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Constructing a Data-Driven Society: China's Social Credit System as a State Surveillance Infrastructure

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Big data technologies have been adopted by both the public and private sectors to develop and expand surveillance capacities. This article traces the institutional processes and political-economic interests of the public and private stakeholders involved in the construction of China's Social Credit System (SCS), which is currently on track for full deployment on 1.4 billion citizens by 2020. The SCS aims to centralize data platforms into a big data–enabled surveillance infrastructure to manage, monitor, and predict the trustworthiness of citizens, firms, organizations, and governments in China. A punishment/reward system based on credit scores will determine whether citizens and organizations are able to access things like education, markets, and tax deductions. While the SCS is widely described by the Western news media as a means of "big brother" or political control, we find that it is a complicated system that focuses primarily on financial and commercial activities rather than political ones. This article presents a framework for understanding state surveillance infrastructures by exploring how various government agencies are cooperating to establish this centralized data infrastructure with the aim of scoring credit, and discussing the distinct but interconnected processes of data collection, data aggregation, and data analytics.

KEY WORDS: big data, social credit, infrastructures, data platforms, state surveillance

Introduction

Big data innovation is increasingly becoming an emerging resource across private and public sectors in many countries. In China, the market size of the big data industry was around $2.5 billion in 2016, and this figure is expected to maintain an annual growth rate of 30 percent between 2017 and 2020 (CAICT, 2017). Meanwhile, big data technologies have been adopted by the Chinese government to improve its control over public opinion, law enforcement, individuals' behaviors, and commercial activities (Creemers, 2017; Liu, He, Guo, Yang, & Zhang, 2014). Recently, the Chinese government has released a series of high-level guiding documents to advance its big data and artificial intelligence (AI) capacities.

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Among these national initiatives, China's Social Credit System (SCS) has drawn considerable academic and public attention not only because this top-level effort tries to integrate traditional commercial credit rating into social behaviors (Meissner, 2017), but also because it involves the construction of centralized data infrastructures for data collection, mining, and analysis (Diab, 2017). By 2020, the Chinese government aims to score the "creditworthiness" and "trustworthiness" of each individual and organizational actor by a computational score based on their historical and ongoing social and economic activities, and these credit scores will determine whether the actor can obtain benefits or punishments. Through this process, big data innovations and information and communication technologies (ICTs) are rapidly being instrumentalized and institutionalized by the government to surveil and govern the political, social, and commercial dominions of China.

Due to the comprehensive and complex interactive participation of public and private stakeholders in the construction of the SCS, this study examines the case from the perspective of *state surveillance infrastructures*: state-sponsored and big data–enabled surveillance efforts that are increasingly instrumentalized by state powers to surveil and regulate the political, economic, and social dominions. Using an inductive grounded case study of the historical context and developmental trajectory of the SCS, we offer a grounded three-phase framework for understanding one of the most ambitious and high-tech surveillance technologies championed by a state power to date. In summary, we propose that first, the *data collection* phase engages in the gathering of financial data (e.g., taxes, loans) and nonfinancial data (e.g., travel information and social media data) via multi-stakeholder mechanisms. In doing so, the SCS substantially expands the scale of the data collected for credit ratings. Second, the *data aggregation* phase focuses on the integration of separate data platforms into a centralized data infrastructure. Data collected by disparate stakeholders are thus shared and integrated for social credit ratings. Finally, the emergent *data infrastructure* is used to surveil four areas for social credit scoring—government affairs, judicial affairs, social activities, and commercial behaviors; and offers a reward and punishment mechanism. We hope that this analytic framework for understanding state surveillance infrastructure will allow scholars to explore the instrumentalization and institutionalization of big data into China's state power apparatuses, as well as to unpack the interplay between public and private sector interests.

Literature Review

In studying the possible role of ICTs in authoritarian regimes, scholars tend to take one of two contrasting positions: while *digital optimists* see ICTs as the great leveler where ICTs function as liberation technologies expanding the autonomous civic capabilities of citizens to challenge state power, *digital pessimists* maintain that the capabilities of new media are socially and politically constructed. In the Chinese context, some scholars argue that ICTs have enabled Chinese citizens to challenge state authority by offering alternative information, encouraging expression, and mobilizing activism. By contrast, others claim that ICTs have instead empowered the Chinese government to conduct censorship, manipulate public opinion, and reduce political risks. Rather than replicating these optimistic and pessimistic perspectives, we argue that government technocrats rarely have the capacity to engineer technological systems alone. Instead, the state plays a more elaborate role in curating competing stakeholders to collaborate and cross-pollinate their expertise across sectors to establish new technological systems, regulatory regimes, and bureaucratic capabilities (Shipan & Volden, 2008).

State Surveillance and Big Data in Comparative Perspectives

To move beyond the optimist/pessimist paradigm, we argue that surveillance studies offer a useful constructivist framework for understanding the institutional construction of the SCS. In this tradition, political technologies are understood as "the ensemble of practices and techniques aiming at the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction" (Lyon, 2007, p. 14). This body of literature has explored the relations between state power and social control in "surveillance societies" where everyday autonomous civic and private life is under constant state surveillance (Trottier, 2016).

Today, state administrations have employed various approaches, including censuses, taxation records, passports, and closed-circuit television (CCTV), to collect data representing populations at large (Gates, 2011). These expanded surveillance efforts are enabled by the development of ICTs and data applications. Additionally, state surveillance is being increasingly integrated into "surveillant assemblages" (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000) leading to "ubiquitous mass surveillance" (Schneier, 2015). Especially since 2010, the widespread adoption of big data–enabled surveillance has further accelerated this trajectory of state intrusion into autonomous domains of civic life (Van Dijck, 2014). Building on this literature, we conceptualize big data–enabled state surveillance into three features to explain how state power and technologies are being normalized in state–society relations.

Big Data–Enabled Surveillance Aims to "Track Everything About Everyone at All Times." One of the most significant consequences of big data surveillance is that larger amounts of public and private data can be actively amassed by state powers and other actors. While conventional surveillance efforts aimed to track specific objects and information (Lyon, 2007), big data surveillance adopts automated methods to "track everything about everyone at all times" (Andrejevic & Gates, 2014, p. 190). Such techniques use both online and offline sources to target each and all individuals, often without their consent. This new "collect everything" approach reshapes traditional data collection efforts in three ways.

First, instead of intentional and explicit sampling techniques, this new approach indiscriminately targets entire populations (Lyon, 2014). Notably, the collect everything approach indicates that personal data are not collected by an identifiable actor for accountable goals. Rather, massive quantities of data about individuals are gathered and aggregated from various sources. Second, while traditional surveillance activities have an intent and goal, big data surveillance lacks these two important attributes and instead aggregates private information before its actual use is ascertained (Van Dijck, 2014). This vaguely defined and intentionally open-ended purpose for data collection has become possible as a result of lowering costs and the increasing ability to automate most of the data collection process (Lyon, 2014). Third, conventional data collection techniques were explicit, and therefore visible. Private individuals were aware of being monitored, albeit not always consenting; but contemporary means of collecting data tend to be invisible and exacerbate the power differential between state powers and private citizens (Tufekci, 2014). In this sense, big data innovations are transforming the surveillant assemblages of states into ubiquitous, invisible, and normalized practices across the world system (Ball & Wood, 2013; Trottier, 2016).

Big Data–Enabled Surveillance Blurs the Interplay Between State and Commercial Sectors. Through mutually beneficial partnerships, states desiring to erect contemporary surveillant assemblages have blurred the boundaries between the public and private sectors (Fuchs, Boersma, Albrechtslund, & Sandoval, 2013; Gates, 2011). While the public sector has played an important role in establishing institutional and organizational conditions for high-tech innovations to take hold in local economies, states have not traditionally been the key sources of new innovations themselves. Specifically, because government agencies are often not able to innovate processes to manage and analyze large amounts of data, specialized commercial entities—high-tech companies in particular—have begun to play a profound role in supporting this process (Fuchs et al., 2013). In addition to supporting data collection and analysis, corporate actors and technical experts from the private sector have been working to meet governments' demands by offering them a range of new surveillance products like facial recognition technologies (Gates, 2011). The integration of public and private sector actors in the advancement of new surveillant assemblages makes it increasingly challenging to identify the primary actors responsible for surveillance expansions in this "corporate–state nexus" (Ball & Wood, 2013, p. 3).

In addition, high-tech firms are routinely coerced into sharing users' aggregated data with third parties, including state institutions, for the purposes of marketing, public services, or maintaining security (Van Dijck, 2014). Accordingly, data gathered by a particular platform are increasingly repurposed for other uses (Andrejevic & Gates, 2014)—leading to fundamental claims by scholars that surveillance itself denotes a new genus of capitalism made possible by the monetization of mass private data. In this process, data collected from commercial areas—cell phone, social media, and banks—can be adopted for intensifying state surveillance, meaning that commercial data may yield new implications in the security field (Lyon, 2014).

Big Data–Enabled Surveillance Sanctions Predictive Decisions About Individual Citizens. If, in the past, the purpose of surveillance was to *prevent* some specified actions, today big data–enabled surveillance allows states to go beyond direct supervision and to *predict* certain actions through automated analytics. Rather than *post hoc* responses to individuals' actions, anticipatory *ad hoc* surveillance attempts to actively "foresee the future in order to control the present" (Lyon, 2016, p. 6). This method has routinely been used to predict and control commercial behaviors but also increasingly political and social activities (Shorey & Howard, 2016). Therefore, big data–enabled surveillance should be understood as a predictive-analytic method, as its main capacity is to analyze seemingly unrelated data and discover unanticipated correlations (Andrejevic & Gates, 2014).

Scholarship on digital politics argues that social media and computer algorithms offer personalized networks and can "guess" the characters of individuals. Although big data–enabled tactics enable surveillance systems to scrutinize everyone, and perhaps understand individuals better than they may comprehend themselves, this does not mean that data-mining enhanced surveillance functions with equity or justice. On the contrary, these new practices have allowed observers to selectively surveil individuals and provide customized profiling, even when no crimes have been committed. Big data shifts surveillance from "aggregated group-based analysis" to "individualized profiling and modeling" (Tufekci, 2014, p. 10). In this sense, big data provide tailored approaches by which the state can implement individualized and selective scrutiny (Andrejevic & Gates, 2014).

China's State Surveillance and the SCS

In the context of China, the government has employed a variety of methods and policies, like *Hukou* (household registration) and *Dang'an* (personal archives), to conduct state surveillance. While *Hukou* contains population registration information and is mainly used for migration control, *Dang'an* aims to archive personal information, including ID numbers, employment records, and education data, and is usually unavailable to individuals. However, with the development of new technologies, China's surveillance assemblages have moved from the traditional *Hukou* and *Dang'an* to more sophisticated methods like CCTV, Internet censorship, and big data analytics (Creemers, 2017). A series of initiatives, including real-name registration and the establishment of a Cyberspace Administration of China in 2014, has indicated that the government is rapidly upgrading digital information control mechanisms.

In sum, China's surveillance society has transformed from the previous "Panoptic model" to a "Panspectric model," because "information is now actively generated by multiple sensors scattered across the lives of its subjects" (Creemers, 2017, p. 96). For instance, many cities in China have recruited grid administrators or neighborhood watchers to monitor people's daily lives (Hornby, 2016). Meanwhile, smart-city pilot projects have been expanded by the government since 2010, and around 500 cities are cooperating with information technology (IT) firms to improve their transportation, public administration, and health service. In addition, China has installed more than 20 million street cameras (the Sky Net Project), which enables the government to not only document criminal activity but also track individuals through facial recognition. With a long history of state-sponsored surveillance infrastructure projects, and including the new surveillance infrastructures being built into and around existing development initiatives, where and how does the SCS factor in?

Scholarship on China's SCS, like the infrastructure itself, is at a nascent stage but has elicited a range of interdisciplinary interests and concerns. First, some scholars argue that the SCS is an all-encompassing system (Chen & Cheung, 2017; Meissner & Wübbeke, 2016). By conducting automatic and real-time monitoring, the government is integrating previously separated surveillance platforms into "an internet of surveillance" and building "an all-encompassing system penetrating, controlling and shaping society" (Meissner & Wübbeke, 2016, p. 52). Thus, the SCS is regarded as an extension of *Dang'an*. In addition to individuals, the SCS also aims to constantly monitor and rate the behavior of companies and other market actors (Meissner, 2017). However, it goes far beyond traditional financial credit rating, as it extends credit ratings to the social, judicial, and political fields (Creemers, 2017). Therefore, only those individuals and organizations who respect the rules and norms of the government and the Party have access to the economic and financial sector, as well as government support and public services. In contrast, those who break the rules and norms will lose economic and financial access or benefits (e.g., market permits, tax reduction) (Meissner & Wübbeke, 2016).

Second, scholars have noted the monumental significance of the vast data collection and sharing ambitions that are implied by the SCS, because the Chinese government is purportedly collecting digital records on the social and financial behaviors of private citizens and organizations with the support of IT firms including Alibaba and Baidu (Chen & Cheung, 2017). Additionally, more than 30 central government agencies are involved in building national data platforms by gathering and sharing their data, and local governments are also required to share data with the central government (Meissner, 2017). More importantly, the SCS is invisible and much subtler compared to traditional surveillance tools, since it embeds political goals within algorithms (Meissner & Wübbeke, 2016). As a result, the distribution of power is determined by the ownership of data, and it is important for the firms and local governments to share data with the central government (Meissner & Wübbeke, 2016).

Third, some scholars are examining the SCS from a broad surveillance and social management perspective. Hoffman (2017, p. 24) claims that the SCS is being built to achieve China's automated social management ambitions, and considers the SCS "a simultaneous co-optative and coercive responsibility system" whereby individuals are co-opted to engage in this system. Moreover, the SCS is creating a joint reward and punishment mechanism through which individuals with good credit records can receive benefits from the state while those with bad credit scores may receive state sanctions (Chen & Cheung, 2017). Furthermore, it is claimed that China's various surveillance tools are integrated by ICTs and ubiquitous data collection and analysis (Creemers, 2017).

However, many questions remain unanswered. For example, it is still unclear how the Chinese government is building the SCS, and how public and private data are collected and integrated. Although the existing research has delivered insightful results through various approaches, we argue that it is important to provide an overall analysis of China's SCS. To achieve this goal, the rest of this article integrates the contexts of high-tech government-sponsored surveillant assemblages that have been observed by surveillance studies scholars, with the concerns surrounding the SCS that have been identified by scholars of contemporary China. To guide this process-tracing case study, we tether our concerns and analytic focus on unpacking the ongoing reconstruction of China as a surveillance society to the following questions:

RQ1: What are the historical antecedents of China's SCS? (Historical overview)

RQ2: What types of data are to be collected for China's SCS, and who is entrusted to do this work? (Data collection)

RQ3: How are public and private data being assembled and processed to establish China's SCS? (Data aggregation)

RQ4: To what extent, and with what consequences, might China's SCS evaluate and score social credit? (Data analytics)

Methods and Data

Process tracing is a commonly used qualitative methodology for systematically unpacking the wide variety of data and chronologies surrounding complex organizational and institutional phenomena (Collier, 2011). Using this approach, we generated a series of detailed descriptive accounts of China's SCS while paying particular attention to the unique sequence of events through which policies developed and initiatives expanded between 2014 and 2017. The case evidence for our process tracing of the SCS was organized in three overlapping but distinct phases, namely: (i) conducting a broad search of media discourse surrounding China's SCS; (ii) examining the resulting database of policy and commercial material surrounding SCS infrastructure; and (iii) mapping the ecosystem and collaborators of the SCS.

The first phase was to collect news reporting about the SCS from both English and Chinese news coverage. We began by establishing a wide range of search criteria and keywords to capture the breadth of discourse circulating about China's SCS policies and efforts. This study focused on the national construction of the SCS, instead of provincial or county level social credit systems. We used 15 English search keywords including, for example: "social credit, China," "social credit system," "personal credit, China," and "credit rating, China," and in Chinese we used 16 keywords, including "社会信用 (social credit)," "社会信用体系 (social credit system)," "个人征信 (personal credit rating)," and "信用平台 (credit platform)."[1] Next, we identified relevant news reports by searching these keywords on Google and Baidu for both English and Chinese content, and LexisNexis for English. We thereby collected a representative sample of news stories spread by China's official media (e.g., Xinhua, People's Daily, Global Times), China's commercial media (e.g., Caixin, Sixth Tone), and Western media outlets (e.g., New York Times, The Economist, Financial Times, and Washington Post), and removed duplicate articles. Our final archive of unique articles consisted of 133 Chinese and 142 English news clippings addressing China's national SCS, much of it published in the years 2014–17.

In the second phase, we gathered an archive of materials produced by the Chinese government and the Party. We searched Chinese keywords on China's official website (http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/), and included both national and departmental policies and documents. By doing so, we obtained 165 results released between 1989 and 2017 (see Appendix Table A). While 56 documents were released before 2014, 109 were issued between 2014 and 2017. Among these 109 documents, 20 are explicitly related to the guidelines and plans of national SCS, and 44 emphasize specific fields (e.g., finance, transport, and the environment). Meanwhile, 21 emphasize the joint reward and punishment mechanisms, and the remaining 24 documents are associated with broader issues (e.g., the big data industry, AI development, and Internet plus). In addition, we collected data and information from five national credit platforms (Table 1). In doing so, we aimed to understand what types of data are collected and shared, and how individuals and firms are evaluated by these official platforms.

In the third phase, we gathered an archive of commercial information from business intelligence services, industry research memos, and organizational reports to further understand the SCS from an industrial and commercial vantage point, in addition to the aims of government and concerns of civil society stakeholders. First, we collected documents regarding China's credit rating and big data development initiatives (e.g., the Report of the Big Data Development in China, and Blue Book on the Development of China's Credit Card Industry). Second, we identify the functions of several commercial credit rating products, particularly Alibaba's Sesame Credit.

Using our combined archive of policy documents, business memos, academic literature, and news reports, we began to map the relationships between actors involved in the development and deployment of the SCS. Drawing links between institutional forces involved examining relationships at the macro (between government departments, and private firms) and micro (different platforms and tools) levels. Through a careful analysis of this database we generated a detailed account of both the imagined institutional architecture of the system and the ongoing processes through which it is being implemented. Throughout the

Table 1. Comparison Table of China's Public and Private Social Credit Platforms

Date	Stakeholders	Platforms	Volume	Focus
Official Platforms:				
2006	People's Bank of China (PBC)	*Credit Reference Center*	899 million individuals + firms	Public; Commerce
2013	The Supreme People's Court	*The Blacklist of Trust-breaking Platform*	7.49 million individuals + firms + governments	Public; Commerce; Government
2014	State Administration for Industry and Commerce	*National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System*	406 million data	Commerce
2015	National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC); PBC; State Information Center; Baidu	*Credit China*	150 million data	Public; Commerce
2015	NDRC	*National Credit Information Sharing Platform*	10.7 billion data	Public; Commerce; Government
Private and State-Owned Firms:				
2005	Shenzhen government	*Pengyuan 800 Credit*	400 million individuals + firms	Public; Commerce
2005	China Chengxin	*Wanxiang Fen*	300 million individuals + firms	Public; Commerce
2013	China Intelli Credit	*Intelli Credit*	70 million individuals	Public
2013	Sinoway	*Zhuzhu Fen*	Potential 920 million individuals	Public
2014	Ant Financial (Alibaba)	*Sesame Credit*	520 million individuals	Public; Commerce
2015	Lakala and Lenovo	*Kaola Credit*	80 million individuals + firms	Public; Commerce
2015	Ping An	*Qianhai Haoxindu*	300 million individuals + firms	Public; Commerce
2017	Tencent	*Tencent Credit*	820 million individuals	Public

Notes: Volume is measured by two categories: 1. How much data is collected by the platform (e.g., 10.7 billion data); and 2. How many individuals, firms, or agencies are targeted (e.g., 520 million individuals). Not listed on table: as of 2014, 150+ companies have various credit scoring platforms, primarily serving commercial sector needs, including: antifraud, lending, and risk monitoring goals.

mapping process we were guided by our research questions and scholarly concerns regarding the relationship between big data and institutionalized power in China.

Results and Analysis

Historical Overview of the SCS

The term "credit" has complicated definitions in Chinese. It is usually used to indicate various ideas like *Chengxin* (integrity), *Xinyong* (credit), *Xinyu* (reputation), or *Xinren* (credence) (Shi, 2007). In the history of China, "credit" was adopted to indicate moral principles, particularly individual ethics (i.e., *Chengxin*) (Lin, 2003). In contemporary China, the concept "credit" includes broader meanings, including social aspects, financial aspects, and legal aspects (Shi, 2007; Yu, 2016). In the process of constructing the SCS, "credit" was first conceptualized as financial credit. In 2007, the State Council released *Guiding Opinions concerning the Constructions of a Social Credit System*, and conceptualized social credit as "an important structural arrangement in the *market economic system*" (State Council General Office, 2007, p. 1, author emphasis). In other words, the government focused on the financial aspects of credit during this period. In 2014, the State Council released the *Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014–2020)*, regarding credit as "an important component part of the *Socialist market economy system* and the *Social governance system*" (State Council, 2014, p. 1, author emphasis). It is obvious that the social aspects of credit are included in the SCS's construction in 2014.

In fact, the demand for a credit system in China can be traced back to the "Triangle Debt" in 1990, where the initial support for a credit system concentrated on addressing problems in the commercial and financial sectors.[2] With the development of economic reforms, many of China's firms defaulted on debt payments and became connected in debts to each other. The State Council consequently pushed reforms to handle the loaning problem, leading to credit scoring companies beginning to evaluate corporate credit during the 1990s (Yu, 2016). Starting in 2000, some state-owned enterprises began to assess consumer credit as well. At the 16th Party Congress in 2002, President Jiang Zemin maintained that China must "establish a social credit system compatible with a modern market economy."[3] At this point the People's Bank of China (PBC) established the Enterprise and Personal Credit Information Database, but the platform had only limited data (Yu, 2016).

In 2007, the Ministerial-Joint Meeting System was established to construct a designated national SCS. Initially, 18 central government departments, including the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC),[4] the PBC, and Ministry of Commerce, were initiated in this system. Some local governments—Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang—were also involved in building a credit information platform at the provincial level. Additionally, mostly state-owned, but also market-oriented credit investigation firms were also included (Yu, 2016). In 2011, China further proposed the construction of a SCS in four areas:

government affairs, commercial behaviors, social activities, and judicial affairs. In 2012, the Ministerial-Joint Meeting System extended its membership to 35 central departments, including the Publicity Department (i.e., China's State Propaganda Department), Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Justice.

Admittedly, much of the early motives and efforts were limited to improve accounting and loan-lending activities for commerce and finance rather than the social sectors (Zhang, 2016). The main goal for building a credit system was to address financial aspects of credit. Another notable feature is that though China had tried to construct data platforms for credit system, it could not obtain enough data for credit scoring. The government had limited data to evaluate the economic and financial domains, and this initial project did not cover the whole of society.

Upgrading of the SCS Since 2014

In 2014, the State Council released the *Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014–2020)*, which upgraded the construction of the SCS in three fundamental aspects. First, China committed to comprehensively completing its national SCS by 2020. This expedites the governmental ambition, noting that China plans to establish an all-encompassing SCS to monitor and manage the entirety of society by using both traditional and big data approaches (Clover, 2016; Meissner, 2017; Zhang, Sun, & Zeng, 2015). Each Chinese citizen, organization, company, and government department will receive a unique social credit number relating to their credit results. Compared to credit systems in other nations like the United States, China's SCS goes beyond a financial credit rating, since it incorporates not only the evaluation of financial and commercial activities but also the assessment of social behaviors. Thus, this system is considered to be a "broad social credit system" by officials (Han, 2014).

The second fundamental change is the expansion of critical collaborators engaged in the technical construction of the SCS. Moving beyond an initially small number of provincial governments and commercial agencies, the State Council significantly expanded the membership of the Ministerial-Joint Meeting System, with 47 central departments included in the system by 2017. In addition, China's technology giants began to cooperate with the government to share data and offer support (Zhang, 2016). For instance, Alibaba is currently working with NDRC to build a commercial credit system by sharing data and blacklists of small businesses (CCTV, 2016). Alibaba will share company information, especially concerning firms with bad credit records, with NDRC in order to establish a national credit platform. Baidu, another Chinese high-tech giant, is providing technical support for NDRC and the PBC to build the Credit China platform (Xinhua, 2016b). Furthermore, some financial and technical firms are building their own parallel platforms and services for individual credit rating, such as Alibaba's Sesame Credit, Tencent Credit, and Kaola Credit (Table 1). Meanwhile, more than 150 companies are now offering credit rating products for the commercial field (Meissner, 2017). In this sense, China now has two parallel but interconnected social credit ecosystems: the official SCS being seeded by government, and other commercial credit ecosystems.

Third, the central government is constructing several national data platforms to collect, store, share, and mine population-wide data (Table 1). For instance, NDRC has been developing the National Credit Information Sharing Platform (NCISP) since 2015, and this platform is connected with 42 central agencies, 32 local governments, and 50 market actors (Xinhua, 2017). Meanwhile, some high-tech firms, including Alibaba and Baidu, are sharing data with NCISP (CCTV, 2016). As will be discussed next, this national platform and the ensuing ecosystem of supporting actors and activities has already stored more than 10.7 billion data points regarding commerce, individuals, and government affairs. In addition, the government's main efforts are now focused on integrating these separated platforms into centralized data infrastructures. By doing so, the state hopes to modernize its surveillance system with key features promised by big data–enabled innovations. It is in this sense that big data technology is being instrumentalized by the state, enabling the state authority to manage, monitor, predict, and govern each actor in its political, economic, and social domains.

Given China's national efforts to deploy such a comprehensive data infrastructure, we henceforth conceptualize the SCS as a *state surveillance infrastructure*—a state-sponsored big data–enabled surveillance effort that is increasingly used by a state power to govern and regulate the political, economic, and social domains of the nation. In the remaining analysis, we unpack the creation of the SCS as a state surveillance infrastructure by focusing on three phases of technical and technocratic innovation: data collection, data aggregation, and data analytics.

Data Collection of the SCS

What types of data are to be collected for the SCS? Figure 1 traces the ecosystem of the emerging SCS at the national level. Obviously, the data collection phase requires collecting both financial and nonfinancial data for evaluation and surveillance from various public and private sources. While financial data include bank statements, taxes, loans, and transactions, nonfinancial data may contain a variety of personal and social information, such as employment, education, and criminal records, and social media use (Meissner & Wübbeke, 2016; Zhang, 2016). Furthermore, this phase also requires partnerships and collaborations across multiple players to gather and share data, including government agencies and private sectors (Zhang et al., 2015). To illustrate, we use the NCISP—the data backbone of the SCS (Meissner, 2017)—as an example to address RQ1.

NCISP is a national data platform developed by NDRC in 2015. Currently, NCISP has 400 data sets collected from central agencies and local governments. Notably, these data sets involve both public data (e.g., administrative licenses and penalties like market access or forfeit) and private data (e.g., citizen names and ID numbers). Among these 400 data sets, about two-thirds ($n = 261$) focus on



Figure 1. Organizational and Process Chart of China's Social Credit System (SCS). *Sources*: Planning Outline for the Construction of a SCS (2014–2020) (2014), and the Three Years' Focal Working Tasks of the Construction of a SCS (2014–2016) (2014).[5] *Notes*: Dotted lines indicate unofficial but anticipated roles of private firms in the construction of the official SCS, and their private credit systems focus on social and commercial credit. National Credit Information Sharing Platform (NCISP); Credit Reference Center (CRC); National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System (NECIPS); Blacklist of Trust-breaking Platform (BTBP).

firms and commerce, while around a fifth (n = 74) collect data from individuals. The remaining data sets cover social organizations (n = 32) and government affairs (n = 33). Although news media tend to highlight the social control aspect of China's SCS (Clover, 2016), it is obvious that the main focus of the SCS is the commercial and financial sectors. Additionally, around two-thirds of the data sets (n = 244) gather *basic information*, including the name and address of the firm/person, social credit number, and ID number. These data are mainly used to identify each actor. In contrast, a third of the data sets (n = 119) emphasize *trust-breaking information*, including information like the category and time of punishment, bad credit records, and crime records. Finally, 37 data sets include *rewards-related information*, such as commercial and individual honors, and volunteer services, which is employed for the rewards and incentives.

What data are gathered in these data sets? NCISP actually uses at least 537 variables to measure commercial firms, individual citizens, social organizations (e.g., nongovernmental organizations), and government agencies. Specifically, a bit over half (295 variables are used to collect information relating to commerce and firms). Some variables focus on basic information like the firm's name, location, legal representatives, website, social credit numbers, phone numbers, shareholders, and product information. Other variables emphasize rewards and honors, punishments, and criminal records. Moreover, around a fifth of the total (n = 110) variables involve individual data, including name, ID number, trust-breaking behaviors, certificates, and administrative penalties. Notably, this does not mean that NCISP collects 110 variables from everyone in China; instead, many variables are obtaining from specific groups of people, such as lawyers, teachers, and students. In addition, 79 variables are employed to gather data from social organizations, including the address, service field, administration registration, and trust-breaking activities. Finally, government affairs make use of 53 variables, focusing on administrative licenses and penalties. These results show that the SCS combines the financial aspects of credit with the social aspects of credit, focusing on the commercial and financial sectors instead of social sectors. This does not mean that social control is not important; instead, the combination of commercial activities and social behaviors has further complicated the practice of state surveillance in China.

Who, then, is responsible for data collection? Of the 42 central government agencies involved, we find that NDRC provides 73 data sets (68 commercial data sets and five citizen-focused data sets), which makes it the most important player. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology is another critical agency, sharing 34 data sets, followed by the Ministry of Agriculture (28 data sets), the National Health and Family Planning Commission (27 data sets), the Ministry of Transport (24 data sets), and the Ministry of Housing and Urban–Rural Development (24 data sets). Overall, these six central agencies supply a bit over half (n = 210) of NCISP's data sets. In contrast, the Ministry of Culture (three data sets), Cyberspace Administration (two), Securities Regulatory Commission (two), and State Administration for Industry & Commerce (one) only provide limited data sets in this system. This does not indicate, however, that they are inconsequential players. As mentioned, the "collect everything" approach is supported by the aggregation and collaboration of various sources (Van Dijck, 2014). The collaborators of NCISP further demonstrate that the SCS aims to gather massive quantities of data from a variety of agencies.

Among 400 data sets, 384 are labeled as one of three sharing categories: *public sharing*, *limited sharing*, and *intergovernment sharing*. Specifically, three-quarters of the data sets (n = 284) are publicly available, meaning that the public can access these data. By contrast, around a fifth of the data sets (n = 70)—mostly punishments-related information like insurance fraud—are limited for sharing, but it is unclear who has access to these data sets. Finally, the remaining 30 data sets are only shared among governments, such as student credit and administrative penalties. Another notable fact is that financial and high-tech companies are also involved in the construction of the SCS (Figure 1), where private sector actors are already collecting data from consumers to build their own credit rating services (Table 1). It is worth noting that these parallel experiments in the marketplace serve as an important vehicle for the state to imagine, test, and transfer potentially viable and useful features for future inclusion into the government-run SCS.

As discussed, big data–enabled surveillance aims to collect everything about everyone (Andrejevic & Gates, 2014), and the Chinese government is advancing its surveillance capacity by using new technologies (Creemers, 2017; Hoffman, 2017). The data collection phase indicates that the SCS is adopting the "collecting everything" approach to gathering large amounts of public and personal data. These 400 data sets have been created to collect data from citizens, firms, organizations, and government agencies in China, and 537 variables are adopted to identify every aspect of each actor. Accordingly, the data collection phase should be regarded as a multistakeholder mechanism that gathers and stores everything from various official agencies.

Data Aggregation of the SCS

In the second phase, both financial and nonfinancial data collected by multi-sector actors will be integrated by central government to serve as a centralized data infrastructure. This process is a black box since many details are unclear. In fact, this process is iterative and adaptive: China is building at least five central data platforms to store and evaluate credit-related data, including NCISP, Credit China, Credit Reference Center, National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System (NECIPS), and the List of Dishonest Persons Subject to Enforcement (Table 1). Although these platforms have been developed by different entities, the central government requires them to share and exchange data (Xinhua, 2017). Thus, these distributed platforms have different foci but the final goal is to construct a centralized infrastructure to support the SCS.

Figure 2 visualizes the institutional partnerships among the central government departments that are curating the SCS infrastructure. Over 50 central agencies are involved in the construction of the SCS, and are tasked with sharing data to help construct various elements of it. Each node represents a government department and is arranged around a circle, where the lines between two nodes indicate that these two entities are collaborating in the SCS construction. Obviously, NDRC and the PBC are the two most important actors in the SCS infrastructure: NDRC is connected to 39 central agencies and has 154 data collection and sharing missions with them. NDRC's primary partners include the PBC, Ministry of Finance, Cyberspace Administration, and Ministry of Commerce. Its mission primarily emphasizes the commercial and social sectors. Moreover, the PBC has 41 partners and 136 missions, such as constructing financial credit investigation systems, local information systems, and the credit scores of enterprises and citizens. While commercial and individual social credit issues are well represented, only a limited number of agencies focusing on political control are involved (e.g., the Ministry of Public Security and the Cyber Administration). Again, these departments emphasize economic, commercial, and financial surveillance rather than exclusively social and political control, suggesting that the SCS is not simply a political surveillance and control system, but rather a comprehensive infrastructure that is upgrading government's ability to surveil all facets of society—thus normalizing a broader culture of a "surveillance society."

Data infrastructures often integrate heterogeneous components into a single ubiquitous and invisible system. Hence, China's SCS is best understood as an



Figure 2. Government Agencies Involved in the Establishment of China's SCS. *Sources*: Division of Tasks for the Social Credit System Construction Plan, Three Year Key Tasks in the Construction of the Social Credit System (2014–2016). *Notes*: Committee of Political and Legal Affairs (CPLA); General Administration of Customs (GAC); General Administration of Sport (GAS); General Administration of Quality Supervision (GAQS); Insurance Regulatory Commission (IRC); Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council (LAOSC); Ministry of Environment Protection (MEP); Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MHURD); Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MHRSS); Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT); Ministry of Science and Technology (MST); National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC); National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC); Securities Regulatory Commission (SRC); State Administration for Industry & Commerce (SAIC); State Administration of Civil Service (SACS); State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE); State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT); State Administration of Taxation (SAT); State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS); State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA).

emerging state surveillance infrastructure since it exhibits intentional efforts by the state to build a centralized data infrastructure, which also necessitates the collaboration of various competing public and private actors working on unifying distributed but connected public and private platforms and systems. These observations stand in contrast to the current logic about the "platformization of infrastructure" which implies that state infrastructures are being replaced by privatized and independent platforms in Western nations (Plantin, Lagoze, Edwards, & Sandvig, 2016). The Chinese government is attempting instead to shift its distributed public and private platforms into a centralized state surveillance infrastructure by reorganizing its bureaucracy—that is, resulting in an "infrastructurization of platforms" (Plantin et al., 2016, p. 3). On the one hand, the SCS is constituted by independent platforms owned by government agencies and private firms, and each platform focuses on distinct data and surveilled subjects. On the other hand, the SCS's developmental history and current trajectory are working on integrating these distributed platforms into an all-encompassing infrastructural system. To achieve this goal, the Chinese government has focused considerable effort in data sharing, integration, and analytics (Figure 1). Both central and local governments are focusing on promoting the infrastructurization of their platforms by credit information exchange and sharing.

In addition, some companies are not only building their own credit rating platforms, but are increasingly poised to cooperate with the government to establish the centralized data infrastructure. In fact, this integration is consistent with recent claims that the rise of big data has blurred the boundaries between the state and private sectors (Ball & Wood, 2013). This "corporate–state nexus" indicates that data gathered from commercial platforms and social behaviors are increasingly used for constructing the official SCS—in other words, a state surveillance infrastructure. Meanwhile, the government also shares data with these commercial sectors for the purpose of credit rating. For instance, Alibaba announced that less than 20 percent of the data used to assess personal credit come from Alibaba itself, and more than 80 percent of the data are collected from other sources, particularly government databases (Caixin, 2016). This means that the state and private actors are integrating to build a state surveillance infrastructure.

Data Analytics of the SCS

To what extent, and with what consequences, might the SCS evaluate and score social credit? In the third phase, planned for 2020, China plans to assess the credit of citizens, firms, organizations, and government agencies, and build a reward and punishment mechanism. Data integrated by the centralized infrastructure are currently being used to build credit systems into various levels of Chinese society. According to official documents, the SCS is being applied to make data-driven decisions in four areas: government affairs (e.g., civil servant performance dossiers); judicial affairs (e.g., law enforcement); social activities (e.g., Internet applications and services); and commercial activities (e.g., e-commerce) (Figure 1). Similar to data aggregation, the process of data analytics is also a black box, as many details are hidden. This section examines two cases—Enterprise Environmental Credit and the Reward and Punishment Mechanism—to unpack the process of data analysis, because these two systems have clear and open processes.

The first case is China's measures for the evaluation of Enterprise Environmental Credit, which is designed to evaluate the environmental credit of some enterprises. According to official documents, each relevant firm will receive a 100-scale score by evaluating four main categories: pollution prevention, ecological protection, environmental management, and social supervision (Table 2). Specifically, each category includes several variables, and each variable will receive one of three scoring results: 100–80, 79–50, and 49–0. For example, pollution prevention includes four variables—air and water pollution, solid waste, hazardous waste, and noise pollution—making up 29 percent of the total score. If a company obtained 80 in the evaluation of these four variables, then it will receive 23.2 points (0.29*80) in the pollution prevention category. In sum, 21 variables are used to evaluate environmental credit of enterprises. Some variables

Table 2. The Evaluation of Enterprise Environmental Credit

Categories	Variables	Weights (%)	Scores
Pollution prevention	4	29	100–80, 79–50, 49–0
Ecological protection	3	5	100–80, 79–50, 49–0
Environmental management	10	54	100–80, 79–50, 49–0
Social supervision	4	12	100–80, 79–50, 49–0
Total	21	100	

Source: National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Ecology and Environment, People's Bank of China, and Banking Regulatory Commission (2013).

(e.g., administrative penalties, and the discharge standard-meeting rate) comprise 15 percent of the total credit score, while others (e.g., resource utilization, and media supervision) only constitute between 1 and 2 percent of the total score. Obviously, the government is using quantified elements to assess different aspects of commercial players.

The consequence of China's emerging SCS should be regarded as a joint reward/incentive and punishment/constraint mechanism (Figure 3), since the establishment of a rewards–punishments system is the focal point of the SCS. According to official documents,[6] this mechanism uses three steps to identify whether a subject (i.e., a person, a firm, an organization, or a government agency)



Figure 3. The Joint Reward and Punishment Mechanism of China's SCS. *Sources:* State Council Guiding Opinions concerning Establishing and Perfecting Incentives for Promise-keeping and Joint Punishment Systems for Trust-Breaking, and Accelerating the Construction of Social Sincerity (State Council, 2016), Opinions concerning Accelerating the Construction of Credit Supervision, Warning and Punishment Mechanisms for Persons Subject to Enforcement for Trust-Breaking (CCP Central Committee General Office, State Council General Office, 2016), Guiding Opinions concerning Strengthening the Construction of a Personal Sincerity System (State Council General Office, 2016), and State Council Guiding Opinions concerning Strengthening and Regulating the List of Incentives for Promise-keeping and Joint Punishment Systems for Trust-Breaking (State Council, 2017).

is in red list (rewards) or blacklist (punishments). Figure 3 visualizes these processes. First, the governments (county level and above) and public affairs organizations are responsible for determining the red list and blacklist, while other actors like news media and firms can offer information relating to rewards or punishments. In the second phase, three types of data are integrated into NCISP. The first is basic information, such as names, ID numbers, and legal representatives. The second indicates the reasons for trust-keeping or punishing trust-breaking behaviors, and the final category contains joint rewards and punishments, credit repair, and withdrawal mechanisms. If a subject displays serious trust-breaking activities, then NCISP will directly share relevant data with Credit China—another national credit data platform developed by NDRC and PBC. Otherwise, this system will establish a Focus Group List including those who are assumed to be trust-breaking subjects but who have yet to meet the standards of the blacklist. If this subject is mentioned by three different sources, then NCISP will move this subject into a Big Data Warning List for further investigation. In the final phase, NCISP will share data with Credit China, and the later will announce the red list and blacklist for the public. Meanwhile, local credit websites and sectoral websites will also release rewards and punishments information. Evidently, these data platforms play different roles in this process: while NCISP emphasizes information gathering and evaluation, Credit China focuses on publicizing the blacklist.

Notably, not every subject will be assigned into the red list or blacklist. If the subjects have good credit records, exhibit compliance with the Party's rules and political goals, and perform good social responsibility, they stand to receive rewards and incentives. In fact, the government is building "Green Channels" for trust-keeping subjects, including prioritization schemes for accessing public services, the optimization of administrative services, and decrease in transaction costs. In contrast, those in the blacklist stand to receive punishments and constraints affecting their social, political, and economic activities. First, administrative restrictions involve market supervision and management, public market access, administrative examination and approval, and policy support. Second, marketized restrictions involve constraints on market interactions and luxury goods and services, and an increase in lending rates. Finally, socialized restrictions try to establish a mechanism of public supervision, strengthening disclosure and exposure of trust-breaking acts.

By deploying this big data–enabled surveillance infrastructure to drive a rewards and punishments instrument across China's state, commercial, and social dominions, the SCS is currently being imagined by state bureaucrats and technocrats as incentivizing individuals to engage in a range of activities important to the state, including issuing permits, buying property, traveling on airlines and high-speed trains, accessing loans, and qualifying for employment, etc. To do so, the government must operationalize data-driven mechanisms that incentivize trust-keeping and punish trust-breaking activities. This reward–punishment strategy will also allow government to decide, for example, who may have access to and participate in public services and commercial activities, respectively.

Conclusion

This study examines the institutional process and political–economic interests of the public and private stakeholders who are advancing the construction of the SCS. By conceptualizing the SCS as a *state surveillance infrastructure*, we investigate three distinct but interconnected phases: data collection, data aggregation, and data analytics. Four conclusions can be drawn from our case study. First, although China has tried to build a credit system since the 1990s, the construction of the SCS has moved forward comprehensively since 2014. The SCS goes far beyond traditional commercial credit, since it plans to build a system that will cover all of society. Second, the data collection phase involves multistakeholder mechanisms by which public and private data are gathered from various sources. Notably, the SCS is focusing on commercial data and agencies (i.e., financial and commercial activities), rather than social aspects, given financial credit is the chief focus of China's SCS. Meanwhile, the current SCS is a combination of (giant) government database and private sector data sets, and it is unclear how social media data might be included and used in the SCS in future. Third, the government is building several data platforms for integrating separate data into a state surveillance infrastructure. In this process, private sectors are cooperating with the government to establish a "corporate–state nexus." This has complicated the process of state surveillance in China, since previous surveillance systems rarely included the private sector. Finally, data instrumentalization indicates that the government is attempting to evaluate every actor in China, and establish a reward and punishment system. This mechanism will determine whether a subject will have access to a variety of activities in China.

However, many concerns and questions remain open with regard to this system. First, a great deal of attention has been focused on personal privacy and information security. As discussed, big data technologies enable the accumulation of detailed personal information without informing individuals, and these data can be used for security or political purposes (Shorey & Howard, 2016). With the aggregation of various data, personal information and privacy might be divulged and undermined (Chen & Cheung, 2017). Journalists have revealed that it is surprisingly easy to obtain private personal information in China. Thus, in a context where it is unclear how companies and government are sharing data with each other, journalists and civil society advocates have expressed concerns about the risks related to data security (Meissner, 2017). Second, while state and commercial entities have exponentially increased their capabilities to monitor the populace, the understanding and ability of citizens to hold them accountable (e.g., by counter-surveillance and sousveillance) has diminished. The absence of a civil society further enhances the information asymmetry between those holding the data and ordinary people. A third question concerns the difficulty of integrating separated platforms and tools into an all-encompassing system. It has been found that some companies and disaggregated security agencies are unwilling to be integrated or share data with others, leading to a concern that the immense scope and complexity of this infrastructure's development may eventually backfire and weaken the state's capacity to manage society (Hoffman, 2017). Additionally, the SCS is currently a simple showcase of credit information (e.g., the blacklist) rather than displaying a sophisticated and predictive approach. Thus, it is unclear how the aggregation of data can be used for automated and computational analysis, and how big data analytics empower the government to advance its surveillance capacity.

The observed activities of the state in the case of China also suggest that when states participate in establishing new surveillance efforts, they do so for reasons including but far beyond the narrow confines of advancing political censorship. Increasingly, exercising state power includes drawing upon the same surveillance–analytics tools that have been deployed widely in the business and marketing sectors. In addition to the national SCS, the Chinese government has recently proposed to build a "Belt and Road Initiative" SCS with 65 other countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe. The official purpose is to establish a transnational credit system that secures international trade and economic relations among nations (Xinhua, 2016a). Coincidentally, in September 2017, Alibaba founder Jack Ma in consultation with the Prime Minister of Canada has urged the Canadian government to grant expedited visas for Chinese visitors by using Alibaba's Sesame credit rating platform (People's Daily, 2017). Thus, in addition to building a national SCS for China, these state and high-tech firms are also encouraging other nations to accept and even adopt their state surveillance infrastructure.

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Notes

1. Contact the authors for a full list of the keywords.
2. State Council Notice Clearing "Triangular Debts" across the Country. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2010-12/17/content_2477.htm.
3. The Report of the 16th Party Congress. http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64569/65444/4429125.html.
4. NDRC is a macroeconomic management agency under the Chinese State Council, which aims to formulate and implement strategies of national economic and social development, annual plans, medium and long-term development plans. See http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/.

5. http://credit.zhaoqing.gov.cn/u/cms/www/201607/12181740yqys.pdf.
6. Guiding Opinions concerning Strengthening and Regulating the List of Incentives for Promise-keeping and Joint Punishment Systems for Trust-Breaking. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-11/03/content_5237087.htm.

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Appendix

Table A: Key Policy Documents on China's SCS

English Name	Chinese Name	Releasing Agencies	Date
1989–2014			
Issuing announcement on the Construction of a Unified Social Credit Number System for Enterprise, Public Institutions, and Social Organizations	关于建立企业、事业单位和社会团体统一代码标识制度报告的通知	State Council	1989
State Council Announcement Clearing "Triangular Debts" across the Country	国务院关于在全国范围内开展清理“三角债”工作的通知	State Council	1990
State Council Opinions concerning Clearing "Triangular Debts"	关于继续组织清理“三角债”的意见	State Council	1991
The Outline of Citizen Ethics Construction Program	公民道德建设实施纲要	Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee General Office	2001
Guiding Opinions Strengthening the Credit Management of Small and Medium Enterprises	关于加强中小企业信用管理工作的若干意见	State Administration for Industry and Commerce etc.	2001
Issuing announcement on Accelerating the Construction of Lawyer Credit System	关于加快建立律师诚信制度的通知	Ministry of Justice	2002
Issuing announcement on Accelerating the Construction of Credit File for Construction Enterprises and Technical Staff	关于加快建立建筑市场有关企业和专业技术人员信用档案的通知	Housing and Urban-Rural Development	2002
Issuing announcement on Constructing Credit File for Real Estate Business Staff	关于建立房地产企业及执(从)业人员信用档案系统的通知	Housing and Urban-Rural Development	2002
Issuing announcement on Constructing Credit Management of Township and Village Enterprises	关于加强乡镇企业信用管理工作的意见	Ministry of Agriculture	2002
The Report of the 16th National Congress of the CCP	十六大报道	CCP Central Committee General Office	2002
Issuing announcement on Undertaking the	关于联合开展“共铸诚信”活动的通知	General Office, Central Commission for	2003

(*Continued*)

Table A (Continued)

English Name	Chinese Name	Releasing Agencies	Date
Construction of Honest Activity		Guiding Cultural and Ethical Progress etc.	
Guiding Opinions Undertaking the Propaganda and Education of Social Credit	关于开展社会诚信宣传教育的工作意见	Publicity Department, CCP Central Committee etc.	2003
Issuing announcement on Strengthening the Financial Management and Policy Support to SME Credit Guarantee Agencies by Local Financial Departments	关于加强地方财政部门对中小企业信用担保机构财务管理和政策支持若干问题的通知	Ministry of Finance	2003
Guiding Opinions Implementing the Credit System for Enterprise Labor and Social Security	关于推行企业劳动保障诚信制度的指导意见	Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security	2003
Issuing announcement on Further Promoting and Completing the Real Estate Credit File System	关于进一步推动和完善房地产信用档案系统建设的通知	Housing and Urban-Rural Development	2003
Trial Measure on Tax Credit Rating Management	纳税信用等级评定管理试行办法	State Administration of Taxation	2003
Guiding Opinions on the Implementation of Credit Classification Regulation of Enterprises	关于对企业实行信用分类监管的意见	State Administration for Industry and Commerce	2003
Issuing announcement on Further Strengthening Credit Education in Middle and Primary Schools	关于进一步加强中小学诚信教育的通知	Ministry of Education	2004
The Outline of Credit Education (for Trial Implementation)	诚信教育大纲(试行)	Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security	2004
The Pilot Work Plan for the Construction of Food Safety Credit System	食品安全信用体系建设试点工作方案	China Food and Drug Administration	2004
The Temporary Regulation on the Classification Management of Drug Safety Credit	药品安全信用分类管理暂行规定	China Food and Drug Administration	2004
Issuing announcement on the Establishment and Change of Interprovincial or Large-scale SME Credit Guarantee Agencies	关于跨省区或规模较大的中小企业信用担保机构设立与变更有关事项的通知	NDRC	2005
Issuing announcement on Undertaking Self-discipline and Credit Construction Activities	关于开展民办非企业单位自律与诚信建设活动的通知	Ministry of Civil Affairs	2005

(*Continued*)

Table A (Continued)

English Name	Chinese Name	Releasing Agencies	Date
for Private NonEnterprise Organizations			
Issuing announcement on Further Undertaking Self-discipline and Credit Construction Activities for Private NonEnterprise Organizations	关于进一步深入开展民办非企业单位自律与诚信建设活动的通知	Ministry of Civil Affairs	2005
Issuing announcement on Promoting the Construction of Credit System for the Construction Market	关于加快推进建筑市场信用体系建设工作的意见	Housing and Urban-Rural Development	2005
Issuing announcement on Further Strengthening the Construction of Credit for Insurance Field	关于进一步加强保险业诚信建设的通知	China Insurance Regulatory Commission	2005
Issuing announcement on Strengthening the Construction of Credit Guarantee for Small and Medium Enterprises	关于加强中小企业信用担保体系建设意见的通知	State Council General Office	2006
Guiding Opinions Strengthening the Construction of Credit Guarantee for Small and Medium Enterprises	关于加强中小企业信用担保体系建设的意见	NDRC etc.	2006
Issuing announcement on Undertaking SME Loan and Credit Guarantee System Construction	关于合作开展中小企业贷款与信用担保体系建设工作的通知	NDRC etc.	2006
Issuing announcement on SME Loan and Credit Guarantee System Construction	关于加强中小企业信用担保体系建设有关问题的通知	NDRC etc.	2006
The Credit Evaluation Methods of Road Transport (for Trial Implementation)	道路运输企业质量信誉考核办法(试行)	Ministry of Transport	2006
Issuing announcement on Guiding Opinions Constructing Market Credit System of Road Construction	关于印发建立公路建设市场信用体系的指导意见的通知	Ministry of Transport	2006
Issuing announcement on Creating National Credit and Law-abiding Township and Village Enterprises	关于开展创建全国诚信守法乡镇企业活动的通知	Ministry of Agriculture	2006
Issuing announcement on Issuing the Administrative Measures for the Credit Information in the Commercial Field	商务领域信用信息管理办法	Ministry of Commerce	2006

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Table A (Continued)

English Name	Chinese Name	Releasing Agencies	Date
Guiding Opinions Deeply Undertaking Activity of "Follow the Contract and Emphasize Credit"	关于深入开展“守合同重信用”活动的若干意见	State Administration for Industry and Commerce	2006
Guiding Opinions Strengthening the Supervision of Enterprises Quality Credit	关于加强企业质量信用监管工作的意见	General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine Home	2006
State Council General Office Some Opinions concerning the Construction of a SCS	国务院办公厅关于社会信用体系建设的若干意见	State Council General Office	2007
Issuing announcement on Guiding Opinions Deeply Promoting SME Loan and Credit Guarantee System Construction	关于印发深化中小企业贷款与信用担保体系建设工作的指导意见的通知	NDRC and China Development Bank	2007
Decision on Establishing Credit Management System in the Management of National Science and Technology Programs	关于在国家科技计划管理中建立信用管理制度的决定	Ministry of Science and Technology	2007
Issuing announcement on Further Exerting the Role of Credit Insurance in Supporting the Development of Hi-tech Enterprises	关于进一步发挥信用保险作用支持高新技术企业发展有关问题的通知	Ministry of Science and Technology	2007
Issuing announcement on Undertaking Credit Rating Evaluation for Private Employment Agencies	关于开展民办职业介绍机构信用等级评定工作的通知	Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security	2007
The Management Measures on Construction Market Credit	建筑市场诚信行为信息管理办法	Housing and Urban-Rural Development	2007
Announcement on Jointly Promoting the Construction of Credit Information Platform in the Construction Market of the Yangtze River Delta	关于共同推进长江三角洲区域建筑市场信用信息平台建设工作的通知	Housing and Urban-Rural Development	2007
State Council General Office Notice on Constructing the Ministerial-Joint Meeting System of SCS of the State Council	国务院办公厅关于建立国务院社会信用体系建设部际联席会议制度的通知	State Council	2007
Issuing announcement on Further Promoting the Exemption from Business Tax for SME Credit Guarantee Agencies	关于继续做好中小企业信用担保机构免征营业税有关问题的通知	Ministry of Industry and Information Technology etc.	2009
The Report of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 17th CPC Central Committee	十七届六中全会报告	The Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee	2011

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Table A (Continued)

English Name	Chinese Name	Releasing Agencies	Date
The 12th Five-Year Plan for the National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China	中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要	National People's Congress	2011
CCP Central Committee and State Council Opinions concerning Strengthening and Innovating Social Management	中共中央国务院关于加强和创新社会管理的意见	State Council	2011
State Council on Agreeing to Adjust the Construction of the Ministerial-Joint Meeting System of SCS	国务院关于同意调整社会信用体系建设部际联席会议职责和成员单位的批复	State Council	2012
The Decision on Major Issues concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms	中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定	CCP Central Committee	2013
Telecommunications and Internet Personal User Data Protection Regulations	电信和互联网用户个人信息保护规定	Ministry of Industry and Information Technology	2013
Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Dividing the Tasks for Implementation of the Plan for Institutional Reform and Functional Transformation of the State Council	国务院机构改革和职能转变方案	State Council	2013
Announcement of the List of Dishonest Persons Subject to Enforcement	关于公布失信被执行人名单信息的若干规定	The Supreme People's Court	2013
The Decision on Major Issues concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms	中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定（十八届三中全会）	The CCP Central Committee	2013
Some Regulations concerning Publishing Name List Information of Persons Subject to Enforcement for Trust-Breaking	最高人民法院关于公布失信被执行人名单信息的若干规定	The Supreme People's Court	2013
Regulation on the Administration of Credit Investigation Industry	征信业管理条例	State Council	2013
2014–2020 main documents			
Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014–2020)	社会信用体系建设规划纲要(2014—2020年)	State Council	2014
Division of Tasks for the Social Credit System Construction Plan	社会信用体系建设规划纲要(2014—2020年)任务分工	State Council	2014
Announcement on Implementing the Outline	关于贯彻落实社会信用体系建设规划纲要 加强当	NDRC	2014

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Table A (Continued)

English Name	Chinese Name	Releasing Agencies	Date
for the Construction of a SCS, Strengthening Current the Construction of a SCS	前社会信用体系建设的通知		
Guiding Opinions concerning Strengthening Cybersecurity Work in the Telecommunications and Internet Sectors	工业和信息化部关于加强电信和互联网行业网络安全工作的指导意见	Ministry of Industry and Information Technology	2014
Guiding Opinions concerning Using Secure and Controllable Information Technology and Strengthening Cybersecurity and Informatization in the Banking Sector	关于应用安全可控信息技术加强银行业网络安全和信息化建设的指导意见	Banking Regulatory Commission etc.	2014
Opinions Undertaking the Activities of "Developing Vigorous Business with Food Credit"	关于深入开展“诚信兴商”活动的意见	Publicity Department, CCP Central Committee etc.	2014
Three Year Key Tasks in the Construction of the SCS (2014–2016)	社会信用体系建设三年重点工作任务(2014—2016)	State Council	2014
Opinions Promoting the Institutionalization of Credit Construction	关于推进诚信建设制度化的意见	General Office, Central Commission for Guiding Cultural and Ethical Progress etc.	2014
Issuing the Industry Standards on the Information Security Standards for Credit Reporting Institutions	征信机构信息安全规范	People's Bank of China (PBC)	2014
Comprehensive Plan for Introducing a Unified Social Credit Number System for Legal Entities and Other Organizations	法人和其他组织统一社会信用代码制度建设总体方案的通知	State Council	2015
Announcement on Effective Preparation for Individual Credit Collection	关于做好个人征信业务准备工作的通知	PBC	2015
Issuing the Key Tasks of 2015 Social Credit Construction	关于印发2015年社会信用体系建设工作要点的通知	NDRC and PBC	2015
Notice of the People's Bank of China on Issuing the Industry Standards on Standards of User Management in Basic Financial Credit Information Database	金融信用信息基础数据库用户管理规范	PBC	2015
Opinions Constructing Support Platform for Encourage People to do Business Creatively and Drive Innovation	关于加快构建大众创业万众创新支撑平台的指导意见	State Council	2015

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Table A (Continued)

English Name	Chinese Name	Releasing Agencies	Date
Opinions Strengthening the Administration of Infringement and Counterfeiting Behaviors on the Internet	关于加强互联网领域侵权假冒行为治理的意见	State Council General Office	2015
Guiding Opinions concerning Strengthening the Construction of a Personal Sincerity System	关于加强个人诚信体系建设的指导意见	State Council General Office	2016
Credit Information Catalogue of the National Credit Information Sharing Platform	全国信用信息共享平台信用信息目录	NDRC	2016
Guiding Opinions of the State Council on Strengthening the Government Integrity Construction	关于加强政务诚信建设的指导意见	State Council	2016
Announcement on Implementing the Construction of a Unified Social Credit Number System for Legal Person and Other Social Organizations	关于贯彻落实法人和其他组织统一社会信用代码制度建设总体方案有关事项的通知	General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine	2016
Interim Measures of Credit Rating Industry (Consultation Paper)	信用评级业管理暂行办法（征求意见稿）	PBC etc.	2017
Related documents			
Guiding Opinions on the Promotion of Fair Market Competition and Upholding the Normal Market Order	关于促进市场公平竞争维护市场正常秩序的若干意见	State Council	2014
State Council Guiding Opinions Strengthening Supervision after the "Business License First and Regulatory License Later" Reform	国务院关于"先照后证"改革后 加强事中事后监管的意见	State Council	2015
Some Opinions concerning the Use of Big Data to Strengthen Service to and Supervision of Market Subjects	国务院办公厅关于运用大数据加强对市场主体服务和监管的若干意见	State Council General Office	2015
Outline of Operations to Stimulate the Development of Big Data	国务院关于印发促进大数据发展行动纲要的通知	State Council	2015
State Council Guiding Opinions concerning Vigorously Moving Forward the "Internet Plus" Plan	国务院关于积极推进"互联网+"行动的指导意见	State Council	2015

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Table A (Continued)

English Name	Chinese Name	Releasing Agencies	Date
Some Opinions concerning Deepening Structural and Mechanism Reform and Accelerating the Implementation of the Innovation-Driven Development Strategy	中共中央国务院关于深化体制机制改革加快实施创新驱动发展战略的若干意见	State Council	2015
Opinions concerning Stimulating the Development of Cloud Computing Innovation and Fostering New Business Models in the Information Industry	国务院关于促进云计算创新发展培育信息产业新业态的意见	State Council	2015
The Overall Outline of Further Improving Real-name Registration System in Related Fields	关于进一步健全相关领域实名制登记制度的总体方案	Central Leading Team for Comprehensively Deepening Reform	2016
The 13th Five-Year Plan for the National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China	中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要	National People's Congress	2016
Outline of the National Informatization Development Strategy	国家信息化发展战略纲要	CCP Central Committee General Office, State Council General Office	2016
National Cyberspace Security Strategy	国家网络空间安全战略	Cyberspace Administration	2016
Measures on the Administration of Internet Live-streaming Services	互联网直播服务管理规定	Cyberspace Administration	2016
Mobile Internet Application Information Service Management Regulations	移动互联网应用程序信息服务管理规定	Cyberspace Administration	2016
Announcement of the State Council on Printing and Distributing the State Informationization Plan for the Thirteenth Five year Plan	国务院关于印发"十三五"国家信息化规划的通知	State Council	2016
Guiding Opinions of the State Council on Accelerating the Promotion of the "Internet + Government Services" Work	国务院关于加快"互联网+政务服务"工作的指导意见	State Council	2016
The Pilot Implementation of Promoting the "Internet + Government Services" and Undertaking Citizen's Benefit from Information	推进"互联网+政务服务"开展信息惠民试点实施方案	NDRC etc.	2016
Notice of the General Office of the State	国务院办公厅关于印发互联网金融风险专项整治	State Council General Office	2016

(*Continued*)

Table A (Continued)

English Name	Chinese Name	Releasing Agencies	Date
Council on Issuing the Implementation Plan for Special Rectification on Risks in Internet Finance	工作实施方案的通知		
Guiding Opinions of the General Office of the State Council on Accelerating the Advancement of the Reform of "Integrating Certificates into One"	关于加快推进"多证合一"改革的指导意见	State Council General Office	2017
Issuing announcement on Sharing Data of Citizens, Public Institutions, and Social Organization during Administrative Approval	关于实行行政审批中公民、企事业单位和社会组织基本信息共享的通知	State Commission Office for Public Sector Reform	2017
Reform of the "Five in One, One Code for One License" Registration System	关于加快推进"五证合一、一照一码"登记制度改革	State Council	2016
Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China	中华人民共和国网络安全法	National People's Congress	2017
A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan	国务院关于印发新一代人工智能发展规划的通知	State Council	2017
Internet News Information Service Management Regulations	互联网新闻信息服务管理规定	Cyberspace Administration	2017
Report at 19th Party Congress of the CCP	十九大报告	CCP Central Committee	2017
Joint Reward and Punishment Systems			
Notice on Issuing the Memorandum on Understanding on Taking Joint Punishment for the Subjects in the Major Cases on Tax Law Violations	关于对重大税收违法案件当事人实施联合惩戒措施的合作备忘录	NDRC etc.	2014
Notice on Issuing the Cooperation Memorandum on the Coordinated Supervision and Joint Punishment for Discredited Enterprises	失信企业协同监管和联合惩戒合作备忘录	State Administration for Industry and Commerce etc.	2015
Notice on Issuing the Cooperation Memorandum on the Coordinated Supervision and Joint Punishment for Discredited Listed Enterprises	关于对违法失信上市公司相关责任主体实施联合惩戒的合作备忘录	Securities Regulatory Commission	2015

(*Continued*)

Table A (Continued)

English Name	Chinese Name	Releasing Agencies	Date
Notice on Taking Joint Punishment Actions against Coal Mines Engaging in Construction and Production in Violation of the Laws and Regulations	关于对违法违规建设生产煤矿实施联合惩戒的通知	NDRC etc.	2015
Several Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Restricting High Consumption and Relevant Consumption of Persons Subject to Enforcement	最高人民法院关于限制被执行人高消费及有关消费的若干规定	The Supreme Court	2015
The Management Method of Joint Punishment List for Seriously Trust-breaking Subjects in Agricultural Field (for Trial Implementation)	农资领域严重失信联合惩戒对象名单管理办法（试行）	Ministry of Agriculture	2015
Opinions concerning Accelerating the Construction of Credit Supervision, Warning and Punishment Mechanisms for Persons Subject to Enforcement for Trust-Breaking	关于加快推进失信被执行人信用监督、警示和惩戒机制建设的意见	CCP Central Committee General Office, State Council General Office	2016
State Council Guiding Opinions concerning Establishing and Perfecting Incentives for Promise-keeping and Joint Punishment Systems for Trust-Breaking, and Accelerating the Construction of Social Sincerity	关于建立完善守信联合激励和失信联合惩戒制度加快推进社会诚信建设的指导意见	State Council	2016
Issuing the Cooperation Memorandum on the Joint Punishment for Trust-breaking Subjects	关于对失信被执行人实施联合惩戒的合作备忘录	The Supreme Court etc.	2016
Issuing the Cooperation Memorandum on Undertaking Joint Punishment for Trust-breaking Production and Operation Units and Persons in the Field of Environmental Protection	关于对环境保护领域失信生产经营单位及其有关人员开展联合惩戒的合作备忘录	NDRC etc.	2016
Issuing the Cooperation Memorandum on Undertaking Joint Punishment for Seriously Trust-breaking Subjects in the Production and Operation of Food and Drugs	关于对食品药品生产经营严重失信者开展联合惩戒的合作备忘录	NDRC etc.	2016

(*Continued*)

Table A (Continued)

English Name	Chinese Name	Releasing Agencies	Date
Issuing the Cooperation Memorandum on Undertaking Joint Punishment for Seriously Trust-breaking Subjects in the Production Quality	关于对严重质量违法失信行为当事人实施联合惩戒的合作备忘录	NDRC etc.	2016
Memorandum on the Joint Financial and Administrative Punishment of Dishonest Behavior	关于对财政性资金管理使用领域相关失信责任主体实施联合惩戒的合作备忘录	NDRC etc.	2016
Action Plan on Joint Punishment for Dereliction of Credit in E-commerce and Sharing Economy Industry	关于对电子商务及分享经济领域炒信行为相关失信主体实施联合惩戒的行动计划	NDRC etc.	2016
Announcement on concerning the Joint Punishment for the Executed Decedent in Bidding and Tendering Activities	关于在招标投标活动中对失信被执行人实施联合惩戒的通知	NDRC etc.	2016
Issuing the Memorandum on Implementing Incentives for Class A Taxpayers with Tax Credit	关于对纳税信用A级纳税人实施联合激励措施的合作备忘录	NDRC etc.	2016
Action Plan on Implementing Excellent Young Volunteers Credit and Jointly Incentives for the Construction of a Youth Credit System	关于实施优秀青年志愿者守信联合激励加快推进青年信用体系建设的行动计划	NDRC etc.	2016
Issuing the Memorandum on the Implementation of Joint Incentives for High Level Certification Enterprises of the Customs	关于对海关高级认证企业实施联合激励的合作备忘录	NDRC etc.	2016
Measures for the Implementation of Joint Punishment in Production Safety Field	对安全生产领域信行为开展联合惩戒的实施办法	General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine	2017
Guiding Opinions concerning Strengthening and Regulating the List of Incentives for Promise-keeping and Joint Punishment Systems for Trust-Breaking	关于加强和规范守信联合激励和失信联合惩戒对象名单管理工作的指导意见	NDRC, PBC	2017
Issuing the Memorandum on Joint Punishment for Trust-breaking Production and Operation Units and Related Persons in	关于对安全生产领域失信生产经营单位及其有关人员开展联合惩戒的合作备忘录	General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine	2017

(*Continued*)

Table A (Continued)

English Name	Chinese Name	Releasing Agencies	Date
the Field of Safety Production			
Specific Fields			
Ministry of Agriculture Guiding Opinion on Accelerating the Construction of Credit System of Agricultural Products Quality and Safety	农业部关于加快推进农产品质量安全信用体系建设的指导意见	Ministry of Agriculture	2014
The Measures for the Administration of Credit of Inspection and Quarantine Enterprises	检疫企业信用管理办法	General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine	2014
Guiding Opinions Strengthening the Construction of Credit System of Safety Production in Enterprises	关于加强企业安全生产诚信体系建设的指导意见	NDRC	2014
Opinions Promoting Credit and Self-discipline in Commerce Associations	关于推进行业协会商会诚信自律建设工作的意见	Ministry of Civil Affairs etc.	2014
Interim Measures of the Customs of the People's Republic of China for the Administration of Enterprise Credit	中华人民共和国海关企业信用管理暂行办法	General Administration of Customs	2014
Opinions Accelerating the Construction of Commercial Credit	关于加快推进商务诚信建设工作的实施意见	Ministry of Commerce	2014
Announcement of the State Administration of Taxation on Issuing the Measures for Tax Credit Administration (for Trial Implementation)	纳税信用管理办法(试行)	State Administration of Taxation	2014
Guiding Opinions on the Construction of China's Logistics Industry Credit System	关于我国物流业信用体系建设的指导意见	NDRC etc.	2014
China's Insurance Industry Credit System Construction Plan 2015–2020	中国保险业信用体系建设规划(2015－2020年)	Insurance Regulatory Commission and NDRC	2015
Plan for Establishing China's Automobile Industry Credit System	汽车行业信用体系建设规划纲要(2015—2020年)	China Association of Automobile Manufacturers	2015
Guiding Opinions on Promoting Healthy Development of Internet Finance	关于促进互联网金融健康发展的指导意见	PBC etc.	2015
Several Issues on the Establishment of an Intellectual Property SCS	关于开展知识产权系统社会信用体系建设工作若干事项	State Intellectual Property Office	2016

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Table A (Continued)

English Name	Chinese Name	Releasing Agencies	Date
Issuing the Implementation Plan of Constructing Credit System in Production Safety of Transport Enterprises	关于印发交通运输企业安全生产诚信体系建设实施方案	Ministry of Transport	2015
Ministry of Transport Several Opinions Strengthening the Construction of Credit System in Transportation Industry	交通运输部关于加强交通运输行业信用体系建设的若干意见	Ministry of Transport	2015
Opinions of the People's Bank of China on Comprehensively Promoting the Building of the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Credit System and the Rural Credit System	关于全面推进中小企业和农村信用体系建设的意见	PBC	2015
The Measures for the Evaluation of Enterprise Environmental Credit (for Trial Implementation)	企业环境信用评价办法(试行)	Ministry of Environmental Protection etc.	2015
Opinions Promoting Convenient Trading of Used Cars	关于促进二手车便利交易的若干意见	State Council General Office	2015
Guiding Opinions on Trust-Building in the Field of E-Commerce	关于全面加强电子商务领域诚信建设的指导意见	NDRC etc.	2016
Opinions on Implementing an Energy Industry Credit System	能源行业信用体系建设实施意见	National Energy Administration	2016
Tasks in Opinions on Implementing an Energy Industry Credit System (2016–2020)	关于　能源行业信用体系建设实施意见(2016–2020年)　工作安排	National Energy Administration	2016
The Credit Rating Methods of Enterprise Labor and Social Security	企业劳动保障守法诚信等级评价办法	Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security	2016
Issuing the Pilot Work Plan for the Construction of Credit System in Courier Industry	快递业信用体系建设试点工作方案	State Post Bureau	2016
Measures for the Prevention and Punishment of Academic Misconducts in Institutions of Higher Education	高等学校预防与处理学术不端行为办法	Ministry of Education	2016
The Interim Provisions of the Record of Seriously Trust-breaking Behaviors of National Science and Technology Plan (special, fund, etc.)	国家科技计划(专项、基金等)严重失信行为记录暂行规定	Ministry of Science and Technology	2016

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Table A (Continued)

English Name	Chinese Name	Releasing Agencies	Date
The Key Tasks of 2016 Credit Construction of Transport Industry	2016	Ministry of Transport	2016
Announcement of the State Administration of Taxation on Issues concerning Improving Tax Credit Administration	国家税务总局关于完善纳税信用管理有关事项的公告	State Administration of Taxation	2016
Guiding Opinions on Strengthening the Construction of an Environmental Credit System for Companies	关于加强企业环境信用体系建设的指导意见	NDRC, Ministry of Environmental Protection	2016
Planning Outline for the Construction of Youth Social Credit System	青年信用体系建设规划(2016–2020年)	Communist Youth League etc.	2016
Questions Regarding the Inquiry and Use of Credit History in Government Procurement Activities	关于在政府采购活动中查询及使用信用记录有关问题	Ministry of Finance	2016
Announcement on Issuing 2016 Special Action Program of Internet Market Regulation	关于印发2016网络市场监管专项行动方案的通知	State Administration for Industry and Commerce	2016
Guide Opinions Strengthening Credit Construction in Transport Industry	关于加强交通出行领域信用建设的指导意见	NDRC etc.	2017
Announcement on Issuing the Joint Incentives for A Level Food and Drug Producers in Tax and other fields	关于印发对税务等领域信用A级食品药品生产经营者实施联合激励措施的通知	China Food and Drug Administration	2017
Measures for the Management of Credit Information in Water Transport Market (Trial Implementation)	水路运输市场信用信息管理办法(试行)	Ministry of Transport	2017
Announcement on Shifting the Payment Network of NonBank Agencies from Direct Connection to Networked Platform	关于将非银行支付机构网络支付业务由直连模式迁移至网联平台处理的通知	PBC	2017
The Management Methods of Waterway Market Credit Information	水路运输市场信用信息管理办法	Ministry of Transport	2017
Interim Measures Released on "Blacklists" for Delaying Payment of Wages to Rural Migrant Workers	拖欠农民工工资“黑名单”管理暂行办法	Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security	2017
Announcement on Issuing the Guideline for	关于印发服务业诚信计量监督管理制度建设指南	General Administration of Quality Supervision,	2017

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Table A (Continued)

English Name	Chinese Name	Releasing Agencies	Date
Establishing the System for the Supervision and Administration of Credit in the Service Industry	的通知	Inspection and Quarantine Home	
The Management Measures of Civil Aviation Credit (Trial Implementation)	民航行业信用管理办法(试行)	Civil Aviation Authority	2017
Them Management Methods of Statistical Staff Statistics Credit File (Trial Implementation)	统计从业人员统计信用档案管理办法(试行)	National Bureau of Statistics	2017
Announcement on the Error Correction Work of a Unified Social Credit Number System for Legal Entities and other Organizations	关于进一步做好法人和其他组织统一社会信用代码信息回传和校核纠错工作的通知	NDRC etc.	2017
Announcement on Securities Companies Access the People's Bank of China's Credit Reference System	关于证券公司接入中国人民银行征信系统相关事宜的通知	Securities Regulatory Commission	2017
The Management Methods of Railway Passenger Credit Record (Trial Implementation)	铁路旅客信用记录管理办法(试行)	China Railway	2017
The Operation and Management Methods of National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System (Trial Implementation)	国家企业信用信息公示系统使用运行管理办法(试行)	State Administration for Industry and Commerce etc.	2017
Guiding Opinions on Strengthening the Construction of Credit in the Field of Transnational Economic Cooperation	关于加强对外经济合作领域信用体系建设的指导意见	NDRC etc.	2017