




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— ON GLOBAL ISSUES —

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Mikumi National Park, Tanzania
June 2015





PERSPECTIVES

— ON GLOBAL ISSUES —

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The Center for Global Affairs at New York University's School of Professional Studies educates and inspires students to become global citizens capable of identifying and implementing solutions to pressing global challenges. Its flagship is the Master of Science in Global Affairs (MSGA) program.

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Rear cover photograph: Kasulu, Tanzania, near Nyragusus Refugee Camp. © 2015 Stevin Azo Michels

Letter From the Editor

PGI wanted to start our Spring Issue with Gender up front to highlight the importance of this issue at a time when women world-wide are again fighting for equality and being denied their right to choose. Inside this issue, there are questions involving gender mainstreaming by CGA professor Anne-Marie Goetz and on the roles of women and men in society by Liza Kane-Hartnett and Richard Bygge. We segue from measures of women's security in Melissa Salyk-Virk's deconstruction of the allure of ISIS into the role of Russian involvement in Eastern Europe by Phil Payne. Melissa Salyk-Virk returns to offer suggestions on organ trafficking and then Ani Karapetyan describes the impact of the current media landscape in Russia and Kelsey Carter illuminates the confusion that befuddles us: disinformation. Next CGA Professor Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu delves into the landscape of nuclear weapons in Asia while Natasha Louis discusses the oil environment in Sudan. We look toward the future with presentations on Trump's geopolitical balance sheet by Willam Jannace and Paul Tiffany and the water-energy-food nexus in Qatar by DeLaine Mayer. We close with the place many roads lead, peacebuilding, with a proposal for Jammu and Kashmir by Eaman Sarwar. On the two covers and sprinkled through the issue are photographs from Global Field Intensives to Tanzania and Japan by Stevin Azo Michels and Moscow, Russia by Alejandro Hoyos.

Despite concern that the world is devolving into a bifurcated and nationalistic landscape, dialogue is happening. The ideas within these pages concern many of the issues we grapple with during these difficult times, and we hope we bring them out into the open with consideration and debate. Ultimately, we hope we do so to keep them from becoming retrenched and impregnable.

This, itself, is good news. Whenever there is an underlying current of unease and unrest, there is a necessary move into areas of uncomfotability in order for solution and peace to take hold. And if we take care during our discomfort by giving voice, maybe we can come to a place where we can live more peacefully side by side. If we don't dialogue, we choose instead to vilify the 'other' and to polarize our conflict. Not on PGI's watch.

Discovery and enlightenment of the nature of these forces and conflicts is why PGI is here. Our voices deconstruct and attempt to contextualize our world. PGI hopes you enjoy this issue as much as we have enjoyed putting it together and we hope that you will add your enlightened voices to the conversations.

With hope for a peaceful future,

Stevin Azo Michels
Editor in Chief

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Gender



Photograph © 2015 Stevin Azo Michels
Dar Es Salam, Tanzania
June 2015

How Wonder Woman exposed the Limits of Gender Mainstreaming at the UN

Anne-Marie Goetz



UN Photo/Kim Haughton

Last October, the UN's Department of Public Information (DPI) announced that the UN was acquiring a new goodwill ambassador for the Empowerment of Women and Girls – linked to the Sustainable Development Goal on women's rights. This new ambassador was not real. It was Wonder Woman, a DC Comics superhero. She turned 75 last year, and evidently someone thought that a fitting gift would be an honorary ambassadorship from the UN.

Outrage swiftly followed from feminists within and beyond the UN, including myself, raising objections about the decision, best expressed perhaps in a petition that originated from within the UN that pointed out that a real life feminist woman activist might be more deserving of the honor, adding:

Although the original creators (of Wonder Woman) may have intended (her) to represent a strong and independent 'warrior' woman with a feminist message, the reality is that the character's current iteration is that of a large breasted, white woman of impossible proportions, scantily clad in a shimmery, thigh baring body suit with an American flag motif (...) the epitome of a 'pin-up' girl'.

It went on:

At a time when issues such as gender parity in senior roles and the prevention of sexual exploitation

Nations expects all its staff members to embody in the core value of respect for diversity (Concerned United Nations Staff Members).

At her official designation ceremony at the UN a few weeks later (October 21), there was a protest by UN staff – they wore white, carried signs saying 'real women deserve a real ambassador' and 'I am not a Mascot', and turned their backs on speakers. The staff protest was exceptionally unusual. Protests are banned inside the UN, and UN staff would not dream of turning their backs on the many real life tyrants that visit the New York premises.

In mid-December Wonder Woman's one-year term was prematurely terminated. The episode is trivial and far too much has been read into it. However, it exposes – or could be seen as a metaphor for – the precarity of the fight for women's rights. Around the world it seems that hard-fought gains in women's rights can be wiped away overnight. An archaic and distinctly hetero-patriarchal celebration of masculine preferences in gender and sexual relations is experiencing a triumphant resurgence in the ascension to power of blustering macho leaders, some of whom have rushed to revoke laws on women's rights or slashed their government's already small-ticket spending on gender equality. Within the UN, which styles itself the global standard-bearer on

It is alarming that the United Nations would consider using a character with an overtly sexualized image at a time when the headline news in the United States and the world is the objectification of women and girls.

and abuse of women and girls is at the top of the United Nation's agenda (...), this appointment is more than surprising. It is alarming that the United Nations would consider using a character with an overtly sexualized image at a time when the headline news in United States and the world is the objectification of women and girls. The image that Wonder Woman projects (...) is not culturally encompassing or sensitive –attributes the United

human, and by (belated, sometimes halfhearted, but nevertheless legally firm) extension, women's rights, the Wonder Woman episode seemed to expose the insecure foundations of over 40 years of 'gender mainstreaming' – the project of making the promotion of gender equality foundational to all aspects of the UN's work.

Good intentions, awful timing, and outrage with ambiguous implications

The idea of appointing Wonder Woman was well-intentioned. The UN struggles to stay relevant and current, and is constantly looking for ways of engaging young people in its work. Women's rights have always been an extremely hard sell – so the employment of a female superhero with a capacity to rescue the oppressed at a time when there is more reporting than ever about mass abuses of women's rights, was seen by some in the DPI as a great idea. The communication capability of an empowering fictional character is significantly greater than what the thousands of pages on the Sustainable Development Goals can accomplish. The Wonder Woman arrangement was supposed to include production of at least one comic book dedicated to promoting women's rights and highlighting the UN's efforts – though to my mind that is an undersell; the 'Honorary Ambassador' title ought to have been met with a significant financial donation from DC Comics too.

I have to admit I might have made the same decision myself. In 2008 while I was the UN Development Fund for Women's (UNIFEM) Chief Advisor on Governance, Peace and Security I contacted several comic book producers to ask for advice on a comic or graphic booklet targeting newly-deployed military peacekeepers, to educate them on their responsibilities to prevent sexual violence in conflict. I abandoned the project because the stereotypically gendered and martial imagery in the proposals I received seemed to invoke and possibly invite the violence we were trying to stop. The medium was distorting the message. But beyond the pressure to find new ways to communicate the UN's work, there is pressure to find new sources of funding, especially from the private sector, to compensate for shrinking national development aid budgets. The prospect of partnership with a culture powerhouse and massive company like DC Comics were likely irresistible.

Inside the UN, the DPI fell on its sword and took the blame for the decision (kindly not mentioning the fact that initially a number of UN agencies, including UN Women, had been involved). Externally there were plenty of defenders of the appointment. Wonder Woman has a lot of fans and they scolded critics, arguing that they were being excessively sensitive, overstressing political correctness, lacking a sense of

humor, engaging in reverse 'body shaming', and failing to appreciate the feminist history and meaning of the Wonder Woman character (Jusino, 2016). A Muslim student of mine pointed out that the 'pin-up girl' reason for rejecting the Wonder Woman appointment is hypocritical and contradicts the feminist defense of women's free choice and self-expression. There were debates on whether Wonder Woman, a man's creation, represents 'the male gaze', or whether she has been successfully appropriated by women as a lesbian and feminist icon, or whether this 75-year-old is relevant to anyone anymore in a field now packed with self-possessed stereotype-busting female heroes, super and otherwise.

These critics of the critics touched on a problem that has bedeviled feminism – a puritanical streak that can work wonders to unite diverse women over issues like anti-alcohol campaigns or banning porn, but that sometimes finds itself in league with those who would protect – but perhaps also control – women and their sexuality. This protection-versus-choice dynamic is illustrated for instance in the major debate within global feminism on whether women who engage in sex work do so as victims of coercion, or out of choice. It has historically been easier to generate broad support for protecting women victims rather than for efforts to recognize their agency and amplify their voice and political power. The UN Security Council, for instance, has in recent years been more willing to take action to condemn conflict-related sexual violence against women than to challenge the legitimacy of peace talks that exclude women, or post-conflict elections with few women participating as candidates, or post-conflict recovery efforts that fail to address women's needs (Goetz and Jenkins, 2017). Another example was pointed out by Ambassador Cathy Russell of the Office of Global Women's Issues in Barack Obama's State Department, where she noted recently that conservative right wing interests are not averse to aspects of women's rights internationally such as stopping female genital mutilation, early child marriage and improving maternal health. Missing is women's political empowerment, participation in peace talks and economic planning, economic autonomy, not to mention of course reproductive and sexual rights, basically anything that enables women to avoid dependence on and control by individual men (Asquith, 2017).

The popularity of the 'victim frame' is something that feminists have exploited as an entry-point for efforts to advocate for women's rights, whether amongst the general public or in institutional gender mainstreaming efforts. Harvard law professor and self-labeled post-feminist Janet Halley and co-writers have witheringly dismissed such efforts as co-opted or sell-out 'governance feminism', an approach that they associate with gender mainstreaming efforts. They argue:

Merging into the mainstream can efface the feminist fingerprints on important governance projects and preclude intra-feminist politics about them. It can consolidate a particularistic, identity-based project, sometimes at the expense of alternative affiliations that ignore the siren call of victimization and identity as prerequisites for legal intelligibility (Halley, Kotiswaran, Rebouche, and Shamir, forthcoming).

In other words, mainstreaming feminism tends towards a reductionist simplification of gendered identities (usually into simple binaries) an irresistible pull to emphasize how men exploit or harm women; a focus on protection against male predation, but not a focus on women's power, let alone how women can harm each other.

In stark illustration of the 'siren call' of protection instead of power, the UN staff petition condemning the appointment of Wonder Woman generated an astonishing 45,000 signatures in several weeks in the autumn of 2016 (Concerned United Nations Staff Members, 2016). A much longer-running petition posted in between February and October 2016 by the Women's Major Group – a coalition of feminist environmental organizations – calling for the appointment at the UN in 2016 of a feminist woman Secretary-General, fell short of its puny target of 1,500 signatures (Women's Major Group, 2015-2016).

The Wonder Woman episode probably would not have triggered such visceral reactions had it not been for exceptionally unfortunate timing. Her 'honorary ambassador' announcement was made the day after the Security Council selected a man – the ninth in a row, to be the next UN Secretary-General, in a year where there had been more female candidates for the position than in all of the other SG selection processes put together. It was as if, with some of the most qualified women in the world eager to serve, perfectly capable of promoting women's rights in real life, the UN defaulted to a fake that

was more palatable to men, and offered this as a booby prize to the campaigns around the world demanding that for once, and as a sign that the UN was at last fitting itself for the 21st century, a woman should be appointed as the world's chief diplomat.

But that was October. At that point, those of us who had fought for a woman SG took comfort in the then very real hope that for the first time ever a woman and a feminist might win the US election.

On November 9th, the Wonder Woman appointment suddenly looked very different. An unabashed self-confessed sexual predator had won the U.S. Presidency. Hillary Clinton may have won the popular vote, but as a number of analysts have shown, Trump's electoral engine was fueled by the howl of both misogynistic and racist fury expressed by white men, resentful of feminism, liberalism, and any form of inclusiveness that erodes their privileged market position (Castillo-Diaz, 2016). At the very point at which feminists had expected a triumph in the fight for equality, de facto permission has been given for a reversion to a 'Mad Men' take on gender relations. How could it be that the American public in the 21st century was not ready to accept a woman president? How had the honorable demand for equal rights come to be condemned as special pleading and a whining form of political correctness? And at the UN, the Wonder Woman appointment suddenly seemed to sound a red alert about an unthinking reversion to an outdated last century version of patriarchy. Where was the feminist brain at the UN? What happened to four decades of gender mainstreaming?

Gender mainstreaming as a bureaucratic project

Gender mainstreaming is sometimes dismissed with derision as a 'jobs for the girls' project. While gender balance in staffing is certainly an important part of gender mainstreaming, the central objective is to reform institutional structures, training, cultures, incentive and accountability systems and yes, staffing, to meet the challenge of making gender equality core to what the institution does, whether it is poverty reduction, peacebuilding, conflict resolution, preventing ecological damage, fighting corruption, or promoting development. There are various models and even schools of gender mainstreaming with competing views on how gender expertise and feminist leadership should be located

within organizations – for instance a Gender Equality Ministry within the government versus a politically independent gender equality national commission with oversight powers, or a gender advisory unit in the CEO’s office versus a standalone gender and development office (Goetz, 1995). There are competing views on

access to the ‘assessed funding’ – the annual required contributions from UN member states – which are core resources that other agencies enjoy. It has to raise its operational budget (the costs of field offices and on-the ground programming) from voluntary contributions from member states, foundations, or the private sector.

An unabashed self-confessed sexual predator had just won the U.S. Presidency.

whether all staff can be trained to incorporate gender equality concerns to their work or whether a watchdog gender entity should provide expertise as well as hold others to account. There is constant experimentation with methods for ensuring that across an institution, all staff can be held to account for performance that advances women’s rights. Ideally, gender mainstreaming in institutions such as the UN is continuously scrutinized and informed by feminists outside the institution, setting up a constructive ‘in and against’ tension to help avoid co-optation and to keep the mainstreaming project relevant to the needs and perspectives of different groups of women.

Gender mainstreaming in the UN has been a struggle since its foundation (Bunting, 2011). Volumes have been published on the topic but in brief, the system that emerged over time ended up pitting four resource-starved, understaffed and low-powered gender units against each other, competing for funds and control of the gender equality mandate rather than mobilizing the whole of the UN to build women’s rights. On top of that, many major UN agencies established their own internal gender units and these saw no reason to be held to account by, for instance, the tiny UNIFEM. After years of feminist pressure (from the world-wide civil society coalition ‘Gender Equality Architecture Reform’ as well as from internal champions), in 2010 a General Assembly resolution called for a merger of the existing gender units into the UN Entity for Gender Equality and Women’s empowerment, or ‘UN Women’, which formally came into existence in January 2011 (UN General Assembly, 2010). This new entity has the same status as other major UN agencies – its Chief Executive is an Under Secretary-General and participates in all of the UN’s top decision-making forums. But UN Women is denied

In its brief life, it has annually raised far less than half of the USD 500 million it needs to meet its needs.

The Wonder Woman episode is a trivial sideshow in the context of the UN’s significant failings on women’s rights. Most egregiously, the UN has consistently failed to stop sexual exploitation and abuse by uniformed and civilian peacekeepers and by humanitarian staff in fragile states (Donovan, 2017). Internally, it not only has failed to meet a 1994 target of 50 percent women staff across all positions (currently women occupy about 22 percent of the most senior positions), but recent studies show that the rate of appointing women to senior positions had stalled and reversed in spite of claims in 2015 and 2016 by then Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon of significant progress (Yancopoulos, 2016; Landgren, 2015). Across most operational aspects of the UN’s work there have been complaints of inadequacy in integrating gender to planning and spending priorities. For instance, in spite of a system-wide target of spending a minimum of 15 percent of country funds for peacebuilding, no UN entity has met this unambitious target except for the dedicated UN Peacebuilding Fund (UN Secretary General, 2010; UN Women, 2011).

These serious problems illustrate the limitations of gender mainstreaming. UN Women simply cannot be everywhere and involved in every decision. Its Executive Director is uniquely positioned to undertake system-wide oversight on gender matters because of her seat on the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee (now called the Executive Committee) – in essence his Cabinet, dedicated to cross-cutting policy and crisis issues. This position is an extraordinary acknowledgement of the significance of gender issues to the UN’s work. Many agencies do not have direct representation but must cluster behind a selected representative. UN Women however was

given its own dedicated seat. But beyond the highest-level decisions, UN Women has to rely on each part of the UN to internalize the gender equality commitment in day-to-day work. It does this through negotiating -- with every agency across every sector of the UN's work -- a 'System-Wide Action Plan' in which agencies commit to goals and measures of progress to which UN Women holds them to account, often incurring resentment at perceived meddling. This is backed up by mandatory gender training (done by individuals on their computers, and considered a box-ticking exercise). In addition, as noted above, some entities have dedicated gender units or will designate a staff member the 'gender focal point' to liaise with UN Women as an add-on part of an existing job description. UN Women also continuously consults with women's movements through a global civil society advisory group as well as civil society contacts in each of its 80 plus country offices.

for emergent feminist graphic artists around the world, perhaps with a campaign employing the metaphor of Wonder Woman's superpower, her 'lasso of truth', to engage young women in breaking silences on abuses of women's rights.

Insiders at the UN have been silent on how the decision was actually taken, and the extent to which agencies beyond the Department of Public Information were involved, and the extent to which other options might have been negotiated with DC Comics. But there is indirect evidence that some doubts must have been raised. The October 21 launch event image of Wonder Woman differs from the familiar iconic full body image of her in a wide and firm stance, arms defiantly raised with her metal cuffs at the ready to deflect attack. The image on the poster for the event showed her head and shoulders only, with a new accessory, a flowing red cape, discretely covering most of her bust. This modification

Like democracy,
the pursuit of gender equality
has to be constantly renewed.

Gender mainstreaming as perpetual political engagement

Gender mainstreaming that relies on everyone buying-in is unlikely ever to work. Resentment is considered politically incorrect and is rarely voiced, but simmers deeply. Since mainstreaming is never going to be able to rely on goodwill, stronger means of holding bureaucrats accountable for gender equality in their work are needed. But resentment and sabotage was not the issue in the Wonder Woman decision. Just the opposite. Someone was trying hard and clearly meant well. The problem is that gender mainstreaming bureaucratizes what is at heart a political and transformative process, and the promotion of women's rights cannot be reduced to a check-list of actions taken and funds spent on women's rights advocacy and programming. Continuous engagement with feminist movement representatives is needed to fend off tin-eared mistakes. Perhaps this is where the Wonder Woman story could have ended differently, perhaps with a public discussion of the changing depictions of powerful women in popular culture, perhaps with a prize

was apparently designed specifically for the UN event, at the UN's request. It was of course at that moment of requesting a modesty paint-over that insiders of the UN ought to have had a 'hang on, what are we doing?' moment. If it was felt that sensibilities in some quarters would be offended, there must have been a debate about whether it was the right thing to do.

Critics on the outside -- including myself -- also must invest in soul-searching. Was the reaction to the Wonder Woman episode an expression of political correctness run amuck, with sensitivities so extreme to real and imagined slights that frank and honest debate has become an impossibility in policy and academic circles? Arguably yes, to some extent. We need to be extremely careful that such reactions do not end up paradoxically reinforcing extremely conservative positions, by narrowing public debate, and building a controlling and protective agenda that can silence women. Tony Blair, writing in the New York Times about the threats to democracy in new political landscape unleashed by the ethno-nationalist surge around the world says: 'outrage is easy, strategy is hard' (Blair, 2017). Like democracy, the pursuit of gender equality has to be constantly renewed. It is not a project

for a sole superhero, nor for a lone superagency at the UN, but requires collective engagement on the part of feminist women and men to bear witness to inequality and strategize for justice.

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Nationalism and Women's Autonomy in Turkey

Liza Kane-Hartnett



Photograph 2016 Mstyslav Chernov
Istanbul, Turkey

I. Introduction

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has gradually transitioned into an authoritarian leader. This has only compounded in the face of the 2013 Gezi protests, 2016 failed coup and its subsequent purges. Invoking an expanded mandate to strengthen his grip on the State, Mr. Erdoğan's response to the coup attempt has included a roundup of dissidents, academics, and journalists as well as a reliance on right-wing nationalism. There has been broad discussion on Mr. Erdoğan's transition from a pro-Western, moderate Islamist during the founding days of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), to the man leading today's domestic crackdown. However, this discourse has focused primarily on his personal consolidation of power and suppression of academics and journalists. Outside sporadic newspaper coverage on key speeches, events, and tragedies, there has been little written on the impact of President Erdoğan's growing authoritarianism on the women of Turkey. Today, women in Turkey are nominally equal before the law, but women's equality is far from realized. Further, progress by women's groups, such as the prohibition of sex with minors under the age of 15, has been rolled back under the leadership of Mr. Erdoğan. His embrace of right-wing nationalism and Islamic populism has substantially impacted women's role in society, providing a case study of the intersection of Turkish nationalism and gender roles.

The use of gender roles and women's autonomy within a nationalist and populist movement is not unique to Turkey, the position of women has long been tied to concepts of nationalism and national identity. Within this paradigm women are often assigned a limited role as mothers of the nation, both biologically and symbolically, creating a passive yet crucial role in which women's bodies are instrumentalized. This paper will explore this relationship within the frame of current Turkish politics, focusing specifically on the effacing of autonomy by right-wing nationalism in Turkey. The paper will seek to answer the question: How has President Erdoğan's brand of right-wing nationalism affected women's autonomy over their bodies — in terms of violence against women and reproductive rights — and their role in society? It will first provide context, briefly detailing both the

academic discussion surrounding gender and nationalism and the current political climate in which populist politics are flourishing. It will then demonstrate how President Erdoğan's administration has had a negative impact on women by encouraging women's subscription to traditional gender norms and roles, before concluding with a summary of the findings.

II. Context

This examination of gender and nationalism in Turkey fits within both the broad academic discussion regarding women and right-wing nationalism and today's larger re-nationalization movement. The relationship between gender and nationalist ideologies is well studied and reveals the importance of women to the creation of national identity or origin. Scholars draw distinction between nationalist ideologies, illustrating that those identities that are based on citizenship rights over cultural or ethnic identity tend to be much more inclusive of women and minorities alike. In relation to right-wing nationalism, specifically, scholars Nickie Charles and Helen Hintjens argue, "right-wing nationalist ideologies most certainly include women but define their 'place' in very specific ways," (Charles & Hintjens, 1998:6). They highlight the consequences of these ideologies, stating that they are, "dangerous for women because maintaining a particular cultural identity involves the control of women's reproductive capacity and a curtailment of their autonomy" (Charles & Hintjens, 1998:6). In this context, the building of a central state is also the building of a hierarchal sexual order and gendered division of labor; "sexual order becomes a synonym for civilisation," (Benton, 1998:32). This can be seen in Turkey, as President Erdoğan's increasingly authoritarian stance has resulted in growing hostility toward Turkish women who move outside their accepted places.

Today, the growth of right-wing nationalist politics, encouraged by resentment of globalization and a subsequent tide of populism, has demonstrated the fragility of women's progress across the Western world as conservative groups have touted traditional values and gender roles. This trend toward re-nationalization has been seen in the United States, Poland, Germany, and France among others, and though their individual contexts differ from those of Turkey, the impact on women is often similar. Utilizing religion,

culture, a fear of lost identity and privilege, and us vs. them rhetoric, these movements elevate dominant national groups while marginalizing women. At the heart of these movements is the underlying belief – often glossed over by the media – that holds there is a biological order of sex that cannot be overturned, and which defines the social order (Kofman, 1998:92-93). Indeed, in Turkey, Mr. Erdoğan has repeatedly spoken of a natural sexual order that assigns women a secondary role.

III. Argument

President Erdoğan's conservative AKP party has embraced a brand of nationalism that pushes against the secular history of the Turkish Republic and encourages a homogenous national identity. Mr. Erdoğan himself has a long history in Turkish politics. Before establishing himself as the most powerful politician in the country, in the 1980s and 1990s Mr. Erdoğan became known as an "unorthodox Islamist" for both embracing Islam in politics but also casting

later, in 2001, Mr. Erdoğan led a group in the founding of the Justice and Development Party, known by its Turkish acronym, AKP. Though politically aligned with a pro-European stance, since his rise to power as Prime Minister in 2003 Mr. Erdoğan has attempted to build a new Turkish identity. Trying "to preserve a conservative social order... He believed that he could harness Sunni Islam, a creed shared by a majority of Turkey's citizens, as a unifying force," (Karaveli, 2016:122). In part, it was this vision, the increase in conservative social policies, and the homogenization of the new Turkish identity – based more on the legacy of the Ottoman Empire than Kemal Atatürk – which drove Gezi protesters against the government in 2013. Unrelentingly, President Erdoğan stayed the course, instituting a large crackdown of dissidents and continuing to drift toward authoritarianism. This has been further compounded by the failed July 2016 coup, which saw an outpouring of support for Mr. Erdoğan's democratically elected government and has furthered "the AKP's transformation toward a more

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aside some norms (Karaveli, 2016:122). This includes the role of women. During his 1989 mayoral campaign, Mr. Erdoğan made a point to involve women, both those who wore headscarves and those who did not, in campaign activities and the Welfare Party (Karaveli, 2016:122). Yet those views changed once he was elected. As mayor of Istanbul in 1994, he declared that he was in favor of imposing Sharia (Karaveli, 2016:122). He was imprisoned in 1999, under a secular government, for inciting the people to religious hatred after reading a poem at a political rally that equated nationalism with Islam (Aslaneli, 1999).

After his release, he realigned his politics toward a moderate-Islamist, pro-Western stance, casting aside calls for the imposition of Sharia law. Two years

hegemonic, nationalist and populist Islamism than was already underway," (Killinc, 2016). Yet, by utilizing tools such as religion and culture to develop a sense of conservative nationalism, Mr. Erdoğan has further oppressed women in Turkish society.

In recent years, President Erdoğan's embrace and encouragement of right-wing nationalism and Islamic populism has resulted in an erosion of women's autonomy – both physically, in terms of violence against women and reproductive rights, and socially, in terms of women's place in society. However, it was not always clear that Mr. Erdoğan would be an antagonist to gender equality. Early in his rule, there was great potential for Mr. Erdoğan to be an ally of the women's movement. He, controversially, re-introduced the veil into public spaces, previously

banned under Turkey's stance of militant secularism. Further, the attempt to integrate into the European Union sparked legislative reforms in support of Western-style women's equality and rights. Notable among these developments was confirming values such as equality within the family, governmental responsibility to implement equal rights, and the confirmation that The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) would take precedence over national law (European Parliament, 2012). These improvements, however, seem to be in writing only.

clear that the demonstrations were about the culture of violence, not only this single brutal crime. Women chanted slogans such as "'Özgecan is not our lament but our rebellion,'" and placed their discontent squarely on the government (Kandiyoti, 2015). Activists argued that Mr. Erdoğan and the AKP have not only ignored the issue of violence against women, but have also contributed to it by creating "a climate in which gendered violence can flourish (Zaino, 2015).

In President Erdoğan's remarks on Aslan's horrific murder, he made promises to tackle violence, but

Violence against women is endemic in Turkey's current system.

Violence Against Women

Violence against women is endemic in Turkey's current system. From January through September 2016, 272 women were killed (Hurriyet, 2016). This includes all murders, and while analysts predict that domestic violence is responsible for significant percentage, that data is unavailable. High rates of femicide has been a pattern under Mr. Erdoğan's leadership; in 2013, 237 women were murdered, in 2014, 281, and in 2015, 303 (Hurriyet, 2016). Though President Erdoğan claimed to make domestic violence a top priority, stating it was a "bleeding wound," on Turkey, little has been done to combat it (Afanasieva, 2015). At times, it has appeared as if there could be an opportunity, albeit from tragic circumstance, to realistically respond to the heinous rates of gender-based violence. In 2015, Özgecan Aslan, age 20 and a college student, was murdered on her way home while trying to fend off rape. The brutal details of the case – she was "bludgeoned with an iron pipe and stabbed multiple times" before being burned and disposed of – called the nation to attention with horror (Zaino, 2015). Rallies broke out around the country, with numbers in the thousands. A widespread social media movement emerged under the hashtag #sendeanlat, #tellyourstory, where women shared their own stories of abuse and/or sexual harassment (Uras, 2015). It was

at the same time confirmed women's second-class status, condemning violence against women on the grounds that "men are the custodians of women" and thus have a duty to protect them (Kandiyoti, 2015). This perception of women as passive beings in need of shelter and protection only furthers societal norms of men possessing women, of the need to segregate women to keep them safe. President Erdoğan's use of this rhetoric plays into the Islamic populism that he has embraced and it continues to embolden those who undervalue and abuse women. Women's rights groups are justly angered by his comments, but despite the passion of the activists and the promises of Mr. Erdoğan, little tangible steps were taken to curb violence against women.

Again in 2016 an opportunity for action seemed possible. In August, Hande Kader, a 22-year-old transgender woman and sex worker, was raped, murdered, and burned in Istanbul (Shafak, 2016). She was a well-known activist and her death sent shockwaves through the LGBTQ+ and broader progressive community. This incident increased visibility of the violence faced by trans women specifically, and through protests and the #speakoutforhandekader social media campaign, has started a new surge of discussion on violence against women (Ertan, 2016). It is striking that both high profile cases included

a burning of the victim, but there has not been significant study to document if this is part of a larger trend. Though a meeting occurred between activists and parliamentary representatives shortly after the murder to discuss action, in part due to the attempted coup a month earlier, the government has thus far had little response.

Violence against women in Turkey is not limited to horrific front-page murders. Women also experience high-rates of domestic violence, sexual assault and

Such attempts to restrict women to the private sphere is common in right-wing nationalist ideologies as it reinforces the division of sexual power and national labor, encouraging motherhood and the passing on of untarnished cultural values to the next generation. Today in Turkey, this sentiment is observed with the government turning a blind eye to domestic violence and other private sphere crimes, in order to 'protect' the family unit, national bloodline and culture. The continued tolerance in violence against women can no longer be attributed to individual in-

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rape, and child marriages and honor killings occur frequently. To make matters worse, 37.6 percent of Turkish men stated that values such as honor, decency, and discipline make violence against women a necessity, while 34 percent said it is "occasionally necessary," and 28 specified that violence is a tool that can be used to discipline women (Hurriyet, 2013). While legally women have equal rights to men, these types of violent behaviors are further legitimized by the State's rhetoric and policies. Among the AKP's initial successes was a 2005 law, which made sex with minors under the age of 15 illegal, finally classifying it as rape (Tremblay, 2016). This was a boon for children and women's rights as well as advocates fighting against child marriage law; however, in August 2016 the Constitutional Court annulled the provision that labeled all sex with children under 15 as sexual abuse (Anadolu, 2016). Further, in November, the AKP proposed a law that would allow men charged with statutory rape to be pardoned as long as they have either married or agreed to marry their victim (Tremblay, 2016). The proposal has been pulled due to outrage from women's groups who argued that this would perpetuate child marriages; however, the intention of the legislation – to keep women within the private sphere and under the domain of their male custodians – is clear.

idents but rather an institutionalized discrimination and undervaluing of women that, in part, stems from the promotion of a socially conservative, right-wing nationalist identity. Violence against women is "the casualty of a system that was seen to have cheapened women's lives in the process of spinning out a polarizing populist discourse targeting women" (Kandiyoti, 2015).

Reproductive Rights

President Erdoğan's assault on women's reproductive autonomy is rooted in his nationalist agenda and fits within the broader academic discussion of gender and nationalism. As mothers of the nation both figuratively and literally, women hold the national bloodline and are the embodiment of cultural values, virtue, and chastity. In right-wing nationalist states, women's role as procreator of the nation and beacon of integrity creates a dichotomy in which "their femaleness must be possessed by the nation, by men who are the nation's ordained mundane representatives (viz., husbands)" (Benton, 1998:33). This desire for national control over women's reproductive health is seen in President Erdoğan's Turkey where rhetoric is focused on how 'good' Turkish and Muslim families reproduce,

and on protecting the Turkish bloodline.

In 2012, while still Prime Minister, Mr. Erdoğan sparked outrage by calling abortion “an act of murder and an insidious plan to reduce the Turkish population,” likening each abortion to an airstrike on the civilian population (Arsu, 2012). Further, Mr. Erdoğan claimed abortions were inherently against Turkish values stating that “our only goal is to elevate this country above the levels of developed civilizations, for which we need a young and dynamic population,” (Arsu, 2012). In the same speech, he argued for limits on cesareans; subsequently legislation was passed that permit cesareans only under medical emergency or to a woman with intense fear of natural birth (Letsch, 2012). Though the legislation allows for medical considerations, it once again reveals the intent of Mr. Erdoğan to limit women’s autonomy over their bodies in pursuit of nationalist goals. In 2014, as president, Mr. Erdoğan went even further, calling birth control treason that aimed to undermine the Turkish population (Taylor, 2014). This “political rather than moral reasoning,” demonstrates how motherhood has been elevated by the nation to encompass the female national purpose (Taylor, 2014). President Erdoğan’s obsession with national reproduction is similar to that of many right-wing nationalist ideologies in that he hopes not only to confine women to the private sphere, but also to counter-balance demographic

8, 2016, President Erdoğan made a speech stating “a woman is above all else a mother,” and that “you cannot free women by destroying the notion of family,” (Agence France-Presse, 2016). His consistent harking on ‘traditional family values,’ such as the importance of motherhood and evils of birth control and abortion is not only to clearly articulate and coerce his vision of Turkey’s national identity, but also to bolster his support among the conservative, religious, often rural, working-class on which his backing depends. President Erdoğan’s rhetoric on reproductive rights, in which he also calls for Turkish women to have at least three children, has resulted in a drastic decrease in abortion services. Research has shown that despite legislation that defines the legality of abortions, “only 7.8 percent of state hospitals provide abortion services no-questions-asked... while 78 percent provide abortions only when there is a medical necessity for it,” (Alphan, 2016). In the large cities of Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, it’s reported that only nine hospitals perform abortions in line with legislative rules (Alphan, 2016). These developments, a result of Mr. Erdoğan’s embrace of Islamic populism, are troubling in a country that has historically valued its secularism and personal freedoms. Turkey’s legalization of abortion in 1983 was second only to Tunisia in the greater Middle East and North Africa region. The current erosion of rights creates bad precedent in terms of the sustainability of women’s rights throughout the Islamic

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shift, be it real or perceived. In the case of Turkey, this demographic shift also relates to Kurdish minorities, leading to fears of weakened privilege or loss of identity among Turkish nationalists (Taylor, 2014).

Mr. Erdoğan’s focus on reproductive rights has continued despite strong opposition from women’s organizations. On International Women’s Day, March

world (Cavallo, 2015). President Erdoğan’s nationalist rhetoric has pushed reproductive health policies that are dangerous for women and has demonstrated to the entire country that for women, “national motherhood was the one true source of national belonging” (Benton, 1998:33).

Women's Role in Society

President Erdoğan's rhetoric has penetrated the entirety of Turkish society, calling into question the value and role of women. This is seen in the education sector with the 2012 4+4+4 reforms. The reforms extended compulsory schooling from eight years to 12, which is more in line with standards of European democracies. However, it has some caveats that display nation-

decline in labor force participation is representative of women's status in Turkey under Mr. Erdoğan's leadership, as Islamic populism and right-wing nationalism have replaced the once secular culture.

The Women's Movement

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alist and gendered undertones (Sabral, 2012). As part of the new curriculum, "students have to take an oath every morning which ends by saying 'How happy is he who can say I am a Turk,'" overlooking both women and minorities in Turkish society (Sabral, 2012). A key critique to the reforms is that it will preserve, and to an extent increase, child marriage due to an exception that allows married students to leave schooling prior to completing their twelfth year (Akyol, 2014). This exception legitimizes early marriage and continues to show Turkish society that the government prioritizes the education of its boys over its girls. According to the 2015 United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Report, 39 percent of women over the age of 25 have at least some secondary education, while for men it is 60 percent (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2015).

These numbers replicate themselves in the workforce, where only 29.4 percent of women participate, compared to 70.8 percent of men (UNDP, 2015). Though women have not historically played a large role in the labor force, since Mr. Erdoğan assumed the presidency in 2014, Turkey has declined in the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Report from 125 to 130, out of 142 and 144 countries respectively (World Economic Forum, 2016). This is no surprise given President Erdoğan's statement that a woman who chooses career over motherhood is a "half person," (Bruton, 2016). The

en's movement has not stood idly by. In the Gezi protests, women held a prominent role, arguing for an end to violence and the realization of their rights. Women were highly visible, taking part in movements such as the 'kiss protest,' against the government's attempt to regulate cultural values and norms (Associated Press, 2013). The women's movement was weakened post-Gezi, and even more so since the failed July 2016 coup, but is still established and remains relatively organized. Women's organizations have organized protests around the murders of Aslan and Kader in a plea to address violence against women, and individual women have also taken a stand. At Özgecan Aslan's funeral, women caused controversy by standing on the front line despite imams asking them to take 'their place.' Additionally, they carried the coffin to and from prayer against Islamic tradition (Doğan News Network, 2015).

While many women resent President Erdoğan's rhetoric, which states that feminists have "no relation to our religion and our civilization," and for weakening their autonomy, many women support him (Kandiyoti, 2015). For some women this limited view of women's role in the nation is preferable, it provides "a distinct role as women...the female part of the organic, homogeneous nation," (Benton, 1998:33). The women in support of Mr. Erdoğan and the AKP are just as

organized and better resourced than the more liberal nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) pushing for reproductive rights and gender equality. In fact, Sumeyye Erdoğan, one of the president's daughters, sits on the board of the conservative NGO, the Women and Democracy Association (Arsu, 2014). Much like the rest of the Turkish population, women are divided on their view of President Erdoğan and his pursuit of a socially conservative, Islamic influenced, right wing national identity.

IV. Conclusion

The standing of women in Turkish society has declined under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's leadership. As he has become more aligned with Islamic populism and right-wing nationalism the consequences have increased. Women, though equal in law, are repeatedly treated as secondary citizens, a reality demonstrated by the high levels of gender-based violence, erosion of reproductive rights, and rhetoric of their president. In adamantly stating "you cannot make men and women equal... that is against creation. Their natures are different. Their dispositions are different," Mr. Erdoğan reveals his belief of women's limited role in society (Tuysuz, 2016). This view of women merged with nationalist sentiment has driven the instrumentalization of women's bodies for the Turkish state, and women outside of their assigned place in the private sphere serve as a threat to the pious Turkish society that Mr. Erdoğan is trying to cultivate. Looking ahead, it is improbable that his approach toward women will evolve unless it becomes a political liability. While it's likely that he will continue to make promises to address key issues such as violence, given that Mr. Erdoğan's support stems from religious conservatives and nationalists, it is unlikely that any tangible efforts will be made to address the standing of women in Turkish society.

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Liberation of Mothers through Fatherhood CSW and the Nordic model of paternity leave

Richard Bygge



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Women's economic empowerment is the theme of this year's UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW). What can men do to help? Take some time off work for starters.

About a year back, the phrase "gay nannies" circulated on Twitter and other social media outlets, occasionally accompanied by a man carrying a small child. Supposedly, this came from an incredulous American turning to his colleague while visiting Sweden and asking "What's up with all the gay nannies?"

Matter of fact, the "gay nannies," were actually fathers on paternity leave, but the idea that men would want, or even afford to, take parental leave is presented as such a foreign concept in the U.S. such a foreign concept that the asker defaults to the assumption that they are all nannies. As to why they would necessarily have to be gay to complete the picture, well that clearly speaks of other underlying assumptions latent in our society.

to new parents, most fathers choose to take 90 days, which is the bare minimum quota granted to both parents by law (those days being lost if left unused). Only around 14 percent of couples divide the allotted time equally. Nevertheless, the above number would be regarded as astounding among other countries, where 90 days accounts for the maximum limit for paternal leave, including the United States (where, additionally, it is usually unpaid).

Despite the lack of embracement, the idea has been addressed in several occasions. On International Women's Day, the 8th of March, Oscar-awarded actress Anne Hathaway took the podium to deliver an address about paid parental leave at the UN. Rightfully, she chose to focus not only on maternity leave, but also paternity leave as well, arguing "In order to liberate women, we need to liberate men" (unwomen.org).

On March 13, 2017, five days after Ms. Hathaway's

For the mother,
the downsides of being
the only viable
stay-at-home parent are obvious.

It is highly probable that this line was never actually delivered by an American, though it does make for an amusing anecdote. It seems to be one of those lines that periodically surface on social media and then rapidly gains widespread traction on the Internet because it resonates with an image of Americans' apparent ignorance, regardless of being justified or not.

Still, the fact that it got the traction does speak to an unspoken truth: paternity leave as a concept or policy is seen as all but unfathomable in the United States. Indeed, the idea would be met with puzzlement in a large part of the world whereas, assuming parental leave exists as a policy at all, maternity leave is seen as the natural option. Even in Sweden, with its supposed deluge of "gay nannies," parental leave is far from being equally distributed between the genders. Though a total of 480 days of paid leave are afforded

speech, the Commission on the Status of Women, as part of its ongoing 61st conference, hosted an event on the Nordic model of equality. As pointed out during the event, the Nordic countries are often held up as exemplars of gender equality, topping several global league tables on women's rights and wellbeing lists, including the Save the Children's Girls' Opportunity Index and the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Index. The Nordic states' welfare state model is, according to CSW speaker Lynn Roseberry, one of the underlying reasons for high levels of gender equality: uniquely, the gender aspect is almost always taken into consideration whenever any major welfare reforms take place, and equality between the genders is closely intertwined with the Nordic ideology on welfare. Today, paid parental leave plays an integral part in this model, including for the fathers in all the Nordic countries with the exception of Denmark.

Of course, as event moderator Brigid Schulte remarked, despite the glowing reviews and the undeniable feeling that something is clearly going right amongst the Nordics, there are some incongruities. The gender pay gap still remains an underlying issue and, perhaps surprisingly, there are fewer women in Sweden who occupy high positions within the labor market than in the United States. Despite the many successes, Dr. Mari Teigen, a speaker at CWS, pointed to a feeling of pervasive stagnation that has gripped gender advocacy amongst the Nordics. There is a growing sense that gender advocates have grown complacent in the region and the issues that remain unaddressed, such as the aforementioned pay gap that was highlighted at this year's CSW where the predominant theme has been women's economic empowerment, receive little attention since the problem is perceived as 'solved'. But in actual fact the hoped for ripple effect of some policies, such as paternity leave, have not been as far-reaching as people believe; true gender equality remains an unachieved ambition.

Even so, at first glance, the introduction or expansion of gender-neutral, paid parental leave policies appears to be a boon for families. For the mother, the downsides of being put in the role as the only viable stay-at-home parent are obvious: they may be forced to choose between their careers and being a mother. A stay-at-home mother may be pushed into the role of an economic dependent, having to rely on her spouse as the household's sole breadwinner.

Moreover, the assumption that women may choose motherhood over their career may even harm those who have no intention of having children (as well as those who wish to adopt already grown children) due to the deeply rooted social mores that suggests that many women will eventually become mothers. Such an assumption can make men a more attractive option as employees, since there is a lower risk that they might step away from the workplace down the line, making them a more reliable investment. The so-called 'motherhood penalty', or how working mothers are disadvantaged in the workplace, can afflict any woman and put up hurdles which are not faced by their male counterparts.

It is not the aim of this article to diminish motherhood to merely an obstacle to economic liberation. As long as it is entered into willingly, motherhood is a

marvelous thing. But so, many will likely agree, is fatherhood. Fathers are by no means exempt from suffering detrimental effects due to the reigning gender dichotomy on parental leave. Not only are men often deprived of the opportunity to be a major presence in their children's life, especially during the early stages, but they are also likely to shoulder the burden of being the household's sole breadwinner in what can only be called economically volatile times the world over.

Being the breadwinner can be an incredibly stressful role to undertake alone where before they had likely shared the burden with their spouse, particularly for young men who have turned into fathers for the first time. Depression is not uncommon and is affecting more men, as shown by studies by organizations such as the American Academy in Pediatrics and the Medical Research Council in the UK (American Academy in Pediatrics; Medical Research Council). At the same time, the Nordic representatives at the CWS pointed to domestic studies that show the benefits paternity leave has on men's confidence and mental health, and how it helps fathers to develop the so-called 'caregiver competence' in parallel with the mother.

This means that, in the absence of paternity leave, children are not only deprived of those early opportunities of getting to know their fathers to the same extent that they know their mothers, but it can also have a detrimental effect on their relationship for years if not for life. Therefore, a more gender-neutral take on parental leave would not simply be beneficial to women. Indeed, the benefits of a paternity leave policy would be many and varied for both genders, and paternity leave certainly should not be viewed as an instrument meant to emasculate men who recently turned into fathers. Nevertheless, it is plausible that it might be viewed in such a light due to the prevalent societal norms that surround the issue.

There are other hurdles to overcome. The United States is the sole remaining high income country where the much more common and socially accepted maternity leave goes unpaid (or even entirely unavailable beyond perhaps a few weeks postpartum) in this manner, it seems like the notion of implementing paid paternity leave might seem too big a leap for family norms to handle. The more immediate concern could possibly be the fact that mothers need to be ensured

income and job position recovery after the initial weeks of their newborn lives. Yet this seems like an unnecessary, if not directly harmful stopover: if the idea of paid parental leave in general came to be accepted practice, it would remove one factor as to why men are so hesitant about taking the leap into the role of fathers as opposed to being the primary breadwinners. Furthermore, the fact that only mothers can take their paid leave while barring such an option for fathers could potentially exacerbate the prevailing gender imbalance, since mothers would have an additional reason to stay at home while further pressure would be put on the father to stay at work to guarantee that no benefits are lost. Such circumstances, a strange sort of dark side to generous maternity-exclusive leave policies, could potentially further exacerbate the damage to a woman's career opportunities. "In order to liberate women, we need to liberate men", indeed.

Ironically, the issue is even more essential in countries that have implemented generous parental leave

the state for getting involved in what is seen as a private family affair, not the least in the United States.

Throughout the talks held in the commission it has become clear that paternity leave is not a miracle solution, and the policy's supposed ripple effect on gender equality in the labor market has been more limited than might have been initially expected. Dr. Teigen suggested that, if paternity leave had been, or will be in the future, a part of a larger push for gender equality across the labor market, its effects might have been more far reaching. For instance, even now, it is common practice for employers to talk with expecting mothers about what kind of circumstances they can expect now that a child enters the picture and how her work might be affected. A similar practice for men, and how a child or parental leave might affect their work, remains curiously absent. Again, the subconscious gender bias is not so easily dispelled or abandoned.

On the other hand, it is worth keeping in mind that simply one generation ago, no fathers in the Nordic

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systems, as mothers feel incentivized to take advantage from such systems while expecting fathers to maintain their employment, furthering the gender gap rather than closing it. As pointed out at the event, there is currently an ongoing debate in Sweden and Norway whether the system already in place should have more incentives to encourage a more equal division of the generous parental leave provisions. Alternatively, simply extending the quota of parent-specific days beyond the already allotted 90 has been bandied about, but there is the issue whether forcing fathers to take leave from work is a solution. Societal norms often need a push to change, and the gender norms have proven to be considerably more resistant than most, but some fathers might grow resentful towards

countries would even consider the idea of taking parental leave. This current generation of fathers are the first to make use of it, and even if only 14 percent choose to divide the allotted time equitably, it is still a meteoric rise even if it may sometime feel glacial. Something is happening. It may not be enough on its own, but it is an important part of the general push towards gender equality in the labor market.

As a final argument, it has often been said that for women to achieve the same level of empowerment as men, economic or in other spheres, male allies are needed. Yet, there is a potential pitfall when it comes

to engaging them, and that is to enlist men in the role of protectors. A guardian to safeguard women's interest is a modern take on the ancient practice of male stewardship. Nonetheless, a policy of paid paternity leave to complement maternity leave would not lead to such a dynamic. On the contrary, it would serve as a step towards balancing the roles of men and women as parents and caretakers, eventually leading to more equal and harmonious prospects both in the workplace and in the family.

Surely that is a goal worth striving for, a conclusion which has been seemingly reached by the CSW during its 61st conference. Among the agreed upon conclusions, the CSW has affirmed its intent to, as part of its promotion of policies for women's economic empowerment, recognize the significance of paid paternity leave and fatherhood in children's upbringing and the need to counter discrimination against parents who would avail themselves to benefits afforded for social security purposes. Whether this will result in concrete policy making down the line still remains unsolved. The idea of paternity leave has been raised on previous occasions, as for instance during the 58th conference in 2014 and even tentatively raised as far back as 1996 during the 40th session when the CSW expressed its will to encourage incentives that would enable men as well as women to take parental leave. But the 61st session has undoubtedly been the first conference that explicitly makes mention of paid "paternity leave" as a stated goal. It is promising that further attention has been called to it and the positive effect it can have on women's prospects in the labor market, even if the road to actually get to that the aimed point may be long.

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Jihadi Brides or Muhajirat?

Understanding the Uptick in Western Women Being Recruited and Emigrating to the Caliphate

Melissa Salyk-Virk



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Introduction

When the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS/ISIL/ISIS) declared its Caliphate in June 2014, the group created something that the groups that had existed before IS had only imagined about—the physical location of a Salafist extremist Sunni-driven Sharia law society. Not only that, but it also developed a sophisticated media machine with targeted message points for recruitment, packed with visuals to cater to the wide range of potential recruits. These message points not only garnered attention from Muslims around the Middle East, but the interest also spread East and Westward, gaining the attention of Europeans and Americans.

The United States (US) House Homeland Security Committee's monthly terror threat snapshot states that nearly 40,000 foreign fighters have traveled to Syria, of which 6,900 are from the West, and 250 from the United States. The United Kingdom's (UK) HM Government Counter-Extremism Strategy states that 750 UK-linked individuals have traveled to Syria. According to a March, 2016 New York Times article, an estimated 56 British women and teenage girls have left the United Kingdom to go to Syria (Stack), and according to a newly released New America report, about 35 women have traveled to ISIS territory from the United States (Bergen, Sterman, Sims, Ford 3).

While this established Caliphate created a new way of recruiting, something even more profound occurred – ISIS started actively recruiting women, not as active suicide bombers, or simply as wives of fighters, but as active members of society. This observable difference started intriguing Western women so much that the recruitment of them, specifically, became an endeavor for ISIS for a variety of reasons. This paper will address ISIS' media machine tactics, themes for women's recruitment, the roles of women in ISIS, (specifically women from the UK and the US) and the counterterrorism narratives in these countries. According to the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) and the International Centre for Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), there is no way to create a broad profile of a muhajirat (female migrant) based on demographics, which makes the development of a counternarrative that much more complex.

The ISIS Media Machine

As recent as 2011, jihadist groups began to

expand outside of traditional media. Traditional media reports official videos released by jihadists or reports on attacks, according to Jytte Klausen of Brandeis University. She states that instead of traditional reporting, "groups, media outlets, and individuals moved on to mainstream social media platforms and created new accounts on Twitter and Facebook. Most groups' media outlets still post their content to jihadi forums but will simultaneously create sponsored Twitter accounts where they release new statements or videos," (quoted in Klausen 3). This concept of reaching out directly to the public without the aid of making official statements to international media allows groups like the Islamic State to remain technologically relevant and have the opportunity to directly interact with the target audience(s).

Since the establishment of the Caliphate in the summer of 2014, ISIS has been actively recruiting members through social media platforms. They do this through targeted messaging for men, women and families to join the society they have set up in the territory they acquired. The types of media being pushed are photo essays, videos, audio statements, news bulletins, posters, and theological essays (Winter 3), and the largest platforms used, outside of the dark web (where special browsers are required to access content anonymously) are Ask.fm, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, PalTalk, kik, viper, JustPaste.it, and Tumblr (Klausen 1). Through these platforms, they are able to acquire large sums of followers who receive their messaging. ISIS has official accounts and other media wings, which push messages out to its tens of thousands of individual social media followers, and message points get shared through this trickledown effect.

ISIS also has supporters that have multiple accounts which promote the official messages and/or post messages in support of ISIS activity. In fact, according to Alex Kassirer of Flashpoint in New York, ISIS has an entire media life cycle. It begins with what she refers to as "battlefield recording", which is raw content. This footage is then exported to a computer, which is edited by ISIS' production team. The logistics team then uploads the compressed file to playback sites, which are then published via links to anonymous text ties. ISIS then posts a press release and a download link to forums, which is then "crowd sourced" by supporters to push out the message

points (Kassirer).

According to the Quilliam Foundation's report Documenting the 'Virtual' Caliphate, the Islamic State propaganda machine issues 38.2 individual propaganda posts every day (Winter 5). While 38.2 may not seem abundant, these are ISIS official accounts that generate these messages, and this does not include additional supporter accounts and followers of these accounts. Therefore, the Islamic State is pushing at least one to two message points per platform every single day, so potential followers or members just need to land on one of their pages to get information. With this increased social media push and the expansion from uploading of videos like al Qaeda's, which were less sophisticated in comparison, according to Terrorism Researcher Michael Zekulin (qtd. in Casciani), ISIS has a larger reach and is able to connect and interact with its target recruitment audience.

There are specific themes that have emerged in the propaganda: mercy, belonging, brutality, victimhood, war, and utopia (Winter 6). In a world where every Western media report documents the brutal nature of the group, and the violations and infringements on society, a glimpse into a softer side of ISIS is what may be appealing to curious Westerners. If these are the largest themes, it appears that they are strategically categorizing media so that they can send their message to those who want to defend the Islamic State's actions against non-Sunni Muslims who do not support the ISIS agenda, while at the same time promote what they consider civil society. It is inviting, though dangerous, the latter of which is increasingly appealing to young men and women.

One of the unique things that ISIS has done with recruiting is not message points or mediums used, but the actual recruiters themselves. Women have been recruiting women online, and even more specifically, Western women who have entered ISIS territory are now recruiting other Western women. "Anecdotal evidence suggests that, compared with their counterparts in Muslim countries, young Muslim women from the West are most likely to respond to the call and that the most effective recruiters are other Western-raised women who have already migrated to Islamic State," (Atwan 183). It makes bringing women into the Caliphate much easier when there is a network and support system in place for these expatriates.

The Call to Make Hijra (Pilgrimage) – Recruitment of Western Women

The Islamic State has been strategic in how it approaches recruitment for hijra. ISIS is actively seeking individuals to come and live in the territory in order to build society. The media team has been very savvy in recognizing that likeminded individuals will gravitate towards one another, so young Western women can relate to others who are curious. This push for friendship, sisterhood, and doing what they believe is right in the name of God, helps build this group.

According to the Institute for Strategic Dialogue report, Till Martyrdom Do Us Part, over 550 Western women have traveled to ISIS territory to join the Caliphate (Saltman and Smith 4). Women recruiters tend to primarily focus on civilian life, and the promotion of marriage and sisterhood. They engage young women in topics of Caliphate life, relationships, marriage discussions, and the pride one has in being the wife of a to-be shaheed (martyr). The Institute for Strategic Dialogue argues that there are "push and pull factors" for why women join, ranging from isolation in the Western world as Muslims, persecution of the international Muslim population and emotions over a lack of response to the persecution (Saltman and Smith 9). The pull factors identified are an idealized vision of the Caliphate, sisterhood, and romanticized expectations (Saltman and Smith 13). Many of these women come from cultures that are individualized, and Eastern cultures are traditionally collectivistic. Collectivism can create more salient relationships in the eyes of these women, because they have the common goal of working for the betterment of the Caliphate, where everyone has the same objectives and wishes, or at least it is marketed that way.

Although there is no one-size-fits-all description of women who join ISIS from the West (Saltman and Smith 5), there are likely certain themes that can be carried across. There is not extensive research on this because the sample is difficult to interact with; it is possible that some of these women are from families which are ethnic or religious minorities, or they are third culture children, growing up in a culture that is different from their parents'. Also, some of these women may have identified with the ISIS agenda and converted to Islam to have access to the Caliphate. There are many possibilities for the backgrounds of

these women and what draws them to the adventure and danger of the Islamic State.

Roles of Western Women in ISIS

Once they reach the Caliphate, women are encouraged to get married soon after arrival, which gives them the opportunity to have children and raise the next generation. According to Jayne Huckerby of Duke University, once there, women can serve in all-female units that patrol and inflict violent punishment on other women; they also raid homes, serve in recruitment capacities, train suicide bombers, serve as fundraisers, and spread propaganda (A27). Some women have been largely effective at dissemination of propaganda for recruitment through social media

Frenett 31). What seems to be problematic with this idea is that these women are told what an honor it is to be the wife of a shaheed, and oftentimes these women may have already had children with their husbands, so the likelihood of them becoming martyrs themselves is small. Therefore, they are encouraged to raise the next generation of jihadists. From this standpoint, it is easier for many mothers to become recruiters, and this way, they still have access to the internet. "Female supporters of ISIS, especially the Western female migrants to ISIS-controlled territory, contribute significantly to spreading ISIS ideology," (Hoyle, Bradford, Frenett 34). Western women fill a recruitment niche because they understand how to connect with other Western women and their

The Islamic State is pushing at least one to two message points per platform every single day, so potential followers just need to land on one of their pages to get the information.

platforms. There are others who have specialized roles relating to women's health or education. Some women are interested in being martyrs themselves.

As aforementioned, it is suspected that others join groups like the al Khansaa Brigade, which is principally an all-women's morality contingent. al Khansaa roams the ISIS territory looking for Sharia violations, making sure the women of the Caliphate are following the rules (Bhutia). If they come into contact with a violator, then they have free reign to punish her. The women who participate in the brigade also get intensive weapons and religious training (Moaveni). According to the al Khansaa handbook for women, translated by the Quilliam Foundation, women in the Islamic State are meant to primarily serve their husbands and children, but may have secondary roles that allow them to leave their homes, such as jihad when called, furthering their Quranic studies and/or serving as doctors or teachers (al Khansaa Brigade).

According to the report by the Institute of Strategic Dialogue, Becoming Mulan, some women in ISIS territory express a readiness and willingness to fight, in addition to their other roles (Hoyle, Bradford,

collective narrative.

Why Women Are Joining from the United Kingdom and the United States

Michael Petrou of Maclean's writes, "Previous jihads, even high-profile ones, such as in Afghanistan during the 1980s and '90s, did not attract anywhere near the same numbers of foreign women, and especially Western ones." The online propaganda has been strategic in brainwashing these young women, known as jihadi brides, to join the Caliphate. This concept of jihadi brides puts these women in a category that infers weakness, impressionability, and being incapable of any decision making of their own. Mia Bloom from the University of Massachusetts Lowell has written extensively on the topic of women in terrorism, and has argued that women in ISIS territory are viewed as "baby making factories," (quoted in Bell). This idea of a jihadi bride that only serves as a wife and mother is something that has largely plagued Western media. How is it then that these young women are able to make the step of initiating contact, plotting to leave what they know,

and making it all the way to ISIS territory? They choose to actively engage in these online platforms and engage with recruiters. The international media has too long regarded these young women as victims, but are they actually perpetrators? According to Jayne Huckerby of Duke University, “We do still very much operate in a world where the idea that women don't have agency – that they must be tricked or under the influence or brainwashed or they only joined to become jihadi brides – is very much still a dominant frame,” (quoted in Petrou).


As previously discussed, women who travel to ISIS territory are often provided with opportunities to engage in society. Perhaps some do wish to be brides of shaheed. Some may want to fight with mujahideen (one who is engaged in jihad) in the literal sense, but realize that they are not given opportunities to fight on the frontlines. In that case, they are able to contribute in other ways, such as promoting Sharia law by being in a group like the al-Khansaa Brigade, which provides an outlet for violence and anger towards those not abiding by Caliphate law. Others may simply feel like they are contributing by teaching Quranic studies and practicing this extreme version of Islam that ISIS has developed. Yet, others want to recruit women to join their ranks because they truly believe that this is the will of God.

and the acts of it are always evolving. Counterterrorism measures and counternarratives/alternate narratives to recruitment and radicalization need to also evolve. Of the countries discussed, both the United States and United Kingdom have created broad counterterrorism measures. The United Nations (UN), of which both of these states are members, has its own counterterrorism strategy. According to the United Nations Action to Counter Terrorism website, the UN has a four-pillar strategy that includes “addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; preventing and combatting terrorism; building states’ capacity and strengthening the role of the United Nation; and ensuring human rights and the rule of law,” (United Nations). In addition, the UN has a Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force.

The United States has a Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT). Within CT, specific initiatives have been created to work toward countering violent extremism (CVE) and specific supporting groups such as partnerships, eliminating financing of terrorist groups, terrorist screenings, among others (US Department of State).

The United States has been trying to counter the narrative that ISIS has been propagating, and has created its own CVE programming with message

ISIS Foreign Migrants from US and UK



Original graphic by Melissa Salyk-Virk via piktochart.com

Counterterrorism Narratives in the United Kingdom, the United States, and the United Nations

Terrorism is not a new concept, yet perpetrators

points crafted by the Department of State. In terms of successful views, it has largely been criticized by the media as being ineffective because it is not drawing website traffic, and may actually be aiding ISIS’ cause instead of deterring (Poole). In addition, this program has been further criticized because it focuses on key neighborhoods which have a strong Muslim population. This has caused tension within

communities due to fear of informants, as well as concerns about stereotyping of the community.

The United Kingdom has gone one step further and has created multiple programs, such as CounterExtremism.org which is managed by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. This group has developed a process called Channel, which focuses on the identification of individuals who may be prone to violent extremism. The UK government also has a program called PREVENT that has now started serving as a surveillance tool. This program has largely been criticized by the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC), which argues that this program is based on illegal or racist and approaches to surveillance, (Chambers).

These programs are created to combat terrorist ideology that has the potential to harm large numbers of people if violent action is taken. However, the most significant problem with these functions is that they are often directly tied to government entities. This means that programs are tied to institutions with numerous and wide-ranging priorities apart from this individual project, which results in limited financial and personnel allocations. Additionally, local communities are less empowered to combat this concern. Since the vast majority of those from the West who have traveled or have tried to travel to ISIS territory are males, the counternarratives and alternate narratives do not really exist for the Western female population, specifically, although, all of these political/government entities recognize the importance of including women in the CVE process. Therefore, "efforts to prevent women from leaving for Iraq and Syria need to address such grievances, just as programs for those who return must be tailored to their specific experiences in the group. The strong influence of social media and peer networks also points to including more young women in these efforts, as well as female community leaders and family members," (Huckerby).

Additionally, most of the counternarrative activities seem to be driven by ideology and not methodology, (German). This becomes problematic because since September 11, 2001, counterterrorism narratives and strategy largely focus on Islamism and terms of radicalization and countering violent extremism. Although message points can be broad, programs like those in the United States and the United Kingdom cater to groups focused on terrorism and violence.

This puts large segments of the population in racist or Islamophobic categories that ostracizes people and builds fear, racism, and resentment against these groups. Even if the governments intend to do something different, programming and research still focuses on young men, and the stereotypes and hypermasculinization of war-driven violent men.

Conclusion

While there was much speculation about an influx of foreigners from the West joining the ranks of ISIS, Western women as jihadi brides has become a focal point in international media. The original notion about helpless young women becoming radicalized and brainwashed online has turned into a complex conversation about rationale for traveling, roles of women, and the appeal of ISIS to Western women specifically. The United States and the United Kingdom alone have under 100 women who have traveled abroad, but the number is not what has driven the conversation so much as the lack of understanding as to why they have left. The other alarming aspect is the response to the counternarratives and alternate narratives available to this population. Much of the available counter conversation has been limited, and the effectiveness of these programs has been questioned by the nations they are meant to support. While states attempt to combat terrorism recruitment, communities impacted the most are facing new challenges such as increased surveillance, stereotyping, and CVE programming developed without their input. Local knowledge and community-driven programming is the most effective way to combat this international concern, and needs to be supported and promoted by governments.

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Transnational Security



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Dar Es Salam, Tanzania
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Real vs. Imaginary Threat

Russian Influence in the Czech Republic and its Security Apparatus

Phil Payne



Photograph 2007 kremlin.ru

Introduction:

It's the country farthest east of the West and farthest west of the East. The Czech Republic has indeed found itself again in the predicament that has harassed its political system and economy over the last century. As the Czechs would say, it is a "medium-sized" European Union country and North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally, stuck in-between two geopolitical giants in the middle of an economic war – Russia and the United States of America. Despite the Czech Republic's public efforts to portray an image of belief in Western values, they have walked a tight line in this conflict, often sending mixed signals to their NATO allies, having used this neutral position to play down plausible threats, and grossly exaggerate unrealistic ones. Czech public discourse focuses on the threat of Islamic terrorism, political extremism, nuclear proliferation and organized crime. However, Russia persistently tries to advance its own policy goals in the Czech Republic within three sectors: first, in the influence of public opinion (e.g., news), second, in critical infrastructure (e.g., transportation, energy and other strategic industries) and lastly, in industrial development (e.g., nuclear power, research and development and biomedicine).

In 2015, the Czech Republic's Ministry of Defense released its updated Security Strategy report that covers a number of vital and strategic interests for the government, as well as several security threats. Throughout the twenty-six-page report, there is neither mention of Russian espionage nor any mention of Russia at all. By examining the report, Article 19 comes closest to addressing the potential of Russian espionage and press disinformation, which states, "Unilateral attempts of some states to carve out their own spheres of influence through a combination of political, economic and military pressures and intelligence activities may be considered a threat; these pressures and activities occur also in cyberspace" (Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, 2015).

While conducting an interview with Dr. Miroslav Mareš, professor of Security and Strategic Studies at Masaryk University in Brno, he professed, "In the Czech Republic, we have special branches of the BIS [Security Information Service] and police units focused on terrorism and yet no law enforcement agencies focused on espionage. There are no institutions for countering espionage within the police. The next problem, in

addition to this huge wave of possible espionage, is Russian propaganda and freedom of speech in the Czech Republic; there are no institutions to deal with these issues." Mareš's comment reflects the Czech Republic's lack of attention for counterintelligence. BIS, the Security Information Service is the agency responsible for all foreign intelligence services within the Czech territory and as Dr. Mareš suggests, they are not properly equipped to contend with the ongoing Russian subversion.

In March of 2015, the Czech Republic claims to have deported two unnamed Russian diplomats and denied a visa to a third for "suspected espionage". The removal of these diplomats came without comment from the Czech government. One can assume one of two things occurred: either the Czech government was too late in preventing these individuals from obtaining particular information, or the government apprehended the individuals too early to catch them in the act of spying. Neither one of the options are a positive outcome for a Czech government that is struggling to protect its society from Russian policies.

Regardless of how alarming these reports appear – they apparently have little effect on the Ministry of Defense's security stratagem. Islamist terrorism, conversely, is mentioned several times in the security report and "Islamophobia" is a key issue in their political debate. Could it be that fear of Islamic radicalization is in fact euphemistically referring to a "fear of Russia?" It appears, from a pragmatic point-of-view on Czech governance, that the threat of Russian espionage specifically poses the biggest hazard to Czech sovereignty and security.

Russia's attempts to destabilize North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) are well acknowledged in the larger Western powers. The Czechs, however, have not taken a hard stance against Russia like Poland and Germany have in the past year. Newsweek reporter, Damien Sharkov writes, "Czech intelligence sources estimate that around thirty Russian embassy staff in Prague are spies and BIS have repeatedly warned of the presence of Russian intelligence in the Czech Republic" (Sharkov, 2015). In spite of this, Czech government officials are either looking the other way or are oblivious to the unnecessarily high amount of employees at the embassy. There is a clear neglect to implement the reforms required to oversee

the activities of Russian diplomats deemed to be suspicious.

Historically, the Russian population is well rooted in Czech society. They have acquired a significant presence in the Czech Republic since the 1970's when large numbers of Russians migrated to the USSR occupied lands. To date there are approximately 30,000 Russians and 120,000 Ukrainians with residency permits within Moravia and Bohemia. While most of them are Czech citizens, there have been many accounts and whispers since the Velvet Revolution regarding those Czechs loyal to Moscow looking to extend Russian interests.

To put threats mentioned in the Ministry of Defense's report into perspective, in a nation of 10,777 million people, the Islamic population is approximately 20,000 people (Prague Post, 2014). Meaning one out of every five hundred thirty-nine individuals is reported to be Muslim (including non-practicing Muslims), while one out of every seventy-two is either Russian or has a robust Russian connection. My research indicates there is an enormous divide on the diminutive threat Islamic terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pose to the Czech security apparatus versus the practical danger that Russian subversiveness represents.

Prague is a vital staging ground for Russian welfare

intelligence and leverage the Czech Republic's status as an EU member state, according to a former head of the Czech military intelligence. After reports emerged in the Czech press that three suspected Russian spies were asked to quietly leave Prague, the Czech government has struggled to play down the incident as [rumors] of its longstanding problem with Russian intelligence have begun resurfacing once again.

To complicate matters further, all three alleged spies had diplomatic ties with Russian foreign missions, one of them being a full time employee Prague embassy, according to Czech magazine Respekt, forcing Prague to refuse to either confirm or deny the truth of the reports. Czech intelligence sources estimate that around 30 Russian embassy staff in Prague are spies and BIS have repeatedly warned of the presence of Russian intelligence in the Czech Republic" (Sharkov, 2015).

I. Public Opinion:

Currently the Russian embassy in Prague has 150 diplomats, in contrast to the United States that employs 70 full time diplomats, and China that has 28. The high number of Russians in their embassy should warrant concern to the Czech Republic's intelligence agencies such as the BIS and UZSI. In speaking with officials at the Ministry of Interior, there was clearly an identifiable frustration in the policies and procedures in

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because it is a crossroads in the European Union and the Schengen area. Individuals can travel freely to Portugal on one side and Estonia on the other. Damien Sharkov, of Newsweek, reported earlier this week that,

"Prague has become a major target for Russian and Chinese spies attempting to gain access to NATO

place to have effective counterintelligence operations and special services.

Through my conversations with an anonymous official at the Ministry of Interior office in Prague, a number of concerns were raised about the counterintelligence operations of the BIS. The

interviewee indicated that though funds for the BIS are due to increase in the future as a result of the recent Paris attacks – keeping a watchful eye on Russian diplomats is an expensive task. The BIS do not have the financial resources, manpower or ability to follow all speculations. Although the BIS have speculative ideas – the agency can only follow up on a few at a given time and has to coordinate leads with the police. This leaves the open the possibility of leaked information tainting investigations because sensitive records are traveling through too many channels. It is even harder to keep track of false identity operators (i.e. non-accredited diplomats) such as a fake tourist emissary.

John R. Schindler, the security-focused author of the XX Committee website, released an article this month affirming this, which states,

“In its annual counterintelligence report released last October, BIS stated that the number of Russians spies in the country was “extremely high,” and they were actively targeting several sectors of politics, security, and the economy. Both Russian agencies that conduct espionage abroad, the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and the military’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), are active in the Czech Republic” (Schindler, 2015).

The ability for Russian intelligence agents to operate practically without restraint is partially due to the overreaction and panic from Czech citizens giving

USSR. Today, Czech politicians avoid the subject of intelligence reform in fear of being connected to corruption. In one example, Jana Necasova, now wife of former Czech prime minister Petr Neca, abused the VZ (Military Intelligence Agency) in 2012 to spy on Neca’s estranged wife Radka (Dolezal, 2014). Perhaps it is cases like Necasovas’ that allows this ‘Post Soviet Complex’ to flourish. Hindering progress that the Czech Republic could be making in their efforts to control sensitive information and investigate political parties that are financed by dirty money and Russian endorsement.

In addition, this anxiety is fueled by Russian propaganda – a major area of aim for Russian activity and sympathizers, as well as a key danger to the welfare of Czech safety. The method is simple and effective: raise doubts in conventional media, thus resulting in greater support for alternative and Internet based information sources to push Russian disinformation. For example, “Britské Listy is a Czech-language cultural and political internet daily. It is published by a reader-financed NGO Britské Listy o.s. (Czech: Občanské Sdružení Britské Listy, OSBL). Their motto is ‘Daily about everything the Czech Republic doesn't talk about’ (Czech: Deník o všem, o čem se v České Republice příliš nemluví)” (Britské Listy, 2006). Their long-term objective is not to publish pro-US government views but instead provide European views on articles and topics that mainstream media in the Czech Republic ignore or under-report (2006). Since Britské Listy identifies with an isolationist and

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intelligence agencies too much authority. These fears that date back to the Russian communist regime, when bureaus like the KGB (Russian Committee for State Security), ŠtB (Czech Secret Political Police) and PGU (Russian Foreign Intelligence Service) operated with impunity and without remorse throughout the

anti-American perspective, they can attract readers who believe the US is forcing their policies on the Czech government.

Another media outlet is RT, formerly Russia Today, a 24/7 English-language news channel that promotes the Russian view-point on global news. It famously runs

anti-West articles such as “NATO troops and bases not welcome in Slovakia and Czech Republic” and “Tanks? No thanks! Czechs unhappy about US military convoy crossing country.” These organizations do a great job of reporting corruption to amplify distrust between Czech citizens and the government, while referencing

Prague Airport and Czech Airlines, as well as railways, agriculture and energy, are the most tangible threats that the Czech Republic face. In my interview with Dr. Mitchell Belfer, Head of the Department of International Relations and European Studies at the Metropolitan University Prague and Editor in Chief of the Central

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sensitive historical events that allow them to provide their audience with the Russian biased truth.

High school teacher turned Slovak activist, Juraj Smatana, has been tracking the upsurge in pro-Kremlin propaganda in Slovakia and the Czech Republic since the annexation of Crimea. He states,

“In the past few months, the number of websites supporting the Kremlin information war in Czech language has been steadily increasing. Soon after the annexation of Crimea, the news portal Aeronet.cz launched an aggressive campaign against the new government in Kiev. In 2014, the Czech counterintelligence agency designated it as ‘source of dangerous pro-Russian propaganda.’ Nevertheless, Aeronet.cz appears to be only the tip of the iceberg, as similar online platforms have since been established or recently increased their activity. Russia is portrayed as a force for moral good and traditional values” (Smolenova, 2015).

In my interview with Dr. Mareš he expressed trepidation about the rural communities in the Czech Republic leaning to these new sources of information because of their identity with isolationist values and support for political figures like current Czech President, Miloš Zeman, more so than the internationalist ideals of most city residents.

II. Critical Infrastructure:

Big business and foreign money in critical infrastructure, such as selling off parts of Václav Havel

European Journal of International and Security Studies (CEJISS), he stressed, “None of these dealings would be in the best interests of Czech national security.” For example, in 2010, Russian airline Aeroflot was barred from involvement in the denationalization of Czech Airline CSA. Still, these acquisitions are bountiful according to Tony Wesolowsky, author for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and contributor for the CS Monitor. He explains,

“Russians are also using their vast oil and gas reserves to spread clout. At the forefront is Gazprom, one of the world's largest energy companies. The Russian gas giant supplies about 25 percent of the natural gas sold in Western Europe. In Eastern Europe, the percentage is higher: Bulgaria and Slovakia alone depend on Gazprom for 90 percent of their gas. Gazprom is also buying up energy infrastructure in the region. Through a subsidiary, Gazprom has bought a Czech natural-gas supplier and is expected to use its network to heat Czech homes. A battle royal is brewing in the nuclear energy sphere, pitting Moscow against Washington for a project billed as one of Europe's biggest and most lucrative: The Czech Republic is planning to build more reactors at one of its two nuclear power plants.” (Wesolowsky, 2011)

Temelín Power Plant, in southern Bohemia, on the Austrian border, is a prime example of crucial Czech infrastructure at the mercy of foreign capital. Though the construction of two new nuclear reactors at

Temelín Power Plant have been suspended numerous times since 2011, it was not due to the Czech Republic wanting to be independent of Russian energy blackmail. Instead, ČEZ Group (Energy conglomerate and policy-maker in the Czech Republic on energy issues) have released statements that the project was suspended due to falling electricity prices that have made the ten billion dollar project less feasible since the Czech government would not guarantee energy prices (as if any government could guarantee energy prices). In my research, I looked for plausible of ČEZ's CEO, Daniel Beneš, to Russian business elite but could not find any information linking him to corruption – however, it doesn't completely rule out a Russian association per se.

Again, according to Wesolowsky, "The Czech Republic's main security agency, Security Information Service, has raised red flags about doing business with Russia, warning in a 2009 report that the Kremlin was using Russian business to infiltrate NATO states with spies. In pushing Temelín, however, Czech politicians not focused on security or energy needs, but rather have talked mostly about jobs" (Wesolowsky, 2013).

2003. They were purchasing nuclear fuel from US based, Japanese owned energy firm, Westinghouse Electric Co. until Russian state-owned, OAO TVEL won a contract in 2006 to supply nuclear fuel to the plant from 2010 until 2020. In addition, "Russia signed a contract to supply secondary neutron sources last year (2014). TVEL also manufactures fuel for the Czech Republic's four VVER-440 Dukovany nuclear power plant units" (World Nuclear News, 2015).

Russia has been removed from the procurement process in building two new nuclear reactors at Temelín because of corruption and Czech government support for Western sanctions on Russia for its annexation of Crimea. However, Wesolowsky adds, "The BIS has warned of growing cooperation in the Czech Republic between Russian intelligence agents and that country's business elite. [The] BIS [say] Russian spies are the most "active" ones on Czech soil" (Wesolowsky, 2011). So the future is still open for the Kremlin and Russian elite to obtain contracts and lucrative acquisitions in key strategic industries in the Czech Republic.

Presently, there are four bidders for the completion

Though the construction of two new nuclear reactors at Temelín Power Plant have been suspended numerous times since 2011, it was not due to the Czech Republic wanting to be independent of Russian energy blackmail.

Benign neglect for intelligence reform by politicians and government officials was the most baffling part of my research in the Czech Republic since there is a long history of Russian involvement in key strategic industries crucial to Czech national security.

The Temelín case is as complex as it is attention grabbing. As shown in Exhibit A and B there is predictable support in the Czech Republic for more nuclear energy in their control – which is to be expected in a country that has been so reliant on outside sources of oil and gas for so long. The Czech Republic already has two VVER-1000, Soviet-designed reactors that have been in operation since 2000 and

of Temelín – Areva (French multinational group specializing in nuclear and renewable energy headquartered in Paris), Westinghouse (Japanese firm owned by Toshiba), KEPCO (South Korean Power Corp), and now China. "The new tender for the completion of Temelín nuclear power plant could start before the end of 2017. Power utility ČEZ has confirmed that it plans to pick the winner by 2019 or 2020" (CIA News, 2015).

Crimea backlash does not completely rule out Russian influence in the future oil and gas procurement of the Czech Republic for three reasons: the increased amounts of pro-Russian propaganda, the current leftist Czech government exploiting political

corruption over the past two decades to justify its actions, and the inability for the BIS and UZSI to operate effectively. "According to a 2014 opinion poll, the post-Communist developments since 1989 have not met the expectations of 54% of Czechs and 70% of Slovaks, and such propaganda is drawing on this sentiment" (Smolenova, 2015). Thus, a declining Russia may still be able to salvage a significant foothold in the Czech Republic during this period of 'uncomfortable hot peace'.

III. Industrial Espionage:

The last major region of Russian reconnaissance and attention is industrial espionage or theft of trade secrets. This is the most tricky sector because of its overlap with business espionage e.g. Temelín. Dr. Norman Bailey, former senior staff in the Office of the

Department, may be traced to the influence of environmental NGOs, the activities of which are, in turn, financed by Russia" (Bailey, 2015).

An area linked to industrial advantages in any democracy is political support. Russia has advisors to current Czech President Miloš Zeman which raises speculation as to Russia's insurgency capabilities in Czech politics. Though democracies, their politicians and institutions are hypothetically transparent – money is key when it comes to officials running for political office. This unfortunate truth allows Russia to yet again insert its foreign policy in the Czech Republic. Dr. Bailey adds,

"Examples of such uses of 'soft' power in the Western Hemisphere have recently been detailed in think-tank reports, but by far the

Crimea backlash does not completely rule out Russian influence in the future oil and gas procurement of the Czech Republic.

Director of National Intelligence in the George W. Bush administration and contributor to the World Tribune, looked at NGOs (non-governmental organizations) role in industrial espionage and reported some interesting findings. He states,

"In the past few weeks it has transpired that several respected environmental NGOs, such as the Sierra Club, one of the largest and most respected, had been receiving millions of dollars from various Bermuda-based companies and funds, the ultimate source of which was non-other than the government of Russia. The purpose of this support was to increase public and government opposition to fracking technologies, which have resulted in substantial competition to those countries dependent on oil and gas revenues, such as Russia. Russia under Putin has been developing a huge, sophisticated external propaganda campaign. The curious failure for years of the Obama Administration to approve the oil pipeline from Western Canada to heavy-oil refineries in Texas, despite two favorable environmental impact reports from the State

most significant target of these activities is Europe, and especially with reference to the parties of the extreme left and right, which are increasing exponentially in coverage and significance. One such party just came to power in Greece. In the last, the extreme-right Front National party was the recipient of funding from a bank associated with the Russian government" (2015).

Additionally, cyber security is a key component of industrial espionage. It is listed as a vital security threat in the Ministry of Defense's 2015 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic. Because cyberspace is where a majority of new business ideas occur - ecommerce activities have flourished over the past decade and will continue to increase in the foreseeable future. In a 2011 report to congress, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive raised concern as to why Russia would dedicate resources to cyber theft. The report states, "Motivated by high dependence on natural resources, the need to diversify its economy, and the belief that the global economic system is tilted toward US and other Western interests at the expense of Russia, Moscow's highly capable intelligence

services are using HUMINT, cyber, and other operations to collect economic information and technology to support Russia's economic development and security" (Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 2011).

Though NATO and the EU are both well informed on the threat industrial espionage poses to their individual countries economic interests, the Czech Republic (which has mentioned cyber security in its security strategy since 2011), is lagging in this priority. Thus, key technologies such as information and communication, armed forces, healthcare and pharmaceutical, farming, energy and natural resources, commerce and macroeconomic information are at severe risk.

Jan Jireš, Policy Director of the Ministry of Defense in the Czech Republic, commented in an interview on the magnitude of this threat and ultimately admitted the Czech government was years behind schedule in their ability to reduce the dangers industrial espionage creates. Nevertheless, he was hopeful that by working

evidence for their claims. On the contrary, meetings with Policy Director Jan Jireš and the University of Defense seemed misguided, focusing their attentions solely on issues of little significance such as Islamic terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and increasing the number of active military members.

Examining the BIS provides key data on policy failure regarding counterintelligence in the Czech Republic. According to their official website, BIS.cz, its responsibilities include collecting and evaluating information concerning: "terrorist threats, activities jeopardizing the security or important economic interests of the state, activities of foreign intelligence services on the territory of the Czech Republic, designs or acts aimed at undermining the democratic foundations, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Czech Republic, organized crime and activities conducive to disclosure of confidential information" (BIS Security Information Service).

What initially came as a shock to me was the BIS

**This unfortunate truth allows
Russia to yet again insert
its foreign policy in the Czech Republic.**

closely with allies like the United States and Great Britain – the Czech Republic could overcome years of stagnant activity in cyber security. That being said, the results of his optimism won't be realized for years to come.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The threat of Russian influence on public opinion, critical infrastructure, and industrial espionage raises the question, "What policy changes does the Czech Republic implement to develop its counterintelligence and improve its national security from Russian subversion?" This is where the opportunity to travel to NYU Prague to observe and speak with security experts was essential to my research. In my conversations with experts such as Dr. Miroslav Mareš and Dr. Mitchell Belfer, they had a clear understanding of the security issues facing the Czech Republic. They were able to speak about different threats in depth and provide

has a major fault, as stated on their website and reiterated to me in conversation with an official at the Ministry of Interior, "The Security Information Service is an exclusively intelligence organization without any executive powers. It may not detain, arrest, interrogate, give orders and force anyone to anything. If it approaches a citizen with a question or query, it is entirely up to the citizen whether he/she will grant its request or not. Neither does the Service take any decision on its findings. Specific reaction to the outputs its work is solely in the competence of their recipients. It acquires a large number of findings from open sources, is in contact with the police, and intensively communicates with partner organizations in the Czech Republic and abroad. It does not shut itself off from the public, and looks for ways of communicating with citizens" (BIS Security Information Service).

In other words the BIS, the only counterintelligence agency of the Czech Republic

responsible for most, if not all, issues related to Czech national security concerning espionage has zero arresting powers and almost no hard authority whatsoever! In fact, my unnamed source at the Ministry of Interior was embarrassed to admit that in order for the BIS to make an arrest or even follow up on Russian diplomats – it first has to coordinate with the Czech police – an agency that wants nothing to do with combating Russian espionage.

This is a major policy failure and needs to be addressed if the Czech Republic wants to thrive as a free nation and democracy. Perhaps instead of leasing JAS 39 Gripen aircraft from the Swedish Defense Materiel Administration (FMV) for \$76.4 million dollars until 2026 (Air Force Technology, 2014), the Czech Republic should be investing its time and resources on intelligence and counterintelligence in order to develop the overall defense of its country and provide valuable contributions to NATO, UN and EU missions alike.

In addition to police and intelligence reform, it would be ideal for the Czech Republic to execute legislation that requires “NGOs to be forced not only to reveal funding sources, but to identify who or what is behind some benign-sounding funders, such as ‘Earth-Friendly Fund of the Cayman Islands’” (Bailey, 2015). This would help deal with the rising amount of pro-Russian propaganda organizations and sympathizing media sources are able promote. It seems at times the Czech Republic is naïve when it comes to implementing policies that dramatically change their national security strategy. Intelligence secrecy and authority in some ways contradict their ideological democracy.

I believe that the Czech Republic will eventually adopt security policies that will better attend to their real immediate and future security threats of Russian policy goals and espionage. The Czech Republic, like the United States, is a work in progress. However, where the United States has two hundred and twenty-nine years of practice and democratic development – the Czech Republic has only twenty-five. The Czech Republic would be best suited by not trying to the military force that it would never manage to become either financially or in strength of numbers. Instead, they could a valuable contributor to the NATO of 3 (United States, Canada and Great Britain) and the EU by increasing their intelligence and counterintelligence

capabilities in regards to Ukraine, Russia, China and even Iran. In the Czech Republic’s case, less is more.

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
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Appendix

Exhibit A



According to a Eurobarometer survey, the Czechs are among the biggest supporters of nuclear power usage in the 27 EU member states.

About two-thirds of people in the Czech Republic are all for or mostly for nuclear power (CEZ, 2013).

Exhibit B



The public's attitude towards nuclear power.

Question: "Which production resources, in your opinion, should have the largest share on the production of electricity by 2030?"(CEZ, 2013).

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How to Combat the Transnational Human Security Threat of Organ Trafficking: The Transnational Human Security Threat of Organ Trafficking – What is it and How Does it Work?

Melissa Salyk-Virk



Photograph 2005 Tareq Salahuddin
Kidney Transplant Surgery
Flickr

In 2014, 119,873 organs were legally transplanted, but this only accounts for a fraction of the needs worldwide (Global Observatory on Donation and Transplantation). In the United States alone, there are over 119,800 people on a waiting list for an organ transplant, of which 99,200 are kidneys (Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network). In 2013, over 63,000 individuals in the European Union were added to the organ transplant waiting list (European Commission). The substantial need has resulted in the epidemic of organ trafficking and the transnational organ sales industry, also known as transplant tourism. Transplant tourism allows wealthier individuals to bypass waiting lists in their respective countries by traveling abroad to receive organ transplants. While wealthier individuals benefit from this opportunity, those selling their organs are often deceived by the process. According to the documentary *Organs Across Borders*, Organ Watch estimates that 15,000 organs are trafficked every year. The World Health Organization (WHO) and Council of Europe estimate that kidneys on the black market range from \$100,000 to \$200,000 USD (Meyer 221). In a recent report by Global Financial Integrity, the estimate for the value of the black market organ trade ranges between \$614 million and \$1.2 billion USD (Hacken 56).

powerful non-state actors, blackmailed, or have their organs removed after death are all susceptible to the power imbalance. Black market organ sales are not on the books, nor tracked by international organ donor medical lists, and result in mistreatment, extortion, and other strong outside pressure exists, as there is little enforcement or protection. "Vulnerable populations (such as illiterate or impoverished individuals, undocumented immigrants, prisoners, and political or economic refugees) in resource-poor countries are now a major source of organs for rich patient-tourists who are prepared to travel and can afford to purchase organs," (Bagheri and Delmonico 888). This problem has not slowed down because there is no internationally ratified treaty against unconventional organ trafficking. The Declaration of Istanbul, a statement signed by over 100 countries combatting against the practice of organ trafficking, is open for ratification, but it has not yet drawn the numbers needed to make a strong impact on organ trafficking. Domestic laws, which prohibit the harvesting of organs for sale, do exist, but, like other contraband, organs end up on the black market.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), organ trafficking of kidneys occurs in more than 90 countries. Some of the most impacted countries are those with large economic

There is not enough supply
to meet the demand
of organ transplants worldwide.

Individuals who are recruited for their organs are often targeted based on their education status, economic status, or financial indebtedness. WHO reported in 2007 that 5-10% of annual organ transplants are performed using illegally sourced organs. Despite the reasoning behind why an individual makes a choice to engage in this practice, it greatly impacts human security. While organ trafficking is a workaround for individuals in a desperate medical state to receive treatment without having to wait on a list in his/her country, it also has created a strong power imbalance in communities.

Those who are saddled with debt, pressured by

gaps, mafia-like gangs, and a sizeable uneducated population. States such as Moldova, India, and China, among others, have had significant amounts of press regarding the use of illegally sourced organs. Individuals working in the illegal organ trade in these countries have created vast networks in order to secure the donors' border crossing to sell their organs. While many countries and organizations within them have set up methods to combat the practice, there have not been enforced protocols to eradicate the process of illegal organ trafficking within country borders, as well as transnationally. This paper aims to address the human security threat, understand what has been done to combat this security concern, and look at

the way forward in how to manage this threat in the future. It specifically focuses on the import purchasing regions of the European Union and the United States, and the exporting sales countries that include Iran, India, Pakistan, Moldova and the Philippines.

Why Is This a Human Security Threat?

The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) outlines the significance of a human security threat for individuals and states. Human security speaks to the individual as a unit of analysis within overall security analysis. In its explanation, UNTFHS discusses “the interconnectedness of both” threats and responses to threats, and how each is connected and emphasized by the other. Additionally, threats can spread outside of countries, yielding “negative externalities for regional and international security” (Human Security Unit 6). If we use that understanding of interconnectedness between the threat of organ trafficking and the response to it, it is clear that the development of this illegal practice in organ trafficking has created and developed negative externalities throughout the world, and that the response to this illicit activity has impacted the threat, which allows the practice to evolve instead of recede.

The organ trade has become a complex practice of process flows and decision charts between organ brokers—those who are purchasing the organs, organ donors—those being paid for their organs, and the organ receiver—those paying to have fresh organs transplanted. In theory, it is possible that from the outside, this practice could work where every party is satisfied, yet, that seldom occurs for a number of reasons. Typically, the only truly happy party is the broker and his/her team. The brokers also act as recruiters, both for the donation, and for the transplant. Each side has its own human security threat.

Individuals who donate their organs are in a unique situation. Some organ donors come from impoverished backgrounds; some may be paying off debts, some need extra income for their families. Organ donors are often recruited by the organ brokers, who exploit these individuals. The organ brokers only pay organ donors up to \$6,000 USD (Bhattacharya). These individuals have a quick fix to put money towards large expenses, whether it be loss of a job, paying for food, rent, and other paycheck-to-paycheck costs. However, this quick fix often puts these individuals in unhealthy

situations post-operation. “What is being ignored or forgotten about by the donors, mostly due to a lack of information, is the risk to their own health condition. Coming from and returning to an environment, where medical support is lacking, causes most donors damage to health due to the lack of after-care,” (Meyer 222). Although organ donors may have previously been healthy, they can have acute pain or infections as a result of losing a kidney or other organ.

Once an organ donor is selected and offered a price for the organ, he/she is sent to a facility, often in another country. Before the donor enters the country of his/her operation, he/she is given strict orders from the broker about what to say or what not to say to immigration and medical professionals involved. Some hospitals and doctors are unaware of their part in the scheme until after the fact (other hospitals and doctors are knowingly a part of the process). In some cases, the untrained brokers perform the operations, unbeknownst to the donor.

The organ purchasers are also in unique positions. The reason why most individuals choose to go abroad for organ transplants is based on the available pool of organs in their country. There is not enough supply to meet the demand of organ transplants worldwide. Those who have enough money to go to the black market will. Individuals will pay the price they need to in order to get the demanded goods because of basic economics of supply and demand. Consequently, purchasers fall prey to transnational organ transplant organizations. “Current patients face a choice between two extremes: Wait for a fundamentally broken system and risk death, or venture into the unregulated wild west of the black market for organs,” (Stier). It is a vicious cycle. There are enough people willing to pay exorbitant amounts of money for organs because the systems created to help them have limits on how many are available.

This human security threat is enormous. There are entire villages and towns in countries that are targeted because of the populations residing in them. Anywhere that has a large amount of people within a vulnerable population is at risk for these types of organ transplant schemes. As researcher Andrew Pratt describes:

Human trafficking is a soft security threat and one that is capable of

undermining domestic stability, whether authoritarian or democratically based, if left unchecked. The concomitant corruption that parallels this commodification of human beings further undermines the political and economic aspects of a nation's democratic development, and trafficking alone can destroy the very moral "soul" of a state, its psychological and socio-cultural identity (55).

Organ trafficking creates a pattern of victims being targeted by organ brokers. Countries' donation systems are set up to allow people to formally engage in a process to save their lives. The black market has filled a void because of the lack of supply of viable organs for transplanting. Despite this service provision, the individuals on either receiving end are put into harmful scenarios economically or health-wise.

The Traditional Models –How Governments and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have Combated Trafficking

Organ sales were first prohibited in 1987 by the World Health Organization (under resolution WHA40.13) in an attempt to respond to the rise in transnational illegal organ transplants. Prior to that, China made it illegal to buy or sell organs in 1984, but had allowed for transplantation from executed prisoners; however, that practice was recently overturned (Efrat 656).

organizations and government offices worldwide (Declaration of Istanbul Custodian Group). However, despite the numerous international guidelines and conventions, the end result is not easily enforced globally.

The United States has its Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act (H.R. 3926) from 2004, but no formal laws against organ trafficking. There have been a number of United States Bills, specifically one that originated in September 2010 (H.R. 6148), and the follow-up Bill for Trafficking in Organs Victims Protection Act (H.R. 6573) in October 2012, which has been sent to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Another was created in October 2015 (H.R. 3694), and has been sent to the Senate. As another importing region, the European Union has had a number of policies against trafficking. Most notably, they include the European Parliament resolution on policy actions in 2008, which was framed off of the United Nations Palermo Protocol in 2000. Also, a European Union Directive regarding trafficking was drafted in 2011 (Directive 2011/36/EU) in addition to the notable Council on Europe Convention in 2014 (Bos 8). Then, there are the exporting nations' policies.

However, there are many different policies that have been created throughout the world to combat the exporting of organs. Iran is one of the few countries that allows for kidney sales, but excludes foreigners from purchasing. It is a government funded and regulated program for living kidney donors that was created in response to Iranian nationals traveling to Europe for organ transplants, and was done with

Iran is one of the few countries that allows for kidney sales, but excludes foreigners from purchasing.

After that, many international conventions and guidelines, such as the World Health Organization regulations and subsequent Guiding Principles, and the Declaration of Istanbul were created to increase awareness and increase the amount of countries abiding by these principles. The UNODC has even gone so far as to create a toolkit for human trafficking and, more specifically, organ trafficking (Columb 31). The Declaration of Istanbul has 115 endorsing

Iranian government funds. The government has also allowed individuals to be compensated for their donation, and that has kept donations in the country (Ghods and Savaj 1137). India criminalized organ sales in 1994 (Bhattacharya), but left a loophole regarding kidneys, so it made an amendment in 2011 to enforce punishment (Efrat 656). As a result, it has created policies that request foreigners to have

correspondence between India and their national consulate/embassy once in India for proof of medical need. That has assisted in the breakdown of the Indian organ trade, but the practice is still done unofficially throughout the country (Danovitch et al. 1308). The Philippines created an implementation policy to aid in combatting organ trafficking in 2009. The Philippines removed the ability for foreigners to receive organ transplants in the country, and that significantly reduced the amount of organ transplants from live individuals in the country (Danovitch et al. 1309). Pakistan issued an ordinance to outlaw the

overlooked because governments do not want to be held accountable for the actions of their citizens.

A New Way of Working for Governments and NGOs

It is difficult for governments to monitor the illegal organ trade. There are many involved, from the donor and purchaser to the immigration officers and police turning blind eyes or accepting bribes. The hospitals and medical teams involved in the surgeries are also responsible, as well as the extensive network of individuals connected to the purchase. It has been

**It is difficult for the government
to monitor
the illegal organ trade.**

illegal organ trade in 2007 (Efrat 656). Interestingly, the Declaration of Istanbul Custodian Group (DICG) helped support the movement in Pakistan, and had reduced the amount of illegal organ transplants in the country, although it continues to be a challenge (Danovitch et al. 1308). Moldova created its organ transplantation law in 2008 in order to combat trafficking (Efrat 656). There have been legal efforts to combat this growing problem, but guiding principles and individualized laws are not enough.

By countries outlawing the practice of organ sales, it has inadvertently driven up the prices of organs, making them more profitable for illicit trade groups. This has created a system that does not identify the root causes of the practice itself (Ambagtsheer and Weimar; Columb 32). Even after outlawing the practice of paying for organs, economically speaking, the wealthy can still pay for the organs on the black market. The demand is what ultimately drives the practice. Then there is the argument that those who are selling their organs should not be considered victims, because they are also driving the practice. Yet, others expect the sellers to play the victim role in order to raise awareness (Columb 37). While there are some who may argue that the sellers of their organs are not victims, there is still a sense of ignorance and injustice in their stories. How did they make the decision to sell their organs? What is their personal story? Did they have all the facts? Were they desperate? This may be

argued that “given the low visibility of the organ trade and its negative effects, governments were unlikely to make the efforts necessary for eliminating this practice,” (Efrat 657). However, governments cannot be morality or health police. They can educate, but individuals possess the liberty to make their own decisions. Governments and the organ regulation or distribution organizations both have a responsibility to educate their populations. Despite these opportunities, there are still chances that the organ supply may not drastically increase. Ghods and Savaj argue:

Because the organ shortage has become more severe world-wide, some from the transplant community believe that altruism alone is not enough to satisfy the needs of the thousands of patients who are on renal transplant waiting lists and that providing some financial incentives or social benefits is necessary to increase the number of deceased or living organ donations (1137).

Organ scarcity is the problem, so how do governments manage that problem for those in need

If not in practice already, governments should allow for the extension of organ donations to cadavers. Granted, this will have other concerns that should be addressed with respect to cultural and religious practices. Governments, with the cooperation of NGOs and non-profits, should have national campaigns for organ donations so that people are aware that they can

donate post-mortem. This also stands for individuals in comas and on life support; once they pass away, it could be made legal to permit the use of their viable organs unless explicitly stated. This is referred to as "implied consent" (Becker and Elias). There is honor in donating, and there may need to be a cultural shift to accommodate that new way of doing things.

As far as a formal market is concerned, it can be regulated. "Legislation and law enforcement must go hand in hand," (Ambagtsheer and Weimar). Like other activities deemed illicit, supply and demand determines the price. By making the practice illegal, it drives up the price in the black market, and it allows for dangerous procedures to take place and individuals to be preyed upon. Awareness campaigns also need to be created so receiving families are aware of the mistreatment of donors in the black market, and individuals being targeted can be aware of the potential health consequences of their decisions.

Incentives can create a system that becomes more self-sacrificing with a nudge. Individuals who choose to sell their organs as live donors may have a different class of donation from that of a brain-dead individual, coma patient, or post-mortem donor.

selling organs compared to freely giving them, all organs should be processed at a specific government-regulated selling price in order to modulate pricing fairly. This prevents private entities from creating companies for organ sales. Subsidized pricing would be implemented for purchasing rates depending on tax returns/proof of income. This would allow all economic classes to have the ability to purchase organs. This subsidized rate would be based on a percentage of income, which is why the government would modulate the initial selling rate. The market for selling organs should have its own waiting list separate from the donations list, but it would move faster because of the transactions. This allows people who are willing to pay for an organ to be moved to a separate list, alleviating the pressure and waiting time for those on the primary donor list.

Conclusion

The practice of illegal organ transplantation on a transnational scale developed as a response to the international dearth of viable organs for transplant. Even with the generous supply of donated organs, countries across the world still face the problem of increased demand for organs. Individuals add

Decriminalizing organ sales
may be the best way to
combat this human security concern
of organ transplants worldwide.

There are certain sacrifices that a living individual makes compared to the donation from the other aforementioned categories of donors. Therefore, a two-pronged approach to organ donation and sales is proposed. Countries can maintain the illegality of the practice of black market transactions for organ sales. And, it is the responsibility of international governments and international NGOs to enforce this. Therefore, creating a database for transactions could prevent the continuance of black market sales.

Historically, there have been obvious concerns about the wealthy having the primary access to organs. In order to mitigate that, the current donor database with its waiting list should be maintained. For those

themselves to donor lists, hoping they can soon have their life-changing surgery. Yet, for many, that day never comes. Others seek out alternatives to the waiting game, and go abroad to take their chances. Those on the giving end of the transaction are often disenfranchised, and selling their organs becomes a quick fix to a larger problem. "Globally, the demand for fresh, healthy human organs is greater than the present legal supply, and is increasing every year. Worldwide the poor are cheated, maimed, and sometimes murdered by ruthless organ traffickers," (Organs Across Borders). Many individuals do not understand the ramifications of the transaction, and they end up selling their organs for a fraction of the

selling price that those on the purchasing side end up paying.

Governments and non-governmental organizations alike have made attempts at eliminating the practice by outlawing the selling of organs. Inadvertently, this has created a dangerous transnational crime scheme that has one winner, the organ brokers. These brokers prey on the desperate and weak on both ends of the transaction: the purchasers who are desperate for viable organs for themselves or loved ones, and those who are desperate for money to sustain themselves. Aware of their circumstances, the brokers maximize their profits on both sides by charging exorbitant fees to the highest bidder as well as giving the lowest payments to those making the sacrifice. Documentarian Ric Esther Bienstock said it best in an interview she did with the CNN network in 2014, "What drives the trade are desperate people, generally in the first world and developed countries, who are choosing between life and death. And they're absolutely in despair, and that's what makes them if they have the wherewithal, and the drive, and the ability to seek out a kidney [and other organs] overseas." Ultimately, organ sales fund illicit activity, and have ignited a growing human security concern. This may become even more problematic as transnational crime and terrorist organizations look to find alternative funding streams.

There may be a way to combat this as time continues, but simply outlawing the practice is not sufficient. Decriminalizing organ sales may be the best way to combat this human security concern. Governments should consider what a national organ market could look like. Allowing a sales market to accompany the preexisting donor process can drive the black market practice down drastically, but governments need to comply and not demonize the practice or those willing to put down large sums of money to save their own lives.

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Freedom of Expressions and Rule Of Law In Russia: A Precipitous Decline

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INTRODUCTION

After a period of decline and restructuring following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 Russia – abundant with natural resources – has emerged once again as an important player in world politics. During a period of privatization under the rule of President Boris Yeltsin in the early 1990s, an oligarchic political structure emerged with a few magnates controlling virtually all important sectors of the country. That structure shook after Vladimir Putin – who remains the country’s most important/powerful political figure – came to power in 2000. As President Putin has succeeded in further consolidating control over the most important economic sectors (i.e. energy), a close circle of his trusted men is now seen as directly or indirectly overseeing the country’s policies (BBC News). The oligarchic form of the government established by Yeltsin changed to a different form of the same governing nature – “silovarchy” – where the former USSR security service representatives became part of the highest hierarchy of Russia’s power. (Laurinavičius).

Despite rampant corruption and questionable political decision making processes, Russia has seen sharp economic growth since 2000, mainly due to its natural resources. Russia still remains the main gas supplier to a large part of Europe, and high prices prior to 2014 brought in lucrative revenues (BBC News). Backed by this economic fortune, Russia started to pursue a more aggressive and assertive foreign policy, especially in regards to its neighbors in the West. Russia is one of world’s leaders in terms of the share of GDP spent on defense. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2015, Russia increased its defense spending by 7.5%, and the budget of the Defense Ministry reached \$66.4 billion rubles (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). Although Russia recently cut its military spending, these policies have arguably been key factors leading to the invasions of Georgia and Ukraine in 2008 and 2014 respectively, resulting in a wave of criticism from the West (GlobalSecurity.org).

Russia’s current political and economic system is affecting not only its foreign relations but domestic affairs as well. Of all indicators measured by Freedom House, Russian civil liberties indicator has fallen the most through the years of 1991- 2015. This drastic change is now being observed in parallel with the decrease in oil prices and US-EU economic sanctions im-

posed after Russia’s invasion to Ukraine. Analysis also shows that of the four categories measured under civil liberties – freedom of expression and belief, association and organizational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy and individual rights – rule of law ranks the lowest (2 out of 16). Also of note is that the sharpest decrease has been seen in the category of freedom of expression and belief, declining from 6 to 3 from 2013 to 2015.

In light of this analysis, it has been decided to focus on the following research question: how do restrictions in freedom of expression and problems with rule of law undermine Russia’s democracy? To answer the research question, I will: 1) present the methodology and results of primary data analysis; 2) examine the reasons a drastic fall in the rankings of freedom of expression occurred after the year of 2013 and the challenges rule of law faces in Russia; and 3) summarize findings of primary and secondary data analysis to support the argument developed in the paper.

METHODOLOGY

Many aspects of Russia’s political life have been criticized as obstacles to democracy. Multiple watchdogs have brought up a variety of problems threatening Russia’s democracy. Freedom House’s recently published Freedom in the World Report 2016 mentions a ranking decline due to “the heavily flawed 2016 legislative elections, which further excluded opposition forces from the political process” (Freedom House). Another major challenge impeding democracy in Russia, according to Freedom House, is “the country’s rampant corruption ... as it facilitates shifting links among bureaucrats and organized crime groups” (Freedom House).

Human Rights Watch criticism is directed towards the government’s “crackdown on civil society, media, and the internet” as well as the “intensified harassment and persecution of independent critics” (Human Rights Watch). Amnesty International (AI) focuses on freedom of expression, or, more precisely, the lack thereof. AI’s annual report on the Russian Federation mentions the increase in “restrictions on rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly” (Amnesty International).

In the reports of all the aforementioned organizations that focus on democracy and human rights worldwide, restriction of freedom of expression is

stressed as a major issue. Besides this qualitative assessment, I have used primary quantitative data to narrow my focus to two major problems Russia's democracy faces.

Freedom House's Freedom in the World report, published since 1972, is a combination of quantitative data (numerical ratings) and qualitative assessment (descriptive texts) of political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House). In order to determine which challenges to analyze and focus on, the numerical data produced by Freedom House since 1991 – after the collapse of the Soviet Union and formation of the Russian Federation – was analyzed to determine the specific areas of Russia's political life according to two criteria: 1) ranked to be the lowest and 2) observed to have seen the sharpest decline over the years.

In order to identify the areas based on the aforementioned criteria, the data on Russia available in Country and Territory Ratings and Statuses (1972-2016 database) has been extracted from the Freedom House website (Freedom House). The data contains ratings on three categories: Freedom Rating, Civil Liberties, and Political Rights. I have conducted a historical comparative analysis of the numeric ratings for all the three categories to identify the one with the lowest ratings and the sharpest decline. This analysis shows that the Civil Liberties category has both the lowest score (7) and the steepest decrease declining from 3 to 7 from the years 1991 to 2016.

This Civil Liberties indicator of the Freedom in the World report has 4 subcategories: D. Freedom of Expression and Belief; E. Associational and Organizational Rights; F. Rule of Law; and G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights. In order to further narrow down my focus, I conducted the same analysis for these four subcategories of Civil Liberties ranking. To be able to conduct an analysis of current events and not a historical analysis of past political developments, also due to the fact that sharp decline of Civil Liberties ranking occurs after 2013, I extracted the data of the subcategories for the years 2013 – 2015 only.

The analysis showed that Rule of law has the lowest score among the subcategories (2 out of 16) and that Freedom of Expression and Belief saw the sharpest decline (from 6 to 3, out of 16). Thus, considering the criteria set earlier, I narrowed down my focus on analyzing rule of law and freedom of expression in Russia.

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RULE OF LAW AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A SHARP DECLINE


Freedom of Expression

Vladimir Putin won the 2012 presidential elections in what has since been argued to be highly skewed elections (Lally and Englund). Given the contested parliamentary elections in December 2011 and the equally criticized presidential elections in March 2012, Putin came to power once again in a very different political environment from what was in place in 2000.

The report of the investigation conducted by the monitors of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) states that "Putin won 63.6% of 71.8 million votes cast, somewhat less than the 71.3% he had received in his last presidential election in 2004" (Nichol). Although not explicitly calling the elections rigged, the monitors stated in a press conference that they did not view the elections to be free and fair. The report also mentioned media giving an advantage to Putin and the mobilization of resources and local authority to "garner support for Putin" (Nichol).

After both the parliamentary and the presidential elections, protests surged in Russia. Tens of thousands of protesters gathered after the parliamentary elections in 2011 (Barry), and, although a smaller number of people compared to the parliamentary election protests, there were many who did not concede to the 2012 presentational election results and participated in demonstrations on March 5th, 2012 (Nichol).

In his victory speech, Putin repeated the gist of what his presidential campaign was about. "We have shown that nobody can impose anything on us" (Lally and Englund), he stated. Given the waves of protests that started late in 2011 and continued after the 2012 presidential campaign, as well as Putin's portrayal of the West as an ill-disposed power with interests threatening Russia's sovereignty, the policies restricting freedom of expression present themselves as a logical choice for Putin's Kremlin.



Russian Federation 2016/2017 |

Table 1: Freedom in the World | Russia | Historical Analysis




Table 2: Civil Liberties | Russia | Historical Analysis

After protesters allegedly refused to disperse from Pushkin square during the 2012 demonstrations, police intervened and used force to detain some 250 of them (Nichol). Following the developments in 2011 and 2012, greater restrictions were imposed on public assemblies, internet and non-governmental organizations (Freedom House).

cally supported by the Russian constitution, deteriorated considerably after the demonstrations of 2011 and 2012. At present, the state or state-owned companies directly or indirectly control all the national TV channels, while only a few radio stations remain independent. Although the internet is relatively free, certain restrictions have taken place, such as a law de-

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and intersex (LGBTI) individuals and their supporters."**

For instance, RIA Novosti – an influential news outlet covering 45 countries and reporting in 14 different languages – was shut by Kremlin, its editor in chief Svetlana Mironyuk was out, and RIA Novosti became part of a Kremlin-friendly news Agency Russia Today (Sandford). "There should be patriotically minded people at the head of state information resources," Putin stated at his 2013 annual news conference, "people who uphold the interests of the Russian Federation. These are state resources. That is the way it is going to be" (Dougherty).

In less than a month after Putin took the office, Duma passed a bill raising the fines for unauthorized protests to 300,000 rubles – at that time, more than \$9,000. The bill authorized fining organizers of unsanctioned rallies up to a million rubles (Boghani). Citing encouragement of illegal activities in public events, three opposition websites and a blog managed by opposition leader Alexei Navalny were shut down (Boghani).

A crackdown on NGOs also followed the 2012 demonstrations. The infamous "foreign agent law" signed by Putin in 2012 required all NGOs receiving foreign funding to register as foreign agents. Failure to register was punishable by up to 300,000 ruble and up to 500,000 fines for individuals and organizations respectively (Boghani).

Protection of freedom of speech, which is techni-

veloped in 2012 that – while having the stated goal of targeting content that was "unsuitable for children" – resulted in the closure of some 180 websites (Freedom House). Freedom of assembly and association have also been undermined by prolonged detentions and irregular trials for demonstrators, including the prominent trial of Pussy Riot – a group who organized and publicized an anti-Putin prayer in a Russian orthodox church (Lipman).

The restrictions on freedom of expression continued the following year. On June 2013, Russia's lower house of Parliament signed two bills criminalizing "activism by lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) individuals and their supporters." (Amnesty International). The measures were later confirmed by the upper house, the Duma, and signed into law by President Putin.

This uptick in restrictions on freedom of expression continued to worsen in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014 and resulting political and economic reactions the West (Treisman). A tightening of control over media in 2014 was connected to international pressure in relation to the annexation of Crimea as well as plummeting oil prices that threatened an increase in domestic disobedience. Independent news outlets, and online news outlets specifically, became a target of government attacks in a strategy to neutralize domestic critics and

limit their spaces for expression and outreach to population. The years of 2015 to 2016 also saw a further tightening of the Kremlin's grip over media and civil society organizations (Human Rights Watch).

With recovering oil prices (Krauss) and the possibility of improving the ties with U.S. (CNN), it is possible that Putin will loosen his grip on freedom of expression as the need for controlling national media outlets and promulgating nationalistic propaganda will be less urgent. The prospect of financial recovery and possibility of strengthening political ties with the U.S. also potentially decreases the likelihood of domestic discontent and, therefore, the need for tighter control over freedom of speech and expression. It is unclear how the large discontent among Russia's population in regards to Kremlin policies and Putin's long-lasting tradition of controlling opinion can be reconciled.

For the prospects of freedom of expression to be optimistic, strong rule of law is also needed. The next section examines the challenges rule of law faces in Russia and the ways those challenges undermine Russia's democracy.

Rule of Law

authorities denied the arrested their rights to "a timely trial and, for one defendant, the right to a speedy judicial review of his pretrial detention." (Freedom House). The Russian court, regardless of the ECHR ruling, sentenced Ivan Nepomnyashchikh – another demonstrator of 2012 Bolotnaya protests – to 2.5 years in prison in early 2016. The court prosecuted Nepomnyashchikh for allegedly attacking a police officer with an umbrella. Soon after his trial and prosecution, Nepomnyashchikh was listed as a political prisoner in Memorial NGO's list of 49 political prisoners (Freedom House).

Another major obstacle to achieving rule of law is the dependence of the judicial system on the executive branch (Freedom House) and the long-running tradition of corruption in Russia's judicial system. According to Transparency International's corruption index, Russia's score is 29, placing the country at 131 out of 176 (Transparency International). Although it is estimated that the number of people who turn to Russian's courts to resolve disputes has increased significantly, certain risks still remain (Pomeranz and Rojansky). There are cases of high corruption in all levels of judicial branch that prove the systemic nature of

It is widely argued that
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Russian law is argued to have a long-standing tradition of being exploited by political authorities as an instrument of control (Muravyeva). This tendency has deepened under Putin's rule. The most recent manifestation of legal sovereignty was the No 21.P ruling of Russia's Constitutional Court stating that "a decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) cannot be implemented in Russia because measures aimed at its implementation would contradict the Russian Constitution." (Roudik).

In September 2015, the ECHR issued a decision that Russia had violated the rights of three demonstrators' arrested during the 2012 protests following Putin's win. The decision specifically found that Russian au-

thorities denied the arrested their rights to a timely trial and, for one defendant, the right to a speedy judicial review of his pretrial detention." (Freedom House).

It is widely argued that Russia's endemic corruption is the legacy of the Soviet Union, and that the tradition is continued under Putin's rule. Although nominal measures have been taken to tackle the issue of corruption, many see them as a way to somehow recover Russia's international prestige rather than genuine efforts to truly address the existing issues. Also, the fight-against-corruption campaigns usually crack down on lower level officials but leave elites immune.

Other major problems in rule of law are the discriminatory treatment of ethnic minorities and immigrants as well as members of the LGBT community. For ex-

ample, Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov tightens his grip over the North Caucasus territory while receiving generous subsidies from the Kremlin. In 2014, the Chechen officials that are under Kadyrov's de-facto control destroyed dozens of homes of alleged insurgents and their relatives. Other human rights violations in Chechnya include harassing Kadyrov's critics, launching "female virtue" campaigns forcing women to wear headscarves in public places, threatening and murdering journalists (Human Rights Watch).

Emboldened by the aforementioned 2013 law banning dissemination of information on nontraditional sexual relationships, hate groups have also increasingly committed abuses against the LGBT community with impunity (Freedom House). "License to Harm: Violence and Harassment against LGBT People and Activists in Russia" – a report prepared by Human Rights Watch – includes interviews LGBT individuals and activists in more than sixteen Russian cities. The report informs that the interviewed individuals had experienced physical and verbal violence in public spaces and, in one case, during a job interview. Tanya Cooper – a Russia expert at Human Rights Watch – claims that "authorities deliberately ignore that these are hate crimes and fail to protect victims" (Human Rights Watch).

The deteriorating conditions in the areas of freedom of expression and rule of law not only undermine Russia's democracy but also damage the country's international image. The high prevalence of corruption also adversely impacts Russia's economy, discouraging foreign direct investments. And although Russia's economy has been recovering from the recent recession, the country is still under pressure from the international community and the US-EU sanctions remain in place. International pressure and the pressure from domestic actors, as well as the need to recover Russia's image, may potentially push the Kremlin's policies towards addressing corruption issues, creating a more independent and effective judicial system that would strengthen rule of law and create more space for freedom of expression in the process.

CONCLUSION

The intent of this research was to identify two major challenges that undermine Russia's democracy. In order to narrow down the focus, I used the numeric

rankings of Freedom House produced from the years 1991 to 2016. Analysis showed that the lowest ranking and the sharpest decrease was within the civil liberties category. To further see what specific civil liberties are restricted in Russia, I analyzed the 2013-2016 rankings of Civil Liberty's subcategories. Based on the results of the data, I focused on freedom of expression and rule of law.

In order to understand how restrictions on freedom of expression and problems related to rule of law undermine Russia's democracy, I conducted a qualitative assessment of secondary data available on the topic. The findings reveal that the sharp decrease in the freedom of expression ratings after 2013 are connected to the increase in political disobedience that surged in Russia after the 2011-2012 elections. They are also connected to Russia's foreign policy decisions and the international and domestic reactions to these policies. In order to suppress domestic criticisms that followed after the 2011-2012 protests and after the 2014 Crimea annexation, Putin has systematically tightened his grip on freedom of expression and strengthened control over media.

The consistent low rankings for rule of law, on the other hand, are connected to Soviet judicial traditions, prevailing systemic corruption, and judicial power's dependence on the executive branch of the government.

While efforts to address the issues of corruption, Russia's recovering economy, and a possible new chapter in US-Russia relations do give some hope for reforms in the areas discussed, the Kremlin's autocratic foreign and national policies are a major hindrance to real progress.

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Weapons of Mass Distortion? The Threat of Online Disinformation

Kelsey Carter



Photograph 2017 Stevin Azo Michels
Whitney exhibition

On December 4, 2016, a North Carolina resident by the name of Edgar Welch drove six hours north to Washington D.C. He entered a pizza parlor by the name of Comet Ping Pong, armed with an AR-15 rifle to investigate online allegations that the restaurant was a child sex trafficking hub that involved the highest ranks of Washington elite, including Hillary Clinton. After firing the rifle once, he was quickly apprehended by law enforcement. Despite the outrageous claims of the “pizzagate” conspiracy theory – as it became known online – Welch claimed that “the intel on this wasn’t 100 percent,” and that he, “just wanted to do some good.” (AP) While the Comet Ping Pong staff had already experienced threats in response to the rumors, they never expected to face a live gunman willing to take violent action because of a fake story.

The pizzagate incident is a true manifestation of today’s internet. While fake news, rumors, and conspiracy theories are hardly a new phenomenon, social media allows false stories to spread throughout the internet at an unprecedented pace and scale. No one was hurt in the strange pizzagate incident, but it shows how online disinformation can become the cause of real-world, kinetic threats. Online disinformation is not relegated to the subculture world of pizza parlors, either. The difficulty in establishing truth online complicates political and global conflicts, and inhibits the democratic and diplomatic processes. In our society, which is heavily dependent on receiving information via the internet, the proliferation of online disinformation has the potential to seriously destabilize our ability to make informed decisions. As editor of the Washington Post, Martin Baron recently wrote: “if you have a society where people can’t agree on basic facts, how do you have a functioning democracy?” (Shafer, 2016)

The Threat of Disinformation Online

Disinformation is no new phenomenon. Rumors and falsehoods have existed in tandem with communication since the beginning of time, and the news media industry has always had to grapple with the challenge of sorting fact from fiction. In the U.S., fake news stories were rampant in the “penny press” of the 19th century. Mark Twain himself was a prolific fake news writer – although his writings often veered on the side of satire. One 1874 fake story about “solar armor” was famous for having run in the San Francisco

Examiner and the New York Times before being debunked as fake. This proliferation of “fakes” led to a journalistic campaign in the early 20th century to combat false information in the media. (Shafer)

Disinformation has also been closely linked with state-sponsored information campaigns, especially wartime propaganda. In World War I, Germany would send fake stories to American news agencies to try and sway American opinions. (Shafer) During World War II, the Allies were infamous for dropping leaflets on troops and populations. This tactic was intended to demoralize, confuse, and create counter-narratives to their own state’s war narratives, sowing doubt in soldiers and civilian populations. (Psychological Warfare and Propaganda in World War II)

Disinformation campaigns were most notoriously used during the Cold War. The Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policy have historically included tactics of information warfare, used to delegitimize its enemies and promote its own narratives. The most famous instance of Cold War disinformation was the rumor that AIDS was a project developed by the C.I.A. (MacFarquhar) Disinformation was also used to cover up K.G.B. activity, such as the false story that Soviet defector Nikolai Artamonov-Shadrin was killed by the C.I.A. when in reality he was assassinated by the K.G.B. (White) The Kremlin also sought to interfere with western information media by jamming transmissions of broadcasting stations, such as the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe. (White)

Disinformation Today

Disinformation and Russian strategy

Today, Russia remains the specialist of disinformation. Russian information specialists use a multi-pronged approach to spread disinformation, including traditional media outlets such as news agencies Sputnik and Russia Today (RT), covert operators, internet trolls, and outright propaganda. The purpose of these efforts is to undermine or alter the truth with the goal of crippling policy making and causing the public to mistrust official narratives. In the digital era, spreading online disinformation has become a critical part of Russia’s foreign strategy. In 2013, Russian Armed Forces Chief of General Staff admitted that: “the role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in

their effectiveness.” (MacFarquhar)

Russia has been especially active in using disinformation tactics in Europe to undermine liberal political narratives, particularly those of the European Union. Part of this strategy includes empowering the populist right and euro-skeptic parties. (MacFarquhar) Fake stories about refugees have been a common trend since the refugee crisis, including a story that a 13-year-old German girl was raped by migrants. Even though the German police debunked the facts, the story still took hold in public imagination. NATO, as an institution perceived to be working against Russian interests, is another common target. When Sweden was considering joining NATO, fake news stories by Russian authors exploded throughout social media. These included the fake headlines such NATO troops being able to rape Swedish women without criminal prosecution.

One clear distinction that makes Russian cyber disinformation tactics different from Cold War-era methods is that they capitalize the public nature of the Internet to undermine the validity of the news environment and dissuade people of the reliability of their news sources, rather than attempt to directly change their opinion. Trolling is key to this tactic. Russian analyst Catherine Fitzpatrick writes: “trolls inhibit informed debate by using crude dialogue to change ‘the climate of discussion,’...if you show up at The Washington Post or New Republic sties, where

the 2016 U.S. presidential election, most of which was transmitted via Facebook. In response to the proliferation of outlandish stories about Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, BuzzFeed reporters tracked these stories to over 140 websites with legitimate-sounding names such as USADailyPolitics.com and USConservativeToday.com. These websites, which were primarily aimed at conservative audiences, were the creation of Macedonian teenagers who discovered the profitability of hosting election-related fake news websites. These teens realized that online advertising revenue from U.S. users was much more profitable than revenue generated from audiences outside of the U.S. Although they published pro-Hillary stories, they discovered that pro-Trump headlines like ‘Pope Francis Forbids Catholics from Voting for Hillary!’ were the most successful in generating clicks and consequently, revenue. Some website administrators could earn up to \$3,000 dollars a day during election season. Over 100 of these sites are managed from the same small town of Veles, Macedonia. (Alexander)

Disinformation also complicated the Democratic National Committee hacking scandal. While most of the Clinton campaign hacks published through WikiLeaks were real, the blog Guccifer 2.0 also posted hoax documents that alleged corruption within the Clinton Foundation. Although security researchers determined that these documents were fake, the allegations of such documents added to public mistrust of the Clinton campaign. Further

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there’s an article that’s critical of Russia, and you see that there are 200 comments that sound like they were written by 12-year-olds, then you just don’t bother to comment.” (White)

Disinformation and the 2016 U.S. election

Online disinformation played a major role in

complicating the issue was the fact that later hacks published by Guccifer 2.0 included real data. (Newman) The effect of disinformation on the U.S. election was so remarkable; many people argued that it swayed the election in Donald Trump’s favor. Though this can hardly be verified, the election was undoubtedly affected by rumors and conflicting truth

narratives; 81% of participants in a Pew Research Center poll said that information about the candidates was so muddled that partisan debates could not agree upon “basic facts.”(In Presidential Contest, Voters Say

The war in Syria has also suffered its own campaign of weaponized disinformation. The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) uses disinformation tactics to confuse the Syrian population, particularly those who support the

Disinformation in wartime context is extremely powerful

‘Basic Facts,’ Not Just Policies, Are in Dispute) This was especially evident during the presidential debates, where Hillary Clinton spent a considerable amount of time imploring audiences to fact-check Donald Trump’s claims.

Weaponized online disinformation

Online disinformation also plays a crucial role in contemporary war contexts to demoralize and destabilize the enemy, as well as stir up war support in domestic audiences. This involves vilifying foreign enemies domestically, and targeting foreign audiences to confuse their domestic narratives. (Bolin, Jordan and Stahlberg) Russia is again the premier actor in the strategic use of weaponized disinformation in conflict. One instance of this was the swirl of internet rumors following the 2014 downing of Malaysian aircraft MH17 during the annexation of Crimea. The proliferation of conspiracy theories so complicated the news story that few people were able to decipher the simple truth, which was that insurgents accidentally targeted the aircraft using a Russian-supplied missile. (Normalizing Misinformation on Social Media)

Disinformation propagated through Twitter and other social media channels has also been a critical factor in the conflict in Ukraine. The onslaught of false news stories is so prolific that analysts have begun to refer to online disinformation as a ‘weapon of mass distortion.’ (Online Conspiracies and Real World Ramifications) Inordinate amounts of trolling and fake news stories about the rape of Ukrainian women are meant to destroy the morale of the Ukrainian army, and the Russian government hardly bothers to deny the issue. (Veebel) When confronted by the debunking of the fake story that a Russian child was crucified by Ukrainian forces, an official responded that the ratings were what was really important. (White)

rebel forces. They hack trusted news networks such as Al-Jazeera, and post fake news stories on their sites. (Shehabat) Other tactics include targeting Facebook pages of U.S. public figures, including President Obama and Oprah Winfrey, posting comments such as, “leave us alone, we love Bashar.” (Shehabat) Photos of bombings are mislabeled to decry or justify violence and hashtags are used to confuse sieges. The proliferation of conflicting accounts from within Aleppo is so overwhelming that it is difficult for anyone to be sure of what is happening on the ground. (Shehabat)

The confusion can be represented by the debate surrounding the Twitter account of Bana Al-Abed, a 7-year old girl in Aleppo. Bana Al-Abed’s account depicts the siege from her eyes, and has 313,000 followers. (Al-Abed) Her posts include pleas for help and videos of the girl huddling in her apartment during a bombing. The proliferation of disinformation about Aleppo has been so extensive that many people doubt whether Bana’s account is real, citing the sophisticated nature of her tweets are too much for a young girl who barely speaks English. They also claim that some of the footage of Bana appears to be filmed on high-quality cameras that could only belong to media professionals. Trolls on her account claim that her father is a jihadist, or that her account is a propaganda fabrication by the U.S. This doubt is not completely unjustified when other Twitter accounts, such as that of a lesbian woman in Damascus later revealed to be written by a 40-year old American man, have been proven false. (Rick Gladstone, Megan Specia, and Sydney Ember)

Disinformation in wartime context is extremely powerful. To quote Dmitry Kiselyev, the director of the organization that runs Sputnik, “today it is much more

costly to kill one enemy soldier than during World War II...if you can persuade a person, you don't need to kill him." (Rick Gladstone, Megan Specia, and Sydney Ember)

The role of social media in contemporary society

How has online disinformation taken such a hold of our society? The answer may lie in the role of social media. Increasingly, individuals turn to social media as their source for news. Thirty-five percent of 18-29 year-olds referred to social media as the most

losing battle. The rumor that President Obama was born in Kenya has existed since the 2008 campaign; and despite proof of contradictory evidence, Donald Trump continued to insist on the rumor as fact during his 2016 presidential campaign – even arguing that it was Hillary Clinton, and not himself, that initiated the conspiracy theory. One Washington Post reporter who a column called "What was Fake on the Internet this Week," realized that facts only caused the audience she was trying to convince to entrench themselves further in their beliefs. She wrote, "In many ways, debunking just reinforced the sense of alienation or outrage

Because of the proliferation of
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countering online disinformation

helpful medium for information about the 2016 presidential election. (Rick Gladstone, Megan Specia, and Sydney Ember) This is different than any other generations. The ability to choose who you follow on social media makes it very easy for users to create echo chambers of opinions that simply confirm the views they already hold. (Online Conspiracies and Real World Ramifications) Receiving information in this setting makes it easy to not hear neutral, fact-based reporting, which as a result, can feed partisan narratives and proliferate extremist views. Online extremism is a particularly thorny problem because social media forums make it very easy to find any extreme political doctrines and beliefs, whether it is populism, nationalism, racism, or sexism. (Online Conspiracies and Real World Ramifications)

Social media is also an ideal platform for conspiracy theories to proliferate. One author of a study that examined social media networks states that that the lack of reporting accountability online "creates an ecosystem in which the truth value of the information doesn't matter. All that matters is whether the information fits in your narrative." (Manjoo) Unfortunately, arguing against falsehoods can be a

that people feel about the topic." Managing editor of Snopes describes fact-checking as, "Sisyphean – we're all pushing the boulder up the hill, only to see it roll back down." (Manjoo)

The traditional news media has a role to play in the changing nature of information transmission as well. Increasingly, the news has become less about direct reporting and more about reporting on what people are talking about – which is often the splashiest topic zipping around social media platforms. One example of this included a segment on Megyn Kelly's show, during which a correspondent repeated the rumor that Hillary Clinton proposed killing Julian Assange by drone. (Shafer) In response to the allegation, Kelly gasped dramatically. There is also an issue of the decline of the traditional news media industry. The ease and low-cost of accessing news online has decreased public demand for printed journalism. This increasingly puts the news in the hands of writers who have not been trained in reporting accountability. (Shafer)

Anti-disinformation measures

Ukrainian media efforts

Because of the proliferation of Russian disinformation about the Ukraine conflict, Ukraine has become extremely active in countering online disinformation. One initiative was the creation of the Ukraine Crisis Media Center (UCMC) in 2014, which airs coverage of the conflict by international-renowned journalists, and provides military and civil society press releases on the issues. The UCMC, which operates in a role traditionally filled by government, is independently run and funded by European and American organizations. The president of the P.R. company that runs the UCMC says her reason for creating the organization was “to counter Russian propaganda, which is very powerful.” (Bolin, Jordan and Stahlberg)

Another similar effort is the website StopFake.org, which was founded by students of the Mohyla School of Journalism in Kyiv. Students and professors team up with fact-finding groups to identify fake news stories about Ukraine. StopFake.org publishes their findings in Ukrainian, Russian, Romanian, Spanish and English; and the founding team regularly speaks to international audiences about how Russian propaganda is affecting the war in Ukraine. The site is funded by grants from the U.S. Congress, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, and even George Soros. (Bolin, Jordan and Stahlberg)

Center of Excellence (StratCom COE) located in Lithuania. The StratCom COE – which cites the 24/7 news cycle and rise of social media as part of the reason disinformation is widespread today – aims to counter disinformation and propaganda by instituting “coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims.”

Private sector efforts

The private sector has also recently become involved in countering online disinformation. In the wake of the election, social media platforms – especially Facebook – were attacked for their complicity in spreading misinformation about the candidates. The result has been a rush, on the part of the private sector, to pledge their commitment to minimizing disinformation on their platforms. Post-election, Google announced that they would no longer accept fake news websites as part of their advertising services, and use the same technologies it uses to prohibit ads for fake luxury items and scams to block fake news sites.

Facebook has also taken measures to assure the public that it is working to fight disinformation. On November 19, Mark Zuckerberg published a detailed statement disavowing disinformation and detailing Facebook's pending anti-disinformation efforts. (Isaac) These include artificial intelligence detection, easy reporting mechanisms, and fake news ‘warnings’

Countering online disinformation

is extremely difficult

Institutional efforts

The EU and NATO are active in countering online disinformation. (Macfarquhar) The EU East StratCom Task Force runs a website that identifies and counters Russian disinformation. It features English and Russian translations and publishes two weekly publications: the Disinformation Review and the Disinformation Digest. The initiative, which uses the tagline, “DON'T BE DECEIVED – QUESTION EVEN MORE,” also tweets and creates YouTube videos about the developments in Russian disinformation.

In 2012, NATO created its Strategic Communications

for readers. If enough readers flag stories as spurious, they will be forwarded to a group of fact-checkers that includes Snopes and PolitiFact. (Isaac) Zuckerberg argues that these measures must be pursued carefully in order to prevent censorship and the limitation of freedom of speech. (Eddy)

Unfortunately, the effectiveness of anti-disinformation measures is very difficult to evaluate, potentially even impossible given the sheer expanse of the internet. However, such measures being undertaken by Ukrainian journalists, NATO & EU centers, and the private sector are all important and

should be pursued with increasing rigor.

Recommendations

Countering online disinformation is extremely difficult. People who are convinced by fake information can rarely be persuaded away from their beliefs. The nature of online disinformation only adds to this problem. The scope of information online can easily create confusion. Adding more information – even correct information – can cause readers to mistrust all narratives, except those they are already convinced of. At an appearance with Angela Merkel, former President Obama expressed his deep concern with regards to this issue, stating: “If we are not serious about facts and what’s true and what’s not, and particularly in an age of social media when so many people are getting their information in sound bites and off their phones, if we can’t discriminate between serious arguments and propaganda, then we have problems.” (Eddy)

Efforts to prevent and mitigate against the threat of disinformation should take three approaches. The first are governments, which can look to European countries for inspiration on countering disinformation. Legitimate journalist efforts, such as the Ukraine Crisis Media Center, can be promoted to ensure factual counter-narratives have the means necessary to reach the public. The U.S. and other recently-targeted countries can also create their own counter-disinformation centers, like those hosted by NATO and the E.U. This kind of initiative should be done in conjunction with social media platforms to ensure that it conveys information in a manner and forum that is attractive and easily accessible to social media users and other populations who are prone to viewing online disinformation. Finally, governments could a cyber task force to review and award factual sites with verified status, which will be displayed on their webpage. Readers will then know that the source they are reading has been vetted for reliability and truth. This would encourage good reporting practices, while steering clear of censorship and authoritarianism.

The private sector also plays a critical role in stemming the proliferation of disinformation via their online platforms and products. Search companies like Google can impose a click-through page that informs readers attempting to access fake news websites that they are entering a website known for proliferating fake news. This can be modeled on click-through pages

that users encounter when trying to access known malware-laced websites. Social media platforms like Facebook can also create a similar function for their platforms.

The last group that needs to be addressed are young people who may be easily influenced by disinformation, or even profiting from it. Disinformation education should be integrated into school curriculum, particularly since children and teenagers are key stakeholders in use of the Internet and social media. Students should be taught how to distinguish real information from fake information, how to access fact-checking resources, and the negative effects of online disinformation. Young people who have been drawn into the lucrative world of disinformation should be provided with counseling and mentorship, since 17-year-olds who can generate up to \$3,000 a day based on fake stories are clever entrepreneurs. Rather than treating them like criminals, the Macedonian government can provide these young people with business mentorship and resources to direct their energy into socially positive efforts. These savvy individuals should also be tapped as allies and resources (perhaps even as paid contractors) in thinking about how build mechanisms for countering online disinformation.

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Nuclear Danger in Asia: How North Korean and Pakistani Nuclear Programs Benefit China

Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu



Photograph 1952 National Nuclear Security Administration
Ivy Mike

If there was any doubt that Asia has become the most dangerous place on earth, with the prospect of a nuclear exchange, then recent events provide ample evidence that the region has attained this dubious distinction. Additionally, a new UN report, which went practically unnoticed, revealed that North Korea has not only continued its proliferation activities but also that these are growing in sophistication. Moreover, while China's proliferation activities vis-à-vis Pakistan and North Korea have been unmasked on several occasions both before and after Beijing joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, they have been largely ignored. Consequently, the rise in global nuclear disorder and its increasing disconnect from world order is epitomized in the nuclear weapon programs of two weak and potentially failing states—Pakistan and North Korea. While both these countries might understandably perceive some advantage to having acquired nuclear weapons, the real beneficiary is China.

practice for nuclear war.

The stated objective of the joint exercises is to “preemptively ‘detect, defend, disrupt and destroy’ North Korean nuclear and missile facilities when an attack is imminent, in addition to defending South Korea”. North Korea's multiple launches of nuclear-capable missiles were intended to signal to Washington and Seoul that Pyongyang would retaliate with a first strike designed to pre-empt any such attempt and to overwhelm the Thaad system, which is designed to intercept single missiles. This is not unlike Pakistan's strategy vis-à-vis India.

The Thaad deployment has also caused perturbation in Beijing. While China is less worried that the system will intercept its long-range missiles, it is deeply troubled with the X-band radar that accompanies the Thaad system and has the ability to look deep into China and detect missiles in flight. Beijing disingenuously suggested that the US and South Korea call off their exercises in return for a promise

**The proliferation activities
of these countries
present an existential challenge
to the tottering nuclear non-proliferation regime.**

North-East Asia goes dangerously ballistic

Following an unprecedented two nuclear and multiple ballistic missile tests in 2016, North Korea has upped the ante even further this year. A high-profile political assassination in Malaysia – using a deadly nerve agent – coincided with yet another missile test and the threat of an intercontinental ballistic missile test capable of striking the US. Then, on 7 March 2017, in a dramatic show of force, Pyongyang simultaneously launched four missiles, which landed in Japan's exclusive economic zone. Although this latest missile salvo was partly in response to the biggest annual joint military exercises of the US and South Korea being conducted in the region and partly in response to the impending deployment of the US Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (Thaad) system, it nonetheless signaled, according to one observer,

that North Korea will not launch additional missiles or conduct nuclear tests. Predictably, this proposal was rejected resoundingly by Washington.

Even as nuclear tensions rise and attract global concern, Pyongyang's proliferation activities continue unabated. According to the latest report of the panel of experts established pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1874 on North Korea, the state is “flouting sanctions through trade in prohibited goods with evasion techniques that are increasing in scale, scope and sophistication.”

The report reveals that North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau uses foreign nationals as facilitators and relies on many front companies in several countries. This modus operandi was evident in the assassination of Kim Jong-nam. For instance, North

Korea has allegedly been selling battlefield radio systems (banned under UN sanctions) through a front company called Global Communications in Malaysia. In 2014, three North Koreans were reportedly detained while trying to smuggle nearly half-a-million dollars in cash at Kuala Lumpur airport. Malaysia was a favorite country for their operations because, until the assassination of Kim Jong-nam, North Koreans were allowed to travel visa-free. Interestingly, Malaysian citizens are the only ones allowed to travel visa-free to North Korea; even the Chinese need visas (except for a couple of tourist locations).

The UN report warns that North Korea's "ability to conceal financial activity by using foreign nationals and entities allows them to continue to transact through top global financial centers" (like Malaysia, Singapore and China). This is not dissimilar to Pakistan's proliferation network led by A.Q. Khan, which, curiously, also used Malaysia.

The UN report lamented that "implementation (of sanctions) remains insufficient and highly inconsistent." Given the present nuclear imbroglio in North-East Asia involving China and the US, both permanent UN Security Council members, the implementation is likely to remain ineffective.

Indeed, resolving the confrontation between China, the US and North and South Korea is a priority but so far the way ahead is not clear. The relationship between Pyongyang and Beijing (which is North Korea's biggest trading partner) is key to a resolution. While China has recently banned the trade of some items, the list is still not exhaustive. Here the US Thaad deployment might convince Beijing of Washington's impatience and frustration and force it to do more.

The Thaad deployment also poses a dilemma for China: Should it stand by its ally at the cost of its own deterrence vis-à-vis the US or should it ensure its own deterrence even as it jettisons its ally? China's instinctive approach is to do both by targeting bans on South Korean companies and political leaders who are in favor of the Thaad deployment while supporting those opposed. The fact that China is also South Korea's biggest trade partner does give Beijing leverage, as does the ignominious dismissal of President Park Geun-hye, a Thaad supporter.

Given the Donald Trump administration's anti-

trade instinct, China's will might just prevail. Besides, resolving this crisis requires greater focus than the Trump administration appears capable of even when they are seriously engaged.

China benefits from nuclear disorder

But North Korea is not the only state in which China emboldens a nuclear program, Pakistan, too, is a recipient of Chinese "goodwill." Beijing's acts of commission and omission in enabling both these crises-instigating states to build nuclear arsenals pose twin threats to the post-Cold War nuclear order. First, the proliferation activities of these countries present an existential challenge to the tottering nuclear non-proliferation regime. Second, these actions in turn also challenge the status of the US as the traditional custodian of the nuclear order; by enabling two weak states to acquire nuclear weapons, the Washington-led regime has been thrown into disarray.

While it could be argued (as non-proliferation purists are prone to do) that New Delhi's arsenal is equally culpable in creating nuclear disorder, India, as the world's largest liberal democracy, the fifth largest economy, and a member of every existing and emerging global regime, has more stakes in upholding and enhancing the evolving liberal world order.

Besides, in the process of accomplishing the 123 agreement for civil nuclear cooperation with the US (and similar agreements with Canada, France, Japan, Russia and the UK), separating its military and civil nuclear facilities, and signing an additional protocol for inspection of its declared civil nuclear facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency, not to mention attaining a hard-fought waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, India has undergone a gruelling agni-pariksha to prove its commitment to upholding the non-proliferation regime.

In contrast, China's proliferation activities vis-à-vis Pakistan and North Korea have been unmasked on several occasions both before and after Beijing joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992. In the most recent revelation, the Institute for Science and International Security alleged that China had allowed the export of material (in violation of UN sanctions) to North Korea, which would enable Pyongyang to build hydrogen bombs.

China's active and tacit support of the nuclear programs of Pakistan and North Korea respectively might be considered a form of extended deterrence (as the US has done by ensuring that its nuclear arsenal also covers its allies). However, China, by enabling the nuclear arsenals of its two neighbors, has not only violated the non-proliferation regime but also created two nuclear-armed states that refuse to adhere to the traditional rules of deterrence.

Classic nuclear deterrence is premised on the basic assumption that nuclear weapons will only be used to deter other nuclear weapons. However, Pakistan has

responsibility in the imbroglio and deftly presented itself as a responsible custodian of the nuclear order.

By the time Tillerson arrived in Beijing he had fallen for the Chinese ploy (despite an unsolicited cautionary tweet from President Donald Trump warning: "North Koreans are behaving badly and China has done little to help").

In Beijing, Tillerson shocked seasoned observers when he made no mention of the crisis with North Korea (let alone the "all option" statement) and described the relationship with China as "very positive"

**Classic nuclear deterrence is premised
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used its nuclear umbrella to instigate conventional conflict (in Kargil in 1999) and sub-conventional attacks with non-state actors (in Mumbai in 2008). North Korea has similarly used its nuclear shield to conduct provocative acts (such as the assassination of Kim Jong-nam) and to proliferate (as the recent UN report notes).

Apart from the unorthodox use of their nuclear capabilities, they also pose new threats for the US and India—the two-leading democratic established and emerging powers—while allowing China to present itself as a peacemaker and upholder of the new nuclear order.

This has become evident in the latest confrontation on the Korean peninsula, where the US has been pitted against North Korea, and China has eagerly donned the mantle of a mature mediator. When Rex Tillerson, the neophyte US foreign secretary, arrived on his first trip to the region, he pronounced that the era of "strategic patience" was over and warned that "all options (including military action) are on the table". In a telling response, the spokesperson for the Chinese foreign ministry chastised both the US and North Korea, asking them not to "escalate towards conflict and potential war" and patronizingly suggesting they "cool down" and seek a political and diplomatic resolution. In doing so, Beijing absolved itself of any

and "built on non-confrontation, no conflict, mutual respect, and always searching for win-win solutions". While these catchphrases have echoes of the China-India Panchsheel agreement, they are entirely alien to the US vocabulary in dealing with China. If former president Barack Obama was accused of bowing too low on his first visit to Beijing in 2009, then Tillerson is guilty of bending over backwards.

If the Trump administration is keen to seek a new approach to deal with the nuclear dangers posed by North Korea and Pakistan, then the first step is to recognize that China is part of the problem, not the solution. The second crucial step would be to develop a backbone to stand up to Beijing. US experts like Robert Blackwill have recognized this imperative and suggest a policy of "engage and contain" towards China. However, it is uncertain that the Trump administration is capable of implementing it.

The Great Oil Divide: The Security Situation Between the Sudans

Natasha Louis



Since the 2011 secession, the governments of Sudan and South Sudan have yet to agree on a solution to determine a permanent border, and it has continued to be a major contention between the two nations (BMI Research). Both states are focused on combatting their own domestic insurgencies, with the conflict in South Sudan progressively threatening the security status of Sudan (BMI Research). While the civil war ended in 2005 with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) of the capital Khartoum, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N) has continually deployed an insurgency to the southern border states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile since South Sudan's secession in 2011 (BMI Research).

Efforts to implement the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ) between the two states are currently suspended (BMI Research). The SDBZ would constitute a 10 kilometer wide buffer zone on both sides of the border, however, both countries have not been able to come to a final agreement on the demarcation of the border (Libson). This has left a dispute over at least 20% of the undefined border (Libson). The Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), where the African Union High-level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) developed the current map, has also been suspended (BMI Research). Accusations by Sudan and South Sudan that both parties are supporting cross-border rebel groups have increased difficulties with bilateral negotiations (BMI Research).

Talks between Presidents Salva Kiir Mayardit of South Sudan and Omar al-Bashir of Sudan resumed this past June (BMI Research). However, with the current strains in both countries and the increase of South Sudan's dire crises, a resolution is not expected any time soon (BMI Research). The dispute over oil flow – an important resource for both states (BMI Research) – is further complicating the border contentions. Oil was the greatest resource when Sudan was a unified country (Ottaway and El-Sadany). "Dependence on oil [...] represents salvation for poor nations, making oil the most immediate source of conflict" between North and South Sudan (Ottaway and El-Sadany).

Due to the severity of the ongoing situation between the two countries, it is highly recommended that focus be put on diplomatic strategies and security

sector reforms (SSR). Tensions have risen over the handling of oil transports, ethnic conflict and lack of national identity, leading to a critical border crisis that currently cannot be managed by its own leaders. In order to begin to cease contentions and what has now developed into a genocide, the international community must take action by applying severe pressure to the governments and intervene militarily and by working with civil societies.

OIL

During the referendum in 2011, "oil accounted for 60 to 70% of government revenue in the North and 98% in the South. About 75% of Sudan's oil is produced below the old colonial line that divided North and South and became the border between the two countries after the split" (Ottaway and El-Sadany). Because the oil fields are located across the dividing line, there are high risks that either side will attempt a takeover (Ottaway and El-Sadany).

The CPA regulated the distribution of oil between the two states before South Sudan gained independence. Yet, South was never content with the method; it discontinued sharing revenue once it seceded (Ottaway and El-Sadany). Since 2011, Khartoum and Juba have fought over the price of barrel in transit fees for oil that is shipped through pipelines from the South to Port Sudan in the North (Ottaway and El-Sadany).

Between January 2015 and March 2016, oil prices have dropped to nearly \$30 a barrel, a decrease of over 70% (Sudan Tribune). "The oil transportation fees (\$9.10 for the oil produced in the Upper Nile or \$11 for the oil of Unity state) [...] are meant to the repayment of a \$3 billion compensatory package that Juba agreed to pay Khartoum" (Sudan Tribune). A complicated pattern has emerged for years where the North charges transit fees that the South does not comply with and the South often responds with threatening or completely halting its oil production (Ottaway and El-Sadany). Shipping the oil south to the Kenyan coast is currently not a good investment as a new pipeline would be extremely expensive and take years to complete (Ottaway and El-Sadany).

South Sudan's oil production has declined due to its internal conflict but is still able to produce 160,000 barrels a day (Sudan Tribune). However, it currently "receives less than \$5 per barrel when transit charges

paid to Sudan are deduced and oil exploration companies are paid” (Sudan Tribune). The least-developed area of Sudan has always been the South and the North has remarked it as a “useless country” (Ottaway and El-Sadany). Since 98% of South Sudan’s annual budget comes from oil revenue, this has further plummeted the country’s status (Sudan Tribune).

BORDER POLITICS

South Sudan’s borders are generally more important than other locations due to the country’s definition of itself, national identity and government legitimacy (Frahm). The South has a more profound sense of tribal rather than national belonging and consists of over 60 cultural and linguistic groups (Frahm). What has somewhat unified the country has been the history of oppression and opposition by the North (Frahm). Because of this, “legal citizenship in South Sudan is actually defined both by ethnic belonging and territorial residence” (Frahm).

South Sudan’s government has failed to territorialize, which has negatively impacted the country’s ability to unify and form a national identity (Frahm). Because people have more allegiance to their own tribes than to the nation as a whole, conflict among tribes is arguably progressing to a “full-blown genocide”

However, Juba has been supporting the SPLM-N across the border (Frahm). It is suggested that a deal between Khartoum and Juba could decrease the areas occupied by the SPLM-N, which would lead to “new border security arrangements” (Copeland). While President Kiir announced in November 2016 that his government pulled troops from the border, it appears he has lost control over his own army as they did not withdraw as instructed (Sudan Tribune, South Sudan withdraws troops from border with Sudan).

Al-Bashir has also created further grievances as he announced an “indefinite halt to peace talks with rebel groups” (Amin). He stated that the government will “never talk to them” and refused to integrate them in the national army (Amin). Bashir also gave a warning to South Sudan regarding their support of the SPLM-N, stating the following: “our message to our brothers in South Sudan is that if they want peace we are ready; otherwise we are also ready” (Amin).

A recent UN Special Investigation reported “a lack of leadership from senior United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) personnel and poor performance by troops and police in the mission” because they did not respond to calls where multiple rapes occurred (Security Council, December 2016

Since oil is the most immediate source of conflict, Sudan needs to regulate its oil transit fees to reinforce its economy and deter price contentions and shutdowns by South Sudan.

(Sengupta). South Sudanese have been fleeing across the border in order to escape conflict and starvation (Security Council, Sudan and South Sudan August 2016 Monthly Forecast), leading to 1.05 million refugees and 1.73 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Security Council, December 2016 Monthly Forecast South Sudan).

In order to promote trade and stability, the North and South signed an agreement four years ago to end the support of rebels in each other’s territory (Tanza).

Monthly Forecast South Sudan). It has been decided by the Security Council to renew UNMISS by adding 196 police officers, produce more human rights reports, condemn ceasefire violations and demand the South Sudanese government to condemn hate speech to avoid outbreaks of violence (Security Council, December 2016 Monthly Forecast South Sudan).

In addition to the renewal of UNMISS, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2304 in August 2016, condemning violence and demanding that all parties immediately cease fighting (Security Council). They

decided “to increase the force levels of UNMISS up to a ceiling of 17,000 troops, including 4,000 for the Regional Protection Force” (Security Council). The resolution also decided to implement an arms embargo on South Sudan by all UN member states for a one year period and to respond to any violations or non-compliance by sanctions (Security Council).

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Implementation of the JBVMM
- Regulation of oil transit fees
- Actions by international communities to address ethnic tensions
- SSR reform and the increase of PMSCs

In order to secure their border, North and South Sudan must make it a priority to work towards an agreement and implement the JBVMM. While it’s understandable that they would be distracted by their own domestic crises, they need to refocus on efforts to address border security and humanitarian issues in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Since oil is the most immediate source of conflict, Sudan needs to regulate its oil transit fees to reinforce its economy and deter price contentions and shutdowns by South Sudan (Copeland). Unfortunately, this seems increasingly unlikely to evolve due to both sides being unwilling to compromise and the developing crises and genocide in South Sudan. “Both sides, perhaps overwhelmed by the magnitude of the problems they face, seem to have sought refuge in something which they have a long experience – namely war” (Ottaway and El-Sadany). North and South Sudan appear to believe that by fighting they can gain an advantage over each other. Since Kiir and al-Bashir have proven themselves incapable of negotiations, and al-Bashir’s remark calling South Sudan “poisonous insects” (Michael and Onyiego), military intervention must be led by outside actors, either by the UN or by private military and security companies (PMSCs).

The international community must take immediate action to address the security situation developing in South Sudan regarding human rights atrocities from ethnic conflicts. International NGOs, UN entities and civil society groups must create and maintain a presence in South Sudan to combat hate speech that has contributed to ethnic violence in the country. “Significant efforts will be needed to promote healing,

reconciliation and the creation of a stronger sense of national identity among the country’s 64 ethnic groups” (Security Council, December 2016 Monthly Forecast South Sudan).

The United States may not currently see South Sudan as a national security priority, but it could become one if China is to step in and build the pipeline to Kenya or if non-state extremist actors continue to grow in the region. Al Qaeda has gained new territory throughout the continent and continues to grow (Searcey and Schmitt). In sub-Saharan Africa, ISIS has lost territories in Africa to Al Qaeda, whose expansion since 2001 has been recognized for its speed and scope (Hansen). In this context, the United States’ involvement with Africa seems insufficient – Al Qaeda grows stronger and ISIS has won allegiance of Boko Haram – events that should alarm the security sector (Hansen). A military intervention is needed to avoid a genocide and rampant development of terrorism in the region.

South Sudan “has licensed only two PMSCs to operate with arms in the country” (Portada III and Riley). UNMISS and the international community have encouraged the modernization of the state’s security services (Portada III and Riley). According to a report by Dr. Robert Portada, security sector reform has paid little attention to how PMSCs may assist in long-term SSR planning. Since the SPLA is trying to transform itself from a poorly trained rebel group into a national army (Portada III and Riley), the increase of more PMSCs in the country is necessary to implement robust SSR tactics. The civil war in South Sudan is rapidly escalating out of control and without effective intervention will increase insecurity in neighboring countries with IDPs, refugees and violence bleeding over its borders.

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Looking Forward



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Accounting for Trade: President Trump and the “Geopolitical Balance Sheet”

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Politics and Economics

It is the intersection of politics and economics that motivates the behavior of most nations when it comes to cross-border trade and investment. However, public commentary often separates these domains when discussing implications of a given policy or proposal for national well-being.¹ This is unfortunate, as it too often limits the proper assessment of political benefits and costs from the policies and actions under discussion. To alleviate this, we propose the notion of a “Geopolitical Balance Sheet” as a better approach to evaluate trade policy outcomes, along with the incorporation of traditional accounting notions of “assets,” “liabilities,” and “owners’ equity.” We believe this is a particularly appropriate time to consider such a proposal, not only because of the new Trump Administration’s frequent pronouncements on trade but also because such terminology might have a more meaningful impact on the business-friendly inclinations of many supporters of this Administration. “When goods don’t cross borders, Soldiers will.” This saying has been ascribed to French economist, Claude Frédéric Bastiat—whether he said it or not—it is we believe particularly important today.

In addition to surrounding himself with several key economic advisors who have left little doubt about their negative views regarding globalism and its supporting institutions, President Trump himself has made multiple negative public pronouncements regarding cross-border free trade, declaring he will “put America first” through policies he terms “fair trade” (Fox News, October 18; M. Fisher; U. Friedman). These include withdrawal from the Trans Pacific Partnership, calls to abandon the long-standing reliance on multi-lateral trade treaties and in their place negotiate bilateral deals, impositions of “Border Adjustment Taxes” on imported goods, new tariffs on imports from China, claims of currency manipulation by China, Germany, and others, and urging citizens to “buy American” and business firms to “hire Americans” (D. Trump, “Inaugural Address”).

Yet while perhaps appealing to many, these actions are not the best long-term means to address the negative side effects that globalization, free trade, and broader neoliberal economic policies have created in this country, and throughout parts of the world. Though we would be among the first to

agree that such issues as worker displacement, loss of manufacturing jobs, trade deficits, and growing despair and social alienation for millions of individuals are more than worthy of public interest and attention, the imposition of President Trump’s trade agenda would not only punish those whom he wants to help but could also destroy the political-economic foundations of the world as it exists today.²

The Returns to Trade are More Than Economic

The economic and social costs from trade, however, are real and should not be discounted. But they must be appraised against the benefits that have derived from the same policies and forces that brought them about— many of which are rooted in political dimensions as much if not more than economic considerations. Most pointedly, one could make the case that up through the middle of the 20th century modern history was essentially the history of war, capped by the unprecedented carnage of World Wars I and II. Since the end of the latter conflict, the world has enjoyed an unprecedented era of relative stability, which we would argue has been beneficial to everyone regardless of national affiliation, geographic location, and political persuasion.

Why the historical break from the past? There is no other meaningful answer outside of the global role that the United States — departing from its long traditions of political isolationism — willingly embraced in the late 1940s (B. Bartlett, 1998). Following the prescient instincts of Dean Acheson, President Truman’s Secretary of State — who got Stalin and the Soviet Union right long before many others — the U.S. emerged as the world’s willing hegemon committed to both democracy and a market-based economic system.³ The protectionism that had characterized America’s trade policies almost since the founding of the Republic were finally put to rest as this country took the lead in establishing programs and institutions designed to facilitate cross-border trade; these included the Bretton Woods Agreement, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and collateral organizations including the UN and NATO (W. Isaacson and E. Thomas). While some argued against this new national posture, the advocates who became known as our “Greatest Generation” ultimately carried

the day beginning with the Marshall Plan that was enacted in 1948. Through the extensive rebuilding plan, more than \$100 billion (in current dollars) was committed by the U.S. to the reconstruction of Europe as a democratic capitalist bastion that could further contain Communism and Soviet expansionism. (Beisner).

peaked in 2006, resulting in a \$760 billion deficit in the U.S., and today it still remains at approximately \$500 billion-- with China still by far the major source of the imbalance (usgovernmentspending.com, and tradingeconomics.com).

Not uncoincidentally, manufacturing employment in the U.S. peaked in 1979 at nearly 20% of the national

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have emerged on both sides of the political spectrum.**

The result was a massive rise in global prosperity in the second half of the 20th century—the “American Century” in which this nation finally displaced Great Britain as not only the dominant economic power but also as the political leader of the Free World. America’s middle class expanded exponentially, its standard of living rose dramatically, and we became a beacon to the world in terms of the aspirations and hopes of people everywhere for a better life.

But this was hardly a cost-free proposition. Federal budgetary deficits that financed growth rose dramatically from WWII (peaking at over 119% of GDP in 1946) through the Great Recession following the financial meltdown of 2008. While budgetary deficits have stabilized since 2012 (estimates for 2017 are less than 3% of GDP), the cumulative amount totals nearly \$20 trillion, over one-third of which is held by off-shore investors. We should also note that the period since 1980 when U.S. budgetary excesses emerged was also the modern era of globalization-- when worldwide cross-border trade in goods rose from slightly over \$2 trillion in 1980 to nearly \$19 trillion by 2014 at its peak (though recently dropping to about \$16.5 trillion due to the slowdown in China). Moreover, the U.S. began to consistently incur merchandise trade balance deficits in the 1980s, as nations such as Japan became globally competitive. The deficits then rose dramatically early in this century as the Chinese economy boomed and imports from that nation exploded. This phenomenon

workforce before trending downward to about 11% today (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). In conjunction with a rising concentration of both income and wealth in a small percentage of the population (many of whom are financial services industry executives directly involved in the facilitation of globalization), along with stagnation in real wages for the middle class as traditional manufacturing jobs disappeared—both trends apparent since the beginning of the Reagan Administration in the early 1980s – it is no wonder that recent political insurgencies such as the Tea Party, Occupy Wall Street, and fringe groups associated with the Alt Right have emerged on both sides of the political spectrum. These groups point to globalization and the perceived budgetary extravagance of public welfare policies as the primary culprits in America’s “demise”—forces which the Trump presidential campaign adroitly addressed and exploited in the upset victory of the 2016 election.

A Geopolitical “Balance Sheet”

But does all of this imply that we are “losing” and that cross-border trade has been “bad” for America and its citizens? That is, have our past economic policies and actions created a vast pool of “liabilities” that demand radical address by President Trump to right the ship of state and establish a steadier course forward towards renewed national “greatness”? If we examine the data

from a purely economic perspective, one can certainly find reason for concern. Interest payments to foreign holders of the budgetary deficit could be better used domestically, repairing dislocations from trade deficits might increase domestic job creation, and a national psychosis about America's "declining" position in the global economy—no matter how ill-informed – could be alleviated.

As we noted at the outset, a broader perspective would have us also evaluate the "assets" that accrued from our national will to power since the end of WWII and not just dwell on the economic liabilities, such as they are. While these assets are no doubt far more difficult to quantify, that in no way should minimize their value; in fact we argue the opposite is true. Let's examine why.

First, the willingness of the U.S. to absorb both budgetary and trade deficits helped fund the establishment of the modern global economic and political foundations that still exist today. This investment turned one-time mortal adversaries Japan and Germany, as well as some other states, into key allies and staunch supporters of American policies and values. More recently, this has also facilitated the peaceful integration of China—tightly governed by the Chinese Communist Party that historically had opposed both market-based economic trade and essentially all private property rights-- into the capitalist world economy, and reversed a trend that many believed would inevitably lead to armed conflict with the West. These are no mean feats in terms of past history. For example, the inability of the victorious European powers after WWI to stabilize global economic relations and resuscitate Germany led directly to Hitler's rise and the subsequent destruction of that region. Moreover, and perhaps most pointedly, the implicit goal of these post-WWII American-led reformist policies was also achieved: the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War.

Through the advocacy and support of free trade policies we have encouraged our prior adversaries to pursue outcomes that have been win-win for everyone: global stability free from the political tensions and devastating wars that followed in the footsteps of past failures to create fair and equitable global relations. To be precise, U.S.-led policies that allowed for implementation of a non-prejudicial system of importation of goods from other countries

have also built a foundation for the importation of global stability—our positive "owner's equity" pay-off that must be acknowledged and calculated alongside any trade deficit that accrued. As well, the large budgetary deficits accumulated by America since 1948 have financed the massive military might of the country— generally used, albeit with some unfortunate exceptions-- to insure global peace and compliance with global rules and norms by those who might otherwise choose to violate them. For any to argue against this, we would simply remind them of the consequences of post-World War I behaviors: Europe— the overwhelming world leader on essentially any metric chosen at the start of the 20th century—sacrificed nearly everything through adoption of invidious beggar-thy-neighbor protectionist economic policies.

Conclusion: The Time To Act Is Now

We therefore argue that global prosperity is in the American national interest. Our "greatness" cannot be measured by the economic and political deficits we would force trading partners to assume through nationalistic protectionist policies on our part. Rather, it is measured by the collective stability, security, and prosperity that we achieve together, and any accounting of these outcomes must factor them into the final bottom-line tally.

But a problem we clearly acknowledge is that these benefits are measured in the aggregate. When measured in total, over time free trade clearly generates greater benefits than costs as economic efficiencies prevail, waste is reduced, and resource allocation decisions are rationalized— which is the whole point of market-based economic theory. But what this calculation usually fails to adequately address is the social (and increasingly political) costs for some that always accompany economic adjustment. Schumpeter's "Creative Destruction" is just that—a two-sided sword. But while it is ultimately a force that favors the "creative" side of the equation, by no means should this imply that the negative consequences of change are to be disregarded or neglected as mere collateral damage to be borne by the deplorable or unfortunate.

In our view, a better and more equitable way to address the resulting imbalances and the justifiable grievances of those left behind from economic

progress flowing from globalization and free trade would be to implement a comprehensive new social program, designed to invest displaced factory workers and others with skills to obtain productive employment in emerging economic sectors (e.g., the industrial internet) where such skills are in short supply. In broad form, we envision a modern-day Marshall Plan for America that establishes a foundation for future national greatness. The architecture of such a program would insure strict requirements for participant inclusion, defined metrics for evaluation of participant progress and retention, and tight fiscal oversight—much as how one would manage a successful construction project, for example (something with which the President has familiarity). Tax incentives could be provided to firms that employ program graduates, and penalties imposed on firms that bypass domestic opportunities in favor of off-shore employment; indeed, the entire program could be outsourced to U.S.-based private enterprise with appropriate rewards for achievement (an approach that has succeeded in the past toward public policy goals, for example the construction of affordable housing for low-income citizens).

Moreover, we also would posit that a program such as we advocate be superior to recent discussion about a “guaranteed annual income” as a means to deal with economic transitions. Through provision of marketable skills, our proposal would maintain the dignity of the individual and would thus contribute towards long-term economic rehabilitation of both people and the nation as a whole.

Accordingly, we think that an approach incorporating re-skilling through training can prepare America and Americans for a better future, at a cost significantly less than engaging in trade wars that ultimately distort efficient resource allocation decisions, bring reputational damage, and in general prove destructive for all involved, politically as well as economically. We would urge that a full accounting be used in the bookkeeping involved in this proposal, acknowledging the positive benefits that global peace and stability have generated (assets) alongside the costs of U.S. budgetary and trade balance deficits (liabilities). By improving the domestic situation while remaining the global guarantor of a free and open trading system—the classical “benign hegemon” – we can secure a more stable world based upon shared

prosperity reflected in “owners’ equity,” the major proportion of which would still accrue to the USA due to the size, structure, and dynamism of our economy.

Recent events would indicate that we are already beginning to witness a reclassification of national “debts and credits” in the geopolitical balance sheet as we have characterized it in this paper. News reports indicate that President Trump might be altering his views on a number of topics relative to trade; these include, among others, a reversal of earlier claims that China is a currency manipulator, that the Export-Import Bank should be abolished, the Chair of the Fed should go, and that NATO was an obsolete institution (C. Wang, 2017; N. Kitroeff, 2017). To be sure, this might reflect little more than a “learning curve” effect that any President undergoes once the campaign trail ends and the realities of office emerge; as well, the ambiguities of the President’s commitment to his prior statements raise doubts. Nevertheless, it is a tentative start towards a more realistic assessment of the benefits that globalization can provide to the nation as well as the entire world economic system. If this can now be extended and deepened through future Presidential action, we welcome it as a positive step towards increasing the “owner’s equity” of globalization and paving the way for a future stream of dividends that will enrich all stakeholders in the game. This, we conclude, can truly make America great again.

NOTES

¹ Academic approaches to the social sciences tend to separate subjects into discrete categories, as interdisciplinary studies are often perceived as too generalized to be of serious consequence; for example, see issues of the *Journal of International Economics* or the *Political Science Quarterly* among others. However, we might also note that President Trump has recently conflated these topical areas: he called on China to get tougher on North Korea’s nuclear armaments program and indicated that China’s trade relations with the US could be improved if that happened; see J. Wagner, “Trump Breaks Silence on North Korea, Defends Reversal on China,” *The Washington Post* (April 16, 2017).

² One need only recall the various anti-free trade legislative actions of many of the trading nations of the world that occurred in the 1920s, capped by passage of the US Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 and the 1932 legislation of the Commonwealth countries, to realize how nationalistic economic policies played into political

movements that resulted in the rise of totalitarian dictatorial regimes in Europe and elsewhere and the subsequent descent into WWII. See, for example, A. Tooze, *The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931* (2014) and B. Eichengreen, *The European Economy Since 1945* (2007)

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The Water-Energy-Food Nexus: Understanding Qatar's Challenges for Achieving Food Security

DeLaine Mayer



Photograph 2017 DeLaine Mayer
Doha, Qatar

“We clearly needed more farms, more greenhouses, but what about water? So we desalinate seawater, but with what power? You don't want more global warming by using fossil fuels, so it has to be solar...Everything has to work together.”

– Fahad bin Mohammed al-Attiya, executive chairman of the Qatar National Food Security Programme

Qatar faces food and water vulnerability due to its arid climate and reliance on imports. Its status as one of the world's richest countries puts it in a unique position to advance global knowledge on what is technologically possible to combat food and water insecurity. The Qatar National Food Security Programme (QNFSP), established in 2011, has an ambitious mission: achieve a state of food security (“Qatar National Food Security Programme - QNFSP”) through four core objectives:

- 1) “Domestic agricultural reform;
- 2) Diversify trade and global investments;
- 3) Maintain reserves of food and water
- 4) Reform market governance”

(Fahad and Al-Attiya).

In 2014, Qatar imported \$3.08 billion worth of food goods, 10 percent of its total imports, and 90 percent of its food (“Qatar.” OEC). The Qatar National Food Security Programme is tasked with producing half of Qatar's food locally by 2025, an ambitious goal for a country with no lakes or rivers and an annual rainfall of less than 3 inches (Baker). Fahad bin Mohammed al-Attiya, executive chairman of QNFSP, believes more desalination plants, solar power, energy efficient greenhouses, and social change towards an “agricultural renaissance” can help the Gulf state reach the goal of growing “five times the amount of produce on the same amount of land using 30% less water” (Baker). These innovative, and costly, national food security projects aim to increase production of local foods, and expand the state's geological and geographic limitations. This paper will examine Qatar's water resources, new desalination technologies, and food imports and production, highlighting opportunities and challenges to the success of the

food security program.


Limited Water Resources

Qatar occupies a peninsula in the Persian Gulf off Saudi Arabia. It has an area of 11,437 square kilometers (4,416 square miles) and a coastline of 563 kilometers (345 miles) (“Qatar.” Nations Encyclopedia). Only 1.2 percent of that land is arable (“Arable land (% of land area”). As previously mentioned, the country has no rivers or lakes, and has annual precipitation levels between 10-200 mm (0.4-7.8 in.) (Alsharhan, Nairn, Rizk, Bakhit, Alhajari). Qatar's problems with water resources are not just due to natural circumstances; they're compounded by human activity and rapid growth. For decades, farmers drew water from Qatar's underground freshwater aquifers without regulation. Now, most of the aquifers are depleted, with recharge (replenishment from rainfall or runoff) occurring at a quarter of the rate that water is extracted (“Fahad Al-Attiya, Qatar National Food Security Programme - Hub Culture Interview at GGCS3”). Much of the groundwater that remains has high levels of salinity due to farming processes that create brine (saltwater), which is discharged back into the ground. This groundwater is then left unusable for farming (Darwish). Heavy water exploitation including high consumption due to government subsidization, underutilized wastewater, and high-energy use for desalination further contribute to the “demand gap” (Darwish). Today, Qatar has a 48-hour water supply, meaning a disruption of water extraction would quickly and negatively impact life in the country within two days from cessation of production (“The energy sector stays ahead of demand as Qatar increases capacity”). This context helps to explain Qatar's push for desalination plants.

Half the water used in Qatar is desalted water (DW). As the population grows and standard of living rises, DW demand will also increase. “Per capita domestic water consumption is directly [proportionate] to the GDP per capita,” and both numbers are rising in Qatar (Darwish). Meanwhile, low water tariffs disincentivize consumer conservation, leading to increased water waste, which further burdens the demand for water. With water consumption on the rise, “new water has to fill the demand gap” and most likely, “the new water would be DW” (Darwish). But desalination is energy intensive and expensive; the cost of DW and the reliance on fossil fuel to produce it must be reduced

for desalination to be sustainable (Darwish).

Globally, freshwater resources are “strained by population growth, development, droughts, climate change and more” (Bienkowski). For many countries, the best option for developing new water sources is through desalination, the removal of salt and minerals from saltwater for residential and agricultural purposes. Desalted water, however, has two significant costs: one, it’s financially expensive to produce, and two, it uses significantly more energy than water treatment. Powering the plant is approximately 55 percent of a desalination plants’ total operation costs; “three to 10 kilowatt-hours of energy [are needed] to produce one cubic meter of freshwater from seawater. Traditional drinking water treatment plants typically use well under 1 kWh per cubic meter” (Bienkowski). The image at right shows the typical operations and management cost breakdown of a desalination plant according to BioLargo, a technology production company working on issues related to water, agriculture, and energy (BioLargo).



Desalination Technologies

Desalination refers to a number of different processes and technologies that purify water for human consumption. Any process requires energy, but the amount of energy needed varies based on the temperature and salinity of the water. Energy differences between processes is a result of the efficiency of the chosen process, not the minimum amount of energy required for desalination (which is the same regardless of the process) (“Energy Use”). Qatar’s three primary desalination plants use thermal

technology to evaporate water and then cool it back to a purified, liquid state. A fourth thermal plant is currently being built. Qatar’s latest desalination contract, however, is for a \$500 million reverse osmosis plant (Kovessy). Reverse osmosis is more efficient than thermal processes because the conversion of water to steam (a phase change) requires more energy than pumping seawater through a filtering membrane (“Energy Use”). These two new plants, one thermal and one reverse osmosis, will be responsible for producing slightly less than a quarter of the country’s current water production (Kovessy). In 2013, Qatar announced a 200-megawatt solar initiative, in a bid to recognize and implement its full solar energy potential, which equals 1.5 million barrels of crude oil annually. Nationally, “Qatar hopes to produce 20% of its energy from renewable sources by 2024” (“Qatari government launches 200 MW solar initiative”).

This is all connected with the region’s tacit acknowledgement that, while oil may provide the necessary revenue for development, alternative, cleaner technologies are required for sustainable development. The oil-rich Arab Gulf states gain significant revenue from fossil fuels, but even the world’s largest fossil fuel exporters recognize a need for greater energy independence and global trends towards pro-renewables investments. Today, Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest petroleum exporter, (“Saudi Arabia facts and figures”) is building the world’s first solar-powered reverse osmosis desalination plant in Ras Al Khafji, blending two resources and technologies that will be crucial to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states’ survival and development (Casey).

Brine Disposal

After water is desalted at a desalination plant, brine discharge is returned to the water source, creating different impacts depending on the kind of water source. Brine discharge is the “fluid waste...which contains a high percentage of salt and minerals” that were filtered out during desalination (Danoun). The impact of high levels of brine discharge in a return to a seawater source may change marine habitats due to the following constituents: high salt concentration, high alkalinity from increased calcium, temperature change due to the high temperature required in the desalination process, and toxic metals (if brine has contact with metallic materials). In a marine habitat, water salinity may influence some species positively

and others negatively. Changes could influence the following: species' development and reproduction, larval survival and life expectancy, population density, and reproductive traits (Danoun).

In aquifers, the impact of brine disposal has more immediate impact on the land and people relying on it for sustenance. Qatar's dependence on groundwater aquifers has led to depleted resources. In an unfortunate cycle, "overdrawing from aquifers has increased soil salinity which, in turn, has reduced agricultural productivity and caused significant land degradation" (Ismail). Qatar's pursuit for food self-sufficiency may have significant negative consequences on the country's land and water quality in the future.

Reliance on Food Imports

Qatar's push for food self-sufficiency despite the cost, technological challenges, and environmental impact comes from its vulnerability in its reliance on global trade. Political-, health-, and economic-related shocks in food-producing countries or at exporting ports cause supply-chain disruptions, which immediately impact food prices and access in Qatar. During the 2008 global food crisis for example, cereal, of which Qatar imports 99.5 percent, (Ismail) reached a price index 2.8 higher than in 2000, and remained 1.9 times higher in 2010 (The Global Social Crisis: Report on the World Social Situation 2011). In The Global Social Crisis, the United Nations describes several global trends in food production and consumption that, in the Qatari context, make local production that much more necessary: climate change is worsening desertification, leading to water-supply problems which impact nations' ability to produce food. Growing populations and trends towards urbanization globally has reduced available farmland, which is increasingly used to produce non-food items, like biofuel. Soil quality has been declining after years of fertilizer misuse and monocropping. Underground aquifers and other freshwater sources are being depleted or compromised, and there are fewer transitional agribusinesses for production and trade, which places undue burden on small farmers and consumers (The Global Social Crisis: Report on the World Social Situation 2011).

Qatar's geographic position in a geopolitically tense neighborhood also threatens its food supply.



Most imports come through the Strait of Hormuz or across Qatar's border with Saudi Arabia. The map above shows Qatar in relation to its neighbors and the Strait (Gladstone). Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz over oil embargos, and has continued to engage American ships and planes in "unsafe and unprofessional" ways in the Strait (Mills). The civil war in Yemen (located south of Oman and Saudi Arabia), fueled by tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia with support from Russia and the United States respectively, has led to an increased presence of militarized units in the Strait. Any disruption of food shipments to the Persian Gulf due to fighting or closure of the Strait would have an immediate impact on the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait (Ismail). Even if Qatar's food self-sufficiency target is reached, 60 percent of its food will still be imported. Supply routes and suppliers should be diversified to reduce the shock of supply disruptions on food cost and accessibility (Ismail).

Trade-Off Analysis

More than half of Qatar's water, 60 percent, is used for irrigation of farmland, despite producing less than 10 percent of food consumed in country (Ismail). A trade-off analysis was conducted through the Valuing Vital Resources initiative of Chatham House, a British policy institute. The analysis highlights "the trade-off between increasing local food production and impacts on...water, energy, financial and land resources" (Mohtar). Using data on food production levels for eight food products, water and energy technologies and efficiencies, and crop yields from 2010 (the year the study was conducted), Chatham House reported that to achieve a 25 percent increase in the yield of the eight food products would "require 206% more water, 382% more land, over 200% more energy and emissions, and a 196% increase in financial

resources" (Mohtar).

Looking Forward


In 2008, Saudi Arabia discontinued its national project towards wheat self-sufficiency due to financial and environmental (mainly water) waste. Qatar faces similar risks (Ismail). Regardless, Qatar's push for self-sufficiency is advancing global research and knowledge on what is possible with new technologies and sustained innovation. The issue of lack of clean water for municipal and residential purposes will only grow as the global population rises and resources are further strained. Desalination is and will be, for many around the world, the only option for sustained access to clean water. The question for Qatar is if the money and waste will be worth it, though they may have few alternatives.

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Peacebuilding in Jammu and Kashmir State: A Proposed Intervention

Eaman Sarwar



Photograph 2010 Kashmir Global
Flickr

Introduction

“People living in settings of deep-rooted conflict are faced with extraordinary irony. Violence is known; peace is the mystery. By its very nature, therefore, peacebuilding requires a journey guided by the imagination of risk.” - John Paul Lederach, *The Moral Imagination*

Jammu and Kashmir's (J&K) identity has been understood mostly through the lens of Pakistani and Indian national frameworks. Since Pakistan and India's independence from British Colonial Rule in 1947, J&K has been a disputed territory claimed by both states. This dispute has led to a state of ongoing political tensions, border violations, and even full-fledged wars, including the War of 1947, 1965, 1971, the Siachen Conflict, and Kargil War. In 1949 the first group of unarmed military observers called the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) were sent to supervise the ceasefire in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1972, both India and Pakistan signed an agreement regarding the Line of Control (LOC), a de facto border between both states that takes the form of an electric fence between eight and twelve feet in height. The narratives told from Pakistani and Indian perspectives excludes the marginalized voices and experiences of the people from J&K. Due to years spent under conflict, children living in J&K have been left on the forefront of violence, and have been deprived of a shared understanding of the region's history.

This paper will propose a peace building intervention in an attempt to fill the void of missing voices from J&K's narrative, gain a collective understanding of history in the region, and promote structural values of peace and understanding in the current and future communities of J&K. This UNICEF-style peacebuilding intervention will take the form of peace education, peace training, and peace workshops. Using UNICEF's model of peace education, and the theories of John Paul Lederach's *The Moral Imagination*, I argue this intervention will begin the process of communities imagining a state of peace in Jammu and Kashmir.

Background

Jammu and Kashmir, which has been under the conquest and rule of the Mughals, Afghans, Sikhs, and the British Empire throughout its history, is a place full of contradictions and complexity. History of this

region extends as far back as the third century BC, “under the rule of Asoka, whose empire extended from Bengal to the Deccan, Afghanistan to the Punjab, and included Kashmir” (Schofield 1). Written records dating back to the 12th century can be found in the “Rajatarangini (Chronicle of Kings), which illustrate how, since legendary times, the valley's rulers came into contact and conflict with their neighbors” (Schofield 1). This historical narrative suggests the extensive nature of conquest in Kashmir, which, today, has left a diverse population made up of various tribes and ethnic groups inhabiting the region now known to the rest of the world as a territory dispute between India and Pakistan. J&K is divided into the geographic regions of Jammu, Kashmir Valley, and Ladakh, and is further divided into the diverse ethnic and religious groups including: “Gujjars, Bakkarwals, Kashmiri Pandits, Dogras, and Ladkhi Buddhists on the Indian side, and Balti, Shina Khowar, Burushashashki, Wakhi, and Pahari speaking people on Pakistan side, as well as Ismaili, Sunni, Shia, and Nur Bakshi sects of Islam in Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas” (Behera 104). The political interests of Pakistan and India have repeatedly overshadowed these diverse tribal, religious, and cultural groups with distinct identities. Additionally, J&K is commonly described as a Hindu-Muslim conflict, which is a misleading and simplistic interpretation of the conflict. Although J&K has a population of Muslims in majority, it is insufficient to overlook the many sects of Islam, as well as religions of Hinduism, Sikhism, and Buddhism that are practiced in the region. “Jammu and Kashmir is one of the most diverse regions in the subcontinent. Even its majority community of Kashmiri Muslims is not a unified, homogeneous entity in terms of its political beliefs, its ideological leanings, or the political goals of the decade-long insurgent movement in the Kashmir valley” (Behera 2). Further J&K political parties such as the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, and the Jammu and Kashmir People's Democratic Party do not represent all interests of the state. Various minority groups including the Kashmiri Pandits, Dogras, and Gujjars are left marginalized and unrepresented by political parties. After the Pakistan and India partition in 1947, J&K was split with India gaining control of Ladakh, Kashmir Valley, and Jammu, while Pakistan controlled Gilgit, Baltistan, Muzaffarabad, Mirpur, and Poonch” (Behera 29). This division of J&K has led to disenfranchisement of minority groups, leading to

further disconnect and grievances over competing narratives.

Due to the diverse identities and interests of J&K, political movements have continuously failed to achieve desired objectives (Behera 144). Regardless of having a Muslim majority in J&K, the different secessionist movements in the 1950s and 1990s remained unsuccessful due to the exclusion of voices of minorities, with only Kashmiri Muslims represented by the campaigns (Behera 144).

“The minority social groups, in fact, sought autonomy from the Kashmir Valley. The collective and consistent opposition of the state’s linguistic, regional, and religious minorities checkmated the Kashmiri Muslim’s demand for secession. Likewise, the most important reason for the failure of Jammu’s political demands- ranging from regional political autonomy and a regional council to a separate state has been the lack of mass supporting in the region” (Behera 144).

Kashmiri politics in pre-partition India and disregarding the political stakes of the Indian National Congress and of the Muslim League in Kashmir, previous analyses have tended to see Kashmir as an immutable zero-sum test of India’s and Pakistan’s legitimating ideologies- in which one’s validity invalidates the other’s- which in turn precludes the possibility of any reconciliation” (Behera 1).

The purpose of this UNICEF-style peace education intervention in the region is to not leave the needs of J&K’s local communities unattended. Rather, UNICEF’s peace education training programs and workshops will allow local communities to imagine a state of peace.

UNICEF has implemented multiple peace education programs under its Peace Education Working Group, which is a part of the UNICEF Peace Education network. The following section will lay out how UNICEF defines peace education in this intervention,

Objective: To help children to understand and tolerate difference

This clearly demonstrates fragmentation and lack of unity among local groups in J&K. Further, regions of J&K such as Azad Kashmir are uncertain of their legality as a province of Pakistan. According to a 1948 resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, Azad Kashmir is not a province, or independent state of Pakistan, but, “pending final solution,” and “administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission” (Behera 172). This clearly suggests the ambiguous nature of local regions of J&K, which can be argued as purposely left unclear in “their constitutional and legal status as an effective tool for politically subjugating these areas” (Behera 172).

Proposed Intervention

Navnita Chadha Behera, in *Demystifying Kashmir*, suggests that our understanding of Kashmir, has always remained through an India-Pakistan or Hindu-Muslim lens, which in turn leaves it solely a conflict between India and Pakistan, ultimately ignoring the history and needs of Kashmir and its local people.

“By turning a blind eye to the local dynamics of

and how the intervention will operate peace training and workshops in the state of J&K. Peace education is defined as “ the process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to bring about behavioral changes that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural; to resolve conflict peacefully; and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national or international level” (Fountain 1). This definition is particularly valuable in that it is rooted in addressing behavioral changes, which will begin the process of changing values and attitudes steeped in distrust and fear. Additionally, this operational definition by UNICEF is one that will work simultaneously with the intended intervention, for it targets structural prevention, or “measures to ensure that crises do not arise in the first place or, if they do, that they do not recur” (Hill PowerPoint).

The proposed intervention, which will implement peace education via peace training and peace workshops, will ultimately influence behavioral changes, which can potentially shift the values of the

society. Both the peace training and workshops will focus on promoting values of understanding, empathy, and recognition of 'other' narratives of history. This process of influencing behavior change in individuals can take place in eight stages as outlined by UNICEF. These include that participants "become aware of the issue, become concerned about the issue, acquire knowledge and skills pertaining to the issue, become motivated based on new attitudes and values, intend to act, try out the new behavior, evaluate the trial, and practice the recommended behavior" (Fountain 5). By incorporating peace education in training sessions and workshops, individuals in the community will begin to develop skills and values that are encompassing of change, solidarity, and reconciliation. UNICEF outlines the aims of peace education to influence both knowledge, skills, and attitudes that include some of the following: "self awareness, conflict analysis, critical thinking, ability to live with change, acceptance of others, and social responsibility" (Fountain 16).

The UNICEF-funded peace-training sessions and peace workshops will occur in J&K both inside and outside of schools. Peace training will be aimed at community leaders, teachers, and parents, while the peace workshops will target children and youth. The community-based training sessions will introduce individuals to both peace education and conflict management.

UNICEF-implemented peace training sessions, which are targeted towards adults, aim to provide adults with skill sets and attitudes that they can bring home to their communities, neighborhoods, schools, and families. For example, peace training sessions in the past by UNICEF have "been initiated by a facilitator who organizes sensitization and conflict resolution workshops for the adult leaders of the school, the parents, and teachers together. Teachers are also trained in pedagogical approaches which encourage planning and decision-making on the part of children and parents, to enable them to be more actively involved in school outreach activities" (Fountain 21). These types of sessions can be modeled in J&K, and can encourage trainees to use conflict prevention, and mediation as solutions to conflict. Further, this will encourage people to begin to challenge past conflict responses, and encourage people to conceptualize methods of self-sustaining peace both within the community and at home. Peace training workshops

aim to bridge the gap of marginalized voices in J&K, gain a collective understanding of history, and promote values of acceptance and coexistence.

UNICEF-implemented peace workshops for children and youth will occur both as part of the school curriculum and outside of the classroom. In the classroom, teachers will use the toolkits provided by UNICEF to implement activities that enhance children's understanding and knowledge of other religions, cultures, and local groups. These types of activities implemented in curriculums will provide children with the skills to understand a shared history of J&K. For example, the following peace activity used in secondary schools in Sri Lanka can be replicated similarly in J&K. (slightly modified to fit the needs of J&K)

"Tolerance of Differences

Objective: To help children to understand and tolerate difference in people in terms of their religions, cultures, personal values and belief systems.

This activity is effective when done as a follow-up to a detailed study of selected human differences. This can be used as an activity connected with religious education or social studies, or it may be done as a separate activity on its own.

Preparation:

1. Select a type of difference you want the children to study; e.g., religious differences, racial differences, national differences, occupational differences, intellectual differences, personal and attitudinal differences.

2. Assign, children to study these differences by analyzing their foundations, sources, historical developments, etc. This may take the form of a formal lesson, self-learning, reading, home assignments, bring outside speakers.

3. All the children in the class should form pairs, choosing one person to be A and one person to be B. In each pair, one assumes the role of one belief, and the other assumes a different belief.

Suggested Questions to lead the discussion

1. What were the feelings you had when listening to someone who was different from you?

2. Did you find it difficult to listen? What made it difficult inside you?

3. How do you think you can overcome this difficulty?" (Fountain 21)

For children who have grown up amidst conflict, these class exercises will teach them to become aware of different groups' needs, as well as their own needs. Further these activities, which are done as a team or as part of group work, encourage skills of cooperation, collaboration, and active listening. Building these skills sets is necessary for helping children develop values of respect, tolerance, and acceptance for all groups. By implementing these UNICEF workshops across schools in J&K, children will begin to learn about the shared history of their region, and develop the skills and values that promote peace.

While these workshops will benefit children in formal schools, UNICEF peace education workshops also aim to benefit children whose schools do not implement peace education, children in religious schools, and children who have dropped out of school to join militant groups. These workshop camps around various communities in J&K will provide children peace education through creative and hands on means. These workshops will be designed based on the interests of youth in respective regions. Past UNICEF models outside of school included "year-round 'Solidarity Camps' in Rwanda that bring together young people of different ethnic groups for recreational and community service activities, and 'Peace Camps' in Lebanon which focused on bringing together young people from different ethnic groups, and engaging them in recreational activities, vocational training, and study of the history and geography of the country" (Fountain 21).

Implementing 'solidarity camps' or 'peace camps' among youth from all diverse regions of J&K will provide understanding and recognition of different voices from the region, especially those voices that have been silenced or are unrepresented. These workshop camps hold great potential in building shared and collective values of recognition and coexistence of others, and will encourage participants to begin the process of imagining shared communities. Similarly, UNICEF peace workshops outside of the school will encourage creative projects and activities to be undertaken by youth. These may include "travelling theater, which has been used in Burundi, Mozambique, and Rwanda, which used art, drama, song and dance, enabling young people to express

themselves and serve as community educators" (Fountain 22). Puppetry, which has been used by past UNICEF peace workshops, is "an ideal medium for discussing sensitive issues. Puppets draw viewers into the drama without causing them to feel threatened by the actions in the drama" (Fountain 23). These different creative mediums can be designed based on the interest of youth in Kashmir, and are extremely valuable in helping participants gain awareness of conflicts, religions, cultures, different groups' needs, and methods of resolving and preventing conflict. These tools of peace education influence behavioral changes in children. In the long-term, these programs contribute to participants shifting attitudes and values to contribute to a collective understanding of sustainable peace.

Theoretical Assumptions

The training sessions can be understood through John Paul Lederach's definition of constructive social change, "the pursuit of moving relationships from those defined by fear, mutual recrimination, and violence toward those characterized by love, mutual respect, and proactive engagement" (Lederach 3). This requires the sessions to consist of encouraging trainees to incorporate J&K's relationship with both India and Pakistan locally within communities. Whether by teachers opening dialogue on the shared narratives between all regions in classrooms, finding ways to incorporate Kashmiri history in school curriculums, in artwork around the community, or even in parenting at home, these actions will create relationships with the 'other' in hopes of dismantling the notion of the 'other' altogether.

"Peacebuilding requires a vision of relationship. Stated bluntly, if there is no capacity to imagine the canvas of mutual relationships and situate oneself as part of that historic and ever-evolving web, peacebuilding collapses. The centrality of relationship provides the context and potential for breaking violence, for it brings people into the pregnant moments of the moral imagination: the space of recognition that ultimately the quality of our life is dependent on the quality of life of others" (Lederach 3).

Using this framework by Lederach, J&K must incorporate all voices in peacebuilding, in order to move forward and begin a new shared narrative. The training

sessions that target community leaders, teachers, and parents will provide them with the tools necessary to engage in peace education in their professions. This catalyst of change for local communities will instill progressive values of trust, understanding, and solidarity in the future generations.

The youth workshops, which will be implemented both in and out of the school curriculum, have the potential to be of immense value and success. Children are key components in peace building, because children are naturally imaginative, explorative, and creative. John Paul Lederach in *The Moral Imagination* emphasizes how imagination is key in the process of peace building. He states, "If the moral imagination lies within us as a dormant seed of potential, and this seed holds the key to breaking cycles of destructive conflict, then our challenge is how to invoke the growth of this kind of imagination as an integral part of developing innovative professionals" (Lederach 7). Children harness these unlocked seeds of potential. The workshops are intended to water these seeds and help them grow. Whether by encouraging theater, artwork, puppet shows, or music, the youth workshops contain an embedded creative element to them, one that is humanely universal and shared. Lederach shares that another "key discipline that gives rise to the moral imagination is the provision of space for the creative act to emerge. Providing space requires a predisposition, a kind of attitude and perspective that opens up, invokes, the spirit and belief that creativity is humanly possible" (11). Children via the intervention of UNICEF-run workshops will be encouraged to explore and create, while envisioning solutions to conflict. This will be extremely powerful in not only unlocking the imaginative element in peacebuilding, but creating a generation that is not discouraged from thinking outside of the box.

The second aspect of the youth workshops, which intend to focus on open dialogue and conversation, will encourage participants to embrace the unknown. Lederach states, "Accepting vulnerability, we must risk the step into unknown and unpredictable lands and seek constructive engagement with those people and things we least understand and most fear. We must take up the inevitably perilous but absolutely necessary journey that makes its way back to humanity and the building of genuine community" (4). The workshops, which promote behavioral changes over time, will

lead to a J&K state identity that isn't rooted in fear or distrust, but is open to accepting and understanding its neighbors. This engagement of youth from J&K learning about neighboring communities and local groups will begin the process of creating a larger community with positive shared values. These shared values will slowly be the catalyst in breaking the cycles of violence and conflict in J&K and lead to a self-sustained peace in the region.

Conclusion

The state of Jammu and Kashmir and its people have remained in a system of violence for many years; children and youth especially have been denied a safe and peaceful environment, which has contributed to increased tension and lack of social cohesion. To challenge the dominant narrative of J&K, traditionally understood through the lenses of Pakistan and India's national frameworks, this paper focused on the perspective of the diverse groups of people who inhabit J&K, emphasizing their respective positions and needs. Through the proposed intervention of peace education, peace training, and peace workshops, this programming will fill the gap of missing regional voices, cultivate a shared and collective understanding of history, and promote values of structural peace within communities. This peace building intervention holds the great potential to encourage and provide individuals with the skill set to imagine coexistence and self-sustaining peace in their communities.

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