

## Online Appendix

“Staring at the West through Kremlin-Tinted Glasses: Russian Mass and Elite Divergence in Attitudes towards the US, EU, and Ukraine Before and After Crimea”

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### A1.1 Robustness Checks

In this section, we rerun Tables 1 and 2b. First, we show in Table A1 that our primary tests of the Common Determinants model carry through when restricting the sample to only Moscow residents (Columns 1-3) and when the Internet usage variable is excluded (Columns 4-6). We find the results to be substantively unchanged, as discussed in Section 4.1.

In Table A2, we include elites working in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as core elites rather than as non-core elites. The results are substantively unchanged.

**Table A2:** Predictive Error for Elite Attitudes (including SOE as core elites)

	Non-core Elites	Core Elites	Difference
Ukraine	0.480	0.560	0.080**
USA	0.511	0.582	0.071***
EU	0.393	0.406	0.013

Note: \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

**Table A1:** Robustness: Demographic Determinants of Mass and Elite Attitudes

	Moscow residents only			No Internet variable		
	DV: Positive attitude towards:			DV: Positive attitude towards:		
	Ukraine (1)	USA (2)	EU (3)	Ukraine (4)	USA (5)	EU (6)
Male	-0.055** (0.023)	-0.037 (0.023)	-0.042* (0.022)	-0.073*** (0.005)	-0.092*** (0.005)	-0.072*** (0.005)
Higher Educ	-0.030 (0.033)	-0.061* (0.033)	-0.031 (0.032)	-0.006 (0.006)	0.027*** (0.005)	0.026*** (0.005)
Age	0.001 (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.0003 (0.0003)	-0.006*** (0.0003)	-0.006*** (0.0003)
Cohort: Born after 1970	0.041 (0.044)	0.009 (0.044)	0.024 (0.043)	0.010 (0.010)	-0.050*** (0.009)	-0.039*** (0.009)
Internet User	0.075** (0.035)	0.205*** (0.036)	0.197*** (0.035)			
Post-Crimea Dummy	-0.566*** (0.024)	-0.583*** (0.024)	-0.552*** (0.023)	-0.522*** (0.005)	-0.535*** (0.005)	-0.647*** (0.005)
Elite Dummy	0.102 (0.193)	-0.181 (0.194)	0.337 (0.243)	-0.047 (0.159)	-0.543*** (0.160)	-0.001 (0.192)
Male × Elite	0.126** (0.061)	0.044 (0.062)	0.074 (0.070)	0.144** (0.057)	0.101* (0.057)	0.104* (0.061)
Age × Elite	-0.003 (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)
Cohort × Elite	0.011 (0.088)	0.047 (0.089)	0.008 (0.097)	0.040 (0.077)	0.099 (0.077)	0.072 (0.081)
Internet × Elite	-0.131** (0.064)	-0.331*** (0.065)	-0.172* (0.096)			
Post-Crimea × Elite	-0.664*** (0.063)	-0.002 (0.064)	0.273*** (0.064)	-0.723*** (0.057)	-0.082 (0.057)	0.369*** (0.056)
Constant	2.672*** (0.101)	2.716*** (0.101)	2.776*** (0.098)	2.758*** (0.017)	2.902*** (0.017)	3.080*** (0.016)
N	5,051	5,060	4,776	78,208	82,961	75,502
R <sup>2</sup>	0.184	0.139	0.150	0.117	0.130	0.203
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.182	0.137	0.148	0.117	0.130	0.203

Note: \*p &lt; .1; \*\*p &lt; .05; \*\*\*p &lt; .01

### A3.2 Mass Opinion Training Models

In this section, we show the results of our estimation of the training models for the Kremlin Cueing analysis. We run OLS regressions with the inclusion of a number of demographic variables on the mass opinion survey data. We use the resulting coefficients to calculate the predictive error for elite opinion.

**Table A3:** Training Models, Mass Opinion Data Only

	DV: Positive attitude towards:		
	Ukraine (1)	USA (2)	EU (3)
Male	-0.066*** (0.007)	-0.078*** (0.007)	-0.082*** (0.007)
Higher Educ	0.003 (0.008)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.031*** (0.007)
Age	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.013*** (0.001)	-0.011*** (0.001)
Age squared	0.00005*** (0.00001)	0.0001*** (0.00001)	0.0001*** (0.00001)
Cohort: Born after 1970	-0.050*** (0.013)	-0.064*** (0.013)	-0.042*** (0.013)
Moscow resident	-0.031*** (0.012)	0.049*** (0.012)	0.101*** (0.011)
Internet User	0.031*** (0.009)	0.110*** (0.009)	0.099*** (0.009)
Post-Crimea Dummy	-0.617*** (0.007)	-0.552*** (0.007)	-0.617*** (0.007)
Male × Higher Educ	2.993*** (0.037)	2.919*** (0.037)	3.063*** (0.035)
N	46,601	47,642	46,140
R <sup>2</sup>	0.150	0.132	0.170
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.150	0.132	0.170

Note: \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

### A4.3 Common Determinants Models Excluding Core Elites

In this section, we reproduce Table 1 but excluding core elites from the data. This is a harder test of the Common Determinants model, since we assume that the non-core elites we include here may be closer in opinion to the mass public than the full sample of all elites we examine in the paper. Our substantive results are unchanged, as discussed in Section 4.1.

**Table A4:** Demographic Determinants of Mass and Non-Core Elite Attitudes

	DV: Positive attitude towards:		
	Ukraine (1)	USA (2)	EU (3)
Male	-0.067*** (0.007)	-0.080*** (0.007)	-0.083*** (0.007)
Higher Educ	-0.005 (0.008)	0.025*** (0.008)	0.027*** (0.007)
Age	-0.001** (0.0004)	-0.005*** (0.0004)	-0.004*** (0.0004)
Cohort: Born after 1970	-0.037*** (0.013)	-0.047*** (0.013)	-0.029** (0.012)
Internet User	0.026*** (0.009)	0.109*** (0.009)	0.102*** (0.009)
Post-Crimea Dummy	-0.617*** (0.007)	-0.553*** (0.007)	-0.619*** (0.007)
Elite Dummy	-0.053 (0.216)	-0.330 (0.218)	0.218 (0.290)
Male × Non-Core Elite	0.104 (0.071)	0.107 (0.072)	0.149* (0.080)
Age × Non-Core Elite	-0.0005 (0.004)	0.007* (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)
Cohort × Non-Core Elite	0.123 (0.100)	0.116 (0.102)	0.016 (0.112)
Internet × Non-Core Elite	-0.196*** (0.073)	-0.233*** (0.075)	-0.018 (0.128)
Post-Crimea × Non-Core Elite	-0.511*** (0.077)	-0.119 (0.078)	0.308*** (0.077)
Constant	2.891*** (0.026)	2.746*** (0.026)	2.911*** (0.025)
N	47,162	48,198	46,538
R <sup>2</sup>	0.153	0.132	0.171
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.153	0.132	0.170

Note: \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

## A5.4 Logistic Regression instead of OLS

In Table A5 we reproduce our main, fully interactive results table (Table 1) using logistic regression instead of least squares. We dichotomize the dependent variable and run the same specification as before using logit. While a few variables lose statistical significance, there are no consistent changes to statistical significance or coefficient sign that indicate a different substantive interpretation.

**Table A5:** Demographic Determinants of Mass and Elite Attitudes, logistic regression

	DV: Positive attitude towards:		
	Ukraine	USA	EU
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Male	-0.206*** (0.022)	-0.265*** (0.023)	-0.281*** (0.023)
Higher Educ	-0.024 (0.024)	0.044* (0.025)	0.065** (0.026)
Age	-0.0001 (0.001)	-0.017*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)
Cohort: Born after 1970	-0.030 (0.042)	-0.175*** (0.043)	-0.114*** (0.044)
Internet User	0.070** (0.030)	0.248*** (0.030)	0.260*** (0.031)
Post-Crimea Dummy	-1.661*** (0.023)	-1.611*** (0.023)	-1.887*** (0.024)
Elite Dummy	-0.049 (0.530)	-0.827* (0.482)	2.472** (0.980)
Male × Elite	0.444** (0.190)	0.459*** (0.174)	0.630** (0.283)
Age × Elite	-0.005 (0.010)	0.012 (0.009)	-0.026 (0.017)
Cohort × Elite	0.157 (0.274)	0.295 (0.242)	-0.185 (0.382)
Internet × Elite	-0.658*** (0.166)	-0.576*** (0.150)	0.222 (0.346)
Post-Crimea × Elite	-2.016*** (0.330)	-0.470** (0.229)	0.213 (0.270)
Constant	1.266*** (0.086)	1.189*** (0.087)	1.726*** (0.090)
N	41,062	40,616	38,997
Log Likelihood	-24,794.480	-24,246.780	-22,792.440
AIC	49,614.950	48,519.550	45,610.870

Note: \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

### A6.5 Analyses without Internet Usage Variable

In this section, we replicate Tables 2a and 2b without the inclusion of the internet-use variable as a predictor. The results are extremely similar in magnitude and statistical significance.

**Table A6:** Predictive Error for Elite Attitudes, without internet use variable

	Pre-Crimea	Post-Crimea	Difference
Ukraine	0.471	0.800	0.330***
USA	0.591	0.415	-0.176***
EU	0.240	0.697	0.458***

Note: \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

**Table A7:** Predictive Error for Elite Attitudes, without internet use variable

	Non-core Elites	Core Elites	Difference
Ukraine	0.515	0.592	0.077**
USA	0.509	0.599	0.090***
EU	0.390	0.406	0.016

Note: \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

### A7.6 Analysis using relative value of difference in predicted effects

Here, we replicate Tables 2a and 2b using the relative value of the difference in predicted effects instead of the absolute value of that difference that we present in the main body of the paper. As noted and discussed in the paper, including in footnote 14, the core interpretation of our findings remain the same.

**Table A8:** Predictive Error for Elite Attitudes

	Pre-Crimea	Post-Crimea	Difference
Ukraine	0.097	0.713	0.6168**
USA	0.117	0.188	0.071
EU	-0.160	-0.507	-0.346***

Note: \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

**Table A9:** Predictive Error for Elite Attitudes


	Non-core Elites	Core Elites	Difference
Ukraine	0.219	0.275	0.056
USA	0.112	0.161	0.049
EU	-0.259	-0.307	-0.049

Note: \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

## A8.7 Interactive Model

Figure A1 combines and summarizes Tables 2a and 2b, showing a coefficient plot of three linear regressions that include interaction terms between the post-Crimea dummy from Table 2a and the core elite dummy variables from Table 2b. The result combines both tables into a unified set of three regressions, while providing additional information about the interactive effect of the post-Crimea period and status as a ‘core’ elite.

**Figure A1:** Predictive Error for Elite Attitudes



The main findings from Tables 2a and 2b are found here as well, with some small changes to statistical significance levels as a result of inclusion of the interaction term. The coefficients on the post-Crimea dummy variable show that *non-core* elite attitudes towards Ukraine and the EU became much harder to predict after Crimea at the same time as core elites’ attitudes towards these entities became even more difficult to predict. Being a core or non-core elite is quite irrelevant in determining post-Crimea attitudes towards the US. These attitudes became more demographically predictable after the Crimean crisis than before it. Core elites had more demographically predictable attitudes towards the US before Crimea than did non-core elites, while there was no difference between the two groups with respect to the EU and Ukraine.