



1 | Authentication Factors and Other Confusion

Passwords, and tokens, and biometrics, oh my!

2 | What the heck is "Single Sign On"?

There's only two identity providers in the world that support this thing, so I could understand your confusion.

3 | And then there's Platform Single Sign-On...

In which we supply a slide with the words "Don't Panic" in large friendly characters.

4 | Three Steps to Hardening Your Fleet

Physical, Cloud, and Network security. And then there will be cake.



"If you wish to make an apple pie from scratch, you must first invent the universe."


Carl Sagan cosmos, c. 1980




Authentication Factors or why don't you trust me

And what exactly do identity people have against jam bands from the 90's anyway?





Something you know Something you have Something you are



Something you know Something you have Something you are

History

macOS is UNIX





By ComputerGeek7066 - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?


Pdp-7 (build) macOS is Unix

"Passcodes and passwords are essential to the security of Apple devices."

Apple Platform Security guide









Something you know Something you have Something you are



Khan C. Smith - phreak



Something you know - phishable Something you have - stealable Something you are - kinda hard to remove




Additive nature of phish





anytime someone says "passwordless" they just mean a possession or a biometric factor possession factor is just a certificate exchange biometric is just a hash derived from the randomness of yourself




touchid and faceid are the biometric combined with unique hardware identifiers of the currently logged in user. also used by a pam. also an unlock from screen saver is not an authentication. blame apple - and why is it not available at login? [next slide]

"With Face ID or Touch ID turned off, when a device or account locks, the keys for the highest class of Data Protection—which are held in the Secure Enclave—are discarded. The files and keychain items in that class are inaccessible until the user unlocks the device or account by entering their passcode or password."


Apple Platform Security guide
https://support.apple.com/guide/security/uses-for-face-id-and-touch-id-secc5227ff3c/1/web/1





The horrible truth of password security and password reset procedure






The horrible truth of password security and password reset procedure




What the heck is Single Sign On

You mean that thing where I type my user name and password 27 times a day?






Single Sign On is possession based factor



Access to the possession based factor is tied to a knowledge factor - unlocking macOS session, FileVault, or turning on iOS/iPadOS/VisionOS device



Spoilers - while there's biometrics on these devices, it is NOT a requirement of the SSOe specification to use biometrics

Use words more gooder

- Kerberos Single Sign-On
- Extensible Single Sign-On SSOe

jamf

Use words more gooder


- Kerberos Single Sign-On
- Extensible Single Sign-On SSOe
- AuthenticationServices API "credential"
- URL interception method "redirect"

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
Use words more gooder

- Kerberos Single Sign-On
- Extensible Single Sign-On SSOe
- AuthenticationServices API "credential"
- URL interception method "redirect"
- Enrollment Single Sign-On "Enrollment SSO"
- Platform Single Sign-On PSSOe





- Companion application with entitlements granted by Apple
 - network layer intercepts authentication requests SAML OAuth Open ID Connect 2.0 (OIDC)
 - Specialized authentication requests depending on identity provider (MSAL)
 - Redirects authentication requests to the companion application
 - Companion app requests a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) which is then used to obtain other tokens for other applications. PRT stored in user's keychain
- Discuss when this was introduced (macOS Catalina 10.15 4 years ago)






Single Sign On - A Possession Factor

- It's on a managed device
- It's only active via an MDM installed profile
- Once it's active.... it's active
- Works in Private Browsing mode

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





0:45 video - first time login to "prime" SSOe




01:07 video Subsequent logins -




0:45 - log in, download okta verify magically, we're prompted to log in






1:08 - So what we did is log in. What we were supposed to do was hit the Sign in with Okta Fast Pass Fast Pass registration - ends at end of fast pass




1:16 - Fast pass, see settings in profiles, see that we are registered with Okta Verify, log into a webpage with okta gate, ssoe works



Spoilers - while there's biometrics on these devices, it is NOT a requirement of the SSOe specification to use biometrics (Oh, and even if it did - what's the bypass for biometrics if say you're wearing a mask?)





FIDO2 and passkeys - a possession factor with a required user interaction




FIDO2 standard says you need interaction. But remember, the MS didn't require it.




"Computers only do what we tell them to do. And if you tell it to do something stupid... it's gonna do that."

Sean Rabbitt
PRESENTER AT PSU MACADMINS 2024






Who is this guy in the photo? How did he get my iPhone?



So obviously if we want to bring any sort of security into this, we'll need to introduce another factor to using SSOE



Platform Single Sign-On and the authentication methods that love them

Password

- Local account password kept in sync with the cloud identity provider password
- Consistent FileVault password
- Updates password at macOS login screen, wake from screen saver

SmartCard

- Tie a PIV to your cloud identity provider account
- Physical key required setup and infrastructure to support rollout
- Use the SmartCard to unlock FileVault on Macs with Apple Silicon processors

Secure Enclave Key

- Key used to authenticate to cloud identity provider stored in hardware bound Secure Element
- Still has a local UNIX password for account and FileVault
- Enforce complexity via MDM configuration profile



Gratuitously cribbed from Microsoft Go to Michael and Mark's session

Password - wstrust join like windows

Platform Single Sign-On and the authentication methods that love them

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Secure Enclave Key


- Key used to authenticate to cloud identity provider stored in hardware bound Secure Element
- Still has a local UNIX password for account and FileVault
- Enforce complexity via MDM configuration profile
- Local auth is Touch ID + PIN/ Passcode




Gratuitously cribbed from Microsoft
Go to Michael and Mark's session



"Advanced Data Protection" - why is phishing and shoulder surfing such a big issue



Remember how we talked about redirect and payloads and config - redirect vs credential



We don't talk about betas in public forums.

jamf

(build)

Platform Single Sign-on

To support highly secure macOS deployments that require authentication with the IdP, Platform Single Sign-on (Platform SSO) in macOS 15 is extended to:

- Require IdP authentication across FileVault, the Lock Screen, and the login window, using a new policy option, RequireAuthentication
- Optionally configure Touch ID or Apple Watch to unlock the screen for ease of use when RequireAuthentication is enabled
- Configure offline and an authentication grace period, so that users can log in or unlock the screen when they're offline



this is an error in the documentation. RequireAuthentication does not work at the FileVault screen. Discuss these new features and network availability.

```
// Profile: com.apple.extensiblesso
<key>PlatformSSO</key>
<dict>
 <key>FileVaultPolicy</key>
 <array><string>AttemptAuthentication</string></array>
 <key>UnlockPolicy</key>
 <array>
   <string>RequireAuthentication</string>
   <string>AllowOfflineGracePeriod</string>
   <string>AllowTouchIDOrWatchForUnlock</string>
 </array>
 <key>LoginPolicy</key>
 <array/>
 <key>AuthenticationGracePeriod</key>
 <integer>604800</integer>
 <key>OfflineGracePeriod</key>
 <integer>604800</integer>
</dict>
```

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Don't Panic

But do really go to Michael and Mark's session on PSSOe with Microsoft.



Hardening with authentication rules and additional factors








We're going to do the same to protect our assets. Physical security, cloud security, and network security. Trusted Access






Remember, password is still phishable or shoulder surfable. see also people stealing iPhones at bars.


"Advanced Data Protection" - talk about this later too - why is phishing and shoulder surfing such a big issue




first obvious thing - enable filevault. turn on password minimums. enforce with config profiles. make passcodes not optional on byo




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



Lock your users out of their computers in even more new and interesting ways with FIDO2 key at "login" screen.






FIDO2 and passkeys - a possession factor with a required user interaction







https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-passwordless#platform-credential-for-macos




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





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
But Sean, you just said to require MFA....




But Sean, you just said to require MFA....




because authentication policy takes over



1 factor that doesn't allow password...



any two factors (including password) - but you can't reuse factors




or password plus another non-phishable factor that "Require user interaction" and "require pin or biometric"







talk about token, bouncer at the club, [build] expiration, [build] refresh token



what happens when machine compromised? token generating machine. without user interaction. papyrus cursed font





Final Thoughts

And then there will be cake.



Final Thoughts

- SSOe is a possession factor, a single factor
- PSSOe is a possession factor too
- If you're accessing a resource, and the device itself is the factor, protect the device.

jamf



feedbackassistant.apple.com

Use your Apple Business Manager or Apple School Manager managed Apple Account. Switch to "Organization" mode.

"Basic authentication is no longer acceptable to decrypt our stored data at rest."



https://github.com/sean-rabbitt for slides

I'll be at Jamf's booth after this.



