule and set a precedent of passive support (Atkins and Wilson 1972, 31-34; Roorda 1996, 112, 201; Pederson 2011, 543-564).

Proponents of this camp believe that American support for Trujillo stemming from Good Neighbor shielded Trujillo from international criticism of his regime. They hold that the Trujillo regime would have faced more significant backlash had the US not aided in the concealment of Trujillo's actions. Lastly, this camp presumes that if the US had not pursued nonintervention, Trujillo would have been unable to remain in power.

The penultimate camp argues that the various institutions constructed and remodeled by the US military during the intervention provided Trujillo with uniquely effective tools to be an effective autocrat (Atkins and Wilson 1972, 31-34; Calder 1985, 31). Historians Moya Pons and Scholar García-Peña demonstrate the unintended consequences of simultaneously disarming Dominican citizens and creating a powerful policing institution in a country formerly without (Hartlyn 1999, 38-45; Moya Pons 2010, 336-337; García-Peña 2016, 60-91). Works investigating the impact of intervention show how infrastructure projects like roads and mail services effectively united the country's security sector, allowed the entire country to be policed like never before, and primed it to be ruled under one person (Castor et al. 1974, 261-272).

To prove the validity of this argument, I must show that the Dominican Republic would not have developed the infrastructure and strong institutions that it did in the 1910s and 1920s without US intervention. Furthermore, I must show that Trujillo would not have ascended to power, or if he did, his regime would not have been as robust or enduring. Finally, I will demonstrate that Trujillo's rule would have been significantly less effective if it weren't for the US-made institutions and security infrastructure that occurred as a result of the occupation.

The last camp discussed in this paper emphasizes the internal dynamics of the country and Trujillo's own ability to unite Dominicans under his cult of personality. Scholars of Trujillo's regime and personal life point to his ability to curate a blend of patronage and an elaborate use of social capital to establish and maintain authority (Derby 2009; Hartlyn 1999, 44; Malek 1974, 253). Trujillo meticulously orchestrated propaganda and gift-giving campaigns that enshrined his image across the nation, with landmarks, streets, and even the capital city renamed in his honor (Derby 2009, 9; Malek 1974, 273). He also created a “theater of violence” that used “highly public episodes of grotesque brutality.” This strategy manufactured an atmosphere of both fear and devotion that strengthened his rule (Derby 2009, 2; García-Peña 2016, 65-73).

To be convinced by this school of thought, one must believe that the institutions created under the US occupation were not crucial for Trujillo's rise to power even if they aided his ascension. It must be assumed that had Trujillo not possessed

such traits of histrionicism or megalomania, he would not have been able to establish the loyalty and strong sense of national identity among Dominicans that were crucial to his rule.

In the following sections of this paper, I will provide a comprehensive exploration of historical accounts and scholarly analyses to support the notion that the implementation of infrastructure projects during the US occupation most significantly contributed to Trujillo's rise and hold on power. My argument will be presented through three distinct components. To begin, I will illustrate two reasons that Trujillo's military connections and knowledge were not as influential as portrayed. First, Trujillo's ascent was contingent on the existence of the US-created police force. Second, the historical record suggests the knowledge he acquired only marginally expedited his consolidation of power as he would've used the same techniques irrespective of external influence. Moving forward, I will challenge that American support via Good Neighbor was a primary factor in Trujillo's rule because its impact was limited to a lack of active intervention against Trujillo's regime, rather than an effort to aid its perpetuation. Lastly, I will present compelling evidence that the US provided Trujillo with the essential tools to establish a highly efficient autocratic system. These tools encompassed a skilled, cohesive military and improved nationwide accessibility via roads and telecommunications services enabling centralized control and enforcement of governmental rule. While Trujillo effectively used patronage and a cult of personality, his ascent to power would have been unattainable without the institutions established by the US.

LESSONS FROM AND CONNECTIONS TO THE US MILITARY

In this section, I contend that even in the absence of exposure to the American military government, Trujillo would have likely employed a military regime to censor and persecute Dominicans thanks to his position of authority in the newly strengthened Guardia Nacional Dominicana (referred to as the Guardia).² Trujillo served in the Guardia for 11 years before he took control of the country in 1930. During his time in the Guardia, Trujillo carried out many duties for the American-run and created force as well as interacted with various powerful American military figures. I will first demonstrate that Trujillo's military connections likely did little to change American predetermined policy decisions. Next, I will explain how Trujillo's employment of censorship and minority persecution as a tool to stop dissent would likely have been pursued regardless of whether the US did it first.

a. American Military Connections and the Recognition of the Trujillo Regime

Trujillo cultivated military connections and allies who later supported his recognition, but their influence did not substantially alter the policy trajectory already set by the US government. American recognition was key to Trujillo's successful rise to power for two reasons. First, Trujillo needed to ensure he would not be overthrown by the US. Having just exited the DR, it would have been easy for the US to tem-

porarily reinsert forces, facilitate a fair and free election, and stop Trujillo's "election by machine gun" (Pulley 1965, 23). Secondly, Trujillo needed to continue receiving funds from the Receiver of Customs which was owned by the US government; 90% of Dominican federal funds were drawn from these tax revenues (Malek 1974, 176; Calder 1985, xxv).

Although Trujillo's military friends advocated for his recognition, the US was likely already going to recognize Trujillo's presidency. While in the Guardia, Trujillo was seen as "the US occupation's right-hand man" and aided Marines significantly in gathering Dominican support for the occupying military government (García-Peña 2016, 60). While attending the Northern Department Training Center and as an officer, Trujillo developed "friendships" with various American Marines including Colonel Thomas E. Watson, Colonel James J. McLean, who was a family friend to Trujillo; Colonel R. M. Cutts; and Major General James C. Breckinridge (Hartlyn 1998, 172; Malek 1974, 155). When it became apparent that Trujillo intended to take over the presidency, the US minister to the DR, Charles Curtis, told the US legation that he would not "under any circumstances recommend US recognition of a Trujillo administration" (Hartlyn 1998, 40). Meanwhile, "In military circles, the Trujillo takeover was viewed favorably," and military figures, namely Colonel Cutts, advocated for his recognition (Hartlyn 1998, 172). Having just withdrawn from the DR after realizing they were exacerbating Latin American relations, the US decided to recognize Trujillo because the "political price" of any other interventionist action was too high (Atkins & Wilson 1998, 46). The State Department did not want to be charged with intervening in the Dominican elections, even if the elections were "palpably fraudulent" or "due to intimidation by the military forces" (Malek 1974, 172). This decision was compounded by a lack of threats to American lives or property (Hartlyn 1998, 41). Given this evidence, it is clear that Colonel Cutts and military advocacy did little to affect the State Department's decision.

b. Lessons of Censorship

In this subsection, I argue that although Trujillo continued the same techniques and employed the same tools as occupying American regimes, he likely would have resorted to these techniques regardless. I will first compare the many instances of violent attacks on supposed rebels, then the techniques of censorship, and finally the use of outgroup violence carried out by first the US military and then Trujillo.

Given Trujillo's military strength and totalitarian policies, he would very likely have resorted to censorship and outgroup violence without Marine influence. During the occupation, American Marines successfully controlled "Hispaniola's population through censorship, intimidation, fear, and military force" (Peña 2016). Similarly, Trujillo's entire regime depended on his use of violence to silence dissenters, kill and disappear political opponents, and intimidate the public into compliance. However, this is a weak causal connection to draw because such techniques are employed to differing degrees by almost every dictatorial regime. More totalitarian regimes like that

of Trujillo obtain “power” and “loyalty” by “being more repressive” (Wintrobe 1990, 869).

The imposition of “strict press censorship” by the US during the Wilson administration, prior to Trujillo’s implementation of even more stringent censorship measures, is characteristic of the tactics employed by suppressive regimes and was used widely across Latin America at the time (Blassingame 1969, 41). Under American military rule, Dominican “intellectuals... were often imprisoned, newspapers closed, literature censored, and gatherings controlled” (García Peña 2016, 90). By 1926, before becoming president, Trujillo was already “using marine intelligence techniques” to spy on meetings and political events, and provide information to then President Vásquez (Calder 1985, 61). Later during his own rule, Trujillo’s regime was characterized by “...telephone tapping, surveillance of foreign diplomats and journalists, targeted assassinations abroad and domestically, jammed foreign radio programs, foreign press reports kept out, mail censored, and no permission to travel abroad” (Hartlyn 1998, 45). While both governments worked to keep “the public unaware” of their “brutal repression,” Trujillo’s autocratic rule would have included such censorship (Suggs 2021). Dictators such as Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay, and many others across Latin America were employing censorship to varying degrees at this time even if they had not been occupied previously (Stahl 2014). The exposure to the Marines’ effective censorship practices may have influenced Trujillo’s own methods or expedited their implementation, but it did not singularly dictate his governance.

c. Lessons of Minority Persecution

The American military government and Trujillo’s targeting of Black Hispaniolans reflected pre-existing colonial-instilled racist attitudes rather than a direct influence from US forces on Trujillo. Out-group persecution bolstered both regimes by cultivating nationalism, fear, and a perception of the ruler as a protector. However, these commonalities were independently developed rather than indicative of a causal relationship.

Marine violence towards Black citizens “exacerbated pre-existing racial tensions” and “encouraged antihaitianismo” (anti-Haitian attitude) but did not cause Trujillo to victimize Black populations. The Marines eradicated entire villages on the Haiti-Dominican border and targeted Afro-religious leaders, and Black Dominicans and Haitians (García-Peña 2016, 64-70).³ Similarly, during the Haitian Massacre of 1937, Trujillo commanded the Guardia to carry out a brutal slaughter of 20,000⁴ Haitian immigrants and Dominicans of Haitian descent residing along the border (Roorda 1998, 23). This genocide appears to have been motivated primarily by Trujillo’s personal desire to “whiten” the Dominican population and was not inspired by past Marine action (Roorda 1998, 12; Wright 2015). Although Trujillo continued this pattern of discriminatory violence, both he and the country as a whole had long possessed these prejudices (Wright 2015). Trujillo exhibited a deep, personal hatred

for Black Dominicans stemming from his own insecurities and perceived racial inferiority (Derby 2009, 20, 201).⁵ Conflict and a clear racial hierarchy emerged due to the pre-occupation “dual streams of immigration” from Europe and Haiti producing a “blackening” of the poorest strata of Dominican society” and a “whitening” of the incipient national bourgeoisie” (Wright 2015). The Marines’ action normalized government-perpetuated violence against minorities,⁶ but given Hispaniola’s history of racial tensions and Trujillo’s personal beliefs, it likely would have occurred notwithstanding.

THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY AND AMERICAN SUPPORT OF THE TRUJILLO REGIME

US noninterventionism and American efforts to downplay Trujillo’s human rights violations were not the reason behind his continued rule. While Good Neighbor marked a significant shift from the occupations earlier in the century, its core principle of nonintervention in domestic affairs weakens the argument that it directly caused Trujillo’s rule. Nonintervention may have enabled Trujillo’s authority, but it cannot be considered a primary reason for it because it represented acquiescence rather than active sponsorship.

a. The Haitian Massacre of 1937

In this subsection, I first outline the Roosevelt administration’s failure to hold Trujillo accountable for his actions. I explain how this lack of accountability did not strengthen Trujillo’s grip on power. This is because 1) the American media ultimately held him accountable, and 2) Trujillo successfully covered up the story, which prevented public backlash in the DR.

After the Haitian Massacre of 1937, the Roosevelt administration did not speak out against or even acknowledge the tragedy despite having early and reliable intelligence.⁷ This delayed the opposition Trujillo would eventually face from the American public and other governments but did prevent his future resignation. When American media became aware of the massacre weeks later, they called it one of history’s “most horrible crimes,” called Trujillo “miniature Hitler,” ran photos of Trujillo and his victims, and called upon the State Department to sever all ties with the regime (Metz 1990, 10; Roorda 1998, 128). This press was “particularly worrisome” to Trujillo who recalled how negative American media coverage contributed to the downfall of Cuban dictator Machado (Metz 1990, 11). Public pressure mounted which forced Trujillo to renounce his presidency and pay an indemnity to Haiti (Pederson 2011, 96). The withdrawal demonstrates the Roosevelt administration’s ineffectiveness to keep Trujillo in favor.⁸ Subsequent American praise had no impact in the DR because Trujillo had already “successfully arranged a coverup” and “kept tight control over all information” (Atkins and Wilson 1998, 76). In the months following the massacre, the US was asked to lead mediation efforts between the DR and Haiti. Despite Trujillo’s unwillingness to “cooperate with multilateral efforts to investigate and adjudicate the dispute” and refusal to “[admit] that the killings had even

taken place,” the Roosevelt administration cited the resolution of a Dominican cash payment to Haiti as a “success for Pan-Americanism and the Good Neighbor policy” (Roorda 1998, 303). However, American Minister Raymond Henry Norweb noted that America’s praise of Trujillo’s response was “played up as an example of Dominican fidelity to the inter-American solidarity and peace” (Atkins and Wilson 1998, 76). Because Trujillo ensured “no account of the events was published in the Dominican Republic,” these efforts did not change Trujillo’s power in the country (Atkins and Wilson 1998, 76).

b. American Support of Trujillo

American support for Trujillo did not perpetuate his hold on power and instead amounted to passive acceptance rather than active endorsement. Despite his recent human rights abuses and lack of presidential title, Trujillo was received warmly by the United States in 1939 (Atkins and Wilson 1972, 57-59; Roorda 1998, 128). He was toured around the New York World’s Fair, laid “a wreath on the tomb of an unknown soldier,” and was “greeted at the White House by President and Mrs. Roosevelt” (Pulley 1965, 26). A few years later, Trujillo was again welcomed by many American politicians including the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Theodore Green (Atkins and Wilson 1998, 59). However, there is little evidence that this friendly reception impacted Trujillo’s rule. While American hospitality may have instilled a sense of support in Trujillo, it did not constitute active endorsement (Roorda 1998, 128). Following the Haitian Massacre, Trujillo, with help from the US, took steps to repair his image. Trujillo took out large newspaper ads in American publications like the New York Times and pledged that the DR would welcome 100,000 Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria (Metz 1990, 1). He allocated a large plot of land to a refugee colony called Sosúa. After receiving significant praise in the press, Trujillo quickly reneged on his promise and only took “a few hundred” (Metz 1990, 11). Despite American knowledge of this “public relations coup,” Roosevelt delivered a statement praising Trujillo two days later (Roorda 1998, 303). Other American politicians like Representative Hamilton Fish of New York, a ranking member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, extolled Trujillo as “a builder greater than all the Spanish conquistadores...” (Pulley 1965, 26). While words of support carry weight since the Good Neighbor Policy effectively eliminated the likelihood of intervention, American approval or disapproval likely did not significantly impact Trujillo’s regime.

ORGANIZATIONS CREATED UNDER OCCUPATION

Bruce Calder, author and Professor of Latin American and Caribbean history at the University of Chicago posits:

“It is “abundantly clear that the military government’s public works programs changed the country politically though perhaps not in the way US officials had envisioned.... it remained for Rafael Trujillo to demonstrate clearly that the United States had left

behind the basis in the form of modernized communications and a modernized military, not only for unity and stability but for the most repressive regime the Dominicans had ever known" (Calder 1985, 53).

Trujillo's rise to power was contingent on the development projects implemented by the US before its exit in 1924.⁹ The two most impactful US-led development projects were road and telecommunications improvements and the creation of the Guardia Nacional Dominicana.¹⁰ First, I will explain how road construction and telecommunications infrastructure rid the country of regionalism and permitted the rise of a single, autocratic ruler. Next, I will show how design choices made by American Marines facilitated Trujillo's use of the remodeled Guardia to rise to and hold power. The last subsection refutes claims that Trujillo's character and cult of personality was the primary reason he maintained power.

a. Public Works Programs

The establishment of telecommunications services and an extensive highway system facilitated governance in the Dominican Republic. The enhanced infrastructure achieved two objectives that enabled Trujillo's reign: it unified the nation under a centralized government and enhanced government oversight.

The new highway system geographically and politically unified the country for the first time in Dominican history. The unification allowed Trujillo to assert control and suppress dissent nationwide, even in previously isolated and self-governing areas. Before the occupation, one of the main hindrances to the existence of a powerful central government was the geographically fractured population (Calder 1985, xxxi). Widespread regionalism due to inadequate transportation and communication services meant that revolution and disorder were prevalent in areas the central government struggled to reach (Frankema and Masé 2014, 336). Consequent political instability alienated investors, paralyzed farming, dried up credit, and increased military expenditures, which perpetuated a cycle of economic and political turbulence (Calder 1985, xxxi).

The new highways also facilitated a demographic shift that rendered the populace more amenable to governance and oversight and enhanced the Guardia's ability to patrol and manage these rural areas. The country began to use cars and trucks instead of donkeys and horses which expanded the newly public mail and telegraph services and increased domestic business opportunities for smaller farmers (Moya Pons 2010, 336). As a result, internal migration eased and the population became settled and secure (Moya Pons 2010, 336). Troops could be moved across the island "in a matter of hours" ensuring citizens could no longer evade the Guardia (Calder 1985, 61). Once centers of rebellion and revolution, these rural communities were subsequently subdued and oppressed, resulting in reduced dissent and a more powerful central government.

b. Dominican Defense and the Guardia Nacional Dominicana

Trujillo joined the Guardia in 1919. The steady wage and free board attracted lower-class, mulatto¹¹ men, like Trujillo, who had few opportunities to rise to power or generate meaningful wealth. In this subsection, I will explain how the architects of the Guardia disarmed the population, consolidated the country's defense organizations, and failed to make the Guardia an apolitical organization. I argue that had the US not created the Guardia, Trujillo could not have risen to power.

Due to the American failure to construct an apolitical police force, Trujillo was able to use his strategic political alliances to quickly secure promotions. The US Minister to the Dominican Republic William Russel called these promotions a series of "purely political" personnel decisions (Calder 1985, 61). By 1925, Trujillo was a Colonel and by 1930, the Commander of the Dominican Armed Forces (Hartlyn 1998, 38)77. Despite the American pursuit of neutral law enforcement, "the chasm between democratic possibilities and political realities undermined the idea of a non-political constabulary from the outset" (Atkins and Wilson 1998, 59). With little guidance from Washington, cultural insensitivity, and insufficient training, resources, and recruits, the Guardia became a "totally political army" characterized by corruption and misconduct (Calder 1985, 41).

Once Trujillo took over the presidency in 1930, there was no chance for effective resistance because of how the Guardia was organized. Under American command, the Guardia "eliminated all potential counterforces" and disarmed the Dominican population.¹² Those brave enough to challenge Trujillo had no serious weapons; during the first 18 months of the intervention, 53,000 firearms were confiscated (Atkins and Wilson 1998, 33). Even Dominicans with political power could not challenge Trujillo because all of the nation's capabilities of force were newly united. The US combined the police, Navy, and Frontier Guard as a single force under one commander before Trujillo rose to power whereas previously, provincial governors commanded the military forces in their districts (Calder 1985, 41). This organization gave Trujillo, the commander of the Guardia, significant power (Atkins and Wilson 1998, 32).

During Trujillo's coup against President Vásquez, Trujillo used the Guardia as a "private instrument of repression" to force all other parties to resign in the days before the election and 'win' by a 99% margin (Hartlyn 1998, 40). Trujillo used his control of the Guardia and monopoly of power to order the killings of Jose Brache, former Secretary of the Treasury, multiple opposition party leaders, many generals and military men, numerous opposition journalists, and even dozens of elites who supported Vásquez (Malek 1974, 185). The killings placed "the entire aristocracy" in a state of "shock and fearful submission to Trujillo's terror" (Malek 1975, 186). Most estimates count that at least 1,000 Dominicans were murdered on Trujillo's orders from May 1930 through October 1931 as he ascertained his grip on power (Malek 1974, 185). From then on, the Guardia "served as a vehicle for the ruthless dictatorship" of Trujillo (García-Peña 2016, 60).

c. Trujillo's Personality and Grip on Power

I argue that Trujillo's persona and cult of personality would have lacked the potency to sustain authoritarianism if not reinforced by the ruthless violence facilitated by the American created Guardia. Trujillo's rule was dependent on a "mixture of fear and rewards" as he utilized a complex system of symbolic politics and gift-giving to maintain power and control over the population (Hartlyn 1998, 17). I assert that while the "rewards" aspect of his rule was important, it would not have inspired loyalty without the "fear" aspect. Trujillo presented himself as a charismatic leader who distributed gifts to citizens, which created a sense of indebtedness and loyalty. These gifts were not genuine acts of generosity but rather tools to manipulate and control individuals; recipients were obligated to support the regime (Derby 2009, 257-266). Citizens would not have been compelled to back the regime if the alternative didn't promise such a grim fate. Trujillo relied on "highly public episodes of grotesque brutality" including ordering killings "by machete," and parading the corpses of political opponents across provinces (Derby 2009, 2). Estimates of deaths and disappearances incurred at the hands of Trujillo's Guardia (both legitimate and illegitimate branches) exceed 30,000 (Derby 2009, 3). These acts "generated a thick fog of fear that permeated the atmosphere" and allowed for an "extremely tight and penetrating control over civil society" (Derby 2009, 3).

IMPLICATIONS

In conclusion, the influence of Trujillo's military connections and control techniques, the Good Neighbor Policy, American support for the regime, and Trujillo's personality cult pale in comparison to the tangible establishment of a formidable military force and the consolidation of the nation through robust infrastructure projects. Trujillo's military affiliations and tactics of suppression couldn't significantly alter the trajectory predetermined by his authoritarian leadership style and American policies. The rhetorical American backing, facilitated by Good Neighbor, did not translate into substantial support for his regime. Finally, his cult of personality relied heavily on violence via the Guardia for its success. If this paper is correct in contending that the American-built Guardia and communications networks caused the rise of Trujillo, then there are serious implications for the future of American democracy-building abroad and the true extent of the impact of American intervention in Latin America that continues to affect the region today.

Even the seemingly positive developments of infrastructure and defense organizations can be weaponized by autocratic leaders to consolidate power and suppress dissent. This implies that efforts to develop a country's institutions need to be carefully monitored to prevent misuse. In this case, the DR's long history of caudillismo¹³ was not considered in the design of the Guardia as it was essentially designed perfectly to facilitate the rise of an all-powerful military ruler. The thoughtless design of the Guardia can help inform future endeavors to set up defense organizations in

other countries. For example, in retrospect, it is clear that the unification of all district police forces as well as the Navy and Frontier Guard into a single force under one commander was not a good design choice. Although Marines united the district forces to try to standardize law enforcement and curb factionalism across the country, the emerging highway and communication networks would have naturally fostered unity. A more effective approach would have involved a structure with checks and balances and incorporating non-military oversight. Communication networks would have naturally united police forces. The Marines should have divested military power to other branches to actively discourage the emergence of a powerful, caudillo president.

The historical context of the US occupation of the Dominican Republic and its broader pattern of interventions in Latin America highlights the significant impact of American imperialism on the region. This paper underscores how American interventions, no matter their stated goals of stability and development, can lead to long-lasting negative consequences, such as the rise of brutal autocratic regimes. This implies that interventions aimed at imposing foreign values and control can result in unintended and severe outcomes for the local population.

ENDNOTES

1. The Good Neighbor Policy (referred to as Good Neighbor) purportedly emphasized American non-intervention, respect for sovereignty, and cooperation based on mutual interests in Latin America. Marking a departure from past interventionism, it sought to create a more positive image of the US in the region and foster stability and collaboration in a changing global landscape. This became especially important during the lead-up to World War II.
2. Translation: Dominican National Guard
3. Although there are many examples of Marine-led violence against supposed rebels, the most infamous is that of *Arroyo del Diablo* where Marines under Captain Morse attacked a village and “brutally killed” 22 civilians including children with the purported goal of eliminating afro religious spiritual leader Olivorio Mateo’s “potential to rally guerrilla resistance.” Olivorio was later shot 15 times as a public event. His body was then tied up in front of San Juan City Hall so that people could “watch it rot.” (García-Peña, *The Borders of Dominicanidad*. 64-70).
4. Estimates range from 9,000 - 35,000
5. Trujillo’s own grandmother was an *hija de la calle* (illegitimate child) of a Haitian couple who migrated westward during the Haitian occupation in the 1840s. (Derby. *The Dictator’s Seduction*. 20 & 201) 47 Wright. “An Epidemic of Negrophobia.”
6. Marines also fostered anti-Haitian attitudes amongst the public to ensure a lack of “resistance” against such targeted violence. One example is the US-spread stories of flesh-eating Haitian zombies, criminal black emperors and rumors of “Haitian monsters who killed virgins and raped their dead bodies in broad daylight” (García-Peña. *The Borders of Dominicanidad*. 81)
7. In the late 1930s, the US government had an interest in legitimizing Trujillo’s regime as the US grew increasingly concerned over a mounting war in Europe. Inter-American defense was a priority and given the DR’s great strategic importance in terms of proximity to the US and to the Panama Canal, the US did not feel it useful to denounce Trujillo no matter the scale of the atrocities he committed (Atkins & Wilson. *The United States and the Trujillo Regime*. 58).
8. Trujillo effectively kept his executive duties and power by simply operating through a puppet government and would become president again.
9. Marines also established many different public works programs including infrastructure projects, education reform, the creation of a plantation economy, bureaucratic reorganization, a sanitation department, and more.
10. The GND would later change names in 1921 to be the *Policía Nacional Dominicana* (National Dominican Police) and then again in 1928 to be the *Ejército Nacional Dominicana*

(National Dominican Army). For clarity, I will refer to the force as the *Guardia* as it was referred to colloquially at the time (Moya Pons. *The Dominican Republic: A National History*. 323-349)

11. *Mulatto* is a term used to describe someone of mixed-race ancestry. In the Dominican context, this usually includes Black, white, and indigenous ancestry. At the time it was often an indicator of being of a lower class.

12. The Guardia was not made effective until mid-1921 when Washington sent Brigadier General Harry Lee to attend to the shortcomings of the policing force. He created the Publicity and Recruiting Bureau, created a new military school near the capital, and drew up a plan to expand the Guardia to 3,000 men who had completed lengthy training (Calder. *The Impact of Intervention*. 58-59).

13. *Caudillos*: "local and regional strongmen, who were both military and political figures" and "ruled by means of shifting alliances, bribery, treachery, armed force, imprisonment, exile, and assassination." They often had "strong personalities." Atkins & Wilson. "The United States and the Trujillo Regime." 14; Moya Pons, Frank. "The Dominican Republic : a National History." 347; Castor, Suzy, and Lynn Garafola. "The American Occupation of Haiti (1915-34) and the Dominican Republic (1916-24)." 261-272; Malek, Michael. Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina: The Rise of a Caribbean Dictator. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1974.

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