

HAUNTED

BY

GEOGRAPHIES OF INTIMACY

IN NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY

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The Intimacies of Four Continents

My investigation begins in 1807, and extends to the surrounding years, in order to examine particular connections between Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Americas just after the Haitian Revolution, when the British abolished the slave trade and introduced Chinese indentured laborers into their West Indian colonies in the Caribbean. C. L. R. James observed in *The Black Jacobins* that the eighteenth-century slave society in San Domingo connected Europe, Africa, and the Americas: the fortunes created by the slavery-based societies in the Americas gave rise to the French bourgeoisie, producing the conditions for the “rights of man” demanded in the Revolution of 1789.¹ In *Cuban Counterpoint* Fernando Ortiz observed that “peoples from all four quarters of the globe” labored in the “new world” to produce tobacco and sugar for European consumption. Ortiz commented, “Sugar was mulatto from the start.”² These understandings that the “new world” of Africans, natives, and Asians in the Americas was intimately related to the rise of European modernity are an inspiration for my investigation. Yet I begin with the premise that we actually know little about the “intimacies of four continents,” despite available knowledge, however uneven, about their various constituent elements.

Historians, philosophers, and sociologists have written extensively about the origins of modern Europe, whether they focus on the French Revolution as a key event in the shift from feudal aristocracies to democratic nation-states or emphasize the gradual displacement of religious explanation by secular scientific rationalism, the shift from mercantilism to industrial capitalism, the growth of modern bureaucracy, or liberal citizenship within the modern state. There is also a distinguished historiography of the Atlantic slave trade and slave economies throughout the Americas.³ There is work

on indentured labor systems utilizing Europeans and Africans but sparser attention to the role of Chinese and Indian migrations to the early Americas, fewer that document the complex history and survival of native peoples in the Caribbean, and even fewer that examine the connections, relations, and mixings of Asian, African, and native peoples in the Americas.⁴ I begin within this modern puzzle of the New World by observing the particular obscurity of the *figure* of the transatlantic Chinese “coolie,” who first appears with some regularity in British colonial papers in 1803 in a plan to recruit the Chinese as contract laborers to work in Trinidad in the British West Indies. Yet because the Chinese are relatively absent in the historiography of the early Americas, and they seem to matter little in eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century liberal political philosophies, I query the particular loss of this Chinese figure, not in an effort to recuperate the loss but as an occasion to inquire generally into the politics of knowledge about “New World modernity.” That is, I am interested in asking not simply about what we know and do not know of the links and interdependencies between Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Americas but also what the circumstances and conventions were for producing these distinctly shaped comparative knowledges. I argue that the particular obscurity of the transatlantic Chinese in these relations permits an entry into a range of connections, the global *intimacies* out of which emerged not only modern humanism but a modern racialized division of labor. By “modern humanism” I mean the secular European tradition of liberal philosophy that narrates political emancipation through citizenship in the state, that declares economic freedom in the development of wage labor and an exchange market, and that confers civilization to the human person educated in aesthetic and national culture, in each case unifying particularity, difference, or locality through universal concepts of reason and community. In my readings of the colonial archive, political philosophy, and historiography I observe that ideas of race, gender, and family reproduction were central to this humanism, as well as to the modern constructions of freedom, civility, and justice that are its consequences. Yet these definitions made universal the politics, culture, and society of republican Europe and North America, and they omitted the global relationships that comprised the very conditions for humanism, despite the displacement of these conditions by its political philosophy.

While *intimacy* is usually taken to mean romantic or sexual relations, familiarity, or domesticity, I employ the term against the grain to elaborate three meanings, which I place in relation to one another within the

emergence of modern liberal humanism. First, I mean *intimacy* as spatial proximity or adjacent connection, and with “the intimacies of four continents” I hope to evoke the political economic logics through which men and women from Africa and Asia were forcibly transported to the Americas, who with native, mixed, and creole peoples constituted slave societies, the profits of which gave rise to bourgeois republican states in Europe and North America.⁵ Reading British Colonial Office papers composed from 1803 to 1807 and from the peak years of Chinese emigration, 1852 to 1866, in tandem with antislavery and proslavery debates among British parliamentarians and West Indian planters—the “intimacies of four continents” emerge as a way to discuss a world division of labor emerging in the nineteenth century.⁶ Colonial labor relations on the plantations in the Americas were the conditions of possibility for European philosophy to think the universality of human freedom, however much freedom for colonized peoples was precisely foreclosed within that philosophy.⁷

In 1807, as Britain abolished the African slave trade in its empire, the first Chinese were sent to Trinidad as a new labor force for the plantations. In a “Secret Memorandum from the British Colonial Office to the Chairman of the Court of Directors of the East India Company,” written in 1803, just following the Haitian Revolution, a colonial administrator laid the groundwork for the introduction of Chinese indentured laborers into the British West Indies:

The events which have recently happened at St. Domingo necessarily awaken all those apprehensions which the establishment of a Negro government in that land gave rise to some years ago, and render it indispensable that every practicable measure of precaution should be adopted to guard the British possessions in the West Indies as well against . . . the danger of a spirit of insurrection being excited amongst the Negroes in our colonies.

. . . No measure would so effectually tend to provide a security against this danger, as that of introducing a free race of cultivators into our islands, who, from habits and feelings could be kept distinct from the Negroes, and who from interest would be inseparably attached to the European proprietors. . . . The Chinese people . . . unite the qualities which constitute this double recommendation.⁸

After two centuries of African slavery this British plan to import Chinese coolies marked a significant, yet largely ignored, shift in the management

of race and labor in the colonies. The decision to experiment with a different form of labor was explicitly racialized—"a free race . . . who could be kept distinct from the Negroes"—but moreover it framed the importation of this newly "raced" Chinese labor as a solution both to Britain's need to suppress black slave rebellion and its desire to expand production. The context for the British desire to innovate sugar production in the West Indian colonies was the international or "transcolonial" rivalries with the French West Indies, the primary producer of sugar for the world market before the Haitian Revolution, and Spanish Cuba and Puerto Rico, who were quickly becoming more competitive since revolts there.⁹ In this sense, while some historians explain the end of slavery in the Americas throughout the nineteenth century as a response to liberal abolitionists, many more now view the British decision to end the slave trade in 1807, and slavery in its empire in 1834, as pragmatic attempts to stave off potential black revolution, on the one hand, and to resolve difficulties in the sugar economy resulting from the relative "rigidity" of slave labor within colonial mercantilism, on the other.¹⁰ The "Trinidad experiment" imagined the Chinese as a "racial barrier between [the British] and the Negroes," the addition of which would produce a new division of labor in which the black slaves would continue to perform fieldwork, and a "free race" of Chinese could grind, refine, and crystallize the cane. The British described the Chinese workers as "free," yet the men would be shipped on the same vessels that had brought the slaves they were designed to replace; some would fall to disease, die, suffer abuse, and mutiny; those who survived the three-month voyage would encounter coercive, confined conditions on arrival. In this sense the British political discourse announcing a decision to move from "primitive slavery" to "free labor" may have been a modern utilitarian move, in which abolition proved an expedient, and only coincidentally "enlightened," solution.¹¹ The representations of indentured labor as "freely" contracted buttressed liberal promises of freedom for former slaves, while enabling planters to derive benefits from the so-called transition from slavery to free labor that, in effect, included a range of intermediate forms of coercive labor—from rented slaves, sharecroppers, and convicts to day laborers, debt peonage, workers paid by task, and indentureship.¹² The Chinese were used instrumentally in this political discourse as a collective *figure*, a fantasy of "free" yet racialized and indentured labor, at a time when the possession of body, work, life, and death was foreclosed to the enslaved and the indentured alike. In other words, in 1807 the category of "freedom" was central to the development of what we could

call, after Foucault, a modern racial governmentality in which a political hierarchy ranging from "free" to "unfree" was deployed in the management of the diverse labors of colonized peoples. In 1807, as Britain moved from mercantilist plantation production toward an expanded international trade in diversified manufactured goods, the Chinese coolie appears in colonial and parliamentary papers as a *figure* for this world division of labor, a new racial mode of managing and dividing laboring groups through the liberal promise of *freedom* that would commence with the end of slavery.

The second meaning of *intimacy* I examine is the more common one of privacy, often figured as conjugal and familial relations in the bourgeois home, distinguished from the public realm of work, society, and politics.¹³ The Chinese emigrant to the Americas occupied a place, also, in the colonial discourses constituting bourgeois intimacy. While this distinction between private and public spheres emerged as a nineteenth-century ideal characterizing British, European, and northeastern American societies, the separation of the feminine home and the masculine world of work has been criticized by some feminist scholars as a liberal abstraction for ordering relations in civil society that is contradicted by the social realities of laboring women.¹⁴ The paradigm of separate spheres, moreover, cannot be easily extended to colonial or slave societies, where the practice of private and public spheres was unevenly imposed: colonial households and districts may have aspired to such divisions in manners reminiscent of the European metropolis, but native-descendant peoples, African slaves, and indentured Chinese could be said to be at once differentiated from yet subordinated to regulating notions of privacy and publicity. Furthermore, in the colonial context sexual relations were not limited to a "private" sphere but included practices that disrespected such separations, ranging from rape, assault, domestic servitude, or concubinage to "consensual relations" between colonizers and colonized, what Ann Laura Stoler has termed the "intimacies of empire."¹⁵ We must critically historicize this second meaning of intimacy, of sexual and affective intimacy within the private sphere, insofar as *bourgeois intimacy* was precisely a biopolitics through which the colonial powers administered the enslaved and colonized and sought to indoctrinate the newly freed into forms of Christian marriage and family. The colonial management of sexuality, affect, marriage, and family among the colonized formed a central part of the microphysics of colonial rule.¹⁶ Bourgeois intimacy, as an effect of the private and public split that was the sociospatial medium for both metropolitan and colonial hegemony, was produced by the "intimacies of four continents"—

in the sense that the political economy of slave and indentured labor in the colonies founded the formative wealth of the European bourgeoisie *and* in the sense that the labor of enslaved and indentured domestic workers furnished the material comforts of the bourgeois home.

The British colonial archive is not a static, comprehensive collection of given facts or a source of recorded history. Following Foucault and Said, we must consider the archive as a site of knowledge production, “reading” it as a technology for administering and knowing the colonized population that both attests to its own contradictions and yields its own critique.¹⁷ As Ann Stoler argues, the colonial archive became “a supreme technology of the . . . imperial state, a repository of codified beliefs that clustered (and bore witness to) connections between secrecy, the law, and power.”¹⁸ Reading British documents on the design of introducing Chinese women among the Chinese contract laborers in the West Indies, I have become especially interested in the *figure* of the Chinese woman, who recurs throughout the papers as a trope for the colonial imagination of the Chinese capacity to develop bourgeois intimacy. From the inception of the plan to introduce Chinese into Trinidad, and continuing throughout the nineteenth century, administrators state their desire to import Chinese women, but all documents indicate that Chinese female emigration was actually quite rare. Attorney-General Archibald Gloster wrote:

I think it one of the best schemes possible; and if followed up with larger importation, and with women, that it will give this colony a strength far beyond what other colonies possess. *It will be a barrier between us and the Negroes* with whom they do not associate; & consequently to whom they will always offer formidable opposition. The substituting of their labour instead of Negro labour is out of the question, as to the common business of the plantation. They are not habituated to it, nor will they take to it in the same way, nor can we force them by the same methods; but their industrious habits, and constitutional strength, will I think greatly aid the planters. They will cut and weed cane. They will attend about our mills. They will act as mechanics.¹⁹

The introduction of the Chinese into the slave plantation economy was thus described in terms of a need for a nominally “free” labor force, one that would not “substitute” for the slaves but would perform different labors and would be distinguished racially and socially from both the white colonial planters and the black slaves. Gloster imagined the community of Chi-

nese workers as an adjacent group that would form a “racial barrier between us and the Negroes.” The British introduced the Chinese into the community of white colonials and black slaves as a contiguous “other” whose liminality permitted them to be, at one moment, incorporated as part of colonial labor and, at another, elided or excluded by its humanist universals. Neither free European nor the white European’s “other” (the black slave), neither lord nor bonded, the Chinese were represented as a paradoxical figure, at once both an addition that would stabilize the colonial order and the supplement whose addition might likewise threaten the attainment of any such stability.²⁰ The Chinese woman figured as a colonial fantasy of the Chinese capacity for bourgeois family and “freedom.”

That Gloster goes on in the same document to liken the Chinese to “our Peons, or native Indians . . . Mulattoes or Mestees” really indicates no similarity between the Chinese laborer and the mixed, part-native, or native descendant peoples with whom he may have worked. Rather, I understand this colonial association of the Chinese with various racially mixed figures as a moment in the history of modern humanism and racism in which the fixing of a hierarchy of racial classifications gradually emerged to manage and modernize labor, reproduction, and society among the colonized and to rationalize the conditions of creolized mixing and the range of potential “intimacies” among them.²¹ With respect to the long history of black African and Native American interethnic contacts from the fifteenth century onward, Jack Forbes has argued that native, as well as part-African and part-native persons, were mostly misclassified with terms ranging from *loro*, *mestizo*, *gens de couleur*, or *mulatto* to *dark* or *brown*, to even *negro*, *noir*, or *black*. The late-eighteenth-century topographer of St. Domingue, Moreau de Saint-Méry, presented eleven racial categories of 110 combinations ranked from absolute white (128 parts white blood) to absolute black (128 parts black).²² We can explain the dramatic, encyclopedic proliferation of both racial classification and racial misattribution of this period if we observe that the racial governmentality continually innovated new terms for managing population and social spaces in the Americas.²³ The colonial relations of production, which required racial mixing, constituted what Fredric Jameson would call the “political unconscious” of modern European taxonomies of race; the relations of production were the absent yet necessary context that founded the possibility for racial classification yet the context with which such ordering was in contradiction.²⁴ Joan Dayan writes of Haiti: “If racial mixing threatened to contaminate, the masters had to con-

jure purity out of phantasmal impurity. This sanitizing ritual engendered remarkable racial fictions."²⁵

The West Indian Governors' offices stated that needs of the plantation demanded male workers, but even in the early correspondence we see the Colonial Office rationalizing the idea of creating Chinese families through the desire for a stable racial "barrier" between the colonial whites and the enslaved blacks. Yet the idea of Chinese reproduction, which persists in the colonial correspondence and parliamentary debates throughout the peak years of emigration in the 1850s and 1860s, was a curious fantasy, contradicted by the fact that the Chinese in the Caribbean and North America did not establish family communities in significant numbers until the twentieth century.²⁶ The persistent mention of Chinese families suggests that for some colonial administrators, the "value" of the Chinese may not have been exclusively their labor but also the instrumental use of the *figure* of Chinese sexuality as resembling the "civility" of European marriage and family, in an implicit contrast to the sexualized representations of "the peculiar nature" of African and African-descendant mulatto peoples.²⁷ In the 1803–7 discussions before the British decision to end slavery this fantasy of Chinese family civility was a way of marking a *racial* difference between "Chinese free labor" and "Negro slaves," through imagining the Chinese as closer to liberal ideas of human person and society. Later, in the 1850s and 1860s, following the end of slavery in the British West Indies in 1834, by which time there were significant numbers of working "free" people of color and South Asian Indian laborers, this phantasm continued to figure as a part of a racialized classification of laboring cultures. In 1851 the agent in charge of Chinese emigration, James T. White, fantasized a *class* hierarchy among the groups of the "Chinese," "Bengalees," and "Negroes" based on the races' ostensive physical traits and capacities for forming families, stating the social potential of the Chinese to form "middle-class" families through Christian marriage and reproduction.²⁸ This required representations of "Chinese culture" that defined it as one whose traditions could be summarized by the protection of chaste virtuous women who would stabilize the laboring community; ironically, Chinese women could only be imagined as virtuous to the extent that "Chinese culture" would not permit them to migrate. As a figure that promised social order, the Chinese woman was a *supplement* who appeared to complete the prospective future society of the colony; yet her absence, around which desire was reiterated, marked the limit of a social field whose coherence and closure depended on ideas of racial purity and dis-

tinction. In contrast, while later nineteenth-century British colonialist and Indian nationalist discourses idealized middle-class upper-caste women in India, the *bhadramahila*, as "pure" and "chaste" symbols of the nation, both discourses represented migrant lower-caste Indian women in the indentured communities in the West Indies as licentious and immoral, precisely *because* they migrated.²⁹ The colonial archive reveals the altogether fantastic structure of racial imaginations based on ideas about Asian female sexualities. Throughout the nineteenth century the racialized sexual differentiation of Africans, East and South Asians, and native people emerged as a normative taxonomy that managed and spatially distanced these groups from the spheres within which "freedom" was established for European subjects.

For European subjects in the nineteenth century, this notion of *intimacy* in the private sphere became a defining property of the modern individual in civil society, and ideas of privacy in bourgeois domesticity were constituted as the individual's "possession" to be politically protected, as in "the right to privacy." We can trace this narrative of the modern individual, or Western man, who possesses interiority of person, as well as a private household, in the liberal political philosophical tradition from Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel through to its critique in Marx and Engels. Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* is arguably distinct in this tradition, however, for its impressive narrative synthesis that has defined the central forms of modern personhood, property, family, civil society, and state. Hegel's text pivots on the dialectical overcoming of "slavery" by modern human "freedom" to be resolved in the unity of human particularity with the universality of the state. Yet this "overcoming" depended on a concept of slavery that located its practice in the "Old World" of ancient Greece and Rome rather than in the "New World" of the Americas. Hegel employed freedom and slavery as primary metaphors in the dialectic of human self-realization elaborated in his *Phenomenology* and in the *Philosophy of Right*, but he significantly foreclosed mention of the slave revolts in Haiti going on at the time of the writing and publication of these works.³⁰ Michel-Rolph Trouillot has argued that the Haitian Revolution entered history with the peculiarity of being "unthinkable" even as it happened and then was forcibly forgotten within over a century of historiography.³¹ The important Hegelian dialectic that established intimacy as a property of the individual man within his family in civil society enacted a series of influential displacements that rendered unavailable not only slavery *per se* but the relations I wish to signify with the concept of the "intimacies of four continents." Hegel's dialectic obscured Europe's dependency on

the new world in a narrative of European autonomy and disavowed native, Asian migrant, and African work, resistance, and contribution to the emergence of European modernity.

In *Philosophy of Right* Hegel traced the dialectical development of the individual's self-consciousness through the political forms of property, family, civil society, and the state. We can think of Hegel's dialectic as a series of phases in which each subsequent phase emerges as a more explicit or more inclusive whole of which the former phase can be seen in retrospect as one moment. In this process of supersession, or sublation, what Hegel called *Aufhebung*, the initial contradiction is suppressed and reformulated in new terms, involving a preservation of its original terms in either a deferral or elevation of the contradiction to a higher level.³² This movement encompasses Hegel's idea of negation comprehending difference, assimilating and overcoming opposition or relation. This dialectic is essential to understanding and to human being. Negation always takes place and operates within a unity; we conceive of nothing and have nothing without this totalizing unity. For Hegel this movement takes place both on the level of the individual person and through the movement toward self-consciousness, as well as through the evolution of the person and community in the ethical and political forms of family, civil society, and state. Property in oneself and in the objects one makes through will, labor, and contract—all are levels in Hegel's dialectical development that resolve in the unity of the particular will of the individual with the collective universality of the whole, or the state.

"Property" is the way that Hegel explained the individual initially investing will and work into nature, making that nature objective, transforming world and himself. Through property the condition of possibility of human self-possession—of one's body, interiority, and life direction—is established. Indeed, Hegel argued that property is an essential condition for the possibility of moral action because without property, without a locus of independence of the individual will, the person cannot be independent, thoughtful, or self-conscious; without property he will be dominated by others, by needs, and by nature. Thus, the individual's possession of his own person, his own interiority, is a first sense of *property*. The ethical contract of marriage and the development of the family are more complex social manifestations of "property" within Hegel's vision of the development of freedom. The individual man establishes his relation to "family" through marriage to a woman whose proper place is the "inner" world of the family, the family constituting the key intermediary institution between civil society and the

state. Interiority of person and of the domestic sphere of the family are thus stages in Hegel's description of the progressive unfolding of the ethical life.

In this sense Hegel defined *freedom* as a condition achieved through a developmental process in which the individual first possessed him- or herself, his or her own interiority, then put his will in an object through labor, and then made a contract to exchange the thing. Marriage and the family were primary and necessary sites of this investment of will in civil institutions; the "intimacy" within the family was the property of the individual becoming "free." Property, marriage, and family were essential conditions for the possibility of moral action and the means through which the individual will was brought consciously into identity with the universal will, expressing the realization of true "freedom" rather than mere duty or servitude.

In 1834 Britain initiated the four-year period of "apprenticeship" in the West Indies that was to grant full "emancipation" to slaves in 1838. This "emancipation" was to promise slaves this set of institutions constituting "freedom": "emancipation" proposed a narrative development in which wage labor, contract, marriage, and family would be the formal institutions through which modern freedom could be attained and the condition of slavery overcome. Yet emancipation clearly did not establish freedom for black peoples in the British West Indies, many of whom were still confined to the plantation and others who left bound in economic servitude and poverty. Indeed, as Thomas Holt has argued, the socialization of former slaves into liberal promises of freedom in Jamaica was part of the gradual disciplining of blacks into wage work, which Marx would call "another form of slavery." Saidiya Hartman has argued that "emancipation" effectively inserted former slaves into an economy of social indebtedness. Catherine Hall has observed that the disciplining of former slaves in Jamaica likewise included their "civilization" into English bourgeois notions of gender, morality, and family, as well as inculcating in the newly freed the judgment that they were essentially "savage" and unable to adapt to the requirements of civilization. The British inserted the Chinese as so-called free laborers at the critical time of slave emancipation, calculating that they would occupy an intermediary position within this governmentality in which the colonized became human through development of economic and political freedom. In other words, the liberal promise that former slaves, natives, and migrant workers could enter voluntarily into contract was a dominant mode for the initiation of the "unfree" into consensual social relations between "free" human persons: in the crucible of American modernity, Amy Dru Stanley

has observed, the contracts of labor and marriage became the very symbols of humanity and freedom.³³

To appreciate the particular “plasticity” of the figure of the Chinese within liberal capitalist modernity, we need only realize that toward the end of the nineteenth century, U.S. discourses about the Chinese laborer contradicted the British discourse that portrayed the Chinese contract laborers as “free.”³⁴ In the United States those arguing for the prohibition of Chinese female immigration in the Page Law of 1875, and the end to all further Chinese immigration in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, emphasized that Chinese laborers recruited to work in mining, agriculture, and railroad construction in the mid-nineteenth century were “unfree” and therefore ineligible for citizenship.³⁵ Historian Moon-Ho Jung observes, of the nineteenth-century U.S. debates, that the Chinese “coolie” was opportunistically constructed as a transitional figure, midway between slavery and free labor, used both to define and to obscure the boundary between enslavement and freedom. The Chinese contract laborer occupied a liminal, ambiguous intermediary position throughout the nineteenth century, brought to the Americas to supplement, replace, and obfuscate the labor previously performed by slaves yet to be differentially distinguished from them. In the British discourse the Chinese laborer was a “harbinger of freedom,” yet in the United States the Chinese was a “relic of slavery.”³⁶ In Cuba, where the Chinese were indispensable to the modernization of the sugar industry, “coolies” were presented as a new source of tractable workers, a viable supplement to slave labor.³⁷ Whether in the British West Indies, where slavery was legally terminated in 1834; in the United States, where the Civil War ended slavery in 1865; or in Spanish Cuba, where slavery was not abolished until later in the 1880s, African, Asian, and mixed native workers labored and struggled together in the early Americas.

Finally, there is a third meaning of *intimacies* in the constellation to be elaborated. This is the sense of intimacies embodied in the variety of contacts among slaves, indentured persons, and mixed-blood free peoples living together on the islands that resulted in “the collision of European, African, and Asian components within the [Caribbean] Plantation, that could give rise to rebellions against the plantation structure itself.”³⁸ The British colonial archive on Chinese emigration to the West Indies, includes a rich assortment of documents: letters from the West Indian governor’s offices requesting specific numbers of laborers per year; documents describing measurements of ships, the water supply, the nature of provisions aboard; im-

migration agents’ records of lengths of voyages, mortality and survival rates of the human cargo; ships’ logs of abuses, mutinies, disease, and opium use. There are copies of the public notices posted in the Chinese ports to recruit workers with promises of freedom and copies of the contracts for five years of indenture at two to three dollars per month. As stated earlier, I approach the colonial archive not as a source for knowledge retrieval but as a site of knowledge production; in this sense one notes the explicit descriptions and enumerations but also the rhetorical peculiarities of the documents, the places where particular figures, tropes, or circumlocutions are repeated to cover gaps or tensions; these rhetorical ellipses point to illogic in the archive, as well. So although this third sense of *intimacies*—the volatile contacts of colonized peoples—is never explicitly named in the documents, it is, paradoxically, everywhere implicit in the archive in the presence of such ellipses. “Intimacies” between contracted emigrants and slaves and slave-descendant peoples are repeatedly referenced by negative means, in cautionary rhetorics and statements of prohibition with respect to possible contacts between the slaves and the indentured, all implying the fear and anxiety of racial proximity in a context of mixture and unstable boundaries. For example, White’s 1851 letter to the governor of British Guiana warned, “The Chinese are essentially a social and a gregarious people and must be located in masses together, not scattered throughout the colony. They must be kept in the first instance distant and separate from the Negroes, *not only at their work, but also in their dwellings.*”³⁹ The repeated injunctions that different groups must be divided and boundaries kept distinct indicate that colonial administrators imagined as dangerous the sexual, laboring, and intellectual contacts among slaves and indentured nonwhite peoples. The racial classifications in the archive arose, thus, in this context of the colonial need to prevent these unspoken intimacies among the colonized. This other valence of intimacies, then, can be said to be the obverse of the intimacy of bourgeois domesticity. These intimacies are the range of laboring contacts that are necessary for the production of bourgeois domesticity; they are also the intimacies of captured workers existing together, the proximity and affinity that gave rise to political, sexual, intellectual connections, including subaltern revolts and uprisings: organizations and rebellions that included the Haitian Revolution, the Louisiana cane workers strike of 1887, or the cross-racial alliances that underlay the Cuban struggles for independence from 1895 to 1898.⁴⁰ This third sense of intimacies as cross-racial alliance is suggested in the work of James and Ortiz, who emphasized the connections of slave-based colo-

cial societies in the Americas to the prosperity of Europe. Both Frederick Douglass and W. E. B. Du Bois also linked black slavery with a global system that used Chinese coolie labor. In his history of the colonial division of labor in Guyana that separated blacks and Asians and permitted the post-emancipation exploitation of those divisions, Walter Rodney advanced an analysis that suggested that Asian indentured workers could have been part of a working class of color, which would have constituted what he called "a definite historical achievement."⁴¹ Thus, defining *intimacies* as the relations of four continents critically frames the more restricted meaning of *intimacy* as the private property of the European and North American individual.

Interpreting the multivalence of *intimacy*, I have tried to identify the genealogy of the process through which the "intimacies of four continents" was rationalized and sublated by a notion of "intimacy" that defined the liberal individual's freedom. Reading the archive, I have observed that racialized ideas of family reproduction became central to early-nineteenth-century humanism and, reading political philosophy, observed that the racialized distribution of "freedom" was an equal part of this legacy. Modern hierarchies of race appear to have emerged in the contradiction between humanism's aspirations to universality and the needs of modern colonial regimes to manage work, reproduction, and the social organization of the colonized; the intimacies of four continents formed the political unconscious of modern racial classification. However, these intimacies remain almost entirely illegible in the historiography of modern freedom, making the naming and interpretation of this global conjunction a problem of knowledge itself. It has been estimated that between 1451 and 1870, 11,569,000 African slaves were brought to the New World⁴² and that after the sixteenth century, out of eighty million native peoples in the Americas, there remained only ten million.⁴³ Between 1834 and 1918, half a million Asian immigrants made their way to the British West Indies, in the context of possibly another million going to Latin America, North America, Australia, New Zealand, and Southeast Asia.⁴⁴ But, while these numbers powerfully convey the roles of working peoples of color in the building of the "New World," I am less concerned with the significance in demographic terms than with the production of knowledge that might link the Asian, African, creolized Americas to the rise of European and North American bourgeoisie societies.

What we know of these links and intimacies has been rendered legible through modern methods of comparative study. Yet Europe is rarely studied in relation to the Caribbean or Latin America, and U.S. history is more often

separated from studies of the larger Americas. Work in ethnic studies on comparative U.S. racial formation is still at odds with American history that disconnects the study of slavery from immigration studies of Asians and Latinos or that separates the history of gender, sexuality, and women from these studies of "race." Native Caribbeans have been rendered invisible by both the histories that tell of their extermination in the sixteenth century and the subsequent racial classifications in which their survival is occluded. While anthropological studies have focused on ethnic mixings of Asian and African peoples in the Caribbean, historians are just beginning to explore the braided relations of indenture, slavery, and independence among these groups.⁴⁵ Recently, scholars of the black diaspora have undertaken the histories of both forcible and voluntary African dispersion as means for understanding the longer global past of New World modernity. Eric Williams and Cedric Robinson both observed the centrality of black labor to the development of modern global capitalism, which depended on the vast labor of African slaves just as European labor moved from agrarian to factory work.⁴⁶ Later studies like Paul Gilroy's *Black Atlantic* illuminate the encounter between Europe and the New World; others bring to light the circuits and connections among Yoróban Africans, Afro-Caribbeans, and African Americans.⁴⁷ Yet Robin D. G. Kelley emphasizes that the significance of black diaspora projects to the field of U.S. history may be precisely their capacity to chart *more* than black identities and political movements, what he calls "other streams of internationalism not limited to the black world."⁴⁸

Kelley's call to investigate "other streams" is suggestive with respect to reconstructing a global past in which Asia emerges both within and independently of a European modernity built on African slavery, in which Asian contract labor in the Americas is coterminous with the emancipation of African slaves. Like the intimacies of four continents, Kelley's "other streams of internationalism" require new inquiries that will uncover and interpret evidence of these relations, but they also mean that we must investigate the modalities of "forgetting" these crucial connections. I suspect that Asian indentureship in the early Americas has been "lost" because of its ambiguous status with respect to *freedom* and *enslavement*, polar terms in the dialectic at the center of modern political philosophy. Yet I would not want to discuss this loss as an isolated absencing of Asians in the making of the Americas. Rather, the loss is a sign of the more extensive forgetting of social violence and forms of domination that include but are not limited to indentureship: that reaches back into the slave trade and the extermination of native peoples

that founded the conditions of possibility for indentureship; that stretches forward into the ubiquitous migrations of contemporary global capitalism of which Asian contract labor may be a significant early instance. Moreover, the loss of the figure includes the process of the operative forgetting itself, the way the humanist archive naturalizes itself and “forgets” the conditions of its own making.⁴⁹ In this sense my purpose in observing the elision of Asian actors in the modern Americas is not to pursue a single, particularist cultural identity, not to “fill in the gap” or “add on” another transoceanic group, but to explain *the politics of our lack of knowledge*. It is to be more specific about what I would term the “economy of affirmation and forgetting” that structures and formalizes humanism. This economy civilizes and develops freedoms for “man” in modern Europe, while relegating others to geographical and temporal spaces that are constituted as uncivilized and unfree. One of its histories is the particular manner in which freedom overcomes enslavement through a dialectic that displaces the migrations from and connections of “four continents” and internalizes it in a national struggle of history and consciousness. The social inequalities of our time are a legacy of this definition of “the human” and subsequent discourses that have placed particular subjects, practices, and geographies at a distance from “the human.”

“New World” people of the British, French, Dutch, and Spanish colonized Americas created the conditions for modern humanism, despite the disavowal of these conditions in the liberal political philosophy on which it is largely based. Colonial racial classifications and an international division of labor emerged coterminously as parts of a genealogy that were not exceptional to, but were constitutive of, that humanism. *Freedom* was constituted through a narrative dialectic that rested simultaneously on a spatialization of the *unfree* as exteriority and a temporal subsuming of *enslavement* as internal difference or contradiction. The “overcoming” of internal contradiction resolves in *freedom* within the modern Western political sphere through displacement and elision of the coeval conditions of slavery and indentureship in the Americas. In this sense modern humanism is a formalism that translates the world through an economy of affirmation and forgetting within a regime of desiring freedom. The affirmation of the desire for freedom is so inhabited by the forgetting of its conditions of possibility, that every narrative articulation of freedom is haunted by its burial, by the violence of forgetting. What we know as “race” or “gender” are the *traces* of this modern humanist forgetting. They reside within, and are constitutive of, the modern

narrative of freedom but are neither fully determined by nor exhausted by its ends. They are the remainders of the formalism of affirmation and forgetting.

We might pursue observation that liberal humanism is a formalism that translates through affirmation and forgetting in a variety of ways. Some have recovered lost or hidden histories to provide historical narratives for the “people without history,” those forgotten in the modern tales of national development, or have challenged existing historiography with new studies of the political economy of British imperialism in nineteenth-century China and India that produced the impoverishment that led to the emigration of Asian laborers. In new ethnographies interpreting the syncretic cultures of Caribbean *créolité*, *mestizaje*, and *métissage*, anthropologists Aisha Khan and Viranjini Munasinghe have found other versions of person and society, beginning and end, life and death, quite different remnants of the earlier affirmation and forgetting.⁵⁰ We could study representations of the rise and fall of the plantation complex in the Americas in nineteenth-century Caribbean literature or its recasting in the twentieth century by Alejo Carpentier, Jean Rhys, or Maryse Condé.⁵¹ We could look at how the problem of forgotten intimacies is thematized in recent Caribbean diasporic or post-colonial literature: Patricia Powell’s *The Pagoda*, for example, imagines the coexistence of Chinese and Indian immigrants, blacks, whites, and creoles in nineteenth-century Jamaica; Cristina Garcia’s *Monkey Hunting* imagines the late-nineteenth-century union of an escaped Chinese indentured laborer and the slave woman he buys and frees, and it follows their Afro-Chinese-Cuban descendants from China to Cuba to the United States and Vietnam. Each offers rich and worthy directions to pursue.

In my discussion, however, I have not moved immediately toward recovery and recuperation but rather have paused to reflect on what it means to supplement forgetting with new narratives of affirmation and presence. There is an ethics and politics in struggling to comprehend the particular *loss* of the intimacies of four continents, to engage slavery, genocide, indenture, and liberalism as a conjunction, as an actively acknowledged loss within the present. David Eng and David Kazanjian describe a “politics of mourning” that would “investigate the political, economic and cultural dimensions of *how* loss is apprehended and history is named—how that apprehension and naming produce the phenomenon of ‘what remains.’” Mustafa Bayoumi, reflecting on the manuscript of Sheikh Sana See, an African Muslim slave in nineteenth-century Panama, observes that it “is at once a

product of the modernity of slavery as it is a representation of how modernity obliterates that which stands in its way.” Stephanie Smallwood, historian of the seventeenth-century Atlantic slave trade, has put it this way: “I do not seek to create—out of the remnants of ledgers and ships’ logs, walls and chains—‘the way it really was’ for the newly arrived slave waiting to be sold. I try to interpret from the slave trader’s disinterest in the slave’s pain those social conditions within which there was no possible political resolution to that pain. I try to imagine what could have been.”⁵² The past conditional temporality of the “what could have been” symbolizes aptly the space of a different kind of thinking, a space of productive attention to the scene of loss, a thinking with twofold attention that seeks to encompass at once the positive objects and methods of history and social science and the matters absent, entangled, and unavailable by its methods. I have tried to suggest that understanding the relation of the intimacy of the “possessive individual” to the “intimacies of four continents” requires a past conditional temporality in order to reckon with the coeval violence of affirmation and forgetting, in order to recognize that this particular violence continues to be reproduced in liberal humanist institutions, discourses, and practices. However, in recognizing this reproduction, we do not escape the inhabiting of our present and the irony that many of the lost struggles we would wish to engage are not only carried out in the humanist languages of liberty, equality, reason, progress, and human rights—almost without exception, they must be translated into the political and juridical spaces of this tradition. Present struggles over the life and death of the “human” often only become legible in terms of those spaces authorized by political philosophical humanism.

Our contemporary moment is so replete with assumptions that freedom is made universal through liberal political enfranchisement and the globalization of capitalism that it has become difficult to write or imagine alternative knowledges, to act on behalf of alternative projects or communities. Within this context, it is necessary to act within but to think beyond our received humanist tradition and, all the while, to imagine a much more complicated set of stories about the emergence of the now, in which what is foreclosed as unknowable is forever saturating the “what-can-be-known.” We are left with the project of visualizing, mourning, and thinking “other humanities” within the received genealogy of “the human.”

NOTES

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1. See James, *The Black Jacobins*.

2. Ortiz, *Cuban Counterpoint*, 58.

3. See Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen, the Negro in the Americas*; Elkins, *Slavery*; Patterson, *Sociology of Slavery*; Klein, *Slavery in the Americas*; Curtin, *Atlantic Slave Trade*; Davis, *Slavery and Human Progress*; Eltis, *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade*. A new generation of scholars is asking different questions of these earlier studies. See, e.g., Johnson, *Soul by Soul*; Smallwood, *Saltwater Slavery*; Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection*.

4. See Saunders, *Indentured Labour in the British Empire, 1834–1920*; Lai, *Indentured Labor, Caribbean Sugar*; Lai, *Chinese in the West Indies, 1806–1995*; Helly, *The Cuba Commission Report*. For discussions of native peoples in the Caribbean see Forbes, *Black Africans and Native Americans*; Benitez-Rojo, *The Repeating Island*; Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs*. For studies of the Chinese in the Caribbean see Jung, “Coolies” and *Cane* (forthcoming); and Yun, “‘Coolie’: From under the Hatches into the Global Age” (working paper; manuscript in possession of the author).

5. Among the definitions of *intimacy* offered by the *Oxford English Dictionary* are “state of being personally intimate”; “sexual intercourse”; “close familiarity”; “closeness of observation, knowledge, or the like”; “intimate or close connexion”; and “inner or inmost nature; an inward quality or feature.”

6. I interpret primary documents from several historical periods: first, correspondence surrounding the introduction of the first Chinese workers into Trinidad in 1807; second, correspondence from 1850 to 1853 (U.K. Public Record Office [hereafter PRO], Colonial Office Correspondence, Colonial Office [hereafter CO] 885, 1/20); third, records from 1860 to 1862 (PRO, CO 111, vol. 327) and from 1861 to 1863 (PRO, CO 111, vol. 334); and fourth, discussions of the Chinese Passenger Act of 1855 (PRO, Foreign Office Correspondence, Foreign Office 97, vol. 101). See also *Great Britain Parliamentary Papers*; Burnley, *Observations on the Present Condition of the Island of Trinidad*. On Chinese indentured labor in the Americas see Lai, *Indentured Labor, Caribbean Sugar*; Helly, *The Cuba Commission Report*. On slave trade and global economy see Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*; Robinson, *Black Marxism*; Tomich, *Through the Prism of Slavery*; Eltis, *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade*.

7. I am not merely observing that philosophers employed freedom and slavery as meta-

phors, while disavowing the slave revolts in the Americas; nor am I only emphasizing that modern philosophy's definition of human freedom excluded women, slaves, and non-Europeans, or simply condemning Hegel's transparent racism toward the "dark races" of Africa, India, and China. Rather, it is my concern to identify dialectical supersession as the key logic that enacts the foreclosure of colonial slavery in the development of European freedom, an argument I develop further in "Race from Universalism," *TRACES* (Durham: Duke University Press, forthcoming).

8. PRO, CO 295, vol. 17.

9. See Tomich, *Slavery in the Circuit of Sugar*; Stinchcombe, *Sugar Island Slavery in the Age of Enlightenment*. Françoise Lionnet elaborates the concept "transcolonial" to stress the multiple spatialities of the colonized Caribbean. See Lionnet, "Narrating the Americas," 69.

10. See Mintz, *Sweetness and Power*; Eltis, *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade*.

11. See Scott, *Slave Emancipation in Cuba*.

12. See Cooper, Holt, and Scott, *Beyond Slavery*; Holt, *The Problem of Freedom*.

13. See, e.g., Berlant, *Intimacy*.

14. On the history of gendered separate spheres see Wolff, *Feminine Sentences*; on feminist critique of separate spheres see Fraser, "What's Critical about Critical Theory?"; Brown, *States of Injury*. On feminists of color criticism of separate spheres as a concept that disregards racialized women's labor see Glenn, "Racial Ethnic Women's Labor"; Collins, *Black Feminist Thought*. Amy Kaplan's "Manifest Destiny," 23–60, discusses the extension of separate spheres of ideology through imperial projects.

15. Stoler, "Tense and Tender Ties"; see also Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power*.

16. On the role of Christian marriage as a social form for assimilating ex-slaves into middle-class citizenship see Hall, *Civilizing Subjects*; and Cott, *Public Vows*.

17. Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*; Said, *Orientalism*.

18. Stoler, "Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance," 87.

19. PRO, CO 295, vol. 17 (emphasis mine).

20. On the figure of the neighbor and the injunction to "love thy neighbor" see Reinhard, "Freud, My Neighbor."

21. On the historical periodization of scientific racial classification see Goldberg, *The Racial State*; Donna Haraway, *Primate Visions*; Moore et al., *Race, Nature, and the Politics of Difference*.

22. Joan Dayan has commented on Moreau's "radically irrational" racial taxonomy, saying that it was "stranger than any supernatural fiction" (Dayan, *Haiti, History, and the Gods*, 231–32). See also Cohen, *The French Encounter with Africans*.

23. The racial governmentality I trace is a normative taxonomy that defined the terms of civilization for both the colonizer and the colonized. Its classifications managed work and reproduction of the colonized, placing subjects within a discourse of civilization and a

regime of desiring freedom. This governmentality insisted on racial distinction and purity yet admitted an always already creolized and miscegenated population that required classification. The Chinese woman was a figure of impossibility signifying the limits of the taxonomy, a trope for the Chinese capacity for bourgeois domesticity within the context of its historical impossibility, and a sign of colonial desire for an indentured family community that would create a racial barrier between black and white. See Foucault, "Governmentality"; and Foucault, "Society Must Be Defended." On racial governmentality see Ferguson, *Aberrations in Black*; Hesse, "Writing Racialized Modernity."

24. See Jameson, *The Political Unconscious*. Daniel Sherman employs Jameson's concept to discuss the nineteenth-century French museum; see Sherman, "Quatremère/Benjamin/Marx."

25. Dayan, *Haiti, History, and the Gods*, 190.

26. Representations of "Chinese women" varied remarkably in the contexts of immigration to the West Indies and the western United States. In the British discourses Chinese women appear as passively feminine and antiquated, unsuitable for work, while in the U.S. discussion of the 1875 Page Law "Chinese women" were represented as prostitutes, promiscuous and morally inferior. See Yung, *Unbound Feet*; Volpp, "Dependent Citizens and Marital Expatriates," paper presented at Rethinking Asian American History, Los Angeles, May 2002.

27. Dayan, *Haiti, History, and the Gods*, 197.

28. White wrote, "Chinese have sufficient intelligence and ambition to rise in the world, and in a short time would become useful and valuable as a middle class in the West Indies. . . . One difficulty . . . is the impossibility of obtaining women and families" (PRO, CO 885, 1/19).

29. On the "woman question" in Indian nationalism see Mani, *Contentious Traditions*; Sangari and Vaid, *Recasting Women*; Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments*; Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*. On representing Indian indentured women's sexuality see Kale, "Projecting Identities"; Niranjana, "Left to the Imagination," 111–38.

30. The San Domingo revolts occurred in virtually the same years that Hegel was writing the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. See Buck-Morss, "Hegel and Haiti," 42–70.

31. Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*.

32. The overcoming of the contradiction is elaborated in Hegel's dialectic of lordship and bondage in *Phenomenology of Spirit* and in the Bildung of the state in the *Philosophy of Right*. See also Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*; Kelly, *Idealism, Politics, and History*; Butler, *Subjects of Desire*.

33. Holt, *The Problem of Freedom*; Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection*; Hall, *Civilizing Subjects*; Stanley, *From Bondage to Contract*; see also Cho, "Narratives of Coupling in the Shadow of Manifest Domesticity."

34. In her study of Indian indentureship in the British Caribbean, Madhavi Kale argues that "free labor" was a "plastic" ideology, based on historically contingent, gendered, and raced assumptions about the nature of freedom and labor. See Kale, *Fragments of Empire*.

35. Lowe, *Immigrant Acts*; Glenn, *Unequal Freedom*.
36. Jung, "Coolies" and *Cane*. I am grateful to Jung for sharing this work.
37. Helly, *The Cuba Commission Report*.
38. Benitez-Rojo, *The Repeating Island*, 12.
39. PRO, CO 885, 1/19 (emphasis mine).
40. See Scott, "Fault Lines, Color Lines, and Party Lines," 61–106; Fu, "Rethinking Chinese Workers in Cuban History."
41. The Chinese coolie figured also in the antislavery and anticolonial thought of Frederick Douglass, W. E. B. Du Bois, and Walter Rodney. For example, Douglass wrote in 1871 about the "rights of the coolie in California, in Peru, in Jamaica, in Trinidad, and on board the vessels bearing them to these countries are scarcely more guarded than were those of the Negro slaves brought to our shores a century ago" (Douglass, "Coolie Trade," 262–63; and Douglass, "Cheap Labor," 264–66). Du Bois describes "that dark and vast sea of human labor in China and India, the South Seas and all Africa, in the West Indies and Central America and in the United States" and calls for "emancipation of that basic majority of workers who are yellow, brown, and black" (Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America, 1860–1880*). Walter Rodney, in *A History of the Guyanese Working People, 1881–1905*.
42. Database of Stephen Behrendt, David Richardson, and David Eltis at W. E. B. Du Bois Institute, Harvard University. See also Curtin, *Atlantic Slave Trade*.
43. Todorov, *Conquest of America*, 47–49.
44. See Lai, *Indentured Labor, Caribbean Sugar*; Helly, *The Cuba Commission Report*; Adamson, *Sugar without Slaves*; Tinker, *A New System of Slavery*; Laurence, *A Question of Labour*; Hu-DeHart, "Chinese Coolie Labor in Cuba and Peru in the Nineteenth Century"; Yun, "Under the Hatches."
45. Anthropological studies have richly interpreted the mixed cultures of Africans, South Asian Indians, and Chinese in twentieth-century Trinidad as expressing the longer braided histories of indenture, slavery, and independence. See Dabydeen and Samaroo, *Across the Dark Waters*; Yelvington, *Trinidad Ethnicity*; Wood, *Trinidad in Transition*; Khan, *Callaloo Nation*; Viranjini Munasinghe, *Callaloo or Tossed Salad?*
46. Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*; Robinson, *Black Marxism*.
47. Gilroy, *Black Atlantic*; Clarke, *Mapping Yoróba Networks*.
48. Kelley, "How the West Was One," 124.
49. On the politics of memory see Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces*; see also Fujitani et al. *Perilous Memories*.
50. Khan, *Callaloo Nation*; Munasinghe, *Callaloo or Tossed Salad?*
51. See Johnson, "Migrant Recitals."
52. Eng and Kazanjian, *Loss*, 6; Bayoumi, "Moving Beliefs," 62; conversation with Stephanie Smallwood about "Saltwater Slavery," her work in progress.

KATHLEEN BROWN

Body Work in the Antebellum United States

In 1827 a butler in the household of Massachusetts governor Christopher Gore published a book of advice for men entering domestic service. Appearing a decade before the best-selling household management guides by Lydia Maria Child, Catharine Beecher, and Eliza Leslie, Robert Roberts's *House Servant's Directory* found a receptive audience, prompting two subsequent editions. In addition to being in the vanguard of the American house books, Roberts's manual stood out among antebellum advice manuals for its author's social and racial position. Roberts was not the master of the house, writing to assist other masters and mistresses in the task of running a household full of servants, but himself a domestic servant. He was, moreover, not a woman, as was the case with most domestic servants and the authors of most household guides, but a man. He was, most exceptionally, a free African American who had experienced the workings of a prominent northern household in a nation where his closest counterparts, racially speaking, were overwhelmingly enslaved and living in the South. Taking advantage of the status of his employer's household, as well as making use of his own literacy, Roberts dispensed household advice that depicted a disciplined and sanitized servant body navigating the intimate spaces of an upper-class white household. Translating Old World taste, manners, and standards into an American idiom, Roberts aimed at capturing the aura of elegance associated with European aristocracy for an audience of newly prosperous Americans who needed to know how to burn Lehigh coal as well as how to clean a japanned tea urn.

Roberts was a fastidious man who found bodily filth distasteful, especially if it broadcast vast social differences. Urging his imagined audience of young male readers to heed his advice, he warned, "How many have we seen