

A New Side-Channel Vulnerability on Modern Computers by Exploiting Electromagnetic Emanations from the Power Management Unit

ABSTRACT

This paper presents a new *micro-architectural* vulnerability on the power management units of modern computers which creates an electromagnetic-based side channel. The key observations that enable us to discover this side-channel are 1) in an effort to manage and minimize power consumption, modern microprocessors have a number of possible operating modes (*power states*) in which various sub-systems of the processor are powered down, 2) for some of the transitions between power states, the processor also changes the operating mode of the voltage regulator module (VRM) that supplies power to the affected sub-system, and 3) the electromagnetic (EM) emanations from the VRM are heavily dependent on its operating mode. As a result, these state-dependent EM emanations create a side-channel which can potentially *reveal* sensitive information about the current state of the processor and, more importantly, the programs currently being executed.

To demonstrate the feasibility of exploiting this vulnerability, we create a *covert channel* by utilizing the changes in the processor’s power states. We show how such a covert channel can be leveraged to *exfiltrate* sensitive information from a secured and completely isolated (*air-gapped*) laptop system by placing a compact, inexpensive receiver in close proximity to that system. To further show the *severity* of this attack, we also demonstrate how such a covert channel can be established when the target and the receiver are *several meters* away from each other, including scenarios where the receiver and the target are separated by a wall. Compared to the state-of-the-art, the proposed covert channel has >3x higher bit-rate. Finally, to demonstrate that this new vulnerability is not limited to being used as a covert channel, we demonstrate how it can be used for attacks such as *keystroke logging*.

1. INTRODUCTION

Modern computers are architected primarily for *power-performance* and security has often been considered as a secondary concern. However, neglecting security as a primary design factor has led to several recent discoveries of new side-channels [1–7] which, if exploited, could severely compromise the entire system and result in po-

tentially huge economic losses or even greater damages.

A ubiquitous power-performance management strategy in modern computers is the dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) [8]- widely supported by a range of systems. DVFS, typically implemented and managed by a power management unit (PMU), provides the capability to scale the voltage and frequency settings of the processors dynamically depending on the workload. Much of the work on the design and implementation of PMUs have been mainly focused only on optimizing the energy consumptions and the overall efficiency of the power-performance algorithms. However, unfortunately, there has been less focus on the security aspects of PMUs in modern systems.

In this paper, we show that a series of hardware and microarchitecture vulnerabilities in the design and implementation of PMUs can create a new, previously unexplored, physical side-channel which can be exploited even from the *outside* of the system by leveraging the underlying electromagnetic emanations of the PMU.

Compared to prior attacks on PMU [7, 9, 10] which could be carried out *remotely*, the proposed side-channel has a different attack model - prior attacks are practical mostly for cloud servers where unrelated (potentially mutually hostile) services/VMs end up being co-located on the same physical server, while the new vulnerability we present is mostly applicable to mobile devices, computers used in offices adjacent to public spaces, etc. Given these differences, our findings are important since the discovered side-channel is applicable even when a computer is highly secured from untrusted users by being physically isolated from other networks (i.e., air-gapped). Moreover, as we will show in this paper, compared to the existing physical side/covert channel attacks [7, 10–15] that can successfully attack an isolated system, the discovered side-channel can exfiltrate data with much higher data-rate, and in many cases, it can be received from much further distances.

The *key factors* that create this new side-channel are the following: when the processor is active, it consumes more power, which requires a higher voltage and draws more current from its voltage regulator module (VRM). That, in turn, results in strong EM emanations at the VRM’s switching frequency. Conversely, when the processor is idle, it requests a lower voltage and consumes

very little current from its VRM, which results in much weaker EM emanations from the VRM. In effect, the processor’s idleness state is *amplitude-modulated* onto the EM signal emanated by its VRM, which can be received at some distance. Thus, these activity-dependent analog/physical side-channel signals can *reveal* the current state of the processor and further *leak* sensitive information about the system or its applications.

Through a set of experimental evaluations, we will show in this paper that an attacker can exploit this information in two ways: (i) using these side-channel EM emanations, a reliable *covert channel* can be established to *exfiltrate* sensitive data from an air-gapped computer where bits of data can be transmitted by switching the processor between active and idle states, and (ii) An attacker can systematically infer sensitive information from the system by using this side-channel in *key-logging* (i.e., secretly finding which keys are pressed on a keyboard), website and/or application fingerprinting, etc.

Our evaluation uses several different commodity laptops as target systems and confirms that *the discovered side-channel exists on all these laptops regardless of the vendor, OS, and/or processor*. Furthermore, our evaluation shows that this EM side-channel signal can be received by a compact and inexpensive software-defined radio (SDR) using a tiny probe, such that the entire setup costs less than \$30 and is pocket-sized (fits in a pocket). Finally, our evaluation also shows that, when using a compact loop antenna such that the setup can be hidden in a briefcase, the signal can be received from several meters away, or even when the laptop and the receiver are physically separated by an office wall.

In short, this paper makes these contributions:

- A new mechanism for information leakage through physical side-channels, using the processor’s *power-states* to modulate the signals (e.g., EM emanations) produced by the system’s voltage regulator module,
- A proof-of-concept exploitation of the proposed side-channel by creating a covert channel with low bit-error-rate, and with a high data-rate to exfiltrate data from an air-gapped computer,
- A practical demonstration of data exfiltration at a distance and through a wall in an office environment.
- A proof-of-concept design and implementation of a keystroke logging framework by exploiting the proposed side-channel.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: § 2 provides a brief background on the processor’s power management, voltage regulator functionality, and side-channel signals, § 3 presents the side-channel which leaks the processor’s activity level through the VRM’s EM emanations, § 4 describes our proof-of-concept implementation of data exfiltration from an air-gapped system using this side-channel, § 5 presents our design and implementation of a keylogging framework that leverages this EM emanation to detect which key was pressed by a user, § 6 is an overview of related work and, finally, § 7 summarizes our conclusions.

2. BACKGROUND

Side-Channel Signals. These signals are unintentionally generated as an artifact during computation. Side-channels can be classified into two categories: *Digital/Micro-architectural* and *Analog/Physical*. Digital side-channels typically rely on *shared hardware* resources in the computer. Examples of these channels include caches [16–22], micro-architectural units [23,24], DRAM and memory bus [25,26], processor frequency settings [10], branch predictors [5, 27, 28], GPUs [29], TLBs [6], etc. Physical side-channels, however, rely on physical characteristics of the system such as EM emanations [14, 30–35], variation in power consumption [36–40], sound/acoustic [41–46], temperature [11, 47, 48], chassis potential variation [49], crosstalk [50], peripherals [51, 52], etc.

The main difference between the two categories is that the former (i.e., digital) typically can be measured *within* the system (i.e., by another process), while the latter often requires some physical proximity to the device for measurements or, alternatively, needs to access some sensors on the chip to read the desired value. Due to this limitation, physical side-channel attacks often have much lower transmission rate. However, unlike digital side-channels, physical side-channels are much more challenging to mitigate, and are often too expensive and impractical to eliminate. This, makes physical side-channels particularly attractive in scenarios where the system is well-protected from digital side-channels through isolation and/or partitioning [53]. For example, a popular method for strong isolation is creating an *air-gap*, where all the computer’s connections to the outside world are either disabled or monitored. However, data can still be exfiltrated using a physical side-channel.

Power Management. To improve energy efficiency, modern computer systems, especially mobile ones where energy efficiency directly affects battery life, employ a number of power-management techniques. One of the most popular such technique is dynamic voltage-frequency scaling (DVFS) [8, 54], where the processor’s clock frequency can be adjusted dynamically depending on the level of performance that is required. The reduced clock frequency reduces power consumption by executing fewer instructions (and thus spending less energy) per unit time. Furthermore, the speed at which the processor’s circuitry can operate is dependent on its operating voltage, so the processor’s operating voltage can be lowered as its operating frequency is reduced, which (dramatically) reduces the energy consumed per instruction executed. Another very popular technique consists of placing unused units within the processor into a low-power state, typically by no longer clocking the unit (clock gating [55]), but in some cases also by further reducing the unit’s voltage level or even completely powering it down. Most modern processors deploy both sets of techniques. For example, the Demand Based Switching (DBS) [56] technology in Intel’s processors provides the processor with a number of *performance states* (P-states), each with a different voltage-frequency value, and also a num-

ber of *processor states* (C-states) which correspond to different levels of low-power idleness. Recent processors can have more than 10 different P-states, where P0 is the highest-performance state, and higher state numbers correspond to lower voltage-frequency settings (and thus lower performance). For Intel processors up to Haswell/Broadwell architecture, the desired P-state is specified by the operating system, by writing the corresponding value into a special processor register, and the processor’s hardware simply implements the specified voltage-frequency settings [57]. More recently (starting with the Skylake architecture [58]), the operating system can leave the control of the P-states to the processor’s hardware (called Speed-Shift technology [56] by Intel), and this is the default behavior in recent operating system releases because it enables more rapid P-state adjustments as the processor’s workload changes.

Whereas P-states allow management of the tradeoff between the processor’s performance and energy consumption while active, the *C-states* are a set of *low-power* modes that the processor can switch to when it is idle. The C0 state corresponds to the processor’s normal operation (execution of instructions), whereas C1, C2, etc. states correspond to idleness with increasing levels of clock- and power-gating for the units within the processor. Thus higher-numbered C-states save more energy while the processor is idle, but also take more time to “wake up” the processor. Typically, states C1 through C3 only apply clock-gating, C4 through C6 reduce the voltage, and new Enhanced C-states can do both at the same time. The transition between C-states relies on a set of sensors that monitor utilization of the cores, but the actual algorithm for choosing when and which C-state to use is not publicly available (and may change from one generation of processors to the next).

The P- and C-states are enabled by default but, on all recent laptops we examined, the BIOS has settings for disabling them. Further, P-states can also be controlled through the OS using tools provided by the kernel (e.g., `cpufrequtils` in Ubuntu).

Voltage Regulator Module (VRM). The VRM is the module that actually supplies power to the cores. The processor uses a set of Voltage Identification (VID) hardware signals to inform the VRM which voltage-level to provide [59]. The VRM is typically an integrated circuit that is soldered onto the system’s motherboard, but in some recent processors (e.g., Intel’s Haswell architecture) the voltage regulator is integrated into the processor’s package (an Integrated Voltage Regulator, or IVR), or even into the processor’s silicon die (a Fully Integrated Voltage Regulator, or FIVR).

In laptops (and desktops, too), the most commonly used style of a voltage regulator is a *Buck* [60] converter (also called step-down converter). It is a DC-to-DC power converter which is connected at its input to a higher-voltage DC supply (e.g., the laptop’s battery pack or AC-power adapter, which typically supply 10-20 V), and outputs a lower voltage, typically between 0.7 V to 1.4 V for recent processor cores, to its load.

Intuitively, a Buck converter consists of a capacitor at its output that it tries to keep filled to the desired voltage level. Since the load draws current from this capacitor, the charge it holds drains over time, causing its voltage to drop. To compensate for this drop, the converter periodically connects the capacitor to its input, causing a burst of current that replenishes the capacitor’s charge, thus bringing the output voltage back to the desired level. The amount of time between these replenishments (*switching period*) in computer-system VRMs is typically a few (1-4) microseconds.

The VRM must be capable of supplying enough current under maximum-load conditions, so its switching period must be short enough that even the maximum output current does not drain the output capacitor below the minimum required level. At low load currents (e.g., when the processor core is idle), however, the voltage regulator becomes less efficient – it switches just as often as under full load, thus wasting a similar amount of power on switching losses, while the power actually provided to the load is very small, so the switching losses become a much larger fraction of the overall power consumption. Since the low load current also means that the VRM’s output capacitor is still almost fully charged at the end of each switching period, a typical VRM improves its low-load efficiency using a technique called *phase shedding* [61–63], where for some of the switching periods the VRM does not switch, skipping the replenishment of the still-almost-full capacitor and saving the energy that would have been wasted to do so.

Electromagnetic Side-channel Emanations. The bursts of current during VRM’s switching activity result (according to Faraday’s law) in changes in the EM field around the VRM. Since the VRM’s switching is periodic (with a switching period T), the changes in the EM field are also periodic at frequency $f = 1/T$, i.e., the switching creates an EM signal that has a very strong component at frequency f and, because the current bursts are square-wave-shaped rather than sinusoidal, at frequencies that are multiples of f . Additionally, the current during VRM’s switching is very high compared to most other flows of electrical current in a computer system, so the resulting EM emanations at f and its harmonic frequencies tend to be very strong.

In the frequency-domain, the signal emanated by a VRM forms “spikes” at frequency, $f = 1/T$, and its integer multiples, where T is the switching period of the VRM. For typical VRMs, T is between 1 to 4 microseconds (i.e., spectral spikes at a frequency in the 250 KHz to 1 MHz range and also its harmonics). Thus, these signals can be received by an inexpensive radio receiver by tuning it to f or, if there is significant interference at that frequency, at one of its harmonics. Moreover, these frequency spikes are very prominent when the VRM is under a high-load, and much weaker when it is under low-load. Thus, from the perspective of a radio receiver tuned to frequency f , the received signal is strongly amplitude-modulated by the processor’s activity state (active vs. idle) which creates an analog side-channel.


```

1 void microbenchmark(int t1, int t2){
2     int dummy;
3     while (1) {
4         // active state
5         for(int i=0; i<t1; i++)
6             dummy += dummy + i;
7         // idle state
8         usleep(t2);} }

```

Figure 1: The micro-benchmark used in this paper to generate active and idle states for the processor to create EM side-channel signals.




Figure 2: Alternation between *active/idle* states and the spikes (and its first harmonic) created by the emanated EM signals from PMU shown in the frequency domain over time.

3. ESTABLISHING A SIDE-CHANNEL BASED ON THE POWER MANAGEMENT STATES

To demonstrate that switching between *active* and *idle* power states (i.e., P-states and C-states) creates a distinguishable signal, we perform a simple experiment where we continuously force the system to switch between idle and active states and then analyze the received EM signal to find whether such a pattern of alternation can be also found in the signal. As described in § 2, due to the way VRM operates, during the *active* state, we expect to observe strong (in terms of magnitude) spikes, and weak spikes during the *idle* states.

We use a program shown in Figure 1 to create such alternations. This program creates an infinite loop that continuously performs some activity (e.g., addition) for a while followed by a period of idleness. The duration of the active period is controlled by the value of t_1 , while the duration of idleness periods is controlled by the value of t_2 . Note that the actual activity (Lines 5-6) can be any processor-intensive activity. Similarly, the idle periods can be implemented in any way that convinces the operating system and the processor that the processor will be inactive for a while.

The resulting EM signals emanated from the PMU is depicted in Figure 2. This figure shows how the measured signals change over time in the frequency domain (called *spectrogram*), where the higher intensity illustrates higher signal amplitude. As can be seen in the figure, a repeated pattern of strong/weak spikes can be observed which confirms the existence of this side-channel. The frequency of the spikes also matches with the expected frequency of the PMU (i.e., around 970KHz) for the tested laptop. To further examine the received sig-

nals, we changed the lengths of *active* and *idle* periods by changing t_1 and t_2 , and observed that the length of the spikes (i.e., the red lines shown in Figure 2) *do* change as t_1 and t_2 change.

To further confirm that these spikes are indeed related to the VRM and caused by the changes in the processor’s power states (i.e., P- and C-states in Intel’s processors), we repeat experiment with disabling/re-enabling of P-states and C-states in the system’s BIOS and observe how that affects the received EM signals and their spectra. We found that, even when either C-states or P-states (but not both) are disabled, we observe a signal spectrum similar to that in Figure 2, i.e., the spikes in the spectrum appear and disappear. However, when both C-states and P-states are disabled, the spikes in the spectrum have a much stronger magnitude but are continuously present regardless of the program activity. This is consistent with our expectations - when the processor’s management of power states is disabled, the processor is forced to operate at its nominal operating voltage and frequency regardless of its workload, even when the system is “idle”¹. This forces the VRM to continuously remain in its high-power mode. The results of experiments where only C-states or only P-states were disabled are also consistent with our expectations - in those cases, the processor can still switch between idle and active states (e.g., C_0 and C_N for C-states, or P_N and P_M where $M > N$ for P-states). This observation indicates that, fundamentally, to observe this side-channel, the processor needs to be able to switch between at least one high-power and at least one low-power state (which can be different C-states, different P-states, or a combination of both).

Attack Model. Based on the observations above, an attacker, \mathcal{A} , can exploit these signals in two meaningful ways: *(i)* The attacker can create a covert channel by intentionally forcing the processor to alternate between periods of high activity and periods of idleness, according to the values of (secret) data bits she desires to exfiltrate. § 4 describes, in detail, how such a covert channel can be created. *(ii)* The attacker can monitor the emanated signals to infer *(a)* whether the processor has become active or not. Such information can be particularly helpful to find, for example, whether a key is pressed. Further, the attacker can monitor these signals to infer *(b)* how long the processor was active to process a certain task. Such information, for example, can be used for website fingerprinting (i.e., by measuring how long it takes to load a webpage, the attacker can infer which website was loaded). § 5 describes how this side-channel can be leveraged for keylogging in details.

4. COVERT CHANNEL COMMUNICATION

4.1 Transmitter Design

To create a covert channel, the *transmitter* (also called source or data sender) application, which has access to

¹When the system is idle while the C-states are disabled, it actually runs the operating system’s “idle” process, usually an infinite loop, so the system’s processor is not actually idle

```

1 void transmitter() {
2   char bit; int dummy1;
3   FILE *file = fopen("secret", "r");
4   while ((bit = getc(file)) != EOF) {
5     if (bit == '1') {
6       for (int i=0; i<LOOP_PERIOD; i++)
7         dummy1 += dummy1 + i;
8       // keeping the processor active
9       usleep(SLEEP_PERIOD);
10      // return-to-zero coding
11    } else usleep(SLEEP_PERIOD * 2);
12  } fclose(file);

```

Figure 3: The “transmitter” code for the covert channel communication.

the secret data, should create the side-channel signal depending on this sensitive information. The transmitter code is shown in Figure 3. For each bit of data, depending on the value of the bit, the code either performs some activity for a while followed by a period of idleness (i.e., *return-to-zero* encoding [17]) or only a (longer) period of idleness. In this code, the duration of the active and idleness periods are controlled by the value of `LOOP_PERIOD` and `SLEEP_PERIOD` respectively.

Note that none of this code requires elevated (e.g., root-level) privileges, i.e., *in our threat model*, the attacker only needs to have access to the data he/she desires to exfiltrate, and the ability to create and run a small program (such as this). Given the simplicity and brevity of the code, any number of programming languages can be used for this purpose, including most scripting languages or even shell scripts. Also, note that methods for creating such a malicious code inside an air-gap computer are abundantly represented in the research literature (e.g., advanced persistent threat [64]), although we do not discuss them in this paper.

The `LOOP_PERIOD` and `SLEEP_PERIOD` parameters in this code determine the bit-rate of the channel – in general, smaller values result in higher data rates. However, in practice, the bit-rate is limited by several practical constraints. First, the active period also includes the execution of the library and system code that implements the actual call to `usleep` and its house-keeping activity, so even when `LOOP_PERIOD` is zero the actual active period includes execution of tens or hundreds of instructions. The usable values of the `SLEEP_PERIOD` are also limited, mostly due to the granularity and precision of time measurement for `usleep` and the variability in the time needed to exit the idle state. Finally, the duration of the active and the idle phase should be roughly similar. Based on our experiments, we found that around $10\mu\text{s}$ is the limit below which the actual idleness period of `usleep()` becomes highly variable².

4.2 Receiver Design

4.2.1 Signal Acquisition

In conventional communication systems, the transmitter, the receiver, and the signal transmitted between

²Even the manual page for `usleep()` states that the sleep time may be lengthened slightly due to other system activities and hence cause some randomness to the overall timing

them, are all carefully engineered to achieve a low bit-error-rate (BER) while sustaining high throughput. This includes maintaining good synchronization between the transmitter and receiver to minimize insertion and deletion of bits, a sophisticated encoding of data bits into the amplitude and phase of the transmitted signal, etc. Furthermore, the carrier frequency at the transmitter is chosen carefully to support the desired range of distances between the transmitter and receiver. However, covert channels rely on signals that are produced unintentionally, thus, there is no control over the transmitter design, i.e., the carrier frequency and its stability, the range in which the signal’s amplitude and phase can be changed depending on the activity, how stable is the duration of these changes, etc. Therefore, after the signal is received, the detection algorithm must deal with the problems of discovering when each transmitted bit begins and ends, changes in the signal’s amplitude, etc.

As discussed in § 3, the observed signal patterns when the transmitter code is executing is similar to Figure 2. The key observation from this figure is that the received signal in frequency domain behaves like on-off keying (OOK) for the considered frequency components. Therefore, signal power level for each bit will be enough to identify the received bit. Exploiting the knowledge that there exist many frequency components related to the transmitter activity, we acquire the signal as

$$\mathbf{Y}[n] = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{S}} \text{abs}(\mathcal{F}_n[k]), \quad (1)$$

where $\mathbf{Y}[n]$ is the signal of interest, $\text{abs}(\bullet)$ takes the absolute value of its argument, \mathcal{S} is the set of considered frequency components,

$$\mathcal{F}_n[k] = \sum_{m=0}^{M-1} r[m - M + 1 + n] e^{-2i\pi km/M},$$

M is the size of the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) function and $r[m]$ is m^{th} sample of the received signal. The goal here is to increase the difference in magnitude between bit 0 and bit 1 to minimize the error-rate of the covert communication.

An example for $\mathbf{Y}[n]$ is given in Figure 4 where we only used the fundamental frequency and its first harmonic from the actual signal. We also plot the time-interval for each signal and the transmitted bit. The main observations from this figure are the following:

- The signal exhibits a sharp increase whenever a new bit is transmitted, even when the bit is a zero, because processor activity is needed to execute the program code that cleans up at the end of a previous `usleep`, reads a new bit of data, and begins a new interval.
- The magnitudes are affected by not only the additive noise but also by the variations in the execution of the transmitter.
- Due to these variations (especially the sleep time), the duration of a signal that corresponds to one “transmitted” bit varies among instances of these bits, even when the bits have the same value.




Figure 4: Average magnitude of the considered frequency components and the corresponding bit sequence.

It is the common practice for the conventional communication systems to use a *matched filter* and sample the filtered signal at each symbol (bit), but that approach assumes that the symbols have practically no variation in their duration, i.e., the transitions from symbol to symbol are synchronous with a clock that has highly stable frequency, and can thus be re-created at the receiver with high accuracy. We found that, when applying the matched filter approach to our received signal, the BER is very high, and upon further investigation we found that the main reason for this is the asynchronous nature of the signal - the actual bit positions in the signal quickly become misaligned with the clock created by the receiver in an attempt to match the transmitter's symbol-rate. Therefore, we had to devise a more robust (but also more computationally intensive) method for determining the timing of each bit.

4.2.2 Signal Timing for the Covert Communication

We determine signal timing using *batch processing*, i.e., we determine the timing of the bit by examining not only the signal that corresponds to that bit, but, also by considering a number of bit periods that precede and follow it. Although it increases (by several bit-periods) the latency between when the signal is received and when the bits are recovered, in the covert channel scenario that additional latency (which is still in the milliseconds) is negligible, while the reduced error-rate achieved by such batch processing is highly beneficial.

The goal is to determine the average signaling time of the transmitted bits after receiving the batch signal. Thus, the first step is to find the starting locations of each bit by exploiting the knowledge that the derivative on these edges is almost infinity. To mimic the derivative operation, we convolve the batch signal with a vector with length of l_d (which depends on the sampling-rate). Half of the vector is set to one, and the rest is set to minus one. This convolution is followed by finding the local maximum points of the convolution. An example of the process is shown in Figure 5 where the black dotted line shows the result of the convolution operation. As seen from the figure, the resulting points




Figure 5: Obtaining the start points of each bit by exploiting that sharp increase whenever a bit is transmitted.




Figure 6: Pulse width variation of the covert communication system.

of the convolution peak at the edges of $Y[n]$ which indicates the starting point of a bit transmission.

Obtaining the starting points of the transmitted bits helps to find out the expected signaling time of each bit. Next, we calculate the distances between the starting points of subsequent bits. As an example, the probability density function (PDF) of the distances between subsequent bits are given in Figure 6. The figure illustrates that the signal time has a Rayleigh distribution. The tails of the distribution indicate that some of the bit locations could not be captured because the distances between points have a positive-skewed distribution.

Having the signaling time of the transmitted bits can help to fill the gaps that the detection algorithm could not find at its first attempt. We choose the signaling time of the covert communication as the point whose cumulative probability distribution equals to 0.5 since the distance distributions accumulate around this point and using the median value for the distribution can minimize the false insertion and deletion rate of bits.

4.2.3 Signal Labeling Based on Average Signal Power

The variation in signal timing can also cause incorrect labeling of the received bits. The total power of the received signal could be high only because the usually




Figure 7: The power distribution of the pulses generated by the power management unit for idle (left) and active (right) states.

very short active part of the signaling period has lasted much longer than usual. Therefore, while decoding the received signal, the algorithm also needs to take into account the variation of the signaling period’s duration.

Specifically, the receiver detection algorithm utilizes the average power of the received signal samples for each bit. Let’s assume we have the samples $s[n] \in \{0, 1, \dots, N - 1\}$ for the m^{th} received bit. The detection algorithm label the received bit as one if

$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=0}^{N-1} |s[n]|^2 > \mathbf{thr}, \quad (2)$$

where \mathbf{thr} is the threshold value. However, the threshold value must be chosen carefully to minimize the error rate. Figure 7 illustrates the distribution for the average signal magnitude for each bit. We observe that there exist two peaks which indicate the power of bit zero and bit one. Therefore, the algorithm selects the threshold as the mean of the points corresponding to these two peaks. This threshold selection process is also illustrated in Figure 7. Red lines in the figure correspond to the local maximum of average power distribution, and the dotted black line is the selected threshold value for the batch. The equal signs on the arrows mean that the distances indicated by these arrows are equal.

4.2.4 Bit Deletion/Insertion

This covert channel presents many challenges not only because its signaling periods are not explicitly synchronized, but also because of occurrences of other system activity, such as interrupts, micro-architectural events (e.g., page faults, cache misses), etc. These events can cause errors in the signaling periods they occur in, and also, in a sort of “domino effect”, make errors much more likely for other signaling periods in the same batch.

An example of the bit deletion and insertion is shown in Figure 8. In the figure (top), the blue line represents the received signal, black lines correspond to the estimation of the detection algorithm for the possible bit starting location. The dashed black lines (bottom) represent the starting location of a bit signal and the




Figure 8: Bit deletion (top) and insertion (bottom) in the covert communication channel due to variations in signal timing.

red box contains the region where the insertion occurs due to an interrupt. The actual bit starting points are given with red dotted lines (top). We observe that one of the bits is deleted. We also provide three sequences labeled with S_1 , S_2 and S_3 , which correspond to an actual transmitted bit sequence, actual transmitted bit sequence after deletion, and the estimated bit sequence, respectively. Here, the receiver’s detection algorithm fails because the edges at the beginning of each transmitted bit completely disappear. The reason behind this disappearing is that other system activities get activated which suppresses the effect of the designed micro-benchmark. However, we observe that the deletion probability of the system is pretty low ($<0.2\%$). Therefore, this problem can be addressed by employing even relatively simple error correcting codes in the “transmitter” application. In our experiments, we use a very simple (parity) code, which keeps our “transmitter” application simple enough to manually implement on a target machine in a few minutes.

4.3 Experimental Evaluation

4.3.1 Measurement Setup

To show the feasibility of exploiting this covert channel, we present our experimental results in two practically relevant scenarios: when a compact and stealthy receiver apparatus is placed in close proximity to the target system, and when a larger (briefcase-sized) antenna is placed up to 2.5 meters away, and also when the antenna is in an adjacent room, 1.5 m away but with a structural 35 cm thick wall included in that distance.

We used a software-defined-radio (RTL-SDRv3 [65], commercially available for \$25) for signal acquisition which is as large as a small flash drive. For close proximity measurements, we used a coin-shaped handmade

Table 1: List of laptops and their OS and (Intel) processor architecture used in our experiments.

Model	OS	Architecture
Dell Precision 7290	Windows 10	Kaby Lake
MacBookPro-2015	macOS (Mojave)	Broadwell
Dell Inspiron 15-3537	Linux (Debian)	Haswell
MacBookPro-2018	macOS (Mojave)	Coffee Lake
Lenovo Thinkpad	Linux (Ubuntu)	SkyLake
Sony Ultrabook	Windows 8	Ivy Bridge

33-turn coil magnetic field probe with a radius of 5 mm which costs <\$5 (no amplifier is used for these measurements). For the distance and non-line-of-sight (NLoS) measurements, we used the same SDR with a magnetic loop antenna (AOR-LA390 [66]) with a radius of 30 cm which costs \$200, including a built-in 20dB amplifier.

For the *transmitter*, we used *usleep()* for UNIX-based machines, and *Sleep()* for Windows-based machines. The sampling-rate for the SDR was set to 2.4 million samples per second, which is the maximum this SDR is capable of. We used 1024 point FFT with maximum overlapping. The receiver’s detection algorithm was implemented in MATLAB 2017-b. For synchronization between the transmitter and receiver at the start of the communication, the transmitter sends a pre-defined bit-stream of interleaved ones and zeros followed by a known short bit-stream of zeros only. The transmitter then sends a *preamble* to indicate the start of the transmission, and then sends the actual data. Depending on the requirement, the data can be sent in packets or continuously. Unless otherwise indicated, we used `SLEEP_PERIOD= 100μs` (for UNIX-based machines) or `= 1ms` (minimum possible for Windows-based machines) and set `LOOP_PERIOD` such that the active and idle periods have (almost) equal lengths.

We used 6 laptops from 5 different vendors (see Table 1), various processor architecture generations, and three popular OS families (Linux, MacOS, and Windows). To receive the EM signals, we placed the probe 10 cm away from the computer. To find the position where the signal power is the strongest, we manually localized the source of the signal. We found that the position which the signal is the strongest is slightly different from one laptop to another but they are mostly concentrated in the middle and/or the bottom right quarter of the laptop (on top of the keyboard). Note that all these measurements were done without making any changes to the laptop’s package. Also, all the measurements were done in the presence of other system’s normal activities (i.e., handling interrupts, context-switch, etc.).

4.3.2 Close Proximity Measurements

To measure the BER and bit-rate, we created a randomly-generated sequence of bits. Also, to decrease the BER, the *transmitter* application inserts parity bits such that the minimum Hamming distance between different code-words was at least three (to correct one error).

In Table 2, we provide the experimental results for six laptops. The columns of the table correspond to the average number (for 5 runs) of BER, transmission rate

Table 2: Experimental results for close proximity. The results include the bit-error-rate (BER), transmission-rate (TR), insertion probability (IP), and deletion probability (DP) for the proposed covert channel on different laptops.

	BER	TR (bps)	IP	DP
DELL Precision	2×10^{-3}	982	0	0
MacBookPro (2015)	3×10^{-2}	3700	0	3×10^{-3}
DELL Inspiron	8×10^{-3}	3162	4.5×10^{-3}	6.3×10^{-3}
MacBookPro (2018)	2.8×10^{-2}	3640	0	2.9×10^{-3}
Lenovo Thinkpad	5×10^{-3}	3020	0	1×10^{-3}
Sony Ultrabook	4×10^{-3}	974	0	5×10^{-3}




Figure 9: Transmission-rate comparison (higher is faster) between the proposed covert channel and the state-of-the-art (shown in log-scale). Each bar represents an existing attack. The proposed work achieve more than 3x higher TR compared to the fastest attack.

(TR), insertion probability (IP), and deletion probability (DP). To calculate the IP and DP, we compared the actual transmitted sequence with the received sequence based on the algorithm described in § 4.

As shown in the table, the proposed covert channel can achieve up to 3.7 kbps (kilobits per second) while having less than 0.1% BER with a low-cost and compact setup, and that the main determinant of the bit-rate is the operating system, i.e., the precision with which the *transmitter* application can control idleness time - the *usleep* in Linux and MacOS is significantly more precise than *sleep* used in Windows, so the TR in Linux and MacOS systems is 3-4 kbps while the TR for Windows systems is slightly below 1 kbps.

Figure 9 compares the maximum TR of the proposed covert channel to the state-of-the-art. Specifically we compared our method to 7 different attacks that leveraged *physical* side-channels to establish a covert channel. As can be seen from the figure, the proposed covert channel can achieve more than 3x faster TR compared to the fastest existing covert channel attack, GSMem [12].

4.3.3 Distance Measurements

LoS Measurements. To study the effect of distance on the proposed covert channel, we computed the BER

Table 3: Experimental results with distance. The results include the bit-error-rate (BER), transmission-rate (TR), insertion probability (IP), and deletion probability (DP).

Distance	BER	TR (bps)	IP	DP
1 m	9×10^{-3}	1872	5×10^{-3}	0
	9×10^{-4}	1645	1×10^{-3}	0
1.5 m	5×10^{-3}	1454	0	0
2.5 m	8×10^{-3}	1110	0	0




Figure 10: Experimental setup when an attacker and a victim are separated by a wall.

and TR while the loop antenna was put 1, 1.5, and then 2.5 meters away from the target laptop. As mentioned in §4.3.1, the loop antenna has an about 30 cm diameter and it can be easily hidden in a briefcase.

Table 3 shows the results for these 3 distances for the DELL Inspiron laptop. As can be seen from this table, the TR can be approximately 2 kbps when the distance for the communication link is around 1m. Additionally, we decrease TR so that BER of the system at different distances is almost the same for a fair evaluation of the performance of the communication link. It can be observed that having smaller TR for larger distances makes the communication more reliable. Although the rate decreases as the distance increases, we can receive 1110 bps when the distance is about 2.5m.

NLoS Measurements (through the wall). The setup for NLoS measurements is shown in Figure 10 where the transmitter and receiver are separated by an office wall which has about 35 cm thickness. Moreover, as can be seen, there are other electronic devices such as a printer in the transmitter’s room and a refrigerator in the receiver’s room which also generates unintentional EM emanations which can interfere with the laptop’s emanations and hence makes the signal noisier. Note that we intentionally chose this setup to show that the proposed covert communication can work reliably even in the presence of other sources of EM emanations.




Figure 11: PMU’s EM emanations over time when the user is typing: “can you hear me ”.

To maintain a low BER compared to the near-field measurements, the bit-rate had to be decreased to 821 bps while having 6×10^{-3} BER. However, as the signaling period is now significantly longer than the typical duration of an interrupt, the detection algorithm is better able to tolerate these system events, and so deletion and/or insertion of bits occurs less often or not at all. Overall, the NLoS measurements show that the covert communications are still possible (although at the lower rate) even when the transmitter and receiver are in two separate rooms which makes the attack more stealthy.

5. KEYLOGGING

5.1 Overview

The goal in keystroke logging, or *keylogging*, is to find when and which key has been pressed on a computer keyboard which, in turn, can lead to stealing sensitive information, passwords, etc. In general, every keystroke can be shown as a 3-tuple [67], (t_p, t_r, k) , where t_p is when the key is pressed, t_r is when the key is released, and k is the physical key identifier. Using this definition, keylogging becomes a two-phase problem: *keystroke detection* (i.e., correctly finding t_p and t_r) and *key identification* (i.e., finding k). It is important to mention that, while, ideally, the goal for keylogging is to find the exact character for each keystroke, realistic attacks [67] typically provide a *significantly reduced possible states* for a keystroke/word. Using this reduced state space, an attacker can then leverage a *brute-force* attack to eventually find the actual characters. In this section, we show how EM emanations from PMU can be leveraged to provide highly accurate keystroke detection.

Compared to the existing works that leveraged digital (e.g., cache usage) [68–71] and/or physical [44, 51, 72–76] for keylogging, the main advantage of using the proposed side-channel for keylogging is that it enables the attackers to perform an attack from a distance behind a wall even on an isolated air-gapped computer.

5.2 Keylogging Side-Channel Attack

The main idea behind this attack is that pressing a key creates a *burst* of activities on the processor which, in turn, causes the processor to switch to an *active* state, hence creates (stronger) EM emanations from the PMU.

Figure 11 shows the spectrogram for the EM ema-

nations received from the PMU (using the setup used in §4.3.2) when the user is typing a sentence/password: `can you hear me`. As can be seen in the figure, each character (including the white-spaces shown as ‘`␣`’) has a distinguishable pattern which means the total number of characters can be found with high accuracy using a simple-yet-effective detection algorithm. Moreover, as can be observed in Figure 11, the number of words and their length can also be inferred by grouping relatively close spikes (lines in the spectrogram) together.

Apart from the number of characters, the number of words, and the length of each word, existing work [77, 78] has shown that the duration of each keystroke and the time difference between two consecutive keys can also be leveraged to further reduce the search space for key identification. e.g., Salthouse [77] has empirically shown that (i) keys that are far apart are pressed in quicker succession than keys that are close together (e.g., see `you` vs. `can` in Figure 11). (ii) letter pairs that occur frequently in language are typed in quicker succession than infrequent letter pairs (e.g., see `hear` in Figure 11). (iii) practicing a specific keystroke sequence can significantly reduce inter-key timings (e.g., compare the timing for the white-space character in the first word, `can`, vs. the rest of the sentence). Using these findings, after properly detecting each keystroke’s timing, supervised or unsupervised classifiers can be used to identify the keystrokes/words and/or to reduce the search space.

5.3 Experimental Evaluations

Setup. We used the same setup discussed in § 4.3 for close-proximity and distance measurements, we performed our measurements at three distances: 10cm, 2m, and 1.5m through the wall while the DELL Precision laptop was used. For each distance, a randomly-generated text with 1000 words³ is typed (by the same person) in the Safari browser while the signal was recorded. It is important to mention that all the measurements were done in the presence of other system’s normal activities, including activities related to the browser.

Keystroke/Character Detection. To find the total number of characters (i.e., count the number of keystrokes), we first normalized and then transformed the signal into a sequence of (non-overlapping) spectral samples (SS) by using short-time Fourier transform (STFT), which divides the signal into equal-sized segments (*windows*) each 5ms long. STFT then applied the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) to each window to obtain its spectrum. We then chose a frequency band which contains the spikes related to PMU (the band is typically known for each device, but can also be easily found using standard peak detection techniques). We then used a simple thresholding technique (cf. §4.2.3) to decide whether the particular window contains a keystroke or not. To reduce false-positives, our detection algorithm then filtered out keystrokes that are shorter than a threshold

³obtained from <https://www.livechatinc.com/typing-speed-test/#/>

Table 4: Experimental results for keylogging in different distances. Results show the accuracy of correctly detecting characters and word lengths.

Distance	Char. Acc.		Word Acc.	
	TPR	FPR	Precision	Recall
10 cm	100%	3%	71%	100%
2m	99%	1.8%	70%	100%
1.5m (with wall)	97%	0.7%	70%	98%

(i.e., 30 ms in our experiments) assuming that a valid keystroke should take longer than this threshold.

Table 4 shows the accuracy (in terms of true-positive and false-positive rates, denoted as TPR and FPR) of detecting characters for the three distances. The main reason for the false-positives is other system’s activities such as handling the browser requests which also appeared as a burst of activities (but often much shorter). As the distance increased, such activities became less prominent (i.e., lower signal amplitude) which, in turn, caused a reduction in FPR. However, this reduction in the amplitude also affected the TPR since the emanations for keystrokes are now also weaker.

Word Detection. Once characters are correctly detected, the next step is to group the characters into the words. There are numerous techniques to create words based on individual characters. Particularly, we used the method proposed by Berger *et al.* [74]. Table 4 shows the accuracy. Since word-length is a multi-class classification problem, instead of TPR and FPR, we report *precision* percentage as the fraction of correctly labeled words (i.e., words with correctly predicted length) among the retrieved words, and also report *recall* as the fraction of words that have been retrieved over the total amount of existing words in the text. As the table shows, we were able to detect almost all the words while keeping the precision accuracy above 70%. The distance did not have a significant impact on either of these two metrics since in all these distances, the characters can be still accurately retrieved.

6. RELATED WORK

Electromagnetic Side-Channels. Prior work on EM side-channel mainly focused on the extraction of small amounts of highly sensitive data (such as cryptographic keys) from the system [30, 79–82]. Beyond extracting sensitive data values, EM emanations have also been used to learn more about program behavior, e.g., for identifying web pages during browsing [83], profiling [84], finding anomalies in software activity [85–87], etc.

While existing works have shown the existence of side-channel EM emanations from different electronic components within a computer, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that identifies the EM-based vulnerability created by the power management unit and exploits this vulnerability to establish a covert channel and/or a keylogging framework. Based on our knowledge, the work closest to ours is the methodology pre-

sented by Callan *et al.* [88] and Prvulovic *et al.* [89], which systematically find the amplitude and frequency-modulated activities on modern systems. Those works discovered that the strongest FM and AM-modulated signals are created by voltage regulators, memory refreshes, and DRAM clocks in modern computers. While the existence of the side-channel signal from the voltage regulator has been presented in these works, the fundamental relationship between CPU’s power states and the resulting EM leakages was not identified, and these signals were not exploited to establish a covert channel/keylogging. In fact, this prior work identifies that different *activity* on the processor weakly modulates the “carrier” signal emitted from the voltage regulator, not that the difference between active and idle states practically amounts to on-off keying, the strongest possible form of amplitude modulation, which is a much more powerful source of information leakage.

Also related to this paper are the methods based on the variations on the voltage and their corresponding EM emanations [32, 38, 49]. The main difference between the proposed side-channel and these works is that voltage-variation is *instruction-dependent* while the VRM side-channel is a *micro-architecture vulnerability*. Note that while the EM emanations for the voltage-variation are the strongest close to the VRM (because VRM spends most of the power) its existence is unrelated to how the VRM operates (i.e., the created side-channel is application-dependent, not VRM-dependent). Due to this difference, the proposed side-channel creates much stronger signals which can be received several meters away. Moreover, unlike other methods, it is resistant against techniques like randomization/blinding.

Physical Side-Channels. Exploiting other physical side-channels such as acoustic, temperature, etc. [11, 36–52] to create a covert channel/keylogging, is another groups of related work. Overall, depending on the setup, different physical side-channels can be used. The main differences between them are *a)* measurement requirements (i.e., cost and size of the receiver, signal-to-noise ratio and maximum achievable distance, etc.), and *b)* the maximum achievable bit-rate which indicates how severe and stealthy the attack could be. As shown in §4.3, compared to the state-of-the-art, the proposed side-channel can achieve more than 3x faster bit-rate mainly because it relies on the fast switches between *idle* and *active* states on PMU.

Yet another related work to this paper are the methods to exploit the power management unit by leveraging *digital* side-channels [7, 9, 10, 90]. Most recently, Khatamifard *et al.* [7] proposed POWER, a new method to leverage the power budget for creating a covert channel. To transmit data, POWER either creates power-intensive activities or remains idle. To infer the transmitted data, the Sink process (also located on the same physical device), measures its own performance by running a known application. The key idea is that due to the limitation in the power budget, the Sink’s performance is directly impacted (modulated) by the source

activity. In this paper, we showed that compared to POWER [7], our proposed covert channel can achieve significantly higher data-rate (>20x) since it does not rely on the indirect measurement of the performance while it is less susceptible to the noises generated by the system. Moreover, as mentioned in §2, the threat model for these attacks are different from the one used in this paper since they are leveraging digital side-channels.

Countermeasures. Another related body of work to this paper are circuit-level techniques to improve the EM/Power side-channel resistance, especially for integrated cryptographic accelerators on the chip such as AES engines [91–94]. These techniques are mainly focused on using on-chip integrated voltage regulators [95] (hence reducing the amount of pin accessibility to the attacker) and adding randomness to the voltage regulator which, in turn, creates random patterns in the generated side-channel signals [96]. While existing works only implemented their techniques on cryptographic engines (not the processor’s VRM) and did not consider the EM side-channel emanation proposed in this paper as a source of leakage, we believe a possible (circuit-level) mitigation to our proposed EM side-channel could be applying similar techniques to the VRM.

7. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we presented a new, previously unexplored, physical side-channel vulnerability on the design and implementation of the power management unit (and its main component, the voltage regulator module) in modern computers. Specifically, we showed that different power states on the system (which are primarily utilized to optimize the energy efficiency) and the way existing power management units create these states can lead to a side-channel which can leak sensitive information about the current state of the system.

To exploit this side-channel, we demonstrated two real exploits including *a)* a covert channel which leveraged an inexpensive and compact setup to establish the covert communication and *b)* a keylogging framework which can accurately detect the keystrokes even when the receiver was behind a wall on a separate room.

In our experimental evaluation, we used 6 different laptops, from various vendors, as the target system. We also performed our measurements under realistic conditions that include environmental EM noise and having other applications run on the target system concurrently with our data-exfiltration applications.

Our results showed that this newly-discovered side-channel do exist on a variety of different machines with diverse hardware and operating systems. Further, we showed that, compared to the state-of-the-art, exploiting this side-channel can lead to a much faster covert channel (when a physical side-channel is used).

We believe that exposing this new side-channel will serve to raise professional awareness and academic interest, and the existing and future generations of computers should address this vulnerability carefully, especially when the system is used in a critical environment.

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