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ASIA as METHOD

Toward Deimperialization

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CHAPTER 4

DEIMPERIALIZATION

Club 51 and the Imperialist Assumption of Democracy

> Over the past fifty years, through training, exchange, and the policy of study abroad, Taiwan has "successfully" fostered numerous elites with American values. They widely and deeply occupy the political arena, the bureaucratic system, the production sector, and educational institutions. American ideologies and value systems have become the common will and thinking among Taiwanese elites, whether in power or in opposition. I am certain that in the global context, no other society is like Taiwan, which falls completely to the U.S.
>
> CHEN YING-ZHEN, "THE MAKING OF TAIWAN'S AMERICANIZATION"

In the middle of the 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis,[1] a document called "An Open Letter to the Social Elite of Taiwan" was distributed to the media and much publicized. The letter was signed by Chou Wei-ling on behalf of a group named Club 51. Next to the signature was a circular drawing featuring a map of Taiwan in the center and a series of slogans in English: "Statehood for Taiwan—Save Taiwan—Say Yes to America."[2]

Club 51 was unknown at the time, but since then, whenever there has been a chance to disseminate its ideas, Club 51 has made its views known. In early 1999, when Lee Teng-hui redefined relations between Taiwan and mainland China as "a special relationship between two countries," Club 51 took to the streets in front of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the de facto U.S. embassy on the island, to protest Washington's ambiguous position on Taiwan's status.[3] After September 11, 2001, Club 51 was one of the leading supporters in Taiwan of the U.S. government's aggressive response. In 2004, Club 51 advocated sending Taiwanese troops to Iraq in support of U.S. military intervention there.

If the seven-page letter of 1996 had appeared at any other time, one would have thought that Club 51 was merely being ironic, but in the context of the missile crisis Taiwanese immediately understood why Club 51 had been formed: to demand American intervention in the Taiwan Strait to counter the threat of an attack by mainland China. This was undoubtedly true, but it was only part of the story. The letter spelled out a much more radical program: Club 51 called for Taiwan to join the United States as its fifty-first state, so as to "guarantee Taiwan's security, stability, prosperity, liberty, and democracy."

Founded on the Fourth of July, 1994, by fifty-one intellectuals and businessmen with strong ties to the United States, Club 51 had grown to some five hundred members by 1996. In addition to its headquarters in Taiwan, it opened a branch office in Los Angeles to promote the idea of "Taiwan state building" in the United States. Anticipating resistance from various groups, Club 51 issued a series of memorandums from 1995 to 1998 addressed to different sectors of the Taiwan population, including the lower-middle class, businessmen, and physicians. In March 2000, Club 51's sister organization, the Foundation for Establishing the 51st State, released "A Report on the Public Opinion Survey of the Will to Build a Taiwan State," a thirty-page analysis of data gathered by a public-opinion research firm.[4]

Club 51 has not expanded into a mainstream movement, but it has nonetheless enjoyed a significant media presence. Its chief spokesman, Chou Wei-ling—also known as David C. Chou—was born in 1949 in Huwei, Taiwan. Often wearing jeans and a T-shirt sporting the American flag, his public persona is that of a hippie, but he holds law degrees from institutions in Taiwan and the United States. A former activist for the Taiwan independence movement, Chou is an articulate writer and speaker. Taiwan's leading newspaper, the *China Times*, devoted a full-page interview to Club 51 on 29 May 1996, and *The New York Times* published a profile of Chou on 4 August 1999.[5] Chou has appeared on various call-in shows on television and radio to offer Club 51's perspective on current affairs.

In mainstream Taiwanese politics, Club 51's 1996 proposal did not initially receive the same serious attention that it garnered in the media. Nevertheless, over the past ten years, its position has slowly become a point against which other positions on the political spectrum are measured. Club 51's seeming pragmatism has, for example, embarrassed the fundamentalist faction of the Taiwan independence movement because it raises an unspeakable dilemma: to become independent, Taiwan must depend on the United States militarily, diplomatically, and economically, but to openly admit this fact is contrary to the very idea of independence.

In 1998, encouraged by sympathetic as well as antagonistic reactions to Club 51's program, Chou published a highly imaginative work to substantiate his arguments and articulate his dream. *A Date with the U.S.—The Ultimate Resolution of Taiwan's Future: Taiwan Becomes a State of the U.S. in 2013; Say Yes to America* advocates a two-stage strategy. First, Taiwan becomes a U.S. territory, along the lines of Puerto Rico, then it seeks full statehood, as Hawaii did. Then, on 1 January 2013—naturally, a splendid, sunny day—Taiwan officially becomes the fifty-first state of the United States of America. All Chinese surnames are changed forthwith: Yuan to Adams, Kung to Cohen, Chen to Dunn, Ding to Dean, and Chou to Jefferson. All Taiwanese cities and districts acquire new place names. Eight pages of the book are devoted to the renaming: Taipei is renamed as Cambridge, Taichung as Dalton, Kaohsiung as Farfax, Hsinchu as Talcom, and Makung as Malcolm. Among the forty-six newly elected members of Congress from the state of Taiwan, twenty-two are fluent in English. Of these, fourteen are second-generation mainlanders and eight were educated in the United States. These eight also happen to be children of the leading politicians of the time, including the son of the former Taiwan provincial governor James Soong, Soong Chen-yuan, who will change his name to James C. Stevens; and the son of the former vice-president and KMT chairman Lien Chan, Lien Sheng-wu, who will rename himself Vincent W. Lane. On this day, the Taiwanese will finally have "the sense of belonging, the sense of certainty, the sense of direction, and the sense of security" denied to them by Taiwan's former ambiguous geopolitical position (Chou 1998, 324).

One might assume that Club 51 is a uniquely Taiwanese phenomenon, but the impulses that gave rise to the organization are not confined to Taiwan. There have been similar movements in the Philippines and Okinawa, kindred but more subdued sentiments in Korea,[6] and similar appeals by groups in other parts of the world.[7] More nuanced explanations of this competition over who gets to be the fifty-first or fifty-second state obviously require detailed analyses of specific local histories and

their interactions with various global configurations of power. Though the theoretical structure of this America complex might be quite similar in various countries, the relationships between the locales' material and imaginary connections to the United States will necessarily have different trajectories.

I wish to make clear that I have no personal investment in Club 51 or its position, and I do not want to be read as taking a stand simply for or against either one. The moralizing tendency found on the nationalist Left and nationalist Right in both Taiwan and mainland China is not helpful in analyzing the issues at stake here. In Asia, there has been a frequent practice of quickly jumping to moral judgments whenever controversy arises, but this forecloses the possibility of critical reflection, which is a precondition of understanding the psychological forces at work in our societies. To either quickly cast Club 51 aside as politically irrelevant or readily endorse its position misses the point. The real political significance of Club 51 is that it opens an alternative discursive space for Taiwanese statehood, one that lies beyond the banality of separatism versus integrationism that has been the dominant discursive mode shaping Taiwanese politics for the past thirty years. Club 51's radicalness lies in its move away from any form of independence or national sovereignty by proposing to become a state of another entity—the United States. This switch from "state building" in the sense of building a nation to "state building" in the sense of building one more part of the United States is a sea change in the parameters of the anticolonial imaginations that have powered third-world independence movements to date. Its form of identification and affiliation may remind us of France's so-called foreign departments such as Martinique or, indeed, of the case of Hawaii, but its emergence shortly before the beginning of the twenty-first century seems to indicate the existence of a new historical condition markedly different from earlier moments of decolonization.[8] How does one describe this new historical juncture? To what extent can globalization account for this change? What are the historical conditions in which such a political position could emerge? What can we learn from Club 51?

Determining the extent to which the sentiments expressed by Club 51 represent current popular desires in Taiwan is not the purpose of this discussion, but Club 51 does provide an ideal vantage point from which to address the question of deimperialization. More concretely, Club 51

penetrates a layer of issues related to what I call the interiority of the imaginary concept of America in East Asia—or, as the Japanese put it, Americanism. America is now an integral part of Asia, as a result of the culture of U.S. imperialism that emerged in the wake of the Second World War. But this crucial problematic also needs to be understood in the wider context of what can be described as an insecurity born of global uncertainty, a new structure of sentiment that is the direct product of neoliberal globalization.[9] The emergence of this sentiment of insecurity cannot be explained except in the context of the currently emerging reconfiguration of imperialism and capitalism, of which globalization is a form of expression.

If the problematic is situated in the analytic and discursive plane of postcolonial cultural studies, we can see there is an urgent need to bring the issue of imperialism back to the center of debate, but we must approach it in new ways. While recognizing the tremendous extent to which the present historical moment has been shaped by anti-imperialist struggles, we must insist that the new direction of the study of imperialism avoid two pitfalls: a return to the old anticolonial nationalist and nativist positions, which often operate within the hierarchical logic of civilization, race, nation, and ethnicity, while placing other social contradictions on the sideline; and advocating a globalist position, which often endorses forms of transnationalism or cosmopolitanism that ironically perpetuate the same racial, national, and ethnic mind-sets. Setting aside these two unacceptable approaches, how do we begin to imagine an alternative? To stake out a new position, we must first recognize that imperialism exercises its power not simply through an imposition of force from the outside, but also from within. The drive for modernization is just as strong among the colonized as it is among the colonizers. If we accept this proposition as the point of departure for rethinking the question of colonial subjectivity, we not only return agency to the colonized subject, but we also come closer to describing real historical conditions.

In East Asia, the United States has always been regarded by critical intellectuals and others on the Left as an outsider—simultaneously outside the territory and the cultural psyche. But after a century of insinuating itself as the dominant point of reference in East Asia, it no longer seems analytically accurate to say that the United States is exterior to the histories of the region. As Shunya Yoshimi has pointed out, Americanism

is no longer composed of unsystematic and free-floating signs but has evolved into a dominant system of reference (Yoshimi 2000). There is, therefore, an urgent need to find new critical languages and positions to overcome the platitudes of the nationalist framework. With perhaps the exception of the Philippines, U.S. imperialism as an integral part of the cultural forces interior to Asia has not been sufficiently studied.

The problematic of U.S. imperialism in Asia is not new. By confronting the United States as an insider to the region, one runs the risk of being read as a postcolonial nationalist. Indeed, advancing nationalist interests in the name of the postcolonial has become the standard intellectual practice in both colonized and formerly colonized spaces. But in this chapter, I attempt to shift the direction of the postcolonial paradigm toward the horizons of decolonization and deimperialization, both of which are directly connected to the reconstitution of subjectivity, and neither of which can be understood from within the closed space of nationalist ambition.

Reading Club 51

Since its inception, Club 51 has maintained a perfectly consistent position. In facing different events, it always responds from the same political stance, and through this process, it deepens and renews its discourse and beliefs. During the 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis, the main arguments of Club 51 were highlighted, point by point, on the first page of its open letter. The first point reads:

> If Club 51 cannot awaken the elite sector of the population of Taiwan in time to give up such selfish and short-sighted practices as individual immigration, and to support instead the proposal of the Taiwan State Building Movement for collective identification and naturalization into the U.S., within a few years Taiwan will not be able to escape the appalling fate of Hong-Kongization. Even if it can avoid this, it will be constantly beset by Beijing's psychological warfare, plunging it into economic recession, falling confidence, and social unrest. (Club 51 Open Letter, 1)

Conjuring up the specter of Hong Kong on the eve of its return to China in 1997 was calculated to trigger fear and insecurity, but Club 51's appeal does rely not just on demonizing the communists and hammering home the threat they pose to Taiwan. It also offers an alternative for the many elite individuals who were thinking about joining the panicky exodus abroad. Club 51 proposes to the Taiwanese elite that they need not selfishly emigrate, but rather collectively change their nationality. No one even has to leave home. The letter states: "once Taiwan becomes a state of the U.S., we will be in America right here, and Taiwanese will not have to dwell in other places throughout the world as a minority of minorities in local societies." The ingenuity of Club 51's proposal is this radical resolution to the impasse of Taiwanese independence. The message is clear: Let us give up our own nation-state, with its hopelessly ambiguous status, and instead join another nation of our choice. State building would then no longer require endless unsuccessful efforts to join the United Nations. Our partial Americanization over the past fifty years can expand to fully embrace a new nationality—one allowing Taiwanese to say of their island "this is America."

This vision is pitched not only to the elite, but to everyone living on Taiwan, which makes Club 51 an ambitious political project. Club 51 articulates the people's desire to be at home and envisions that the impending economic success of the island as part of the United States would not only make those currently in Taiwan willing to stay, but would also encourage emigrants and their children to return. Underpinning this craving to be at home is an overwhelming sense of insecurity. The closing words of the paragraph—"economic recession, falling confidence, and social unrest"—can be understood as either a strategy for mobilizing popular fear and hence support for Club 51's position, or as an expression of such fear. Either way, the fear of communism cultivated by the KMT is deeply rooted in the same cold-war discourse that later produced Club 51. Despite the rhetoric of globalization that it employs, Club 51's approach is based on a cold-war sensibility.

Having triggered a sense of crisis, the open letter continues: "When Beijing announced its 'missile rehearsal' to threaten the presidential election in Taiwan, our Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs called upon the AIT Director, begging the U.S. to uphold justice for Taiwan. Any clear-sighted person knows that Taiwan cannot survive without U.S. protection. If the United States does not uphold the principle of justice, 'the Republic of China in Taiwan' might soon become 'the Republic of China in Los Angeles'" (ibid.). The United States is perceived as an international

police force whose mission is to maintain the principles of global justice, and without whose protection the Republic of China would devolve into something else. In the Taiwanese context, Club 51's gesture is provocative, even iconoclastic. Although everyone knows that the island is under U.S. protection, this has never been publicly admitted by any member of the government. It simply remains an unspoken assumption, but one that frames the activities of both of Taiwan's major political parties, with the KMT typically seeking "help" from the U.S. Republicans, and the DPP "assistance" from the Democrats. Questions of whether or not Taiwan can survive without the U.S. military shield, or without the mainland Chinese market, have never been debated in the public arena.

Club 51's blunt use of the word "begging" reveals the hierarchical nature of the Taiwan-U.S. relationship and Taiwan's subcolonial status—or, as Club 51 imagines it, Taiwan's quasi-state status, similar to the relationship between the suzerain and vassal states in the classic tributary system. Club 51's pragmatic realism cancels out all rhetorical pretensions of national dignity. It does so in the name of survival, a consideration that overrides any theoretical claim to state sovereignty. Herein lies the real difficulty: Club 51 speaks the reality that cannot otherwise be openly discussed because it is a slap in the face of nationalist sentiment. But once this taboo subject is brought to the surface, there is no way to circle around it any longer. It must be confronted. This is the reason why Club 51 has persistently attempted to bring to light the reality of Taiwan's dependence on the United States, which Taiwan independence supporters want to hide. Only by recognizing and accepting the hard facts can state building proceed.

Particularly striking in this respect is the scenario projected in the last sentence of the paragraph. If Taiwan were forced to become a part of China, then something like a refugee government would be set up in Los Angeles. By what chain of equivalents could the quasi-nation-state of Taiwan somehow effortlessly shift categories and borders to set up shop in the city of Los Angeles? But this idea is by no means ungrounded. From the 1960s to the 1990s, the United States, in particular Los Angeles, was the destination of choice for Taiwanese emigrants, and the city is now home to the largest concentration anywhere of middle-class immigrants from the island. In the Taiwanese imagination, Taiwan has long been inside Los Angeles and is an integral part of that city. The large residential community of Monterey Park just east of downtown Los Angeles is widely known as Little Taipei, and several other communities in the area could also vie for this distinction. At the same time, Los Angeles has also been inside Taiwan and is an integral part of its life. The pop group LA Boys, all of whose members grew up in greater Los Angeles, has "returned home" to Taiwan, and become one of the most popular "local" pop acts in Taiwan. It is not difficult to imagine Los Angeles hosting a Republic of China government in exile.

During the Taiwan presidential election campaign in March 2000, all of Taiwan's satellite news channels set up call-in programs to boost ratings and advertising revenue. One popular station, TVBS, set up its call-in center across the ocean, in Los Angeles. This was a rather natural choice. Supporters of each of the three presidential candidates, their affiliations clearly identifiable by the colors of their campaign vests, were brought into the studio and divided into groups. Each group enthusiastically proclaimed that its candidate best represented the real "new Taiwanese" (*xīn Táiwānrén*), and that his rivals were fakes. Yet when asked by the television host who constituted the real "new Taiwanese," the participants all agreed that the real "new Taiwanese" are the ones who live in Taiwan and have a commitment to Taiwan. How can we explain this paradox?

Overseas supporters were in fact probably more involved in the election battle than most of those who actually live in the geographic space of Taiwan. The overseas Taiwanese spared no effort to further their respective causes by donating money, arranging debates with opponents, and persuading expatriates to go home to Taiwan to vote (airlines supporting a particular candidate offered discounted tickets to his supporters). The overseas supporters acted as if they were the real "new Taiwanese." In fact, Los Angeles was already imagined as part of Taiwan. The physical distance between Taiwan and Los Angeles was negated by the television screen and the imaginary it sustained. It is typical for immigrants to live in communities in different parts of the world, but in every other respect to live "at home." They read newspapers published at home, watch satellite news broadcast from home, consume goods and foods from home (exported to supermarkets and restaurant chains run by enterprises from home), and worry more about changing the government at home than about the one they are subject to abroad. They split and form new alliances when political parties at home do the same.

How does Club 51 handle possible objections to its program? The open letter states: "If you hear an accomplice of the Chinese communists cursing Club 51 as 'the slaves of a subjugated nation,' 'traitors to the country,' 'traitors to the Han people,' 'the running dogs of American imperialism,' please argue back that national identity is based neither on blood descent nor threat of military force. Like the Chiang family, which has German, Russian, and Japanese blood, we have the right to choose to be American or German, and to live in New York or San Francisco" (ibid.). Club 51 is well prepared for the kinds of rude reactions it is likely to attract and has prepared lines of response for each of them. The phrases in the letter are derogatory Chinese terms that were used in different historical moments and during various nationalist wars against foreign invaders. Anticipating likely directions of attack, Club 51's letter instructs the reader how to debate with the "accomplices of Chinese communists." Its counterargument is impeccably anti-essentialist, rejecting common descent as the basis for national identification. Boldly, it invokes the international marriages of the supposedly evil Chiang Kai-shek family as a point of reference to legitimize the free choice of nationality. It is slightly unclear why American and German are mentioned as identities of preference, and why Russian or Japanese are silently discarded. Indeed, German itself seems little more than a rhetorical flourish when the choice of cities is confined to the United States. Why this selectivity?

The answer is offered a little later when the letter quotes Professor Lee Hsiao-fung, a professor of history at Shih Hsin University: "We would rather be stuffed to death by the hamburgers of American imperialism than shot to death by machine guns of Chinese Communist imperialism." Of special note here is the phrase "American imperialism," which appears only once in the letter. Even so, its mention is a further indication of Club 51's willingness to openly address issues considered anathema in mainstream politics. The letter continues: "all of us try desperately to stay out of China's reach, and all of us nourish a deeply hidden 'American dream' in our mind" (ibid., 6–7). Hamburger heaven is the outward expression of an implicit dream: America is the pinnacle of human civilization; a powerful, prosperous, democratic society; a land of certainty and security. Here, courageously displayed, is a window into the psyche of nouveau riche Taiwanese who harbor a "deeply hidden 'American dream'" and long for an impossible assimilation into the U.S. middle class.

This leads us back to what I suggested earlier: the great imperial dream of becoming American is never simply imposed from the outside. On the contrary, it is also cultivated within the local milieu—and in our particular case, within the "new Taiwanese" middle class. The longing to become an American imperial subject occupies a prominent and intimate position in the Taiwanese psyche. My analysis will show how, in the aftermath of September 11, Club 51's imperial desire was transformed into an imperialist desire.

However, it would be a mistake to essentialize this American dream. Near the end of the open letter, this paragraph appears: "If the Chinese break everyone's glasses [confound expectations] and build a free, democratic, universally prosperous, happy land on earth, while America becomes a poor, devastated inferno, the people of the state of Taiwan can always peacefully promote a movement to 'unite Taiwan and China,' without any fear of suppression by American military force. In short, once Taiwan becomes a state of America, the door to either 'Taiwan independence' or 'reunification with China' will not be closed, because America is a democratic and free country" (ibid., 7). The logic of the choice could not be clearer. Economic success is the primary criterion for selecting national belonging. Club 51 claims Taiwan can keep the door open to China or any society rich and powerful enough to guarantee freedom, democracy, and wealth, since the American state is such that if one day Taiwan changes its mind and wants to leave the United States, it will make no objection. Club 51 appears never to have heard of the American civil war, but that hardly matters. The point is that its proposal dispenses with national loyalty and replaces it with a calculation of pure self-interest.

Despite this rhetoric of openness, Club 51 is really demanding that Taiwan make a choice between the United States and China. If in fact wealth is the fundamental criterion, why is Japan, which is much closer to Taiwan, not also an option? Unlike mainstream Taiwan independence groups, Club 51 considers only the United States and China. The absence of Japan reveals Club 51's unconscious identification with the Chinese empire, an empire with a worldview that looks down on Japan as a small country on the periphery of East Asia, a country that can never compete culturally with China. And herein lies a major clue to Club 51's logic: whether it is the United States of today or the China of the past, Club 51 wants to identify with the strongest empire.

The open letter is aware of the kind of resistance it may provoke: "although you cannot immediately accept our case at an emotional level [*qínggǎn shàng*], we believe that on a rational level [*lǐzhì shàng*], you cannot deny that our new proposal for Taiwan's future is the only solution to the real crisis of our society" (ibid., 1).

To be effective, Club 51 must take account of nationalist sentiment, which is deeply rooted in historical experience. It understands that the intended readers of its letter are likely to feel uneasy "at an emotional level" about the idea of becoming American. Although in practice many Taiwanese have, as individuals, become naturalized as American, Australian, or Canadian citizens, to demand that every Taiwanese immediately become American is likely to offend collective pride. Club 51 thus urges its audience to operate rationally and cast aside their irrelevant emotional, moral, and historical baggage. Of course, Club 51's appeal to rationality has its own emotional bottom line, evident in its strong desire for prosperity and security. The group's appeal also plays upon feelings of nostalgia. The sentiment that Taiwan would be better off if it were still under Japanese rule is quite widespread, especially among the generation that lived through the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan. Club 51's tacit message to these people is this: Let's not miss our chance again. We can make the rational choice to substitute the Americans for the Japanese.

After establishing these key arguments, the open letter moves into a detailed narrative. It begins with a description of the military threat facing Taiwan in an attempt to elicit a mood of insecurity, and it suggests that even if there were no immediate danger of Taiwan's being occupied by communist forces, the island still lacks the means to defend itself. The letter then raises a critical question: whom can we count on to protect the lives and freedoms of the Taiwanese people—Taiwan's own armed forces? This narrative relies on the logic of fear: threats lead to war, and war results in the destruction of life, security, and accumulated wealth. There is, therefore, a need for a mechanism that guarantees protection, which can be provided only if Taiwan becomes part of the United States. This basic argument underlies all of Club 51's claims.

If we consider the overall tenor of the letter, what we find at work is a "radical plural opportunism."[10] I use this term without any derogatory connotation. What it denotes is a nonessentialist, pragmatic, and open-ended position whose adherents will seize any opportunity to further

their self-interest. The phrase embodies an imperative to abandon whatever moral baggage one may be carrying and jump onto whatever vehicle promises the quickest route to individual wealth and security. Operating within an overwhelmingly conservative political society, critical forces in Taiwan lack the strength to propose radical alternatives such as this, yet the outlook can nevertheless be found in many parts of mainstream Taiwanese society—in nongovernmental organizations, civil society, and business. One might even say that it is a general characteristic of Taiwanese capitalism, or perhaps of any brand of capitalism.

There is little doubt that current global conditions provide particularly fertile soil for such opportunism. The emergence of Club 51 in the 1990s was symptomatic not only of specific anxieties about Taiwan's status vis-à-vis mainland China and the United States, but also of a general uneasiness about the direction of the world as a whole. The protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 1999 and Hong Kong in 2005, and other reactions against globalization, contributed to the apprehensiveness felt by Taiwanese already unsettled by mainland China's military threats. While no analysis can confidently predict the exact nature of the changes that globalization will bring, it is clear that gaps between countries and classes are likely to widen. In this environment, a strategy of leaning on the strongest party—"the watermelon tilts toward the bigger half," as the Taiwanese expression has it—makes sense to Club 51's middle-class constituency. Club 51's nostalgic desire for empire, energized by the pressures of globalization, strongly marks the continuity of imperialism even after the Second World War. The decolonization movement has not yet undertaken the cultural process of deimperialization, and thus it has not yet examined the problem of imperial imagination. This old desire to be part of the empire has spilled over into the present. Rather than illustrating any epochal decline of the nation-state, Club 51 is evidence of the rise in identification—imaginary, symbolic, and real—with the strongest state, that single superpower we coexist with today.

How to Understand Americanism

The presence of the United States in East Asia as an imperial power has not been seriously taken up as an object of study, and we must try to account for this lack of analysis. The easiest and least satisfying explanation is to deny the imperial status of the United States altogether, which is

to argue that U.S. hegemony has been established by virtue of its global leadership and the consent granted by other nations rather than through military force, economic domination, or other means. This argument immediately crumbles if we consider the conspicuous military presence of the United States in East Asia (where people's movements have struggled to have U.S. bases removed),[11] the first Gulf War (conducted under the guise of liberating Kuwait), the U.S. missile attacks on Iraq and Kosovo (which lacked sufficient international consensus), or the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq in the aftermath of September 11. The imperial status of the United States is also sometimes obscured due to methodological failings. In her introduction to *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, an important work in the national tradition from an earlier moment in American studies, Amy Kaplan succinctly explains the denial of contemporary U.S. imperialism: "Most current studies of imperial and postcolonial culture, however, tend to omit discussion of the United States as an imperial power. The history of American imperialism strains the definition of the postcolonial, which implies a temporal development (from 'colonial' to 'post') that relies heavily on the spatial coordinates of European empires, in their formal acquisition of territories and subsequent history of decolonization and national independence. How would this Eurocentric notion of postcoloniality apply to the history of American imperialism, which often does not fit this model?" (Kaplan 1993, 17). Kaplan's analysis suggests that because the dominant paradigms used to understand imperialism are based on European experiences, and that there exist no models that can properly account for U.S. imperialism.[12] This assumes an epistemological break between Eurocentrism and American-centrism: as we entered the era of American hegemony, the issue of imperialism conveniently dissolved, allowing the American empire to escape the same kind of scrutiny that European imperialism has been subjected to.

The neoimperial form of U.S. postcolonialism mixes military force, international diplomacy, intervention in other countries' domestic affairs, and cultural exports. And the active importation of American ways of doing things by nationalist elites who worship at the altar of American modernity certainly suits U.S. national interests. The United States does not have to invest capital to occupy and develop colonies, yet it still manages to achieve its strategic and economic objectives. Furthermore, the

local modernizing elites save face, since they are not seen as the running dogs of the imperialist master, while at the same time the United States can maintain the facade of American idealism. This complicit arrangement is the distinguishing characteristic of the U.S. model of postcolonialism.

A third reason that the U.S. role as an imperial power has not been adequately addressed can be attributed to the formation of an enduring cold-war logic. In East Asia, after all, there was a direct connection between the traditional form of colonialism and the cold-war structures that emerged after 1945. Ever since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese state has lived under the permanent shadow of American rule. In many parts of East Asia, Japanese imperial holdings were handed directly over to the United States. Meanwhile, authoritarian anticommunist regimes in South Korea, Taiwan, and South Vietnam were strongly supported by the United States as part of its effort to establish a vast arc of strategic protectorates to defend against the spread of communism. All of these imperialistic developments have ironically served to displace the question of U.S. imperialism.

While the cultural impacts of the cold-war structure are indeed significant and underanalyzed, we must resist the temptation to accept a determinist worldview in which the feelings for and against the United States engendered during the cold war are seen as natural and inevitable. Automatically distancing ourselves from the United States would once again deprive us of the critical distance needed to analyze the open secret of the American dream as internal to national and nationalist identity in Asia. This has been a problem for the nationalist Left in East Asia because it complicates attempts to hold U.S. imperialism fully responsible for dividing our countries. This type of reductionism does little to explain the desire for America cultivated in East Asian societies and exaggerates the discontinuity between politics during and after the cold war.

In documenting the 1948 Cheju Uprising, the feminist anthropologist Kim Seongnae describes the momentum and resilience of anticommunism:

> Although the Cold War has ended, anti-Communist ideology continues to dominate state politics in South Korea and has effectively silenced much of the memory of the 4.3 Event . . . Since the end of

> World War II, it could be said that Koreans have lived under "the state of emergency" for national unity and identity. This profound sense of emergency has served to justify state violence in both separate regimes of South and North Koreas . . . As it is described as "a microscope on the politics of postwar Korea," the 4.3 Event remains stigmatized as a primal scene in the acceleration of Korean modernity that is closely related to political violence of the state. (Kim 1996, 8)

Kim reminds us of the continuity between the cold war and the post-cold-war "state of emergency," as well as the role of the state and critical intellectuals in perpetuating it. To these often-overlooked points we must add the importance of imperial identification, a cold-war product which is absent from studies of U.S. imperialism in East Asia. Cultural studies of U.S. imperialism in the region are only just starting to emerge, and it is important to caution against counterpositioning one (subaltern) nationalism against another (paramount) nationalism.

Due to the complexity of the sixty-five years of U.S. hegemony in East Asia, a comprehensive laundry list of the deep American impacts in the region is impossible to produce (Chen 1998). It is important to note that the fact of U.S. hegemony does not imply its acceptance; in fact, resistance to U.S. hegemony is evidence of its presence. To see the strength of the American complex in East Asia, one need only look at the popularity of the "X Can Say No" phenomenon. After the big success in 1990 of Ishihara Shintaro and Morita's Akio *The Japan that Can Say No* came the popular *China Can Say No* (Sung 1996) and *Taiwan Can Say No* (Ker 1996). Unmistakably, the United States is what these countries are saying no to. What this implies, of course, is the preexistence of an indisputable yes. These texts are signs of deep and continuing identification with what their titles deny but are unable to displace.

East Asians' profound identification with the United States also raises a crucial methodological issue. The study of the culture of U.S. imperialism needs to move beyond the frame of cultural imperialism that was formulated in the 1970s. The earlier argument holds that newer forms of imperialism operate through an external imposition of cultural products and ideologies that brainwash third-world societies, or create a false consciousness in them. Frequently cited examples are McDonald's, Hollywood, and American Top 40 music, but the effects of these symbolic objects have been exaggerated. Since the mid-1980s, several parts of East Asia have seen the emergence of local culture industries strong enough to compete with the American output. For some thirty years now, Hong Kong films have captured a significant share of the market in various East and Southeast Asian countries. By the 1990s, younger East Asians were no longer singing American pop songs in karaoke bars. The false consciousness thesis no longer has explanatory power. It cannot persuasively articulate these imported products to the internal logic of local cultural history. The theoretical turn from cultural imperialism to the culture of imperialism enables a more sophisticated understanding. We need to ask why imperialism produces such long-lasting effects when the local cultural machinery is not, or at least is no longer, mediated through transnational media. We need to carefully investigate the specific mechanisms through which imperialism links up with local political and economic forces.

Before more historical research is done to address these questions, we can only put forward a tentative proposition. In East Asia, colonial identifications and disidentifications since the Second World War have set the boundaries of the local cultural imagination, consciously and unconsciously articulated by and through various institutions of the nation-state in alliance with capital and even sectors of the civil society. The power behind the culture of U.S. imperialism comes from its ability to insert itself into a geocolonial space as the imaginary figure of modernity, and as such, the natural object of identification from which the local people are to learn. Throughout the region, U.S. institutional forms have been copied, American English has become the first foreign language to be studied, and the United States was practically the only foreign space available for advanced education until the 1980s. For the elites of both the state and the opposition, American experiences have become reference points that reinforce their own legitimacy. In the popular imagination, the extent of the unconscious identification with America can be seen in the use of the Mandarin word *guówài* (abroad, foreign) which is very often used interchangeably with *Měiguó* (America).

To evoke this identification is not so much to add a psychological gloss to history, but to suggest that the material history of imperialism has created identifications and disidentifications through which neocolonial systems of representation and modes of living have infiltrated the space of the national popular imagination. The flow of psychic desire and energy

is confined within the boundaries of the colonial and neocolonial cultural imaginary, and this network stretches to every corner of the social body. It would be inappropriate to directly apply Fanon's famous thesis to suggest that Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and Taiwanese want to be American just as "the black man wants to be white." However, it is difficult to deny that a similar theoretical logic is at work. The twist in the post-cold-war era of globalization has been the leaving behind of the limited theory of colonial identification, and the new articulation of identity under a condition of global uncertainty.

The complexity of the situation is the complexity of history. The past is inevitably appropriated to explain and respond to the present, a case in point being the emergence of civilizationalism as the latest form of nativism. Cho Haejoang (1999) has succinctly analyzed the Confucian revival movement in Korea; Chua Beng Huat has taken up the Singaporean redrafting of Asian identification (Chua 1998); and Japan is also undergoing a re-Asianization phase. These self-rediscovery movements are obviously connected to the regionalization of global capital, but the psychological drive at their core is once again grounded in colonial history. The implicit Other that defines this new Asian civilizationism is America, and the regionwide anti-Americanism that has surfaced is a return of the repressed desire for empire. Even the pro-American Club 51 is an example of this trend.

The preceding analyses have no ironic motive; I do not wish to ridicule any of these movements, only to point out that both the pro- and anti-American modes operate within a space defined by the same object. Disidentification assumes the existence of a prior identification. I believe this is one reason why the question of U.S. imperialism has not been adequately addressed. America as an object of identification has not only been with us all along, but it has been so thoroughly integrated into our thoughts and practices that we have lost the ability to critically engage with the issue of U.S. imperialism at all. America exists and thrives at a level deeper than most analysts have explored. If we wish to honestly understand the subjectivity of the self in East Asia, we have to recognize that the United States has not merely defined our identities but has become deeply embedded within our subjectivity. And it is precisely by occupying this position as the dominant system of reference that America constitutes our subjectivity. When the United States, rather than the Philippines or Korea, has been consistently adopted as our default point of reference, it means that we are Americanized, if not American. This basic recognition is the necessary starting point if Taiwanese subjectivity is to be transformed.

Americanism after September 11

The reconfiguration of global politics that followed September 11, 2001, compels us to think about the U.S. neocolonial military-industrial complex in a wider context, beyond that of Club 51, Taiwan, or East Asia. Most responses to the attack from around the world could be divided into two types. The first strongly supported U.S. military action to combat terrorism, which was Club 51's position. The second reflected the anti-American sentiment that rapidly surfaced throughout the world on an unprecedented scale. Among the responses in this type, a consensus emerged: "*Yes*, we condemn the inhuman aggression and express our great sympathy for the victims, *but* we also think this attack is the result of the U.S. government's unacceptable conduct toward other countries. We hope the American people will be prompted by the attack to reflect on the harm their government has inflicted on the rest of the world and work to change their government's brutal foreign policy." The development of the Internet made it possible for the first time to have an extremely focused global discussion of America's role in the world; in the wake of September 11, "yes, but" was the rhetorical mode of many of the critical commentaries that emerged. The sympathetic expressions in the first half of these utterances were largely negated by the condemnations in the second half. If this rhetoric accurately represents the sentiment of a significant segment of the global population at the time, it shows that the United States was losing legitimacy in the eyes of the world, and that the singular hegemonic superpower was in decline. Indeed, its leadership had been questioned long before September 11, and the event was really a touchstone for preexisting antagonisms. This being the case, the question becomes: how can this intense, global anti-American sentiment be properly explained?

A theoretical mode of interpretation will not be useful in this instance. To understand how the United States has been perceived, especially in East Asia, we need to return to history. Since the mid-nineteenth century, America has never been outside Asia. Japan was opened to the United

States in 1858 when the treaty-port system was established. The impact on Japan of the subsequent economic and cultural interactions, continuing through the period between the world wars, cannot be overstated. By the 1930s, some Japanese intellectuals felt that America had become a constitutive element of Japanese identity. A startling passage from Takanobu Murobuse's *America*, published in 1929, makes this quite clear: "Where could you find Japan not Americanized? How could Japan exist without America? And where could we escape from Americanization? I dare to even declare that America has become the world, Japan is nothing but America today" (quoted in Yoshimi 2000, 202–3). The presence of the United States on the Korean Peninsula also had significant cultural impacts. Yoo Sun-young's important analysis of 1930s Korea highlights the role American modernity played in combating Japanese colonialism (Yoo 2001). For the elite in Korean society at the time, a command of things American in everyday life allowed them to express a modernity that surpassed that of Japan.

The studies by Yoshimi (2000, 2003), Yoo (2001), and Chen (2001a) suggest that the emergence of America as the dominant symbol of the modern had to do with its image as a liberator in East Asia and elsewhere. The rise of the United States as a global power after the First World War was felt not only in the imperial centers of Europe and East Asia, but also in their colonies. The United States was a relative newcomer to imperialist power politics, and led by President Woodrow Wilson, it proposed a strategy of self-determination for colonized spaces, which proved to be effective not only in U.S. competition with established imperial powers in already occupied territories, but also in leading colonized nationalist subjects to collaborate with the United States. Ideologically, self-determination was difficult for the imperial powers to oppose, and it held tremendous appeal for colonial elites. National self-determination was quickly propagated as the meta-language of anticolonial independence movements. The image of the United States as a liberator in the imagination of nationalist elites continued after the Second World War and contributed to the postwar formation of the global cold-war power structure.

The historian Bruce Cumings has traced a direct transition from Japanese to U.S. imperialism throughout East Asia in the years following the Second World War (Cumings 1984). In addition to occupying the

Japanese mainland, the United States assumed control of Japan's colonial apparatus directly from the defeated Japanese empire. The KMT's retreat to Taiwan and the Korean War finally consolidated the cold-war power structure in East Asia. The United States had built its anticommunist boundary against China and North Korea. The East Asian capitalist bloc was different from its counterparts in Europe and other parts of the world. In East Asia, old colonialism was immediately replaced with new militarism, and mainland China, which had not directly been under U.S. influence, began to view America as the negative Other, the idealized representative of the West.[13] In short; since the 1950s, America has gradually become East Asia's "inside outsider" or "outside insider"—in either case, an important element in the formation of identity and subjectivity in East Asia.

In the past fifty years, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Okinawa have become semicolonies of the United States. The domains of economic development, military management, and international politics are all subject to American influence. With the exception of Taiwan, where military bases were removed after the United States established formal relations with mainland China, these locations still host operating U.S. military bases. American military aircraft take off and touch down continually in the suburbs of Tokyo. Itaewon, in the center of Seoul, is the site of an American base. U.S. bases occupy nearly twenty percent of the island of Okinawa. Should hostilities break out in East Asia, these bases are sure to be among the first places targeted for attack.

The U.S. cold-war strategies of balance of power and containment depended on military force, but this began to change in the late 1970s. The reform and reopening of mainland China was the starting point. The Chinese hatred of the United States slowly gave way to open admiration of American modernity. The American dream was no longer exclusive to the capitalist zone of East Asia but had finally unified the collective imagination of the region.

The end of the cold war was marked by the collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, and then the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. By the late 1980s, it was clear that the bipolar global competition was over, and that the United States had become the sole military superpower. But the spectacular growth of capitalism in East Asia at the end of the 1980s made that region symbolically, if not in reality, the center of the world's

economy. The Reagan administration could not claim world hegemony. However, by the early 1990s, with the bubble economy in Japan about to burst and the slowing of economic growth in the remainder of East Asia, America had unequivocally become the sole global superpower. Militarily and economically, no other nation-state or regional bloc of nations could compete with or even serve as a counterbalance to the United States. It was in this context that the "end of the cold war" rhetoric ushered in the neoliberal globalization movement. With its promise of a fresh start and new economic opportunities, the discourse of globalization was in some ways a throwback to the old Wilsonian call for self-determination.

In 1991, the first President Bush initiated the first Gulf War, which can be seen as an attempt to reclaim America's national honor after the defeat in Vietnam — but after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it also signaled the selection of the Islamic world as America's new enemy. This choice was later explored by academics such as Samuel Huntington (1993), whose "clash of civilizations" theory describes a shift from the cold-war opposition between the Left and the Right to a confrontation of civilizations. The selection of the Islamic world (among the seven or eight civilizations identified by Huntington) was clearly evident in the U.S. response to September 11, which was not to bring the guilty to justice by following international law or even U.S. domestic law, but instead to unilaterally select Afghanistan and Iraq as the objects of its vengeance. Ironically, the heavy-handed American reaction fostered an overwhelming anti-American sentiment and helped unify the diverse Islamic world by bringing it to the center of global politics.

Like his predecessor, President Clinton also ordered a military attack on Iraq, albeit on a much smaller scale, and the Clinton administration also oversaw NATO's bombing campaign in Kosovo, which was conducted without the backing of the United Nations. American authoritarian militarism ended any hope that the regional balances of power achieved during the cold war would be maintained, and it radically weakened the U.N.'s ability to fulfill its core mission, which is to mediate conflicts in the global system of nation-states. By the time of the 1999 World Trade Organization protests in Seattle, which involved a large-scale transnational alliance, the legitimacy of U.S. world leadership was already in doubt. In East Asia, however, Clinton dealt with mainland China as a strategic partner rather than as an adversary, and he did not intervene in the summits between the two Kims in Korea. These real and symbolic choices contributed to hopes for a long-lasting regional peace.

After the 2000 election, however, the second President Bush began to reverse the Clinton administration's East Asia policies. Mainland China was redefined as a competitor, if not an enemy. On the Korean Peninsula, negotiations between the North and South were blocked, and Kim Dae-jung's 2000 Nobel Peace Prize quickly faded from memory. Beyond East Asia, Bush antagonized the entire world by refusing to submit the Kyoto Protocol to the U.S. Senate for ratification (following Clinton's precedent). These positions betrayed a disregard for the changing global political situation. The neoliberal globalization project spearheaded by the United States in the early 1990s had also ramped up the formation of regional alliances: the European Union was already in place; Latin America was slowly integrating economically; ASEAN Plus Three, which added mainland China, Japan, and South Korea to the Southeast Asian group, was moving forward; the booming mainland Chinese economy gave rise to thoughts of a Greater China; and the reintegration of the Koreas had become a tantalizing possibility. Furthermore, there were direct interactions among the various regional blocs. The creation of regional economic entities and superstate organizations signaled the emergence of multipolar nexuses of power and laid the foundation for the development of regional subjectivities. The mood of the time differed strongly from that of the early 1990s, when the United States was universally hailed as the sole superpower. In a very short period of time, a global sentiment had surfaced in response to the reactionary policies of the Bush administration: the United States had done its best to tear apart the international consensus and had become the global enemy.

The shift from liberator to global enemy was what enabled the explosive critique of the United States that emerged in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.[14] Rather than implement the democratic ideals that the nation ostensibly stands for, the United States acted just like the imperialist powers of old. The current fierce anti-Americanism is part of a necessary historical process. It is an important step in dismantling and moving beyond the myth of American singularity and ushering in a more pluralistic and heterogeneous global future. The multifaceted contradictions unleashed by September 11 have given rise to the delinking of politics and culture, state and society. Democratic political regimes have their own

internal logics and do not necessarily represent the will of the populations they were elected to serve. Though we have long been fed the propaganda that the cold war is over, many state leaders have in fact not yet discarded the cold-war paradigm and continue to embrace what are now in effect alternative cold-war positions. The Iraq invasion was fully supported by Tony Blair in the United Kingdom, John Howard in Australia, Junichiro Koizumi in Japan, Kim Dae-jung in South Korea, and Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan. Many legislatures have become nothing but rubber stamps. Voices of opposition from the civil society were loud but ineffective. The gap between the operating logic of the state and peace movements in the civil society is painfully obvious.

Democratic Movements under Imperialism

September 11 and its aftermath changed the political dynamic in the Taiwan Strait. Because the Bush administration needed mainland China's participation in the so-called global war on terror in order to contain North Korea, part of what Bush referred to as the axis of evil, the U.S. anti-China policy was recast as a strategic partnership. Not long after that shift, mainland China, emboldened by its new relationship with the United States, for the first time openly tried to counter the DPP's line on Taiwan independence.

In March and April 2003, Anglo-American military attacks in Iraq provoked spontaneous global antiwar movements that were unprecedented in scale. Even in Taiwan, where the tradition of anti-Americanism is relatively weak, there were multiple rounds of street demonstrations and protest rallies. In public forums, the Taiwanese government's support of the U.S. invasion of Iraq was fiercely debated. Those in favor of the government, the United States, and the war formulated a chain of equivalents: antiwar = anti-America = anti-Taiwan = pro–mainland China ("Disclosing the 'Anti-war, Anti-US, Anti-Taiwan' Syllogism of the Pro-China Force's Conspiracy" 2003). In contrast, the movement that formed to protest the first Gulf War in the early 1990s had no such formula—being antiwar then was merely a universal humanitarian value. Ten years later, some of the opponents of the earlier war became supporters of the new war (King 2003).

Though public-opinion polls in Taiwan indicated that a majority opposed the war in Iraq, the antiwar movement was much weaker in Taiwan than in the neighboring countries of Japan and South Korea.[15] Nevertheless, the movement managed to gain sufficient momentum to raise the taboo issue of Taiwan-U.S. relations.[16] In some of the discussions on Taiwan's interest and involvement in the war, Club 51 began to be cited as a point of reference. Club 51 had finally entered the arena of public opinion as the proponent of an extreme but viable position.[17]

In April 2004, a controversy was sparked when Taiwan independence groups lobbied the U.S. Senate to pass a resolution calling for Taiwan to send troops to Iraq as an expression of solidarity. Given the U.S. relationship with mainland China, it was of course impossible to believe that the United States would entertain the notion, but within the DPP, support for the measure was strong. If Taiwan had still been in the old KMT era, we could easily understand this eagerness to support the U.S. intervention in Iraq, but the DPP was supposed to represent the democratic opposition movement, and previously it had shown little interest in international affairs of any kind, let alone aggressive military adventurism. How can we explain Taiwan-U.S. relations in the new era of antiterrorism?

Growing out of the same democratic opposition movement as the DPP, Club 51 was not absent from this round of political events. The group, now also known as the Taiwan State Building Movement, announced:

> The Taiwan State Building Movement posted an essay to call for the Taiwan government to send troops to Iraq to join together with the multinational forces in action there . . . Saddam Hussein's evil regime has to be overthrown and his two ferocious sons have to be prevented from taking over his position [as head of the state]. Unless a stable democratic regime is established in Iraq, the Middle East will not find peace, and the U.S. itself will not be secure . . . Taiwan has to send troops to assist the U.S. in establishing a new order in Iraq. Under such a democratic and free new order, different ethnicities and political factions can coexist and prosper together. After stable development, starting from Iraq, the whole Muslim world can be gradually democratized . . . Under American guidance, the Taiwanese people have moved toward democratization. Now it is our responsibility to assist the U.S. to eradicate the evil empire . . . To respond to Little [George W.] Bush's demand, Taiwan's action to send troops to Iraq

is the first step for we Taiwanese to learn to assume responsibility for the world.[18]

This statement brings to light a dimension of Club 51 that goes beyond lobbying for U.S. statehood. In the eight years between the Taiwan Strait missile crisis in 1996 and the controversy over sending Taiwanese troops to Iraq in 2004, Club 51 internalized and solidified its position; members of the group began speaking as Americans to defend what they perceived to be American national interests. In 1996, America stood for democracy, freedom, wealth, and power. But after September 11, Club 51 justified the U.S. invasion of Iraq in a manner that was perfectly consistent with U.S. government propaganda. It was necessary to overthrow Saddam Hussein's evil regime for the sake of establishing political democracy in Iraq, and to further democratic development in the Islamic world. Club 51 is advocating an imperialist democracy.

If Club 51's attitude toward the United States had not been one of absolutist American patriotism, if it had instead selectively endorsed America's democratic freedom and criticized its authoritarian militarism, then we could have understood Club 51's approach as radical, plural opportunism. However, given Club 51's support of the war, the label does not seem to apply. Where did this imperial desire come from? How did Club 51, a group born out of the democratic opposition movement, end up as a supporter of imperialist action? And since this mentality was also widely shared by the so-called democratic movement in Taiwan, including the DPP, we can also pose a more fundamental question: what is the relationship between democracy and imperialism?

In order to address the issue of democracy and imperialism, allow me to shift our points of reference to contrast sentiments toward the United States in Taiwan and South Korea. Even if we accept the argument that anticommunism and pro-Americanism are major elements of Taiwanese subjectivity to explain Taiwan's relatively weak opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the depth of pro-Americanism in Taiwan is still difficult to acknowledge. Being anti-American is like opposing ourselves, and to love Taiwan is to love America. This is why we cannot oppose U.S. imperialist intervention. Taiwan's popular culture has a long tradition of Japanophilia; the Korean Wave (Korean popular culture circulated widely during the last decade) that swept through Asia has created its share of Taiwanese Korea-philes; and there are even groups of Taiwanese Shanghaiphiles. But no one speaks of Americaphilia. The desire for America is so deep that we have no easy way of addressing it. For Taiwanese, America still provides the default models to follow in the areas of critical intellectual thought, alternative culture, and even oppositional political movements.

Once as anticommunist and pro-American as the democratic movement in Taiwan, the democratic movement in South Korea underwent a major change in the 1980s after the Gwangju Uprising. The South Korean democratic movement not only liberated South Koreans from an authoritarian military regime, but it also radically questioned U.S. support of the South Korean government. Anti-authoritarianism and anti-imperialism became the same political agenda. South Koreans originally thought that the United States would, in the name of human rights, intervene to stop Chun Doo-hwan's violent suppression of the popular protest, and the joint-command agreement between U.S. and South Korean military forces certainly would have made intervention possible. But the United States did not intervene, and the Korean government's crackdown was widely understood to have been approved by the Reagan administration. Later, President Reagan invited President Chun to visit the United States, which intensified popular discontent in South Korea. Koreans realized that the United States had a double standard: domestically, it claimed to support democratic values and respect for human rights; but internationally, it practiced imperialism and supported authoritarian military regimes for its own benefit. This recognition formed the basis of anti-American sentiment in South Korea. By 1985, progressive activists there had determined that the fundamental condition allowing for the survival of the authoritarian military regime was U.S. imperialism. The struggle for Korean democracy therefore had to also eradicate external imperialist forces.[19]

Because of the affinity established between anti-authoritarianism and anti-American-imperialism, South Korea's democratic movement has accumulated a solid anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. sensibility. This explains how huge rallies protesting the U.S. invasion of Iraq after September 11 simultaneously occurred in nineteen Korean cities. It further explains how Roh Moo-hyun, proclaiming a strongly anti-American position, could have been elected president (restrained by equally strong conservative

forces, he was unable to remove the U.S. military from South Korea). By celebrating South Korea in this way, I do not mean to belittle Taiwan. The South Korean desire for Americanization may even be stronger than its Taiwanese counterpart. My point is that in Korean political culture, U.S. imperialism is regarded with a critical distance that is absent in Taiwan.

In light of this discussion, it is clear that Taiwan's democratic opposition movement as led by the DPP has not done the necessary work of reexamining American complicity in the authoritarian rule of the KMT. Though exercising considerable political control over the KMT, the United States did nothing to stop the atrocities of the White Terror or the suppression that followed the Formosa Magazine Incident.[20] In its eight years in power, the Democratic Progressive Party did not disassociate itself from the imperialist policies of the United States. Instead, the DPP's pro-American tendencies became even more pronounced than those of the KMT regime under martial law. If anti-imperialism is a defining feature of third-world democratic movements, then Club 51 and the DPP are not such movements, never having even critically reflected on the relationship between U.S. imperialism and Taiwan. And once an opposition movement assumes power, the desire to maintain that power, and the opportunities to further the movement's self-interest that come with it, make it all the more difficult to overturn the status quo.

On the evening of 20 March 2004, with the results of the presidential election in, Chen Shui-bian addressed his supporters by emphasizing that his reelection was a victory for Taiwanese "subject-consciousness," although he did not clarify what he meant by this. In terms of the history of representative democracy in Taiwan, the most important result of the election was the open revelation that Taiwan was a U.S. protectorate. Prior to 1987, the KMT maintained that the whole of China was its territory, which had been temporarily occupied by communist thieves. The KMT regime in Taiwan presented itself as the government of a large and dignified country, even though in reality it led only a small state under U.S. military protection. To save face, the KMT never openly acknowledged that Taiwan was a protectorate of the United States. In the eyes of the Taiwanese public, the United States was simply Taiwan's most intimate ally. Although this ally deserted Taiwan in 1979 and formally recognized the Chinese Communist Party as the legitimate government of China, Taiwanese justified this abandonment by thinking that because

the United States was a global power, it had no choice but to work with mainland China. And even so, the United States was still our loyal ally in defending the Taiwan Strait.

But the political situation quickly changed after the DPP assumed power. All the embarrassments hidden in the past now had to be put on public display, and when mainland China took issue with these actions, President Chen would have to send senior members of his staff to Washington to report. It became increasingly clear to the public that Chen needed permission from the United States to make political decisions, and three events surrounding the 2004 presidential election in Taiwan spelled out the nature of the countries' relationship in no uncertain terms. First, because the United States opposed the use of a ballot referendum, Chen was forced to edit the content of the referendum in a way acceptable to the United States. Second, because of the controversy surrounding the failed election-eve assassination attempt on Chen,[21] the U.S. government postponed congratulating him. Annette Lu, Chen's vice-president, immediately demanded an official acknowledgement from the United States recognizing the election's result. Third, Chiu Yi-ren, the general secretary of the Taiwan National Security Council, flew to Washington to seek approval for Chen's inauguration speech.[22] As the public became aware of these events, the perception grew that sending Taiwanese troops to Iraq was like paying the Mafia a protection fee, or like the ancient tributary system in which the vassal state had to offer tribute to the emperor of the suzerain state. If the United States and Taiwan have long been engaged in a protectorate relationship, one that is commonly understood to exist by the political elite of both parties, but one that each side was unable or unwilling to acknowledge, then the major shift here is that the public now saw the exact nature of the relationship. What was the effect of this public recognition?

For proponents of Taiwan independence, that is a sacred ideal that cannot be compromised. Recognizing Taiwan's status as a protectorate of the United States is a move that could never be accepted. As Chen Shui-bian has frequently said, "Taiwan is an independent sovereign state and its name is the Republic of China." If you add what he has left out—"under U.S. protection"—does the independence movement still have legitimate appeal? Of course, a reliance on U.S. imperialism is what has allowed the movement to exist in the first place. If it is to stake out a

legitimate position, its first mission must be to clarify its position vis-à-vis the United States. The reality, however, is that none of the factions within the independence movement have dared to challenge U.S. imperialism.

Compared to the independence fundamentalists, Club 51's position is much more courageous. Club 51 is willing to honestly face the political realities of the present; its problem lies with its obviously fantastic vision of the future. What makes it think that American citizens will accept Taiwan as a state, or that mainland China will accept that arrangement?[23] Nevertheless, Club 51 relentlessly pushes its views: Taiwanese must choose whether they want to be Chinese or American. This is how the group framed its position in 2003 in relation to the existing political spectrum: "We will make and seek a new basis of support beyond the life and death struggle between green and blue, beyond ethnic confrontation, and beyond the impasse of unification and independence. This white space will be established to be different from red China, and the blue and green camps in Taiwan."[24] There is no need for a critical reading to unpack the meaning of this statement: the "white space" that Club 51 identifies with is nothing other than the United States.

We have come full circle. Anticommunism and pro-Americanism built over the decades following the Second World War are constitutive of Taiwan's subjectivity. In the mid-1980s, Taiwan's so-called democratization movement began to focus on conflicts over ethnic and national identity. By exploiting the politics of ethnic difference, the opposition movement accumulated the energy to finally grasp state power in 2000. The 2004 presidential election continued and deepened these rifts. The sturdy ideological structure of anticommunism has effectively delegitimized any thought of unification with mainland China under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. Now, although the KMT's Ma Ying-jeou has won the 2008 presidential election and economic integration has pushed forward, the old-line anticommunist stand is still alive.

To put the issue in a wider context, democratic opposition movements in Taiwan and other parts of Asia need to rethink our history. Through this process, we need to face the long-term damage that Japanese colonialism inflicted throughout Asia. We also need to investigate the impact of U.S. support of pro-American authoritarian regimes on contemporary democracy. But we must abandon the habit of treating imperialism as a force external to regional discourse. For a very long time, imperialism has

not just operated on East Asian politics, societies, and economies but has also slowly shaped our Asian bodies, thoughts, and desires. The critique of subjectivity needs to begin with the self if we are to entertain any hope of true independence.

Asia's Independence

In March and April 2005, large-scale anti-Japanese protests broke out in South Korea and mainland China in response to Japan's bid for a seat on the United Nations Security Council. Underlying the protests was a mix of unfinished historical business and new political developments. The main driving force behind the changing dynamics in East Asia is the peaceful rise of China, but the anti-Japanese demonstrations were also energized by Roh Moo-hyun's attempt to move away from the anticommunism, pro-Americanism policy of the past, and toward independence and autonomy on the Korean Peninsula. Roh's policy was a calculated one: Korea hopes to play a key role in what some Seoul-based analysts call the Northeast Asian century, a dream that could never be realized with Korea's continued reliance on the United States. Driving the U.S. military out of Korea would bolster Korean independence, but even more important, it is a precondition for Korea's assuming a position of leadership in the region.[25] In contrast, Taiwan's Chen Shui-bian and Japan's Junichiro Koizumi were still confined within a structure inherited from the cold war, which bound their countries to continued dependence on the United States.

During the wave of anti-Japanese protests in China and Korea, reactions in Taiwan were low-key, but Taiwan was engaging a different regional dynamic. Before 2005, no Taiwanese politician dared pay a friendly visit to mainland China, because doing so would be seen as "cozying up to China and selling out Taiwan" (*qīn Zhōng mài Tái*). Chen Shui-bian's razor-thin and heavily contested reelection victory, and the DPP's huge losses in the 2004 legislative elections marked a major shift in Taiwan's political climate. In this context, the opposition KMT and the People First Party felt they had enough popular support to bypass the elected DPP government and deal directly with the CCP. Lien Chan, chairman of the KMT, undertook a visit to China in the hope of easing tensions across the Taiwan Strait, which he called "a journey of peace." His direct talks with Hu Jintao, chairman of the CCP, symbolized a reconciliation of sorts

between the two parties. Had the fifty-year Chinese civil war come to an end? Such a scenario would not have been imaginable before 2005.

Lien's visit may have suggested to some that reconciliation between Taiwan and mainland China was inevitable, but in reality, the contradictions and conflicts accumulated over the previous decades have made neither unification nor independence possible for Taiwan in the short run. Without the possibility of internal consensus, any hasty move toward either extreme runs the risk of igniting a civil war in Taiwan. Maintaining the status quo is the probable reality, while interaction between China and Taiwan continues. The question becomes whether the two regimes on either side of the Taiwan Strait will be able to reach a peace agreement, temporarily postponing the issue of independence or unification. Doing so demands that Taiwan stop seeking independence and that China renounce its threats to invade Taiwan to force unification. Only in this way can communication at other levels continue. Whether such an agreement can be reached, however, remains to be seen.

If peaceful interaction between Taiwan and China is to continue, the biggest remaining obstacle to the integration of East Asia is Japan. Neither the Japanese state nor Japanese society seem prepared to debate Japan's postwar relations with the United States. On 22 April 2005, the fiftieth anniversary of the Bandung Conference, Prime Minister Koizumi once again apologized on behalf of his government for Japan's invasions of different parts of Asia during the Second World War. This type of apology has become frequent and formulaic. The victims have not yet accepted these apologies because Japan refuses to stand with the rest of Asia, where most people would say to Japan: "You say you are not a military power, but your weaponry is the most advanced in Asia, and since you rely on your security alliance with the United States, how can you function as a truly independent nation?" If the question of Japan's status as an independent nation is still debatable, then how can it be a member of the United Nations Security Council? If Japan were given a seat, that would essentially give more voting power to the United States. Thus, many Asians believe Japanese apologies to be insincere, and made only for the sake of Japan's national interest. For the victims of Japanese fascism, the apologies carry no emotional resonance. Japan is respected for its economic prowess, but it has yet to win political or cultural respect

from its neighbors. To accomplish this, Japan must reexamine its identity, identifications, and position in the region as a whole.

This situation stems from a consensus established after Japan's defeat in the Second World War. The U.S. military mandate brought Japan democracy—known as God's gift in some circles—and economic promise. Almost overnight, Japan went from being a colonizing power to being a U.S. colony, from victimizer to victimized. This mutually negating shift dissolved any momentum Japanese society had had to reflect on its relations with its former colonies and colonial subjects. The arrival of the cold war soon after further diminished the possibility of deimperialization. The result was a postwar national consensus in Japan in which economic development took priority over politics, the promise of a peaceful and prosperous future replaced a tragic history, and military matters were left entirely to the United States.

In the early postwar years, South Korea and Taiwan were also incorporated into the U.S. defense network. Like in Japan, economic development was the priority, and colonial histories were ignored. But in both Taiwan and South Korea, military expenditures siphoned off half the national budget, and authoritarian rule suppressed democratic energies. The implications are clear. First, the rapid recovery of the postwar Japanese economy was made possible in part by Japan's passing defense spending along to the United States. Japan now declares itself to be a world power, but at the same time, it is unwilling to relinquish its reliance on the U.S. military. The trade-off is immense: on the surface, Japan is an independent country, but in reality, it subordinates itself to U.S. military power. Culturally belonging to the third world, Japan refuses to position itself accordingly and stand with its Asian neighbors. Second, democracy in South Korea and Taiwan was achieved through difficult and persistent struggles against authoritarian regimes. Problematic as they are, the democracies in South Korea and Taiwan were not gifts from a U.S. military government, but achievements won in spite of American strategic interests.

If Japan is an independent country, how does it justify maintaining a U.S. military presence on its soil? One could argue that this is merely the historical legacy of a postwar political arrangement, but both U.S. and Japanese officials have publicly acknowledged that the cold war is

now a thing of the past. The eruption of protests against the presence of U.S. bases in Japan and on Okinawa clearly indicates that opposition is strong at the societal level, and that the Japanese state has little democratic justification for its policy of keeping the bases. While the likelihood of American troop withdrawal in the short term is low, a first step toward achieving that goal is considering the implications of such a move. If, for example, U.S. military withdrawal means an increase in the Japanese defense budget, then in what ways would Japan's military affairs with its neighbors have to be readjusted for peace and stability in the region to be maintained? Does the AMPO Treaty have the goal of keeping the U.S. military in Japan permanently?[26] If not, when and under what set of conditions will the U.S. military leave Japan? These sensitive questions must exist in the minds of many critical intellectuals in Japan and elsewhere in Asia. If the consensus among Japanese is in favor of allowing the U.S. military to remain, then Club 51's approach seems to be the appropriate model to follow. However Japan proceeds, it is clear that the postwar political arrangement formed in the context of the early cold war is now in need of adjustment.

Takeuchi Yoshimi's penetrating reflections in 1952 on the U.S. military mandate offers a relevant perspective. In his essay "Independence and Ideal of the Nation," Takeuchi argues:

> What we should be concerned with is to not become entangled in the legal and political surface meanings of independence, but with the substantive meaning of independence, or what I think can be called cultural independence. Since the Meiji era, the formation of the mainstream spirit in the Japanese state has only emphasized independence in its external form, but has not reflected on its real substance. The result is a failure. Everyone is puffed with pride when the international political arena recognizes Japan as an independent nation and calls us a first-rate country. But seen today, it is not real independence. Today, those who were educated in the Meiji era can still consider prewar Japan the model of an independent country. But I do not recognize it as that model. At that time, it looked as if Japan acted in accordance with its own will, but actually it did not. Conscious or not, in sum, it was manipulated by international imperialism and was blindly used as cannon fodder for imperialism. Independence in name was actually being another's slave. Today's occupation is really a logical result, and not because defeat in war led to the loss of independence. Our generation understands this point through physically experiencing it. (Takeuchi 2005b [1952], 279–80)

Reading this passage today, one cannot help but be disappointed by the fact that not only Japan, but East Asia as a whole, has not yet achieved the independence imagined by Takeuchi. His notion of "cultural independence" can be understood as an attempt to build a more penetrating critical subjectivity at the societal level. In Takeuchi's view, this is a level deeper than that of law and politics, and without reaching it, true independence cannot be realized. As with the present situation in Taiwan, changing the name of the country or the national flag will do nothing to achieve this type of independence.

The urgency of dealing with the U.S. military occupation did not spur even highly self-reflexive thinkers such as Takeuchi to break through their own epistemological limits and reflect on the pain Japan had caused by depriving its former colonies and colonial subjects of their independence. If, even in discussing the issue of independence, the Japanese cannot recognize the suffering caused by their country in Asia, then Japan's defeat in the Second World War was not just a military loss, but also a cultural failure. Because Japanese intellectuals were not pushed to think through the meaning of depriving others of their independence, it is difficult for them to understand the importance of achieving their own independence. I concede that it is not fair to expect Takeuchi to have thought along these lines. After all, Takeuchi was one of the few scholars who, despite overwhelming national shame, could self-reflexively address Japan's historical problems in the years immediately following the Second World War. He demanded that in the struggle for independence, Japan's citizens not fall once again into the trap of formalism, which would result in their once again becoming slaves of imperialism.

Japan's evolution in the half-century since Takeuchi's essay confirms the prescience of his concern. On the surface, independence seems to have been achieved, but in reality the choices that Japan made were just taking the easy way out. In the end, Japan did not avoid becoming a slave of imperialism. Being a slave is not necessarily shameful. What is embarrassing is when a slave adopts the superior attitude of the master.

Takeuchi's thoughts on independence force us to ask what independence really means. For him, a crucial component of true independence is the presence of an ideal to pursue. Without this ideal, independence is meaningless. In the same essay, Takeuchi suggests that to have a genuine impact, the formulation of the ideal has to result from collective involvement of the body politic. For him, the "wealthy country, strong military" ideal of the Meiji era was not a meaningful ethical practice and was proved by history to have been a fantastic dream. Defeat was a logical necessity. Learning from this failure and moving toward substantive independence is the way forward. Takeuchi suggests that Japan has gone in the opposite direction of India and China, since both of those countries "did not immediately gain formalistic independence, but have firmly acquired a non-conformist ideal" (ibid., 281). He attempts to guide Japanese citizens to imagine what that ideal could be by quoting Sun Yat-sen on his Three Principles of the People (nationalism, democracy, and socialism):

> After all, what responsibility should China have for the world? World powers at present are destroying other countries. When China becomes strong and prosperous, if it learns from the imperialism of world powers to destroy other countries, China would be repeating their mistakes. Therefore, we need to make a policy to support the weak and to help the ones in trouble [*zhìruò fúqīng*]. That is our nation's natural duty. We have to support weak nations and resist world powers. If all citizens of our nation have this firm ambition to stand on, then the Chinese nation can develop. If this position is not established, there is no hope for the Chinese nation. Before we are fully developed, we have to establish this will to support the weak and to help the troubled today. (Quoted in Takeuchi 2005b [1952], 281; my translation)

Takeuchi is heavily influenced by Sun Yat-sen's ideals, but he knows full well that it will not be easy to adopt them in the Japanese context. Nevertheless, he hopes Japanese citizens will be inspired by Sun's ethics to collectively consider the future of Japanese independence.

Rethinking the problematic of independence through our reading of Takeuchi's account of Sun Yat-sen, it is clear that half a century later, we face drastically different conditions in Asia. Japan and the Four Little Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) now have formidable economic resources. China is not yet "strong and prosperous," but is in the process of a peaceful rise. In formulating an ideal of Asian independence today, we should at the very least strive to answer Sun Yat-sen's call: supporting the weak, helping the troubled, and resisting imperialism should be not just slogans, but actual practices. The resource-rich countries of East Asia need to think beyond the basic considerations of national interest. To reach multilateral consensus, resources—material and otherwise—need to flow freely between different groups and locations.

Resisting imperialism can no longer be reduced to the simple gesture of resisting outside forces. Chinese intellectuals need to transcend the lingering master narrative of the tragic Western imperialist invasion. Our shared consciousness of suffering should not prevent us from critically reflecting on the immense political, military, and cultural pressures that the Chinese empire has exerted on its neighbors throughout history. The anxiety over the rise of China in the region today does not stem only from contemporary China's economic and military growth or the authoritarian policies of the CCP, but also from the historical China—the China of the tributary system. Intellectuals in mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and even the Chinese communities in diaspora need to reflect on the historical identity and positioning of the Chinese empire in the premodern era. Doing so preempts the possibility of falling back into the imperial dream, the desire to become a superpower that can compete with the United States.

In Asia, the deimperialization question cannot be limited to a reexamination of the impacts of Western imperialist invasion, Japanese colonial violence, and U.S. neoimperialist expansion, but must also include the oppressive practices of the Chinese empire. Since the status of China has shifted from an empire to a big country, how should China position itself now? In what new ways can it interact with neighboring countries? Questions like these can be productively answered only through deimperialized self-questioning, and that type of reflexive work has yet to be undertaken. In my view, it would be a huge mistake to think of a return to empire as a way to resist U.S. imperialism, though this sort of dangerous thinking has already begun to emerge in mainland China. Instead, Chinese intellectuals need to self-consciously recognize that by positioning itself as a

big country, China needs to shoulder a commensurate responsibility—not to fight to achieve world domination, but to make contributions to the integration of Asia. China must not become an imperializing force in Asia.

Following Sun Yat-sen's insights, we must recognize that the first step toward the elimination of imperialism is the lessening of our own imperial desire. Only by radically reflecting on our own past imperial identity can we acquire a new subjectivity, and only then will we be able to extend the deimperialization question to rethink Euro-American imperialism and Japanese colonialism. In this context, debating whether Japan is an independent country is, in fact, a type of self-questioning. The Japanese problem is also ours. The worship of America in Chinese and Taiwanese intellectual circles is due to our inability to recognize our own imperial identification with the Chinese empire. To peel back the layers of history and expose imperial desire is a precondition for moving toward regional reconciliation, integration, and independence.

Deimperialization and the Global Democratic Movement

On 21 September 2005, a news item with the headline "Political Advertisement Published in Washington D.C.—'Taiwan Defense Alliance' Calls for the U.S. to Take over Taiwan," written by the senior journalist Fu Jianchung, was published in Taiwan's *China Times*. Given the extraordinary nature of the subject, the tone of the article is matter-of-fact:

> An organization called the "Taiwan Defense Alliance" bought a full-page advertisement today in *The Washington Post* urging the U.S. government and Congress to take over Taiwan, include Taiwan as part of the U.S. defense system, dissolve the government of the Republic of China, and terminate the operation of the Ministries of National Defense and Foreign Affairs.
>
> The argument put forward by Lin et al. justifying a U.S. takeover of Taiwan was that after World War II, the taking over of Taiwan by Chiang Kai-shek (of the Republic of China) was conducted under the order of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the Allied forces. Therefore, legally speaking, Taiwan is still under U.S. military government rule, and the U.S. is still occupying Taiwan. Hence, to dissolve the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs is only to return Taiwan to the status of the immediate postwar situation. As for defense affairs, the U.S. Congress should authorize its Ministry of Defense to be responsible.
>
> The U.S. Congress should also come up with a timetable to retire the current President, Vice President, Heads of the five Yuans [branches of government], the Grand Justice of the Supreme Court, and so on, and then the U.S. will assist Taiwan to establish a transitional government and to hold meetings for making a new constitution, national flag, national emblem, etc.

After the analysis of Club 51 earlier in this chapter, this news item may not come as much of a surprise. It reflects the despair about Taiwan's indeterminate status felt by many Taiwanese after the country's bids to rejoin the United Nations are denied year after year. It also reflects anxiety over the steady rise of China. In fact, policy statements posted on the website of the Taiwan Defense Alliance (TDA) indicate that its position is quite different from that of Club 51.[27] Club 51's agenda is to completely give up on the idea of Taiwan independence and have the country join the United States, whereas the TDA's position is that Taiwan's being taken over by the United States is only a necessary first step toward eventually achieving independence. Where Club 51 and the TDA overlap is in their calculation that because of the international power structure, reliance on the United States is the only option for Taiwan in the short term.

To return to the question posed earlier in the chapter, what has been the relationship between local democratic movements and imperialism in the former colonies of the third world? Owing to the structural conditions of the capitalist bloc during the cold war, democratic movements became entangled in the culture of U.S. imperialism, and the result was that the democratic movements that emerged were right-leaning, anti-communist, and pro-American. These movements were driven by a yearning for American modernity, an uncritical acceptance of an imagined U.S. conception of democracy, and, as a consequence, subordination to the United States in the arena of international politics. These assumptions are being questioned in the post–September 11 era. The American mode of democracy is now viewed with suspicion around the world, and the wider consensus is that the brutality of U.S. imperialist interventions has destroyed its symbolic status as a paragon of modern democracy. In my

view, the issues that Club 51 embraces are the products of conflicting desires and pressures that have been accumulating throughout the history of imperialism. To unravel these issues, we will now focus the discussion on the political and theoretical meanings of deimperialization.

In the first chapter, I argued that the process of imperialization is wider in scope than the process of colonization because imperialist expansion is always based on domestic mobilization, which is itself a process of imperialization. As an overall process of mobilization and integration, imperialization is the basis of colonization, not the reverse. If this is the case, then any decolonization movement cannot be completed without a corresponding deimperialization movement in the imperial center. Without a dialectical arrangement, decolonization will be unidirectional and incomplete. Gandhi wanted to liberate India and at the same time liberate England. Fanon thought likewise: he argued that there is a symbiotic and intimate relation between the colonizer and the colonized. The colony not only has to decolonize, but it must also pass through a deimperializing process to undercut its loyalty to the empire and undo imperial desire. This reflection and critique in the colony cannot move forward without a corresponding consciousness in the imperial center from which to radically question and examine imperialist tendencies.

I assert that there is one key issue at the heart of contemporary global politics: third-world decolonization has not unfolded as it could have because deimperialization movements did not take place in the homelands of the former empires. The former empires have not actively thought through the history of their imperialism and hence could not respond properly to the living historical issues in the former colonies. Consequently, decolonization and deimperialization movements could not successfully advance in the third world, and they were unable to build enough momentum to drive the former imperial powers to take on the historical responsibility of self-reflection. This seems to be a hopeless, self-perpetuating loop, but we must recognize that, in contrast to the former empires, the third world has developed a tradition of large-scale decolonization movements, which can now be mobilized to drive the next round of deimperialization.

In *Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*, Leo Ching argues against the unquestioned presupposition in Japanese studies that there is a continuity between "assimilation" and the

"imperialization of the subject" (kōminka in Japanese; *huángmínhuà* in Chinese). According to Ching, the conflation of these two different colonialist ideologies results in the acceptance of an official discourse that justifies the "equality and benevolence" of colonial policy (Ching 2001, 91). In this view, the imperialization of the subject cannot be understood as the ultimate stage of assimilation but must be analyzed as its own historical process. When this is done, not only can the specific characteristics of each mode be identified, but through detailed analysis, Ching discovers that the internal contradictions inherent in assimilation are covered up by the process of imperialization. At the same time, imperialization changes the way colonial subjectivity is represented, especially on the level of identity formation. In so doing, it ushers this unresolved postcolonial issue into the contemporary fold (ibid., 132). To use my own terms, the conflicts and contradictions of today's identity politics in Taiwan presuppose a historical subject that has not yet been deimperialized.

The way in which Ching historicizes the imperialization of the subject is different theoretically than the way I have approached it in this book. Nevertheless, his analysis provides inspiration for alternative approaches. If, for example, we massage Ching's analysis of the imperialization of the subject a bit, different and more general theoretical questions emerge: How does imperialization work through the "bodily practice of everyday life" in the colony and in the imperial home (ibid., 90)?[28] By what specific practices, for example, were colonized subjects mobilized to fight for the imperial center? These types of questions are as relevant as ever. Cold-war subjects are similarly enveloped in the totality of imperialist strategic deployments and conditioned to serve the objectives of the center. Will decolonization, deimperialization, and de–cold war not require the same degree of intensity to reform, reshape, and rearticulate the body, desire, and thought of the subject?

Former colonies in East Asia, specifically Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Macao, have not yet adequately reconciled their historical relations with their former colonizers. What has complicated the issue is that in the postwar period, Taiwan and South Korea became U.S. protectorates, which makes the work of deimperialization more layered and more difficult. In the late 1990s, Hong Kong and Macao were handed over to mainland China, itself a former semicolony that had gone through a socialist revolution before becoming caught up in the cold war. Busy with

resisting the U.S.-led capitalist bloc and focusing on ensuring its own survival, mainland China set aside the question of its historical relations with imperialist powers and has not yet returned to it.

At the center of the international dynamics in East Asia is the question of the legitimacy of the U.S. presence. If a deimperialization movement does not first unfold in East Asia, are there legitimate grounds to address the issue of deimperializing the United States? If one pushes even further to argue that there must be a dialectical process in any deimperialization movement, then what conditions need to be created in the United States to bring about an effective movement there? What would the concrete forms of such a movement be? In addition to marching in the streets to protest the invasion of Iraq, what other actions should be taken? What are the appropriate methodologies for making deimperialization a reality in the neoimperial center?

In the second half of 2005, a curious book appeared in East Asian bookstores: *Modern History of the Three Countries in East Asia: Learning from History, Facing the Future, Building a New Peaceful and Friendly Framework Together.* The book was edited and written by scholars and teachers from China, Japan, and Korea.[29] According to the afterword, the book was conceived at the first Forum on Historical Understanding and East Asia Peace, in March 2003 in Nanjing, and plans were further developed at later forums in Tokyo and Seoul. In August 2003, the committee charged with writing the book met in Korea, with four later meetings in Japan and China, and two in Korea. Seventeen members of the team were from universities and research institutions in China; thirteen were from Japan, including university professors and high-school teachers; and twenty-three were from universities, independent research institutions, and the national archives in Korea. The book took three years to complete.

The introduction lays out the general conditions in each of the three countries in the premodern era, with special focuses on the countries' interrelations and the formation of civil society in each. The first chapter narrates the general historical processes of modernization in the countries, with an emphasis on the Euro-American powers' invasions and the responses to that aggression. It describes how the First Sino-Japanese War in the 1890s and the Russo-Japanese War in the 1900s reconfigured East Asian relations, and how the reform movements those wars brought

about spurred social change and affected people's lives. The second chapter, "The Expansion of Japanese Imperialism and the Resistance of China and Korea," starts with a discussion of international relations in East Asia before and after the First World War. It describes the Japanese imperialist attempt to annex Chosen (an earlier name for Korea) and the resistance movement there, colonial conditions in Taiwan, the 1911 revolution in China, and the founding of the Republic of China. The analytical focus is on colonial rule in Korea, and the resistance and social movements in the three countries. The third chapter reexamines the violence inflicted upon individuals due to Japanese conquest. It includes discussions of such familiar topics as the Nanjing Massacre, the movement to imperialize the subject, so-called comfort women, and the atomic bomb, as well as of less frequently addressed issues like biological warfare and the brutality of the Battle of Okinawa. The fourth chapter, "Postwar East Asia," focuses on issues of historical assessment, including the Tokyo war-crimes trials, postwar reparations, and the social problems produced by the legacy of colonial rule. The chapter ends with a description of the establishment of diplomatic relations among the three countries. The final chapter discusses the direction East Asia is heading and the possibility for peace through open discussion on several unresolved controversies: for example, individual war reparations, the comfort women, history textbooks, and the Yasukuni Shrine.[30] It also outlines some positive aspects of current regional integration, such as the transnational flow of youth culture and the networking of civil-society groups, including East Asian peace movements.

The book is not without its problems. An emphasis on the Japanese colonization of Korea at the expense of investigating the situation in Taiwan and Manchuria, the absence of any detailed treatment of Okinawa, and the relative invisibility of locations at the peripheries of the region are among the shortcomings of the work. But as a whole, the book is a step toward regional reconciliation, and we must applaud the immense effort made by the many writers who worked together to produce such a landmark text. From the analytical standpoint of deimperialization, the fact that authors from Japan are willing to use imperialism to frame Japan's expansionist invasions is commendable indeed. The position of the former imperial power is crucial here. In light of the denial of imperi-

alism that has been part of Japanese historiography for more than sixty years, we can imagine the difficulty the Japanese authors may have faced in dialogues with their counterparts from Japan's formerly colonized regions. In my view, it is this human dimension that is one of the most challenging tasks of deimperialization. The writing of this book proves that collectively facing difficult historical issues is possible. Furthermore, the fact that the writing committee included members from a former empire as well as others from former colonies means that a common will to take on the history of imperialism does exist. Reflecting on the past from the unidirectional perspective of a single country can be supplemented with the understandings and perceptions of others. Deimperialization is a double process. Mutual understanding is a necessary step for the dialectic to move forward.

Although *Modern History of the Three Countries in East Asia* cannot be considered a model for the work of deimperialization, its method should be appreciated. Addressing imperialism is a necessary first step toward deimperialization. With the emergence of this concrete practice, we can begin to imagine historians in the Philippines and the United States working together to write a history on the lasting impacts of American imperialism in the Philippines. Intellectuals from the United Kingdom can work with their counterparts in India, Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, and Hong Kong to write the history of British imperialism in Asia. Scholars in Indonesia and the Netherlands can work together on the problems that Dutch imperialism brought to Indonesia. French historians can collaborate with scholars in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia on the legacies of French imperialism in Indochina. Simply because Japan is a defeated empire and is located in Asia does not mean that it has had to deal with its neighbors. The lack of substantive communication between former imperial powers and their former colonies is a general problem of imperialism, neither diminished nor increased by geographic proximity.

In Europe and America, despite the postcolonial turn, an intellectual movement with the desire and energy to reexamine the legacy of Euro-American expansion at the level of theory and methodology, and simultaneously address the issue of how the historical responsibility of imperialism should be shouldered, does not seem to exist. Euro-American studies on decolonization in Southeast Asia, for example, are mostly conducted

in a mode that neglects the political impacts of past imperialism on the present. Through the cultivation of individualism, relationships between the individual (scholar) and the state (nation) are always fragmented; therefore, there is no imperative for the individual to assume responsibility for the actions of the state. As critical intellectuals (leftists, feminists, and antiwar activists), we have naturally maintained an internationalist position against aggressive expansion undertaken by our own states. Should we be held personally responsible for the violence of our own states simply because we have been too weak to stop it? Once again, an ongoing debate within Japanese intellectual circles is instructive.

The activist Hanasaki Kōhei's essay "Decolonialization and Assumption of War Responsibility" sums up the key issues involved in the debate. In criticizing Katō Norihiro's controversial *Discussing Post-Defeat Japan,* Hanasaki develops his own theory: "I would like to emphasize that Japan, in the postwar state reconstruction process, has ignored the settlement of its historical legacies of colonialism. I mean decolonialization proper, including, but not reduced to, the settlement of war responsibilities in the narrow sense. This essay is intended to discuss the two related topics in a single context—the question of subjects in the assumption of war responsibility and the problem of decolonialization in postwar Japan" (Hanasaki 2000, 72). After Japan's defeat and the collapse of the Japanese empire, decolonialization was commonly understood as demilitarization and democratization. Hanasaki argues that this interpretation is incorrect, and I agree. Such reductionism is a legacy of the cold-war power structure, which has frozen the resolution of historical relations between former colonies and former imperial centers. Now that the cold war is supposedly over, Japan has to resume its incomplete task. Hanasaki cites Mitani Taichirō's *Wars and Politics in Modern Japan* to argue that Japan should enter the second stage of decolonialization: "Decolonialization primarily means the liberation and independence of former colonies, but it also refers to the corresponding process of decolonialization of the colonial powers. Mitani mainly discusses this latter process, the process of Japan 'liquidating its empire and Japan freeing itself of its empire'" (ibid., 72–73). The most fundamental issue of deimperialization has been ignored: the "pre-war imperial consciousness was not liquidated, but survived in postwar Japanese society" (ibid., 73). This is a crucial point. The collapse

of the empire does not mean the collapse of the former colonizing population's imperial consciousness.

The most challenging criticism Hanasaki makes of Mitani is that the latter's account of the current state of decolonization is merely descriptive, and does not put forward any solutions. Hanasaki asks, quite directly, who should be held responsible for undertaking the task of decolonialization. He considers Japan's general lack of national responsibility to be a result of the common postwar historical narrative of how the Japanese nation came to be: "Japan's modern past was never properly grasped as a history of empire building and the eventual failure of this project and, as Kang [Sanjung] points out, the exclusion of Koreans and other former subjects of the Japanese Empire has been obliterated" (ibid., 74). Hanasaki wants to remedy the situation by reassociating contemporary Japan with its former colonies so that the modern history of Japan can be properly articulated.

This task has been made particularly difficult by the wave of nationalism that rose in the 1990s, when the Japanese right wing pushed hard to erase what they called the "dark side" of the nation's recent history. Japanese nationalists wanted younger generations to receive a "healthier" education, to learn about Japan's national glory, and to cultivate a commensurate sense of patriotism. The denial of responsibility, however, does not only exist on the Right. Radical Japanese refuse to identify with their country, and feminists consider Japanese imperialism to be the sin of men, therefore claiming the crimes of the past empire have nothing to do with them. Facing difficulties on both sides of the political spectrum, how can the Japanese reclaim the responsibility for deimperialization that was made possible by the loosening of the cold-war structure? Hanasaki advances a simple—but, in my view, workable—proposal. He appeals to those living in Japan, as well as to intellectuals who do research on Japan, to adopt a temporary and transitional identification with Japan in order to actively accept historical responsibility:

> I take the stand that as long as I was born as a member of the colonizer nation-state, and am still positioned in a historical situation where the decolonialization of Japan is not complete, I would provisionally take upon myself the definition of being "Japanese," the definition that is given to me by other people and that puts me in the national Japanese collective. I say "provisionally" because I do not think I would remain forever passively defined and bound by this given relationality. Japanese colonial rule as viewed from the colonized people's perspective presents itself as nothing other than national oppression by the Japanese as a race. The colonized peoples thus take the Japanese race to task for their colonial responsibility. In the context of decolonialization, this identification of the nation-state with the race is grounded in both imagery and reality. (ibid., 78)

Without at least provisionally identifying with the Japanese, there is no position from which to respond to the call made by formally colonized peoples for the entire Japanese nation and race to take responsibility for colonization. But the assumption of Japanese identity is not simply a passive response to an external demand. Hanasaki cites an argument made by the highly respected activist intellectual Mutō Ichiyō: "As Mutō says, we will only be able to cease being an accomplice to the crimes committed by the state—war, colonization, and cover-ups—when we have overcome the postwar Japanese state and transformed it into a political formation based on alternative principles. However, we take on this task not because we are named and urged to do so, but because we have an inner urge and sense of obligation to do so" (ibid., 79).

In this important intervention, "decolonialization" is the word used by Hanasaki to frame the political task at hand. The use of the term intersects with my own use of deimperialization. As I use the word, "deimperialization" includes the following aspects: demilitarization, democratization, the assumption of war responsibility, and critical reflection on both imperial consciousness and the victimization of the colony. What needs to be emphasized is that war responsibility is but one aspect of deimperialization. To use Mutō's classification, deimperialization includes self-reflection on "war, colonization, and cover-ups." Although his discussion was formulated in Japan, the wider political and theoretical implications are clear. From the subject position of the former colonizer, Mutō urges critical intellectuals in the former empire to take responsibility for past aggression and to be actively involved in deimperialization. The discourse and practices of activists and scholars like Hanasaki and Mutō inspire us to work on different aspects of deimperialization. Critical reflections need to be developed not simply in the former colonies, but also,

and with equal emphasis, in the former imperial homelands. Otherwise, imperial desire of the type expressed by Club 51 will continue to manifest itself.

The Meaning of Deimperialization

Our analysis of Club 51 has allowed us to explore the central problematic of deimperialization in contemporary East Asia. The analysis finds that anticommunism and pro-Americanism have, through the processes of imperialization and colonization, become an integral part of our social subjectivity. These processes, driven by the engine of world capitalist expansion, were able to endure in the postwar era through the establishment of the global cold-war structure. Club 51 is symptomatic of the underdevelopment of a tripartite movement of decolonization, deimperialization, and de–cold war. At a deeper level, Club 51's desire for empire is rooted in the historical memory of a glorious Chinese imperial past.

Of the three movements addressed in this book, deimperialization is the most basic, as it encompasses the problematics of both decolonization and de–cold war. In the context of Taiwan, the task of deimperialization inevitably compels us to address the state's own imperial desire to expand into Southeast Asia (as discussed in chapter 1), and the layered forces that constitute Taiwanese subjectivity: postwar American imperialism, prewar Japanese colonization, and the premodern Chinese empire. Through analysis of concrete events, we have attempted to disentangle these complex relations at different levels of abstraction.

In the process of sorting out the theoretical and political meanings of deimperialization, we have discovered that, although there are common issues to be addressed, the urgency to be given to particular questions of deimperialization is different in different locations. For instance, war responsibility and colonial victimization are key issues confronting Japan's deimperialization, whereas these are not a priority for Taiwan and Korea. Demilitarization, democratization, and the critique of imperial consciousness are concerns common to all three locations.

In the final analysis, Club 51 exposes a fundamental contradiction at the heart of many global conflicts: there is an unbridgeable gap between the exercise of national democratic rule and the functioning of imperialism, which is inherently international. One may disagree with Club 51, but its political appeal is made in line with democratic practices in Taiwan.

That is, domestically, the success or failure of the movement is contingent upon the will of the public, however imperfectly that will is expressed. Its competitors in the marketplace of possible political futures for Taiwan—be they integrationist, separatist, or something else—do not use military or police violence to suppress Club 51. Beyond the boundaries of the nation-state, the situation is not so polite. September 11 exposed a global crisis: most governments are to some extent obliged to follow democratic principles at home, but internationally these same states can ignore public opinion and, for example, support U.S. imperialist invasions. States operate beyond representational democracy. National democracy has only a weak mechanism to counter the potential for authoritarian rule: if you're doing badly, we'll vote you out in the next election. What are the democratic mechanisms at the international or global level? Is there any way to vote a superpower out of office?

This is precisely the issue of global governance. The world is increasingly globalized, but there is no corresponding growth in global democracy. The crisis now is that no force can stop U.S. military aggression. Once leaving their national territories, the strong freely impose their will on the weak. This abuse of power is sometimes understood and justified as the principle of real strength, though more commonly it goes by the name of neoliberal globalization. In such a situation, one often hears: "Well, it's unfortunate. But they are stronger, and we are weaker." We know from history that the principle of real strength leads to war, and that unless a democratic mechanism can be put in place at the global level to check it, it may well move us all toward destruction at an unimaginable scale. If there is no global deimperialization movement, imperialism will continue to be the default mode of future global "democracy."

One effect of neoliberal globalization, however, has been regionalization, and I believe that regionalization may afford a means to move beyond earlier failed attempts to counter real strength. Although the United Nations has proved to be as ineffective as national democracy, a model built up organically from regional democratic forms promises to make a positive contribution to global governance. The question of what kind of democracy is needed to allow this to happen is discussed in detail in the next chapter.

EPILOGUE

THE IMPERIAL ORDER OF THINGS, OR NOTES ON HAN CHINESE RACISM

Deimperialization is an ongoing intellectual project, and therefore a conventional conclusion would be inappropriate here. I end the book with a type of self-critique so as to invite concerned readers undertaking other forms of reflexive practice to bring to light issues that are close to home yet often forbidden to address. As a Han Chinese, I find the task of critically engaging the oppressive aspects of the Chinese empire to be central to the deimperialization movement. I suggest that the problem of racism in the Han-centric worldview is located within the structure of the imperial order.

A tragic event motivates my self-critique.

I first met Martin Jacques in 1996. He was the editor of the London-based journal *Marxism Today* in the 1980s and is a respected journalist, television producer, and political analyst. Commissioned to produce a documentary called *The Decline of the West and the Rise of East Asia* for BBC Two, Martin asked his close friend Stuart Hall to approach me for help in making the necessary contacts in East Asia. Martin and I soon became good friends, often sharing thoughts on the dynamics of the region. Two years later, he moved to Hong Kong with his family and started a book project on the transformation of the East Asian economy and culture in the global context. The move was also occasioned by the career of his beloved wife, Harinder Veriah (Hari to her friends), a lawyer whose London-based firm assigned her to its Hong Kong office—partly, I would guess, because she was Asian. As an Indian Malay growing up in a Chinese neighborhood, Hari had learned Cantonese, which she thought would be a great advantage for working in Hong Kong.

When Martin came to Taipei to do research and interviews for his

book in 1998, I helped arrange his visit, and it was then that I first met Hari and Ravi, their newborn son. In my role as the local host, I took Hari, Martin, and Ravi out to dinner. I found Hari very thoughtful and warm, the kind of person who would always think first of friends rather than herself. After we got to know each other better, she started to talk about her experiences of discrimination in Hong Kong. Hari had thought her ability to speak Cantonese would have made her life easier, but no: few people in Hong Kong could see past her dark skin and South Asian features. She did not feel respected anywhere she went—in the office, at the market, or on the subway. Whenever we met after that, the three of us analyzed Chinese racism. Alas, our informal discussions proved inadequate to prevent the tragedy.

In late December 1999, I was invited by Martin and Hari to stop in Hong Kong on my way home to Taipei from Beijing, to meet their old friends, the Hobsbawm family. I happily went to stay with them and had a wonderful evening. Several days after I returned home, Andy Hobsbawm called to inform me that Hari had died on 2 January in a local hospital. The reason was unknown, and the Hong Kong police were investigating the case.

Hari's death triggered strong responses in foreign communities in Hong Kong. There were charges that she did not receive prompt and proper treatment at the hospital because of her race. A lawsuit was filed, and the case sparked a broad antidiscrimination campaign.[1] The loss of such a wonderful human being can never be lessened through analysis. But it is the responsibility of the living to move forward and honestly confront and change the unacceptable conditions of life.

In the course of the legal proceedings, it has been difficult to establish a definitive causal relation between racism and Hari's death. At the same time, no one can confidently deny the strong possibility of that connection. My purpose here is not to argue that Hari's death was the result of racism, but to expand on the discussion of Han racism that this tragic event prompted in Hong Kong, and to attempt to provide some explanations. In Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia, diverse forms of labor migration are increasingly visible, and previously latent conflicts are beginning to emerge. The prevailing triumphalist sentiment underlying the so-called peaceful rise of mainland China has also evoked anxieties and could easily trigger racial confrontations. Reports on the insensitive

ways in which mainland Chinese businesses operate in Africa suggest that Han Chinese racism may become a global problem. As Chinese intellectuals, these circumstances compel us to take up this issue and seriously consider our responses.

How was the racism of the Chinese empire different from that of other colonial and imperial powers? What is the specificity of Han racism today?

The conceps of Han and racism must be analyzed. Han has never referred to a homogeneous population but to a historically fluctuating, imagined community. In mainland China, the Han are by far the largest official ethnic group. The nation's official language is *Hànyǔ* (Mandarin, also known simply as the national language, or guóyǔ), which uses *Hànzì* (Chinese characters). In the global context, the word "Han" is increasingly being displaced by "Chinese" (for people, Huárén or *Zhōngguórén*). My insistence on the use of Han (rather than simply Chinese) is to indicate analytically that even as the meanings of "Han" continue to evolve, the Han people's long history continues to condition our practices in the arenas of daily life, intellectual thought, and cultural production. Politically, the Han are one of the dominant populations in the world, and distinguishing the Han from the many minority groups subsumed under the category Chinese (Huárén) is a necessary step toward critically confronting the history and current expressions of Han racism. To problematize racism is to call attention to the fluidity of terms such as race (*zhǒngzú*), ethnicity (*zúqún*), and nationality (*mínzú*), which now overlap in both Chinese and English. For instance, we would say that in Malaysia the three major "ethnic" groups are Malay, Chinese, and Indian, and that there is a "racial" problem among these populations; in mainland China, Han is a category of "nationality," and its relation to minorities is not a matter of "racial" but of "national" (*mínzú*) difference. The ambiguity of these concepts cannot be analytically resolved but will have to be constantly problematized.

The predominant approaches to racism in the social-science literature are to analyze economic and class differences or to resort to culturalist interpretations, such as Huntington's (1993) "clash of civilizations," but these modes of explanation do not sufficiently capture the immanent logic and specificity of racism in Han Chinese societies. Such a blunt assertion is not a claim for Han Chinese particularism. Han racism existed long

before China's encounter with the West and is found today in mainland China's interactions with its Asian neighbors and within the Han population itself. Unpacking the specificity of racist logic in our own societies may open up new perspectives on racist practices in other locations.

Methodologically, the analysis could begin by tracing Han relations with the group's Others through different moments of history, and could then track the developments and divergences of those relations in different Chinese societies.[2] Here I can operate only on the level of theoretical reflection, with the hope that concerned intellectuals in different Chinese communities will address the specificities in their own locations.

Two important feminist works on the Qing Dynasty inspire the following analysis. Maram Epstein's essay "Confucian Imperialism and Masculine Chinese Identity in the Novel *Yesou Puyan*" contrasts descriptions of the sexual encounters of the Han protagonist in the 1880s edition of the novel with those in the abridged version published in the 1930s. As the narrative unfolds, the protagonist interacts with characters from far-off lands such as Italy, Portugal, Spain, and India, as well as those living in places on the periphery of the Chinese empire, including Taiwan, Japan, Burma, Siam, Ceylon, and the Miao and Yao Kingdoms. What emerges from reading Epstein's account is a set of three discursive and psychic strategies for dealing with the Other. The first is to demonize (*guǐhuà*) the unfamiliar subjects. These Others are imaginatively portrayed as having "green faces with exposed long teeth," or sometimes with tails, feathered bodies, and the like. This is a genre of fascination with—and fear of—what Chinese have traditionally called the foreign devil. Within this category there are various subsets, such as Western foreign devils, who are physically imposing, and Eastern foreign devils—the Japanese—who are shorter. To demonize the Other is part of a familiar Han imaginary in which the self is human while the Other is not.

The second strategy is to animalize the Other. When the protagonist travels to Taiwan, he discovers the island to be a wild land inhabited by "human bears" (*rénxióng*); in southern China, where the Miao reside, he encounters six pairs of white pythons who subjugate the Miao people and encourage them to rebel against the Chinese empire. The pythons resemble humans, but they have long bodies covered in scales, white hair, and cold, numb sexual organs. Arriving in India, he describes it as a Buddhist country: "those who are Buddhists exert no effort, they are as stupid as cows, ugly as dogs, and all they do is recite sutras, and fast" (Epstein 1998, 17). What is interesting is that even these animalized Others stimulate the protagonist's sexual desire. This desire for sex with animals is amusingly justified because in such encounters "chaos transforms itself into civilization" (ibid., 12). This is once again the story of the Han civilizing mission. Animalized Others can ostensibly become human through being educated by us, though at the gut level, we know they can never really become like us.

The third strategy, often applied to neighboring minority peoples, is to differentiate outsiders through even finer distinctions, thereby producing additional sets of hierarchies. These peoples were divided into two broad groups: the "cooked" and the "raw," with the cooked being those who were "culturally different but could be easily 'digested' (*xiāohuà*) into the sphere of influence of Chinese culture." Unlike the decadent Eastern devils (the Japanese), who were considered hopelessly raw, the Miao were "dancing their way into the Chinese consciousness" (ibid., 14). They were being Hanified, yet with the knowledge that since they are not fully human, not quite the same as us, the assimilation process would never be successfully completed. This strategy of pushing the Other through a humanization project while forever maintaining a superior position in the social hierarchy is intrinsic to the functioning of colonialism.

Epstein's feminist analysis relies on a gendered understanding of yin-yang logic—in which yang is always superior to yin—to interpret the hierarchical relation between the Han (yang) and the Other (yin). My own reading is that what unifies these three strategies is a hierarchical distinction between human and nonhuman—or, more specifically, an assertion of the power to judge the degree of humanness of others. This hierarchy is articulated by a speaking position above the constituted categories, and this position is occupied by a male subject who has cultivated himself through long and rigorous training and has attained the highest levels of cultural capital and power. The hierarchy presupposes that there are beings who can physically pass as human but who cannot be qualified as having fully achieved humanity. Reading and reciting the classics (*sìshū wǔjīng*) and cultivating one's body and virtue (*xiūshēn yǎngxìng*) are the routes by which one moves toward humanness. Confucianist ethics and

moral thought as practiced philosophy can be understood in this light, and in this sense the human is above the categories and speaking positions of yin and yang, man and woman.

This is the key to understanding the logic of Han racism. But where does this logic come from? Let me first clarify that we are not addressing the idealist issue of Asian values. Instead, we are addressing materialist practices, which are shaped by a particular worldview. Within the system of Han racist practices, this logic has long been an instinctual response when encountering the Other. This means that the encounter always presupposes the subject's knowledge of an accumulated set of practices, which in turn condition and mobilize the subject's practices when confronting the unfamiliar Other.

One source of these practices can be found in the theory and historical practices that developed around the notion of *nèishèng wàiwáng*—internally like a sage, externally a ruler. The sage-king cultivates the inner virtue of a saint while governing through winning the hearts and consent of his subjects (*bǎixìng*). Here I rely on Liu Jen-peng's work. In "The Disposition of Hierarchy and the Late Qing Discourse of Gender Equality,"[3] the first chapter of *Feminist Discourse in Early Modern China: Nation, Translation and Gender Politics* (2000), Liu borrows from Louis Dumont's analysis of the Indian caste system in his classic *Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications*, published in 1980, to understand the Chinese construction of hierarchy. She sees Dumont's theory of hierarchy as an articulation of a relation between "the encompassing" and "the encompassed": within the totality of a system of relations, the higher position is able to encompass the lower one, but not the reverse. For instance, male positions can encompass female, but the female cannot encompass the male. On some levels, the male and female are mutually supportive, but structurally they are not equal.

In another chapter of the same book, "'Penumbrae Questions the Shadow'—Sexual Subject Outside 'Gender Equality,'" Liu cites an allegory used by Chuang Tsu to rethink the development of hierarchical relations among different speaking positions and their subsequent unequal representations in the public arena.[4] The allegory includes three positions: the subject (*xíng*, which literally means form or substance), the shadow of the subject (*yǐn*), and the penumbra (*zhòngwángliǎng*), which is the slight shade outlining the shadow. If the subject is the form or body, the shadow

relies on the subject to exist, and the penumbra, as the outer shadow of the shadow, relies on the shadow to exist. Because the penumbra is not clearly defined, and hence cannot be identified in terms of an individual subject, it is seen as a cluster of lumps crowding around the shadow. In the space of the social, this encompassing epistemological framework is based on the principle that subject and shadow cannot be separated (*xíngyǐn bùlí*). Because the penumbra cannot present itself—or, if seen as a cluster, themselves—directly, its presence is represented by the shadow in the public arena.

Liu's distinctions can be more easily understood if they are viewed in terms of identity politics: if the structure is a heterosexual patriarchy, where the subject is a male, and the shadow is a feminist, then the penumbra is a lesbian group, which cannot be properly presented except—at least in the contexts of Taiwan and mainland China—by masquerading as a cluster of feminists. If the structure is capitalism, the capitalist is the subject, the working class is the shadow, and the penumbra is the migrant worker who cannot be presented in civil society except through mediating "shadow" organizations such as churches or activist labor groups. If the structure is the world system, the subject is the dominant race, the shadow is the minority, and the penumbra is the demon, the animal, the raw, the nonhuman. In these three instances, the subject occupies a position from which a structural universe is formed and thereby encompasses the other speaking positions. The subject is above other categories and controls the dynamics of the structure.

This formulation of differentiated subjects has wider implications. It radically questions the normative assumption of public-sphere theory, which assumes that all subjects have direct and more or less equal access to public spaces. In my view, this allegory should be applied only with caution. Its importance lies in its descriptive and analytical acuity, which accurately captures the objective existence of the hierarchical dispositions of human subjects. This level of analysis needs to be kept separate from normative and strategic considerations. Whether the allegory can be used to develop strategies that empower subaltern subject groups cannot be theoretically predetermined; rather, it has to be weighed by subjects in action. One thing is certain: any useful strategy would have to involve political analysis of the specific objective conditions within which the action takes place.

According to Liu, in the Chinese scholarly tradition, the relation between the subject and object is not conceptualized as a binary opposition. Rather, it is a relation of yin and yang, a relation of complementarity, negotiation, and division of labor. But Liu points out that this tradition ignores a crucial structural relation. She argues that the Taoist concept of *taiji*, as a structural totality in place prior to the existence of yin and yang, has to be analyzed on two levels. On the higher level, the unity of yin and yang is complementary and indeed encompasses a totality. But on the lower level, yang is higher than yin, and the former governs and encompasses the latter.

To bring the discussion to the level of social analysis, we see that the enunciative position—from which the ontological and epistemological foundation is produced, and which thus provides the basis for the disposition of all social hierarchies—is in fact the same transcendent human implied by the Othering processes identified by Epstein. In other contexts, this position may be described as the man of moral integrity (*jūnzǐ*), the saint (*shèngrén*), or the sage-king (*shèngwáng*). Put bluntly, in the late Qing discourse on gender equality, the saint is the source of equality. In the words of the scholar and political reformer Liang Qichao, whose life spanned the late Qing Dynasty and the early republican era, "in the teaching of the Saint, man and woman are equal" (*shèngrén zhījiào nánnǚ píngděng*) (quoted in Liu 2000, 52). In other words, only the saint can teach the true meaning of gender equality; the speaking position of the saint encompasses and operates above the categories of both man and woman. The existence of the saint presupposes that humanity's diversity is hierarchically constituted: the saint is on top, the untouchables below, and demons and animals—the nonhumans—are even further down in the hierarchy.

At this point, we are ready to return the discussion to the logic of Han racism. For the Han, the position of human at the top of the hierarchy applies not only to gender relations but also to race and class relations. "We are equal, yet you are not quite human enough to take over my speaking position as a saint" is the psychic mechanism constantly mobilized in encounters with the Other, a basic formula of self-defense through the maintenance of psychic superiority.

This logic, I submit, is the epistemological foundation of the Chinese empire; this imperial order of things is embedded deeply in the psyche

and practices of Han Chinese.[5] As part of the modernization project that accompanied the Western imperialist invasion, reform-minded Han literati were forced to adopt notions such as tolerance and equality, especially in their interactions with imperialist Others. But the mind-set, the psychic structure, and the ideological practice of the formula "we are equal, yet you are not quite human enough" was and is entrenched in the political unconscious. The human-nonhuman distinction still persists. The formula is contextually mobilized to deal with Others who might be classified into a spectrum of the superior (white), weaker (minority), and unfamiliar and inferior (dark-skinned South Asians). This universal chauvinism has provided a psychic mechanism for the Han to confront imperialist intervention and to make life more bearable: these (white) foreign devils can beat us by material force, but they can never conquer our spirit. This is precisely the logic of Lu Xun's famous character Ah Q. But the identical racist logic is used to discriminate against those living on the periphery of China and most likely contributed to the death of Hari Veriah. A sharp-edged shield can be used for self-defense, but it can be a lethal weapon when deployed carelessly.

Though the works of Epstein and Liu are mainly concerned with issues of gender and sexuality, they have opened up a discursive space at the core of the Chinese empire that has wide-ranging implications. Throughout the history of the Han, multilayered discrimination has been an expression of practices growing out of a particular conception of the human, a conception that is constituted within an inherently discriminatory hierarchy. On the surface, human is a universal horizon; once that plane is reached, differences in gender, sexuality, class, nation, and race are transcended. In other words, hierarchical differences within the categories of gender, sexuality, class, nation, and race are the natural expressions of human as an operating regime. This regime is shaped like a pyramid, where human is on top, and the half-human and nonhuman (the shadow and the penumbra) look up in admiration as they continue their slow, futile climb. Meanwhile, the human looks downward. He is the authority who determines how far the Other is from reaching the top and becoming a real human being like him. This transcendent human has no traits: he is above gender, sexuality, class, and race. He manifests discrimination at precisely the moment when he patiently and conscientiously tells you, "Work harder and you can make it!" If you wish to move

away from the logic of the pyramid by telling him that the rules of the game are invented by the Han, the male, and the literati, he will kindly tell you: your intelligence and wisdom (*huìgēn*) are not yet fully cultivated; you have not yet crossed the horizon into true humanity; you are much too Westernized; and you have been poisoned by feminism, Marxism, or postcolonialism.[6]

I think the supposedly heated debate on Chineseness is not nearly hot enough. It has not reached the heart of the matter: universal chauvinism. If one accepts the understanding of the Han perception of human presented here, can one not support the call for deimperialization? As Chinese living in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and mainland China, we need to work together to think through the issue of racism in comparative terms. In Taiwan, racism is expressed in the dominant population's treatment of aboriginal peoples, foreign laborers, migrant domestic workers, foreign and mainland Chinese brides, and foreign English-language teachers. The so-called democratization of Taiwan has not yet resulted in more democratic ways of relating to others. Unless a reflexive deimperialization movement can be actively staged, we are still a long way from achieving Sun Yat-sen's dream of world equality (*tiānxià dàtóng*).

On 30 September 2005, Denmark's *Jyllands-Posten* published a dozen cartoons caricaturing the prophet Muhammad, several of which portrayed him as a terrorist. According to Islamic teachings, any visual representation of the Prophet is blasphemous, and the publication of the cartoons triggered strong protests from the Islamic world, as well as heated debates within Europe. In February 2006, the London-based *Guardian* published an essay by Martin Jacques (2006) titled "Europe's Contempt for Other Cultures Can't Be Sustained," a piece critically reflecting on the problem of racism across Europe. The deck copy clearly brings out his main argument: "A continent that inflicted colonial brutality all over the globe for 200 years has little claim to the superiority of its values." Martin sees the wide-ranging reactions to the Danish cartoons within Europe as a revealing combination of "defensiveness, fear, provincialism and arrogance." The controversy clearly demonstrated that Europe is ill prepared to cope with the changing world. This is not the first time that Martin has written on the need for Europe to seriously consider the imperialist damage it inflicted around the globe. In his frequent contributions to the public debate, with his persistent concern with the rise and transformation of Asia—China and India in particular—he seeks to shake up European parochialism.

Even though Hari most likely lost her life to the racism of Hong Kong Chinese, Martin has never emotionally turned against the Chinese. On the contrary, he hopes that his beloved son, Ravi, will learn Mandarin, and in addition to having him study Indian music, Martin is also encouraging him to play the *erhu*, a two-stringed Chinese musical instrument. Instead of fostering resentment, Hari's tragic death has been the driving force behind Martin's persistent exploration of contemporary racism and its intimate connection with the history of European imperialism.

Two days after his piece on the Danish cartoons was published in *The Guardian*, Martin told me that he had received more than two hundred strongly worded e-mails, most of them unfriendly. He was very pessimistic that Europeans would critically reexamine their imperialist histories, which he believes is the most important issue for Europeans to address in the coming decades. After reading Martin's essay, I asked him what the reaction would have been if the piece had been published not in his name but mine. He said readers in Europe would have ignored it or thought that I was just another Chinese who did not understand Europe. Indeed, I imagine some would have responded by saying that China was also an empire, that it too was rife with racial discrimination, and that I therefore had no right to question them. I also imagine that if this epilogue addressing the issue of Han Chinese racism were written by a European or an American, it would be quickly cast aside by Chinese readers.

If these speculations are true, then we really do need to take this issue seriously. Identity politics has not faded away, and it will not in the foreseeable future. Critical intellectuals have to make more proactive use of our own inescapable identities to speak from within, so that the subject groups we belong to will respond to the problems in question. In the words of an old expression, to criticize others, one has to first examine oneself. It all starts with reflexive self-criticism.

This book now comes to a close. Though I do not naively think that the problems currently facing the world can all be reduced to the problematic of deimperialization, conflicts and clashes within national borders and those between nations and regions are all too often inescapably connected to the history of colonialism and imperialism. To explain such

contradictions in flat, abstract, and simple conceptual terms has always been the collaborationist mode of knowledge production, one that deflects responsibility away from imperialism. One often hears that racism occurs everywhere, that there is no need to track the specificities of its practices, that history is always the result of imperialist rivalries and conquests, and that there is no need to change those truths—indeed, no possibility of changing them. This book challenges those assumptions and the arrogant conditions of knowledge production that sustain them. These conditions attempt to regulate academic production into a singularity, coated with professionalism but stripped of critical concerns and political positions. The imperialist apparatus and the collaborationist desire of the colonized to catch up have ensured that the mechanisms which have evolved to shape intellectuals into professional academics are now firmly in place throughout the globe. But the rules of the game were set by the empire. Carrying with us the historical experiences of the colonized third world, we cannot allow ourselves to be swept up in the rush toward neoliberal globalization. We have to insist on advancing the critical work of deimperialization, decolonization, and de–cold war, and facilitating regional integration on the level of knowledge production through the practices of Asia as method.

NOTES

Introduction: Globalization and Deimperialization

1. "Chinese empire" is, of course, a modern phrase in English. It is used here to denote Chinese regimes which underwent regular dynastic shifts, and their relations with other political entities in the region. According to Wang Hui's recent study, "Chinese empire" is a phrase heavily charged with evolutionist imagination. The narrative of the modernizing nation-state requires the construction of an imaginary backwards empire against which the nation-state measures its development. For a detailed discussion, see Wang (2004).
2. See the important chapter by Hamashita (2003) in Arrighi, Hamashita, and Selden (2003). This book is highly recommended for its sophistication and explanatory power, though it is somewhat uncritically committed to a positive, romantic narrative of the rise of East Asia, especially China, as a counterbalance to the Euro-American hegemony of the past two centuries. Needless to say, the dialogue is once again directly shaped by a Eurocentric view of world history.
3. Okinawa remained a vassal state until the 1870s.
4. Perhaps because of this unclear mix, it is still difficult for East Asians to fully understand the notion of the nation-state, or at least to agree on what it is. The translations of "nation-state" in Japanese, Korean, and Chinese indicate completely different understandings of the term.
5. The statement is arguable because of the complex history of Hong Kong. The Kowloon Peninsula was ceded to the English in 1842 after the First Opium War. In 1898, the New Territories, which make up 92 percent of Hong Kong, were leased to England for ninety-nine years. Whether Hong Kong was a colony or a concession depends upon which historical moment we refer to.
6. For earlier research on this period, see the important volume edited by Myers and Peattie (1984).
7. For recent scholarship on the subject, see Duara (2003).
8. For an important, historically grounded account of the differences between assimilation and imperialization in the context of Japanese colonialism, see Ching (2001).

20. I had always thought that this sentiment existed only among the older generation of běnshěng rén, but I was wrong. On 28 February 2001, a public forum was organized by *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies* to discuss the controversy generated by a Japanese comic book, *Thesis on Taiwan*. In the forum, a young man who spoke with a Minnanese accent confessed that he was very disappointed by the new DPP government and said that it might be better to be ruled by the Japanese.
21. Close to half a million soldiers came to Taiwan with the KMT regime. By the 1980s, they were aging and came to be collectively labeled "old soldiers." In the late 1980s, they were one of the first groups to visit their old homes on the mainland.
22. See Wuo (1993) for an account of "returning home" movies produced in late 1980s and early 1990s.
23. From the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, Hong Kong was where these family reunions took place. Many hotels offered accommodation packages specifically for that purpose.
24. I use the word "representation" reluctantly, for two reasons. First, the central concern of this chapter is emotional structures, which cannot easily be represented. And second, representation presupposes something that exists before it is reflected, whereas these films themselves are part of the social-real sphere.
25. Since at least the 1930s, "anti-Japanese" has been the dominant mind-set of the KMT regime, and the image of Japan has been the imaginary Other through which the KMT version of Chinese identity was constructed. Until the 1980s, for instance, the Taiwanese government tightly restricted the importation of Japanese films and in propaganda films always represented Japan as the enemy.
26. The Mukden Incident was the bombing on 18 September 1931 of a section of railroad in Manchuria owned by a Japanese company. Japan blamed Chinese dissidents for the attack and used it as a pretext to invade Manchuria, which Japan quickly made into the protectorate of Manchukuo. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident, a battle on 8 July 1937 between Chinese and Japanese troops near Beijing, marked the official beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War, although the Mukden Incident is now regarded as an early event in that war.
27. In "Two Discursive Formations on Chineseness in Taiwan New Cinema," the second chapter of her Ph.D. dissertation, Shi Wei (2005) criticizes this view and argues that the most important difference between běnshěng rén and wàishěng rén is really the divergence of their attitudes toward mainland China. Her criticism is well taken. As I see it, her account fills many of the gaps in the present chapter.
28. See Butalia (1998) for an important account, based on oral histories.
29. Mizoguchi's essay was first published in Japan and was intended for Japanese readers. A Chinese translation was published in the Chinese (Beijing) monthly magazine *Du-shu* in May 2001.
30. In May 1980 a popular uprising broke out in Gwangju City that was crushed by the Korean army under the Chun Doo-hwan dictatorship.

Chapter 4: Deimperialization

1. Taiwan's first presidential election involving universal suffrage and a direct vote took place in March 1996. The new policies were considered by mainland China as signs of a move toward Taiwan independence. Relations between the two countries were tense in the weeks leading up to the election, and the crisis escalated when the presidential candidates used separatist rhetoric during the campaign. It was in that context that mainland China held military exercises, including missile launches, in the Taiwan Strait.
2. All the quotes below are from the letter, dated 6 March 1996. The translations are my own.
3. This controversy was initiated by President Lee Teng-hui. It was a move to expand the autonomy of the Taiwan state in relation to the People's Republic of China.
4. According to this report, the main findings of the survey were: (1) considering Taiwan's security, 60 percent of Taiwanese oppose Taiwan's becoming a state of the United States, and 26 percent support it; (2) in a choice between joining the United States or being governed by mainland China, 37 percent prefer the former, and 20 percent prefer the latter; (3) if Taiwan could preserve its language and culture while joining the United States, 46 percent would support the move while 46 percent would oppose it; (4) among those who oppose Taiwan's joining the United States, 55 percent indicate it is because they are "Chinese," and 40 percent say it is because they are "Taiwanese;" and (5) to maintain the status quo, 70 percent think Taiwan will rely on U.S. protection, and 25 percent think it will not.
5. For details, see Chang (1996).
6. When I gave a presentation on Club 51 at an open forum in January 2002 in Seoul, a Korean friend reacted strongly saying that if similar activities took place in Korea, people might beat the organizers to death. At the same time, what might be called the America complex is very strong in Korea. Another friend, Cho Haejoang, pointed out in our conversation, after the Second

World War, the United States has generally displaced China in terms of cultural influence in Korea. Undoubtedly, this has also been the case in Taiwan. The classic Japanese notion of "leaving Asia for Europe" is not at all a phenomenon unique to Japan. In fact, "leaving Asia for America" is a postwar trend throughout East Asia. See the first section of chapter 5 for a detailed discussion.

7. According to Chang (1996), there are groups similar to Club 51 in Canada, Australia, and several island nations in the Pacific.
8. In Chou Wei-ling's book (1998), a small map of Taiwan appears alongside small maps of Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, all of which are placed next to a larger map of the continental United States.
9. Chou Wei-ling's book (1998) is "dedicated to the People of Taiwan, who have no sense of security and certainty."
10. The term "radical plural opportunism" (jījìn duōyuán tóujī zhǔyì) was coined by Huang Zhi-xiang, a prominent writer of television dramas. His *Big Eunuch and Little Carpenter* was a popular show broadcast in 1994.
11. At one demonstration in Okinawa in 2000, over 27,000 people holding hands encircled Kadena Air Base to protest the presence of American forces. Protests like these indicate that the U.S. refusal to leave is not just unreasonable but downright shameless. The United States imposes its own democratic values onto the rest of the world, but when these values come into conflict with its perceived self-interest, it simply refuses to follow basic democratic procedures.
12. To be sure, Kaplan is not trying to deny the imperial status of the United States; rather, she is struggling to rewrite the dominant historiography. Writing in the context of American studies, Kaplan's strategy is to reconnect "United States nation-building and empire-building as historically coterminous and mutually defining" (Kaplan 1993, 17). Her argument seems to have struck a chord. In 1998, empire and imperialism was the theme of the annual meeting of the Association of American Studies.
13. Qian Liqun provides a succinct analysis of the worldviews held by mainland Chinese intellectuals during the 1950s (Qian 2005). What is important for our purposes is his description of the positions of the KMT (for the United States and against communism and the Soviet Union) and the CCP (against the United States and for communism and the Soviet Union), which is useful in understanding the conditioning effect the United States had on China during the cold war.
14. For the historical trajectories of anti-Americanism in Latin America, the Middle East, Europe, East Asia, and within the United States, see the timely *Anti-Americanism*, edited by Andrew Ross and Kristin Ross (2004).

15. According to a poll conducted by the *United Daily News* in March 2003, 55 percent of Taiwanese opposed U.S. military intervention in Iraq and 21 percent supported it. In a poll taken by TVBS the same month, over 60 percent were opposed and 20 percent in favor.
16. On 24 March and 18 April 2003, two public forums were organized by *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies* to address the Taiwan-U.S. question.
17. For instance, Zheng Chun-chi, a labor leader and representative figure of the progressive forces in Taiwan, mentioned Club 51's positions on several call-in television shows in Taiwan.
18. "Why Does Taiwan Want to Send Troops to Iraq?," http://www.yam.com (accessed 30 April 2004).
19. For a detailed discussion, see Shin (2002).
20. In 1978, *Formosa Magazine* was closed down by the KMT, which sparked a violent popular revolt.
21. A gunshot was heard on the day before election day while Chen was campaigning in southern Taiwan, and Chen was found slightly injured. The supposed attack on him won the sympathy of some voters, which was deemed to give him the margin he needed to be reelected. After the election, controversy broke out, with many people believing that the attack had been faked by Chen's camp. Even today, what really happened remains a mystery.
22. According to a report in the *China Times* on 5 June 2004, Chiu had to go to Washington to read Chen's inauguration speech, line by line, to U.S. government officials (Liu 2004).
23. Mainland China's antisuccession law was enacted in 2005 to counter the Taiwan independence movement.
24. Public statement made by the Taiwan State Building Movement Organization, http://www.yam.com (accessed 16 March 2003).
25. For a recent account of the changing dynamic in Korean thinking, see Shin (2005).
26. The official name of the AMPO Treaty is the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. It was first signed in 1950 and revised in 1960. The treaty has been the legal basis for the U.S. military presence in Japanese territory.
27. Taiwan Defense Alliance website, http://www.taiwantda.org.tw/.
28. Here Ching cites Tomiyama Ichiro's analysis of the "Japanization" process in Okinawa. Tomiyama maintains that "battlefield" and "everyday life" are not separate spaces, and that subjectivity is dialectically formed.
29. All references in this chapter refer to the 2005 Chinese edition, published by Social Sciences Studies Publishing in Beijing.

30. The Yasukuni Shrine in Japan is dedicated to those who died for their country. For many East Asians the shrine is seen as a memorial to Japanese imperialism.

Chapter 5: Asia as Method

The title of this chapter is inspired by Mizoguchi Yūzō's *China as Method* (1996 [1989]). Takeuchi Yoshimi published an essay called "Asia as Method" (2005a [1960]). Although the contexts and specific issues and problems discussed here are quite different, there is nevertheless a connection. See the fourth section of this chapter for a detailed discussion of this point. For my purposes here, Asia refers to an open-ended imaginary space, a horizon through which links can be made and new possibilities can be articulated. As an attempt to move beyond existing limits, and as a gesture toward something more productive, my notion of method does not imply an instrumentalist approach, but is imagined as a mediating process.

1. For an account of the project, see Chen and Chua (2007).
2. We have to acknowledge the immensely important work done by Mutō Ichiyō, Suh Seng, Chen Ying-zhen, Matsui Yayori, and Hamashita Takeshi. Without the contributions made by these respected individuals over the past forty years, it would have been more difficult for the following generations to move forward.
3. This point was made by Professor Choi Wan Ju, the editor of the influential journal *Creation and Criticism*, in his round-up session at the East Asia Cultural Forum, organized at SungKongHoe University, Seoul, in 2002.
4. To be fair, Chakrabarty later turned to other parts of Asia. See Chakrabarty (2000b).
5. For a detailed discussion, see Nandy (1983, 1–63).
6. The three lectures were based on four papers (Chatterjee 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001). Translations of these lectures and selected essays were later published in Chinese in K.-H. Chen (2000). See also Chen (2001b). Some of the ideas presented in Taiwan were later published in Chatterjee (2004).
7. "Betel nut beauties" are young women who sell betel nuts and wear sexy clothing to attract customers. For visual images of the betel-nut culture, see Chin-pao Chen (2000).
8. Such a project has begun. See the special issue of *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies: Movements* edited by Chun and Shamsul (2001), in particular Shamsul (2001), Deshpande (2001), and Sun (2001b).
9. After the June Fourth Incident, a series of essays was published in an effort to open the discussion on popular democracy. See Nan (1989), Ping-fei Wu (1989), and Shi Si-hung (1989). The most thorough analysis was later published as a book by the pseudonymous Ka Wei-po, using the pen name Robocop (1991).
10. A part of the story of the popular democracy position is available in English. See Chen (1994c).
11. For a sophisticated analysis in the context of modern Chinese literary history, see Shi-he Chen (1997).
12. Deng Zheng-lai (2002) is one of the key proponents of introducing the notion of civil society into China.
13. For a detailed account of the transition, see Cho Hee-yeon (2000b) and Cho Hee-yeon and Park (2002).
14. For a detailed historical account of the guómín discourse in relation to the Chinese nationalist discourse, see Shen and Chien (1999). The Mandarin notion of guómín is confusingly taken from the Japanese notion of *kokumin*, which uses the same two characters. Partly due to the Japanese colonial legacy, all public elementary and junior high schools in Taiwan are called guómín schools and have the ostensible purpose of training children to become subjects of the state. The term is also used in Korean and Japanese political discussions. For details, see Cho Han Haejoang (2000).
15. The lunar calendar has not been widely used in Japan since the Meiji era, but that does not mean that mínjiān spaces no longer exist. Traditional festivals are still celebrated, but they are now scheduled according to the Gregorian calendar. The Buddhist calendar still used in Thailand and the Islamic calendar widely used by Muslims are both lunar.
16. For instance, according to Wuo Young-Ie's study on the construction trade in Taiwan, in 1984, out of 16,000 companies, only 2,687 had acquired legal licenses, while the rest operated without a license. See Wuo (1988, 221).
17. When Chen Shui-bian took power, numerous members of the civil society joined the government, including one feminist who became a member of his cabinet.
18. Two related papers in English on the politics of sex work are Ho (2000) and Ding Naifei (2000).
19. I have benefited from work on translation by Niranjana (1992), L. Liu (1994), and Sakai (1997).
20. On the question of universalism, I have benefited from discussions with Ashish Rajadhyaksha, Kim Soyoung, Wang Hui, Ding Naifei, Paul Willemen, and Stuart Hall.
21. I should note that my conversations with Professor Mizoguchi have always been inspiring and enjoyable. He is one of a group of intellectuals who, though now in their 70s, are still always on the move. The word retirement does not exist in their dictionary.

22. Takeuchi Yoshimi (1910–77) was an important modern thinker in Japan. Though he taught for a while, his intellectual interventions were never conducted in an academic style. The issues he was concerned with and the cultural and political activities he participated in spanned the full range of major problematics facing intellectuals in modern Japan. In 1944, he published *Lu Xun*, one of his most important works. Lu Xun became a system of reference, an interlocutor, throughout Takeuchi's life. Through his study of the inner world of Lu Xun, Takeuchi proposed the highly intuitive proposition of Asia as method, which challenged the Eurocentrism of the Japanese intellectual world. Because his intellectual style was unique, and because he often had no sense of political correctness, it is very difficult to label him. For a long time after his death, his work was simply forgotten. Recently, in Japan his original contributions to Japanese intellectual history have been rediscovered.
23. I read translations of the lecture in both English and Chinese. I am grateful for Richard Calichman's English translation in *What Is Modernity? Writings of Takeuchi Yoshimi* (2005a), and for Hu Dong-zhu's Chinese version, published in 2007 in *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies*, no. 65.
24. Takeuchi's *Lu Xun* and his important essay "China's Modern and Japan's Modern" (1948) are the representative texts analyzed by Mizoguchi.
25. I must thank Professor Sakamoto Hiroko for bringing this issue to my attention, and for further clarifying the point in the context of the Sixth Community of Knowledge Conference, which took place at the Japan Foundation in Tokyo in August 2002.
26. For details of the project, see Sun (2001b). The six-year project, organized by Mizoguchi Yūzō and Sun Ge, officially ended in 2002. It was a series of forums in Beijing and Tokyo with the purpose of bringing critical intellectuals from China and Japan together to address important historical and political issues, which was not possible through existing modes of academic exchange. The memory of the Sino-Japanese War was one of the many important topics discussed.
27. I have observed a trend of increasing interactions within Asia, especially in Northeast Asia. The Cultural Typhoon project, initiated in Japan, has become an annual conference open to participants from outside Japan, mainly from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea. The annual conference of Taiwan's Cultural Studies Association has also become an international gathering, with participants from Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, Korea, and Hong Kong. If there were an annual Chūgokugaku gathering in Japan, scholars from neighboring places would probably also be present. That would change the logic and language of dialogues, and a relatively closed national space would be opened up.

Epilogue: The Imperial Order of Things

The earliest version of this epilogue was written in English and titled "'Foreign Devil' and 'Han Chinese Racism.'" It was written in response to a talk given by Immanuel Wallerstein at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology on 21 September 2000. A Chinese version was presented in January 2005 as part of a panel on Han Chinese racism in the context of migration at the annual conference of the Cultural Studies Association of Taiwan, where Qua Sy Ren of Singapore, Josh Hong of Malaysia, Yan Hairong of China, Hsiao Hsiao-chuan of Taiwan, Ben Ku of Hong Kong, and I began to address this issue together. In June 2007, we gathered again at the 2007 Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Conference at Shanghai University, to further our discussions.

1. For details, see the Harinder Veriah Trust website at http://www.harinderveriah.com (accessed 28 May 2009), as well as Jacques (2002). The Hong Kong government finally passed an antidiscrimination law on 10 July 2008.
2. For a systematic study of the Chinese discourse of race, see Dikotter (1992). M. Dujon Johnson's (2007) *Race and Racism in the Chinas: Chinese Racial Attitudes towards Africans and African-Americans* is a major contribution on Chinese racism in mainland China and Taiwan. His research finds no "qualifying difference" in these two places.
3. A shorter version of the chapter in English can be found in Liu Jen-peng (2001).
4. The full fable in English is quoted in Liu Jen-peng and Ding (2005, 49–50), which addresses the problem of queer politics in Chinese contexts. This line of thinking is also developed in Liu Jen-peng, Perry, and Ding (2007).
5. I believe that China's tributary system can also be understood through this framework.
6. Perhaps because the notion of the transcendent human based on a moralistic universalism is so difficult to overthrow from within, Liu's (2002) later work turns toward science fiction, from which she formulates a concept of posthuman.