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# PHILOSOPHY IN 19TH CENTURY AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

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## 1. Moral Philosophy and Common Sense, 1800-1840

Bruce Kuklick, the distinguished historian of American philosophy, stated "in the eighteenth century, philosophy as we know it did not exist in America as an independent pursuit."[1] For contemporaries, however, "philosophy" was a familiar term. The American Philosophical Society, founded by Benjamin Franklin in 1743 (and revived in 1766), aspired to promote "Useful Knowledge." Natural philosophy encompassed what became known in the nineteenth century as the physical sciences. Moral philosophy touched upon subjects that much later would belong with the social sciences. Logic and metaphysics had been taught to college students since the founding of Harvard (1636), although still drawing largely on Aristotle. Much contemporary thought reflected religious quarrels among Calvinists, at least until the Revolution. The American Revolution embodied and advanced the American Enlightenment, including historic contributions to political thought. It also assimilated much of the Scottish Enlightenment, which had spawned the most advanced philosophical thought of the eighteenth century.

The agent most responsible for introducing the Scottish Enlightenment to American colleges was John Witherspoon, a Scottish minister who assumed the presidency of the College of New Jersey (Princeton) in 1768. His lectures on moral philosophy conveyed the Common Sense philosophy propounded in his native land, principally by Thomas Reid. This philosophy synthesized and critiqued a host of thinkers from John Locke to David Hume. It upheld the reality of the physical world and hence its validity as depicted in natural philosophy. Human moral sense, it posited, was innate, like our sense of touch or smell. Witherspoon, like Reid, excoriated the immaterialism of Bishop Berkeley and the epistemological skepticism of David Hume. The world was knowable through reason and so was the truth of Christianity. Witherspoon shaped Princeton as the foremost patriot college, and he was the only minister to sign the Declaration of Independence. Common Sense, then, became a piece of an Enlightenment package that included devotion to republican principles, a Whiggish conception of the social order, a moderate Calvinist orthodoxy, and a template for molding character and citizenship.[2]

After the Revolution, Witherspoon's legacy was assumed by his son-in-law, Samuel Stanhope Smith, an Enlightened philosophe in his own right, who presided over Princeton until 1812. He published Witherspoon's *Lectures on Moral Philosophy* in 1800, with an augmented edition in 1812. However, Common Sense was amplified and explicated by Scottish writers, especially Dugald Stewart, who were extensively published in the United States from the 1790s.

It became the basis for the standard curriculum of American colleges: "Following and developing the pattern set by Witherspoon, the colleges organized their curriculum with moral philosophy at its peak;" and, "at least until the Civil War, and in some places long after, the Common Sense philosophy reigned supreme in American colleges."[3]

The reign of Common Sense, or Scottish Realism, complemented the teaching of natural philosophy (as it was called through the 1820s) and natural history. Simplified in American textbooks, it emphasized the moral sense, implanted by the Creator, which provided a rational guide to ethical judgements. American colleges were pervasively religious institutions, with twice daily chapel and full observance of the Sabbath. Moral philosophy was taught to seniors along with evidences of Christianity, usually by college presidents, almost always ministers. It purportedly provided a synthesis of the college course—how the subjects fit together into a unified account of man's duties to God, America, and fellow humans. As such, it constituted a guide for living a moral life, more philosophically grounded than philosophical.

At Union College, longtime president Eliphalet Nott's (1806-1866) moral philosophy course was famously known as "Kames," ostensibly based on Lord Kames' summary of Common Sense—*Elements of Criticism* (1762). Nott sought to inspire students to think for themselves by critically deconstructing Kames' arguments and, further, to provide preparation for life with practical lessons drawn from the president's rich fund of experience. Nott's teaching was remarkably effective, educating thirty future college presidents. They were an impressive lot who reflected Nott's zeal for collegiate reform and advanced philosophy as well (see below).[4] Equally renown was the course of Mark Hopkins, president of Williams College (1832-1876). Described by one student as "the key-stone of the whole arch of college studies," Hopkins portrayed the unity of nature and Christian revelation while also explicating practical advice for living a Christian life. Francis Wayland, president of Brown (1827-1857), a former student in Nott's Kames course, published *Elements of Moral Science* (1835), the most widely used textbook in the subject for a half-century. It propounded a system of conscience and duty, but two-thirds of the book was devoted to "Practical Ethics."[5]

In the absence of a charismatic president, the instruction in moral philosophy was more likely to be brief and superficial. In the late 1820s, seniors at Yale recited three books by William Paley—*Natural Theology (1802), Evidences of Christianity (1794),* and *Moral Philosophy (1785)*—and Dugald Stewart's *Philosophy of the Mind.* Paley was a conventional Christian apologist who stressed the deity's immanence in nature (natural theology).[6] Harvard seniors recited one term of intellectual philosophy and another mixing moral philosophy and natural theology. Amherst seniors recited the philosophy of the mind using Stewart and others in the first term, and moral philosophy from Paley and others in the third term.[7] In these typical curricula, the principal emphasis was on reinforcing the truth of Christian doctrine.

The distinction between mental and moral philosophy was fundamental to the Scottish philosophy of Reid and Stewart, but while the moral became largely didactic in American colleges, efforts to develop mental/intellectual doctrines grew from the 1820s onward. This

tradition wedded Lockean empiricism with the three elements of faculty psychology, understanding, taste, and will. Of these, American writers were most concerned with the last, which related to the legacy of the renowned Calvinist theologian, Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758). Yale president Jeremiah Day published *An Inquiry Respecting the Self-Determining Power of the Will or Contingent Volition* (1838) and a subsequent volume explicitly addressing Edwards's conception of freedom of the will. Day was the principal author of the Yale *Reports* of 1828, the definitive defense of the nineteenth-century classical curriculum, which above all valued developing the faculties of the mind. Henry Tappan, professor of intellectual and moral philosophy at University of the City of New York (later New York University), also published an analysis of Edwards's freedom of the will in 1838. However, attention focused more generally on faculty psychology or the theory of the powers of the mind: "between 1837 and 1857 American textbooks on mental philosophy appeared at the rate of about one per year." Although generally written by clerical professors or presidents, they represented "a genuine cultivation of philosophy for its own sake."[8]

In theology, the "fossilization" of the Edwardsian tradition, known in the eighteenth century as the "New Divinity," led to the abandonment of any "attempt to give it a philosophical foundation." However, it spawned an important development in higher education.[9] In 1806, liberal Harvard defenestrated the New Divinity in favor of what was soon known as Unitarianism. Spurned Calvinists withdrew and quickly organized the Andover Theological Seminary (1808). Its three-year course for training ministers was soon emulated. In 1812, Presbyterians opened a seminary at Princeton to safeguard Old-School Calvinism from the New Divinity. Yale followed in 1822, propounding the more moderate New Haven Divinity. Harvard's Divinity School was chartered in 1819, upholding Unitarian rationalism but preserving revelation and natural theology. In the 1820s and 1830s, more theological seminaries were opened than colleges. However, the four just mentioned were the most prominent. They were the first postgraduate institutions in American higher education and the first to nurture academic scholarship, including appreciation of German scholars. Moses Stuart at Andover was America's first Biblical scholar, followed by Josiah Gibbs at Yale and Andrews Norton at Harvard. The seminaries' preoccupations with Divine Grace and salvation (save Harvard) contributed little to philosophy, but the germ of academic scholarship would grow significantly in the middle decades of the nineteenth century.[10]

## 2. Idealism and Collegiate Philosophy, 1840-1880

These years witnessed a marked advance of both academic science and the spirit of reform in at least a few American colleges. The same was true for philosophy, which attained a pre-modern stage of development that Kuklick called "collegiate philosophy."[11] Scottish philosophy was challenged by proponents of idealism. Advancing scientific knowledge posed some discomfort for natural theology even before the impact of Darwinism. And mental philosophy was now increasingly called psychology, although it remained a part of philosophy.

After 1830, the idealist philosophy of Immanuel Kant gained increasing influence in America. Kant's distinction between the known phenomenal world of the senses and mental activity and the "noumenal" world of things in themselves undermined the Scottish realism that had prevailed in America. The earliest convert to Kantian idealism was James Marsh, president of the University of Vermont (1826-1833). A student of Moses Stuart at Andover, Marsh was reputedly the first American to read Kant in the original German. In his inaugural address as UVM President, he rejected common sense realism and invoked Kantian idealism as the basis for a far-reaching interpretation of educational reform and religious faith.[12]

A synthesis of sorts by the Scot Sir William Hamilton sought to reconcile realism and idealism in ways that had great appeal in America. The ensuing generation of collegiate philosophers each formulated unique interpretations of a hybrid idealism. Their writings helped philosophy to shed identification with social topics and acquire recognition as a separate field of speculation. Although largely free of theology, it remained profoundly committed to an axiomatic affirmation of Christian faith. The principal exponents were also deeply concerned with the state of American collegiate education and became early advocates of university-like reforms.[13]

Laurens Hickok attempted a thorough incorporation of Kantian thought into American philosophy. While teaching at Auburn Theological Seminary he published *Rational Psychology* (1849), the first of many publications that sought to reconcile Kantian idealism with New School Presbyterianism. A former Nott student, he accepted the position of professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy and vice-president at Union College (1852-66) in the expectation of creating a graduate program, which would have been the first of its kind. These plans were blocked by the aging president Nott, and they were moribund by the time Hickok briefly assumed the presidency (1866-68).[14]

Henry Tappan was the most successful philosopher-reformer. Also a Nott student, he shaped the University of Michigan into the country's first real university (1852-63) with learned professors, elective lecture courses, and master's-level education. Tappan's embrace of Kantian philosophy occurred after his New York professorship (1832-38), during his extensive travels in Prussia; and he later gave fulsome praise to Sir William Hamilton's Kantian interpretation of Scottish philosophy. Tappan's *University Education* (1851), while an eminently practical treatise, is predicated on "the philosophical idea of a university," a reflection of German idealism. Adamantly opposed to sectarian religion, his university ideal also embodied nondenominational Christianity.[15]

John Bascom, another Nott student, imbibed his Kantian idealism directly from Laurens Hickok, at Auburn Seminary and from his later writings. Idealism for Bascom wedded a full appreciation of modern science, including Darwinian evolution, with devout liberal Protestantism. The latter engendered a growing commitment to social reform, including temperance, women's rights, and the rights of labor. During his years on the Williams faculty (1855-74) he chafed under the conservative autocracy of Mark Hopkins, but as president of the

University of Wisconsin (1874-87) he introduced liberal reforms. Bascom taught a version of moral philosophy that he called sociology, which envisioned the state safeguarding the interests of the "social organism" and encompassing a Divine presence, social welfare, and material progress. The state university had a central role to play: advancing morality through religion; creating knowledge especially in the social sciences; and serving the state through its loyal graduates and their expertise. These were the seeds of the "Wisconsin Idea" which helped his institution become the foremost public university by the turn of the century.[16]

Princeton president James McCosh (1868-88) was an active partisan in the philosophical controversies of the era, both in Great Britain and America. He supported Hamilton against the controversial attack by John Stuart Mill but had only a qualified appreciation of Kantian idealism.[17] McCosh above all championed Scottish realism and Presbyterian orthodoxy (a requirement at Princeton). Educated at Edinburgh, he taught at Belfast before taking over a rather insular Princeton college, where he instituted perhaps the most far-reaching academic transformation of the era. He sponsored promising graduates for European graduate study and then appointed them to the faculty, creating a whole generation of notable scholars. He also enriched intellectual life by personally hosting seminars on diverse topics. However, as an academic reformer McCosh repeatedly clashed with reactionary trustees, while his traditionalist efforts to instill discipline and religion into students conflicted with the emerging collegiate culture. McCosh's continued publishing during his presidency, but *The Scottish Philosophy* (1875) was largely an historical account. He encouraged the introduction of the new psychology (see below) but failed to incorporate it into his own work. By the 1880s he exemplified the waning of the collegiate style of philosophy.[18]

Yale president Noah Porter (1871-86) is often paired with McCosh as a diehard defender of the classical college, but the institutional contexts were quite different. Antebellum Yale was the foremost home of academic science and scholarship, but it was also dominated by a pervasive consensus on the evangelicalism of the New Haven Theology. Yale faculty pursued learning, studied in Germany, and were leaders in their fields, all done with the conviction that they were also advancing Christian culture. Porter's studies at Berlin introduced him to German idealism and convinced him that psychology had superseded mental science and moral philosophy. In *Human Intellect* (1868) he defined psychology as "the science of the human soul," implying that the study of the mind affirmed man's spiritual nature. Advancing knowledge, however, did not apply to college students, for whom only the classical curriculum and required chapel could produce liberally educated men. In Porter's last year, he taught Yale seniors mental philosophy, moral philosophy, natural theology, and evidences of Christianity—the same subjects seniors were taught in the 1820s. The curriculum began to be modernized as soon as Porter departed, but his outmoded legacy proved difficult to erase. Philosophy and his version of psychology remained joined together but had "fallen on evil days" by 1903 when both required revamping.[19]

The romantic idealism of these five figures was characteristic of mid-nineteenth century America. It included an underlying consensus on evangelical Protestantism that transcended denominations and the colleges. This religious foundation tacitly assumed the literal truth of the Bible and the belief that Nature exemplified the Design of the Creator. In antebellum America, James Turner observed, "Protestants in general and Evangelicals in particular read the Bible with a flat-footed literalness unparalleled in the history of Christianity." Pathbreaking advances in astronomy and geology contradicted biblical accounts, and German historical criticism cast doubt on biblical stories, including the life of Jesus. Religious writers and philosophers were relatively unperturbed by such developments. Parts of the Bible could be given metaphorical interpretations, and German biblical criticism was scholarly esoterica. But the argument for Design, ironically an original borrowing from eighteenth-century Deism, became central to American Protestantism with the widespread acceptance of Paley's *Natural Theology*. It complemented the idealist interpretations just reviewed to such an extent that "rage for design peaked in the 1850s."[20]

These tenuous doctrines could not withstand the challenge of Darwinian evolution. Darwin's carefully documented arguments in *On the Origins of Species* (1859) were soon accepted among scientists (with a few notable exceptions). For philosophers, the embarrassment of biblical literalness was easily abandoned, but Design was fundamental to their philosophies. Evolution through random natural selection was the antithesis of Design by an omniscient Creator. For the prevailing collegiate philosophies, Darwinism threatened both idealism and theism, and it required a response. Bascom, McCosh, and Porter, in different ways all now posited a far greater separation between nature, including natural selection, and a guiding supernatural divine hand. Out-and-out opposition came mostly from conservative theologians, although Harvard philosopher Francis Bowen, another collegiate philosopher, was also an outspoken—and largely ignored—anti-Darwinist.[21]

Darwinism marked a tipping point for the role of religion in American higher education. For theists, the positivist philosophies of Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, and the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill, posed greater challenges. The United States remained a thoroughly religious nation, and writers would continue to rationalize the relationship between faith and evolutionary science. However, the subjects that Noah Porter had taught disappeared from the curriculum after the 1870s, along with compulsory chapel. Evidences of Christianity was among the first to go, but moral philosophy soon followed, now considered a relic by younger philosophers. But universities were not prepared to abandon religion. Rather, a consensus emerged among liberal but still-pious educators that a science of religion could promote a modern reshaping of contemporary religious thought, while providing religious training for students as well. This effort reflected the academic revolution, which was well underway by the 1890s. Typically, William Rainey Harper, a leading Biblical scholar and founding president of the University of Chicago (1892-1906), sought to make his institution a center for this new science. Academic courses in religion were established in most universities, often combined with the historical offerings from divinity schools. These studies had slight

effects on students, but they laid the groundwork for pathbreaking scholarship on religion.[22] But not philosophy. The aim to foster an eclectic, nondenominational approach to religion precluded examining spiritual and moral issues. Further, Julie Reuben concluded, "the universities adherence to scientific standards of inquiry precluded a strong religious presence in higher education."[23]

### 3. Institutionalization of Modern Philosophy, 1880-1914

The academic revolution of the late nineteenth century transformed American higher education. Led by the emerging universities, it comprised the organization of academic disciplines with associations and journals; the reconfiguring of universities into disciplinary departments; and faculty recognition and reward for empirical research and paradigmatic scholarship. The pioneers are justly famous. Cornell opened in 1868, the premier Land-Grant institution offering academic and applied subjects in several degree courses. The next year Charles W. Eliot was named president of Harvard (1869-1909); he promptly encouraged faculty scholarship, reconstituted the schools of law and medicine, and instituted elective courses for undergraduates. In 1876, Daniel Coit Gilman presided over the opening of the Johns Hopkins University, consciously dedicated to fostering Germanic-style empirical research and graduate education. Controversial at first, in the 1880s these initiatives became ascendant. After 1890, they constituted a new model of the American university, dedicated to a relentless advance of academic knowledge.[24] Philosophy was a comparative laggard in this transformation, but the same dynamics eventually brought full institutionalization as an autonomous academic discipline.

Before the 1890s there were few faculty positions for academically trained philosophers. In 1876, both G. Stanley Hall and William James complained in the *Nation* about the wretched teaching of philosophy in American colleges. The subject was assigned to older, seminary-trained professors (or presidents), with orthodox theological views and unaware of new developments in science or German thought. In 1879, a year after receiving Harvard's first PhD in philosophy, Hall complained there was only a "very small chance that a well-equipped student of philosophy [like himself] … will secure a position as a teacher of the subject."[25] The situation at Harvard was not atypical. The relevant professorship had an amalgam of titles: Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity. It was held for 36 years by Francis Bowen (1853-1889), whose qualifications had been in history and political economy. Bowen proved to be a more competent teacher of philosophy than most contemporaries, but his course in psychology, using Porter's text, perpetuated the traditional idealist dualism between mind and matter.[26] His own writings defended Unitarian attachment to Scottish realism and attacked Darwin and Mill in the manner of collegiate philosophers.[27] To engage contemporary philosophy, students needed to study at German universities, but even that did not bring an academic appointment.

Johns Hopkins was the first university to seek faculty in modern philosophy, although religious considerations prevailed even there as it felt the need to refute local allegations of ungodliness. Gilman sought but failed to dislodge William James from Cambridge and instead appointed three part-time lecturers—Charles S. Peirce, George Sylvester Morris, and Hall. Peirce best represented the inchoate future of philosophy and its relationship with science, but his brilliance was not yet recognized while his difficult personality became a problem. Morris, after lengthy German studies, had an established reputation as a Christian Hegelian, but he only obtained a faculty position teaching modern languages at the University of Michigan. Hall was entirely dedicated to the new psychology, the focus of his Harvard PhD and subsequent study in Germany. Hall was also something of an academic entrepreneur, and in 1884 gained promotion to professor of psychology and pedagogics. The dismissed Peirce never attained another academic appointment, while Morris returned to Michigan, now as professor of philosophy. Hall focused intensively on psychology, but in 1888 he was named founding president of Clark University. Dedicated above all to developing his field, he recruited the psychologists who had worked with him at Hopkins, emptying the university's philosophy department. Despite its prescient initiatives to nurture modern philosophy, Johns Hopkins ended with no presence in the field.[28]

Developments at Hopkins in the 1880s exemplified the difficulties facing philosophy as psychology emerged as an experimental science and increasingly as a separate discipline. By investigating the relation of the individual consciousness to the external world, psychology was "both more and less than traditional philosophy. More, because it was supposed to be scientific in the sense that physics and chemistry were and that post-Kantian metaphysics were not; and less, because as a natural science it had to be content with describing psychic phenomena and not explaining their ultimate relation to the physical world."[29]

The 'new psychology' was based on the measurement of physiological responses in psychological laboratories. The elaboration of physiological or experimental psychology has been credited largely to Wilhelm Wundt at the University of Leipzig—where Hall had studied after his PhD. The lure of experimental psychology grew enormously in the 1880s. Employing scientific methods in empirical research, it exemplified values of the academic revolution and hence was rapidly adopted in developing universities. Although still located in departments of philosophy, it developed along two tracks. The natural science track was content to focus solely on experimental research and findings; but philosophers were concerned with how this new knowledge of perception was related to larger issues of consciousness. The experimentalists would be led, at least initially, by G. Stanley Hall, while the principal philosophical contributors, somewhat later, were William James and John Dewey.

William James, with only a Harvard MD (1869), was appointed instructor of anatomy and physiology in 1872. He was acquainted with initial German efforts in physiological psychology, and he began to teach the subject at Harvard in 1875. He performed some laboratory experiments when Hall was his student. In 1880 he moved to the department of philosophy and

focused entirely on psychology. Throughout the 1880s, James compiled a monumental analysis of the state of scientific psychology, *Principles of Psychology* (2 vol. 1890). James described "mental phenomena in rich, precise, and graphic detail," but was also aware that the consciousness of individual minds assumed the reality of the external world. However, the exploration of this relationship—the correspondence between thought and its object—was epistemology, or philosophy. James continued to be honored for his contributions to psychology, but he had become skeptical of the value of laboratory experiments. After *Principles* his chief interest turned to philosophy.[30]

John Dewey reached a similar destination although with greater initial commitment to philosophy. He completed his PhD at Hopkins in 1884 with a dissertation on Kant's psychology. Given that year's upheaval in philosophy, he was fortunate to accompany his mentor, Morris, to the University of Michigan. He nonetheless felt a need to come to terms with the new psychology he had learned from Hall at Hopkins. After several articles, he published *Psychology* in 1887. The book identified the findings of the emerging science, but "bent its results to his moral and ethical purposes in justifying an active and moral will." In the end, it was a philosophical work, consistent with the Neo-Hegelian idealism and theism that characterized his thought during his decade at Michigan (1884-94).[31]

G. Stanley Hall was characteristically critical of both works. Dewey, he objected, had interpreted psychological findings in terms of his own system rather than recognizing their independent scientific status. He was also dismissive toward his old mentor, James, accusing him of introducing philosophical issues throughout.[32] Hall worked for the professionalization of his discipline by founding the *American Journal of Psychology* in 1887, and in 1892 he organized at Clark the founding meeting of the American Psychological Association.[33] Between those years, 20 universities established psychological laboratories, eight under professors who had earned PhDs with Wilhelm Wundt (Hall trained another four).[34] Experimental psychology was institutionalized as a separate academic discipline with scientific credentials, although philosophers still considered it a part of their cognitive bailiwick. However, by the mid-1890s the younger generation of psychologists wanted no part of philosophy and excluded it from their journals. Philosophy had to pursue its own path to professionalization.

These steps were largely taken at Cornell. Henry W. Sage, a munificent benefactor of the university, endowed a professorship of philosophy for old-fashioned reasons: "[to] instruct students in mental philosophy and ethics from a definitely Christian standpoint." In 1886, Jacob Gould Schurman was named Sage Professor of Christian Ethics and Mental Philosophy and fulfilled these mandates and more. Schurman's courses were exemplary and quite popular with students. He espoused Kantian idealism in both philosophical doctrine and a nationalist vision for philosophy: "America will be the scene on which … the human spirit will manifest its next world-phase of philosophical discovery, interpretation, and construction."[35] Sage, no doubt impressed by Schurman's nationalism as well as his Christianity, donated an additional $200,000 to establish what became the Sage School of Philosophy. The school opened in 1891

with eight well-qualified faculty, a psychological laboratory, and library. It was consciously intended to advance the discipline of philosophy through graduate education, research, and the *Philosophical Review*—the first academic journal in the field.[36] With the *Review,* Schurman hoped to accelerate the field's development by providing opportunities for communication and publication that existed in other academic sciences. Indeed, the Sage School quickly became the largest producer of philosophy PhDs, who soon populated growing departments. When Schurman was made president of Cornell (1892-1920), he was succeeded by his former student, James Edwin Creighton, also a proponent of idealism. Creighton led the school and the *Review* until his death in 1923, but he was a lackadaisical steward whose intellectual contribution was negligible.[37]

Philosophical idealism in the 1890s "was not so much argued for but assumed." An 1895 symposium at the University of California agreed, "our common philosophy is idealism—that explanation of the world which maintains that the only thing absolutely real is mind; that all material and temporal existences take their being from mind." However, different interpretations of idealism were propounded at Michigan, California, the University of Pennsylvania, and Boston University, not to mention Harvard. More than nuances differentiated the philosophers at these respective universities.[38]

In 1901 the launching the American Philosophical Association at Cornell ostensibly provided the final organizational piece of a complete academic discipline. However, it also revealed some of philosophy's weaknesses. The founding has been described as defensive professionalization, prompted in part by deteriorating relations with a more vigorous discipline of psychology. Philosophy papers presented at meetings of the American Psychological Association were at best politely tolerated, an increasingly unsatisfactory situation. Moreover, founding president James Creighton perceived that philosophy was lagging the academic revolution: "philosophy does not enjoy the general recognition, even among educated men, that is accorded to many other sciences." Nor was it valued adequately in colleges and universities (see note 19). He blamed the lack of real results, of recognized advancements in the field. And he hoped that the APA would serve to remedy these conditions by encouraging scientific inquiry and cooperation among philosophers.[39] But unity was elusive. The APA had to assume the title of Eastern Division because a Central APA had formed the previous year. A short-lived Southern Division formed in 1904, and later a Pacific Division in 1924. But geographical fragmentation was the least of philosophy's problems.

For the first decades of the twentieth century the bane of academic philosophy was a lack of agreement on the fundamental nature of the field—on common problems and methods of addressing them. In the somewhat jaundiced view of historian Laurence Veysey, "philosophy had developed into a field characterized by peculiarly deep-seated internecine disputes…. What … the APA truly offered was a forum for the individual display of intellectual manifestoes."[40] In fact, the leadership of the APA was acutely aware of this fissiparous state and vainly sought to address it. Two underlying issues defied resolution. Philosophers persisted in asserting their

interpretive superiority over psychology despite the latter's de facto independence. And given the esteem of science in academia, philosophers differed on whether or to what extent their subject could or should be scientific. For six of the first ten meetings of the APA, formal sessions were organized in an effort to foster consensus on issues like the criteria for truth and realism versus idealism. But the resulting discussions lacked the rigor, focus, or consensual foundations needed for scientific debate. By 1909, Creighton had become less sanguine about cooperation and consensus but still hoped for some agreement "regarding the nature of the problems that can profitably and significantly be raised and the kind of answers which they demand," These issues were directly confronted again in 1916 in Arthur O. Lovejoy's presidential address—"On Some Conditions of Progress in Philosophical Inquiry." He advocated greater methodological rigor and six steps to make philosophy more scientific, but his vision was roundly criticized in the next issue of *Philosophical Review*.[41]

Not everyone felt that standard academic departments and a national organization were the means for advancing philosophy. William James declined an invitation to join the APA, writing that "philosophical discussion proper only succeeds between intimates who have learned to converse by months of weary trials and failure." Although he soon relented—and was named president of the APA in 1906—he later wrote "the collective life of philosophers is little more than an organization of misunderstandings." John Dewey had little involvement with the APA discussions, holding by then his own maturing philosophical views. In 1904 psychologists and philosophers at Columbia launched the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods* (after 1920 the *Journal of Philosophy*) as an alternative to the Cornell school's *Philosophical Review*.[42] The careers of both men suggest that philosophical advancement arose more from individual genius than disciplinary institutions. However, in both cases academic settings were indispensable complements to individual achievement.[43]

Before Morris and Dewey, philosophy instruction at the University of Michigan resembled the conditions mocked by James and Hall—taught by a minister with no university training and heavily larded with Christian apologetics. Morris introduced courses on German philosophy with particular emphasis on Hegelian idealism. Dewey initially taught the new psychology, and his 1887 volume became the subject's text for the next decade. However, his deeper concern was with the relation of scientific knowledge and evolution to an ethical system for the social organism (the term he used). In 1888 Dewey was called to the University of Minnesota, but when Morris died the next year, he was recruited back to Michigan as department head. He taught Morris's courses on Kant and Hegel, but his thinking inclined away from idealism. If nature could not produce a valid ethical system, then human intelligence in combination with nature would have to derive one. In his final years at Michigan, Dewey was abandoning idealistic preoccupations with the absolute in favor of concern with the world around him—the germ of his subsequent instrumentalism.[44]

Dewey's move to the University of Chicago in 1894 plunged him into the social upheavals of the era—the Pullman Strike of that year, a polarizing crisis that bared deep social fissures,

and his friendship with Jane Addams, whose Hull House settlement sought to mitigate the hardships of urban poverty. Dewey was deeply affected by these manifestations of social dysfunction and the lack of philosophical means for addressing them. His subsequent career would address such issues, building a philosophical foundation for consensual democracy and social reconstruction. At Chicago, these preoccupations took a practical turn in his extensive engagement with education. In 1896 Dewey became head of a new department of pedagogy. That same year he launched an experimental school at the university. Dewey called it a laboratory school—a philosophical laboratory that sought to explore how humans learned. The school pioneered a revolutionary approach—'learning by doing,' connecting education to everyday life. Education was a common subject for contemporary philosopher/psychologists. G. Stanley Hall, whose appointment at Hopkins had included pedagogics, made educational research a specialty at Clark; William James's *Talks to Teachers on Psychology* (1892, 1899) was perhaps his most popular book. Dewey's lifelong contributions to education rival those to philosophy. His *School and Society* (1900), based on the lab school, has never been out of print.[45]

Philosophically, Dewey' aim was to understand how the acquisition of knowledge shaped human activities and environments. The volume he wrote with Chicago collaborators, *Studies in Logical Theory* (1903), brought Dewey recognition as the leader of a distinctive school of thought—Chicago pragmatism, which remained an enduring tradition there, even after Dewey's departure the following year. Dewey quarreled with President Harper over the administration of the laboratory school and abruptly resigned. He made his availability known to James McKeen Cattell at Columbia, and an appointment to the Columbia Department of Philosophy was soon forthcoming.[46]

Columbia under President Seth Low (1890-1901) had emerged as an academic powerhouse, with leading academic scholars, journals, publications, and doctoral programs that by the turn of the century rivaled the prestige of Harvard, Chicago, and Johns Hopkins. Low's successor, Nicholas Murray Butler (1902-45)—the first trained philosopher to teach the subject there and a founder of Teachers College, harbored soaring ambitions for the university and himself. Cattell, a pioneer of statistical psychology and mental testing, assembled the strongest department of psychology in the country. Cattell also recruited Franz Boas to the philosophy department in 1896, soon the nation's first professor of anthropology. Thus, Dewey joined a stimulating academic milieu, intellectually and professionally. Moreover, New York City was the commercial and media capital of the U.S., a crucible for the political, social, and educational issues to which Dewey would apply what he called his instrumental philosophy.[47]

Dewey was extraordinarily self-driven, and his position at Columbia suited his style. He avoided administrative tasks, taught only graduate students, and had many learned colleagues. Frederick Woodbridge, for one, was department head, mainstay of graduate instruction, editor of the *Journal of Philosophy*, and sympathetic intellectual foil. Dewey's scholarly output was simply gargantuan—in philosophy, education, and occasional pieces., Dewey developed his

instrumentalism unperturbed. From 1904-1910 the in-house *Journal of Philosophy* published his most serious philosophical pieces—23 in all. His mature instrumentalism was elaborated in *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* (1909), and *How We Think* (1910) was another classic contribution to education. The former held that modern science and particularly Darwinian evolution had discredited traditions of Western thinking in terms of first causes and final ends. Rather, they revealed the interrelatedness of things and the need for intelligence to comprehend them. The latter book promoted classroom adaptations that would shape and configure actions to useful purposes. Dewey would continue to refine the instrumentalist philosophy, which served as a template to apply to education and to society.[48]

William James benefited from spending his career in what became the nation's leading department of philosophy; however, the department's august stature owed greatly to the presence of William James. The wellspring of James' early recognition is difficult to identify. He published his first book, *Principles of Psychology,* when he was 48, after 18 years on the Harvard faculty. Yet he was Gilman's first choice to lead the Hopkins philosophy department more than a decade earlier. In his initial efforts to reshape the Harvard faculty, president Eliot often chose recent graduates solely by his assessment of their intelligence and character. George Herbert Palmer, with a B.D. from Andover, was made tutor in Greek in 1870 (a traditional appointment) but then jumped to an instructor of philosophy in 1872 (where he remained an administrative stalwart for 41 years). James's appointment that same year as instructor in physiology reflected a similar judgement of someone Eliot had known as a student and in Cambridge social circles. As for James, he was resigned at this point to teach biology, but regarded philosophy as his true vocation.[49]

James had been wrestling with the problem of free will in light of the materialism or determinism implied by modern science and Darwinian evolution. Local amateur interest in such philosophical matters in these years eclipsed anything inside Harvard. James participated in the legendary Metaphysical Club (1871-2), an ad hoc group of lawyers and would-be philosophers. The focus of discussions seems to have been on causation, in philosophy and the law: "For the club a connection to human purposes and conceivable empirical consequences guided all reasoning." Charles Peirce introduced the term 'pragmatism' in these meetings, and later in the decade expanded his ideas in publications. James's first philosophical publication (1878), on Spencer, revealed "that certain of his most fundamental ideas of both psychology and philosophy had already crystallized." [50]

In 1880 his assistant professorship was moved to the department of philosophy where his influence predominated despite the seniority of Palmer and Bowen. James was largely responsible for the appointment of Josiah Royce, whom he had met on a visit to Hopkins. An early Hopkins philosophy PhD (1878), Royce could find no work in his field (like Hall and Morris) and was teaching English at the University of California when James brought him to Cambridge to fill in during his leave (1882). He then kept Royce there with temporary appointments until he was made assistant professor (1885). He soon had a profound impact. His formulation of

absolute idealism "shaped the emphases of twentieth-century American philosophy until the First World War." At the same time, James's *Principles* made him the foremost authority on the new psychology. Still, when Bowen retired in 1889, Palmer received the Alford Chair of Philosophy (James's professorship soon followed). In 1892, James wished to dispense with psychological experiments, and advised Eliot to make the unusual appointment of a German academic, Hugo Münsterberg. A multitalented genius, Münsterberg combined his expertise in the new psychology with its philosophical implications. A fifth member of the department, George Santayana, joined the old-fashioned way. An 1889 PhD, he persevered as an instructor for nine years, apparently with James's backing, and then another nine years as an assistant professor—despite a prolific output of literary and aesthetic writings. All told, led by the growing stature of James and Royce, Harvard became "the undisputed philosophical center in the United States."[51]

Nothing was more central to that august reputation than James's delineation and promotion of pragmatism. The well-known birth of pragmatism as philosophy was his 1898 address to the Philosophical Union of the University of California. Although he acknowledged Pierce's priority, he broadened pragmatism, or practicalism as he called it, to assert "that the effective meaning of any philosophical proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence, in our future practical experience." Widely circulated, the address and pragmatism were analyzed, criticized, and amplified throughout the academic community, in the U.S. and abroad.[52] James actively spread the new gospel in his frequent speeches and publications. His 1906 Lowell Lectures expanded pragmatism by defining true ideas or beliefs as those that were successfully validated by experience. The lectures were published, modestly titled *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking*. But in a letter to a friend James was anything but modest, envisioning "converts to 'pragmatism' … to found a 'school' and to become a 'cause' … displacing all rationalistic systems … [to] make the pragmatic method … the philosophy of the future. Every sane and sound tendency in life can be brought in under it."[53]

In 1903, James published "The PhD Octopus," a backward-looking rejection of the professional mores of doctoral training spawned by the academic revolution. In fact, his own department had emerged as the leader in training the next generation of professional philosophers. PhD production took off slowly with ten awards from 1893-98, but then averaged six degrees per year through 1912. Palmer was especially adept at strategic placement of Harvard doctorates, and they tended to populate the most respected departments. The decade from 1898 to James's retirement in 1907 was the zenith of the quantity, quality, and variety of the Harvard philosophers' work—the Golden Age.[54] However, from 1910 to 1916, Harvard lost all five of its stars through the deaths of James (1910), Royce (1916), and Münsterberg (1916) and the retirements of Palmer and Santayana. Although the department maneuvered to maintain its prestige, its intellectual accomplishments waned.[55]

The twilight of Harvard's Golden Age occurred as the formative period of American academic philosophy closed. After 1910, and more definitely after the hiatus of the First World

War, three trends marked the incipience of a new era: First, challenges to the assumed dominance of idealism along with reinterpretations of the prevailing pragmatism; Second, professionalization of academic philosophy favored strategies of academic advancement and specialization on largely technical topics; and third, as academic philosophy withdrew from addressing popular themes and public venues, Dewey and his followers at once fully engaged politics and social reconstruction, becoming less academic in the process.

The consensus on idealism eroded slowly, but after 1910 it had lost favor. The Columbia department promoted naturalism and employed the *Journal of Philosophy* to counter the idealism prevailing at Cornell and the *Philosophical Review*. At Harvard, idealism was challenged by a concerted assertion of realism, and elsewhere by expressions of radical empiricism. Ironically, the emergence of modern science and particularly Darwinism stimulated the original development of academic philosophy, but now even stronger assertions of scientific authority, at least for some, undermined the domains of purely philosophical speculation.[56] Nor was pragmatism safe. In 1908 Arthur O. Lovejoy published "The Thirteen Pragmatisms" in the *Journal of Philosophy*—a critique of James's core concepts of meaning and truth. Pragmatism, of course, would play a central role in American thought and culture, but it suffered from fundamental vulnerabilities as a technical, academic philosophy. [57] These developments extend well beyond the purview of this volume, but they reflect in part the maturation of philosophy as an academic discipline.

In 1924, a half-century after the onset of the academic revolution, the relative standing of academic departments was formally rated. In philosophy, Harvard (#1) and Columbia (#2) were each in a league of their own. Below them, Chicago and Cornell were highly rated, and another five were clearly respectable. Even the final nine rated departments had some academic standing—three to five faculty, most all with PhDs, and active in disciplinary scholarship.[58] The doctoral graduates of chiefly the first four now filled the philosophy departments of the other fourteen listed schools as well as colleges and universities across the country.

Philosophy had become an activity of professors—a delimited field of knowledge distinguished by special techniques and an accepted set of doctrines. Competence in its arcane domains was acquired in an intense apprenticeship, certified by the doctorate, and subject to expert evaluation. Assimilation into the academic revolution, which had been a source of concern short years before, was a welcome development. At meetings of the American Philosophical Association, an observer reported, a younger generation presented highly specialized papers using technical terminology, although he also felt that "discussion was for the most part perfunctory, trivial, or irrelevant," More characteristic of an academic discipline, philosophy had moved away from "clarification of the fundamental problems of contemporary social life."[59]

But not John Dewey. *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (1920) was a vigorous presentation of views he had long harbored and would promote over succeeding decades. The new postwar

age demanded a new role for philosophy, abandoning sterile concerns with idealism and absolutes and focusing on articulating and achieving improvements in human conditions. Philosophical reconstruction required harnessing science and scientific methods to address "the larger social deficiencies that require intelligent diagnoses." Dewey called for "experimental intelligence" to guide "reconstructive action" to "liberate man from the bondage of the past, due to ignorance and accident hardened into custom." And such science-based "intelligent action" would need to be guided by interaction with the democratic community. [60] Thus Dewey, besides being the guru of progressive education, served as consistent inspiration for an idealistic vision of democracy and social betterment. His philosophical epigone may have contributed little to his academic legacy, but he inspired a generation of public intellectuals who contested the fundamental problems of social and political life in interwar America.[61]

**NOTES**

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[1] Bruce Kuklick, *A History of Philosophy in America, 1720-2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 2.

[2] Roger L. Geiger, *The History of American Higher Education: Learning and Culture from the Founding to World War II* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 72-76.

[3] Henry F. May, *The Enlightenment in* America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 347-8.

[4] Wayne Somers, *Encyclopedia of Union College History* (Schenectady: Union College Press, 2003), 425-6; Codman Hislop, *Eliphalet Nott*, (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1971), 231-54.

[5] Frederick Rudolph, *Mark Hopkins and the Log: Williams College, 1836-1872*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), 47; Geiger, *History of American Higher Education,* 227. Hopkins published *Lectures on Moral Science* (1862) based on his class. For Wayland: see note 13.

[6] The title of William Paley's 1802 volume indicates the message: *Natural Theology: or, Evidences of the Existence and the Attributes of the Deity, Collected from the Appearances of Nature*.

[7] David B. Potts, *Liberal Education for a Land of Colleges: Yale's* Reports *of 1828* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 157-221. The college year was divided into three terms; students recited (were examined on the day's readings) three times daily, six days per week.

[8] Herbert W. Schneider, *A History of American Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 202-12, quotes pp. 211-12. For the importance of Jonathan Edwards: Kuklick, *History of Philosophy*, 20-25.

[9] Schneider, *History of American Philosophy*, 201-2; also discussed in Kuklick, *History of Philosophy*, 38-57.

[10] Geiger, *History of American Higher Education*, 140-42, 154-60.

[11] Kuklick, *History of Philosophy*, 62-72.

[12] Ethan Schrum, "Marsh, James (1794-1842)," *Dictionary of Early American Philosophers*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[13] The foremost critic of the state of collegiate education was Francis Wayland, a traditional moral philosopher, whose 1850 plan to reform Brown was widely admired, but ultimately failed: Geiger, *History of American Higher Education*, 227-9. James Marsh was the first to attempt to reform the classical college.

[14] Kuklick, *History of Philosophy*, 67-9; Schneider, *History of American Philosophy*, 379-85; Somers, *Encyclopedia*, 378-83.

[15] J. David Hoeveler, *John Bascom and the Origins of the Wisconsin Idea*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2016), 77-9; Geiger, *History of American Higher Education*, 251-6.

[16] Hoeveler, *John Bascom*.

[17] These and other philosophical issues were widely discussed in the numerous quarterly journals published by Protestant denominations and engaged theological seminaries but had little relevance to collegiate philosophy: J. David Hoevelar, *James McCosh and the Scottish Intellectual Tradition: From Glasgow to Princeton*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 315-17.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Louise L. Stevenson, *Scholarly Means to Evangelical Ends: The New Haven Scholars and the Transformation of Learning in America, 1830-1890*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), quote p. 70; George Wilson Pierson, *Yale College: An Educational History, 1871-1921*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), 70, 147-9: William Graham Sumner in 1903 advocated abolishing the philosophy department, charging that it was "as bad as astrology": 148.

[20] James Turner, *Without God, Without Creed: The Origins of Unbelief in* America, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 144, 97.

[21] Hoevelar, *McCosh;* Hoevelar, *Bascom*; Stevenson, *Scholarly Means*; Bruce Kuklick, *The Rise of American Philosophy: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1860-1930*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 28-45. Charles Hodge, conservative stalwart of the Princeton Seminary, equated Darwinism with atheism: "the denial of design in nature is virtually the denial of God": Julie A. Reuben, *The Making of the Modern University: Intellectual Transformation and the Marginalization of Morality* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996), 31.

[22] E.g., Sir James George Frazer, *The Golden Bough* (1890); William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature* (1902); Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904); Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1912): Reuben, *Making of the Modern University*, 88-124, 303, n39.

[23] Ibid., 119-32, quote p.132.

[24] Geiger, *History of American Higher Education*, Chapter 8.

[25] Daniel J. Wilson, *Science, Community, and the Transformation of American Philosophy, 1860-1930*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 40-42.

[26] Sheldon M. Stern, "William James and the New Psychology" in Paul Buck, ed., *Social Sciences at Harvard, 1860-1920: From Inculcation to the Open Mind*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 175-222.

[27] Kuklick, *Rise of American Philosophy*, xv, 28-45.

[28] Hugh Hawkins, *Pioneer: A History of the Johns Hopkins University, 1874-1889*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), 187-212; Louis Menand, *The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America*, (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2001), 255-84.

[29] Kuklick, *Rise of American Philosophy*, 180.

[30] Ibid., 180-6; Stern. "William James," 180-98; Wilson, *Science,* Community, 76-94.

[31] Wilson, *Science, Community*, 81-8; Kuklick, *History of Philosophy*, 122-7. David Hoevelar, *The Evolutionists: American Thinkers Confront Charles Darwin, 1860*-1920, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 225-34.

[32] Wilson, *Science, Community*, 86-94; Dorothy Ross, *G. Stanley Hall: The Psychologist As Prophet*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 231-3.

[33] Hall forfeited influence over the development of psychology in the 1890s due to his authoritarian character and devious personality, as well as the quixotic direction of his theories. The rival *Psychological Review* was founded in 1894: Ibid., 231-75.

[34] Ibid., 169-85, 235-8; Ernest R. Hilgard, *Psychology in America: A Historical Survey*, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1987), 32-34. Another 21 psychological laboratories were established in universities from 1893-1900. On the attraction of experimental psychology vis-à-vis philosophy: John M. O'Donnell, *The Origins of Behavioralism: American Psychology, 1870*-1920, (New York: New York University Press, 1985), 141-51; On the formation of academic disciplines; Roger L. Geiger, *To Advance Knowledge: The Growth of American Research Universities, 1900-1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 20-39.

[35] Morris Bishop, *A History of Cornell*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), 276; Schneider, *History of American Philosophy*, 403-7, quote p. 404.

[36] The first philosophical periodical was the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, launched in Saint Louis by William Torrey Harris (later U.S. Commissioner of Education), published from 1867 to 1893. Overtly Hegelian, contributors nonetheless included James, Royce, Peirce, Dewey, and Hall. With no academic affiliation, it succumbed to the academicization of philosophy: Kuklick, *Rise of American Philosophy*, 57.

[37] Randall E. Auxier, "Creighton, James Edwin (1861-1923)," *The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

[38] Kuklick, *History of Philanthropy*, 111-22, quote pp. 112-13. Schneider, *History of American Philosophy*, 398-415: "At Cornell were trained the greater part of a generation of professors of philosophy in the United States, and through them the Cornell theories and methods came to exert a dominant role in philosophical instruction and research": p.405. However, Kuklick argues that Harvard PhDs were subsequently far more influential in shaping academic philosophy: see below, p. 14 and *Rise of American Philosophy*, xvi-xvii.

[39] H. N. Gardiner, "The First Twenty-Five Years of the American Philosophical Association," *Philosophical Review*, 35 (1926): 145-58; J. E. Creighton, "The Purposes of a Philosophical Association," *Philosophical Review*, 11 (1902), 219-37; Wilson, *Science, Community*, 108-11.

[40] Laurence Veysey, "The Plural Organized Worlds of the Humanities," in Alexandra Oleson and John Vos, eds., *The Organization of Knowledge in Modern America, 1860-1920*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 51-106, quote p.79.

[41] Discussed in Wilson, *Science, Community*, 110-45.

[42] Ibid., 111, 133-4, 145-6.

[43] The philosophies of James and Dewey are examined elsewhere in this volume. This essay concerns only their academic contexts.

[44] Wilson, *Science, Community*, 64-71; Hoevelar, *Evolutionists,* 232-5; *Encyclopedia of the University of Michigan*, 672-5.

[45] Darnell Rucker, *The Chicago Pragmatists*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), 83-106.

[46] Louis Menand, *The Metaphysical Club*, (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2001), 285-333; Kuklick, *History of Philosophy*, 179-85.

[47] McCaughey, *Stand Columbia*, 190-202, 211-45; Michael Rosenthal, *Nicholas Miraculous: The Amazing Career of the Redoubtable Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler*, (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2006).

[48] Alan Ryan, *John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism*, (New York: Norton, 1995), 154-99; John Herman Randall, Jr., "The Department of Philosophy" in *A History of the Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia University*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), 102-45.

[49] Ralph Barton Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, (Nashville: Vanderbilt University press, 1996 [1948]), 135. From 1867-77, James published extensive book reviews on broadly philosophic topics, all unsigned; in 1878 he published his first signed philosophic contributions in *Mind* (an English journal) and the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* (see note 35): John J. McDermott, ed., *The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition*, (New York: Random House, 1967), 812-17.

[50] Kuklick, *Rise of American Philosophy*, 47-54, 159-68, quote p.54.; Perry, *Thought and Character*, 147; Menand, *Metaphysical Club*.

[51] Ibid., 135-9, quotes pp. 140, 139.

[52] Kuklick, *History of Philosophy*, 157; Max H. Fisch, "American Pragmatism before and after 1898" in Robert W. Shahan and Kenneth R. Merrill, eds., *American Philosophy from Edwards to Quine*, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977), 78-110.

[53] Kuklick, *History of Philosophy*, 157; Perry, *Thought and Character*, 299. James repeated the Lowell lectures at Columbia in 1907. Although Dewey later distinguished his instrumentalism/experimentalism from pragmatism, they expressed mutual admiration during James's life: Ibid., 305-12.

[54] Ibid., 233-58. Kuklick lists the recipients of Harvard philosophy PhDs and rates their careers: Appendix 3, 581-9. Cf. Schneider's quotation in note 38.

[55] Ibid., 407-16.

[56] Schneider, *History of American Philosophy*, 459-491, 509-516; Kuklick, *History of Philosophy*, 190-214.

[57] Arthur O. Lovejoy, "The Thirteen Pragmatisms," reprinted in idem., *The Three Pragmatisms and Other Essays*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963), 1-29.

[58] R. M. Hughes, *A Study of the Graduate Schools of America* (Oxford, OH: Miami University, 1925), 26-27. In related fields, Columbia rated first, above Harvard, in psychology; in education Columbia, then Chicago, were well ahead of number three Harvard.

[59] Herbert W. Schneider (1924), quoted in Wilson, *Science, Community*, 154-5; Kuklick, *Rise of American Philosophy*, xvii-xviii.

[60] Wilson, *Science, Community*, 155-9; Kuklick, *History of Philosophy*, 188-97.

[61] David A. Hollinger, "The Problem of Pragmatism in American History" in idem., *In the American Province: Studies in the History of Historiography of Ideas*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 23-43; Morton White, *Social Thought in America: The Revolt against Formalism*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976 [1947]).