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Information, Knowledge, and Deliberation

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Information deficit and information excess

A well-functioning democracy, or, perhaps, democracy as an institution that is worth defending, requires that citizens make well-reasoned choices. Yet, how do we make well-reasoned choices when we seem to be so bad at it? This is an old question – in some ways as old as some of the earliest recorded debates about the justifiability of democratic institutions – and the traditional perspective on it is that the effectiveness of democracy turns on its ability to aggregate information. The information relevant to governance is diffused across citizens. Democratic institutions pool that information, some better than others, and produce outcomes that are better than the judgment of individual citizens – a phenomenon, or a hope, that has become ubiquitously known as "wisdom of the crowds" (Hong and Page 2004; Goodin and Spiekermann 2018).

One of the key contributions of Lupia and McCubbins' (L&M) book is to suggest a way of approaching the old question from a perspective that upends the informational presuppositions of the wisdom-of-the-crowds. As they put it, "Ironically, for many political issues, information is not scarce; rather, it is the cognitive resources that a person can use to process information that are scarce" (p.6). Indeed, the issue is not that there is too little information for a correct individual judgment, but that there is too much of it. The real problem is one of properly making sense of it, of figuring out what is relevant and, critically for their book, at a meta-level,

how we could know how to know that. In L&M's language, this is a problem of knowledge (reasoning through the information), not a problem of information deficit. Put another way, L&M are less interested if aggregation can generate better, informed outcomes and instead ask the question of how do people sort through information in the first place – an information excess problem.

The idea that the problem may be the opposite of an information deficit is an important insight that holds great explanatory power, even if existing work in social sciences has barely scratched its surface.[1] The two problems are also quite distinct. Information deficit and information excess are not equivalent in their legal and political implications: for example, transparency (conventionally understood as the commitment to not withholding information) is a fine remedy for the former, but may exacerbate the latter.

Nor are the appropriate formal environments for theorizing these two problems likely to be logically equivalent (though see more below). The inability to process efficiently is not plausibly independently randomly distributed across the information space, and so the settings that generate the wisdom-of-the-crowds results relying on that assumption – for example, in different variations of the Jury Theorem – are, from this perspective, implausible also. Indeed, the processing inefficiencies are predictable with respect to the types of information and citizens' prior beliefs and backgrounds – that is, biases are systematic (Kahneman 2011) – and so, in the standard one-step aggregation environment, will lead to biased, not wise, collective choices. That is, information aggregation is not a solution for the information excess problem.

If the condition is one of information excess and the challenge is how to turn information into democratically usable knowledge, what are the possible solutions? L&M's main claim here is that citizens can sustain effective democratic governance through deference to those with expert knowledge. The key to acquiring the relevant knowledge is figuring out how to identify whom to trust in the context in which enjoying trust and commanding (and possibly manipulating) the following that comes with it, are highly desired by those whose preferences one shares as well as by those whose preferences one does not – in other words, in an

environment in which misrepresentation may be a useful way of attaining support. In their exploration of this idea, L&M's book set the methodological standard, of closely linked strategic micro-models and lab experiments, for much of subsequent work – indeed, it is one of the first, if not the first, substantive-topic monographs in political science to proceed that way.

Strikingly, the claim that the right response to one's insufficient knowledge and, at the aggregate level, a way to preserve the salutary epistemic property of collective choice may be to defer to other (more knowledgeable) citizens/experts parallels a central conclusion reached at about the same time from within the deficit-of-information approach. The "rational abstention" result of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1999) is formulated in the context of better (more precise) or worse (less precise/noisier) information, but it has the same flavor.

In an important sense, this coincidence is not surprising because L&M's approach is to transform, instrumentally, the information-excess problem into the information-deficit problem. They do this by resolving the question of how to obtain knowledge into the question of how to find the knowledgeable and trustworthy, and, conventionally, L&M treat the latter as a question of the information-deficit variety. By so doing, they are able to apply standard information-theoretic tools and the technology of cheap-talk signaling. Deference to experts being the paradigmatic theme of the information-deficit framework, the L&M approach, in effect, circles back to it, now grounding it in behavioral micro-foundations concerning excessive information about policy, the cognitive burdens of personal judgment, and incomplete information about opinion leaders – the micro-foundations that more plausibly fit democratic electorates.

While the cue-taking mechanism is, certainly, behaviorally prominent, the information-excess problem that was L&M's point of departure continues to loom large with respect to the question of public argumentation, which remained outside their framework. Yet the public debates that lead to electoral and policy changes proceed not merely by opinion leaders' taking positions, but also by their attempts to develop syllogistic associations-- resonating arguments

that can reinforce voters' self-understanding as not merely supporters of candidate or policy *A* but as supporters of candidate *A* for an articulable (if possibly not broadly shared and even mistaken) reason. It is not obvious how to think meaningfully about such argumentation within the information-deficit framework, and so what the transformation of the information-excess problem into the information-deficit problem can do to shed light on it. I will next sketch the broad contours of an approach that my colleagues and I have developed to conceptualize this phenomenon within an argument-based framework that captures critical features of information excess problems. In an important sense, this approach is inspired by L&M's formulation of the problem of democratic governance in information-excess terms and complements the mechanism they study. But in a different sense, it provides an alternative answer to the key motivating question of whether and how citizens can learn what they need to know for democratic governance.

Deliberation as self-discovery

The core idea is that of "deliberation as self-discovery" – a deliberative interaction that, if successful, produces greater self-knowledge in the sense of creating an understanding of what judgments the participant should have held in the first place and why.[2] The upside of such an interaction is not the gain of information previously privately held by the speaker and now shared with a listener, but the gain of the connective tissue between pieces of information which the listener already holds true, but of which she might have failed to take proper count. In a familiar language, there are "latent" beliefs or reasons that deliberation may "activate" (Hafer and Landa 2007; Hummel 2012; Landa 2015.)

The standard cheap-talk signaling model is the natural model of communication between an expert and a dilettante (or a knowledgeable opinion leader and a follower who is interested simply in learning the position that she should take). The asymmetry of knowledge/expertise does not leave room for the receiver to evaluate the truth content of the sender's statements: their believability is determined by the equilibrium incentives and the conjecture about play. The resulting challenge implies the key subsidiary questions of L&M's inquiry into how effective

democratic governance may be possible: “whom can you trust?” and “what conditions make trusting possible?” (or, alternatively, when will the communication from an opinion leader to a potential follower succeed?). The possibility of what L&M call “enlightenment” -- resulting from opinion leaders’ knowledge-based truth-telling -- as opposed to deception and/or absence of learning, depends, then, on the equilibrium compatibility of the underlying environment with the posited behavioral rules (Landa and Meirowitz 2009).

In contrast, the natural communication framework for studying deliberation as self-discovery is one with verifiable messaging because, to the extent that opinion-leaders use arguments, they issue messages with discernable, if somewhat decidedly “little *t*”, truth content. Their verification is in the form of a test for “internal resonance”: If the message sent (argument made) resonates with the receiver – perhaps because it clearly connects and draws upon reasons the receiver already accepts as true, whether the connections were appreciated prior to deliberation or not – the receiver successfully verifies the message as truthful; if the message fails to resonate, she does not. From the receiver's perspective, a new resonating argument is like a previously elusive solution to a puzzle: Although she may have always understood what features a solution had to have and had all the clues necessary for it, the number of possibilities to consider in the search for the solution may simply have been too great for her to readily find the solution herself. The key challenge of information excess—how to identify in streams of information those bits that actually matter—has the same critical feature: it is a daunting task to consider each piece of information and determine its relevance, yet, as with seeing a solution to a puzzle, when the relevant bits are selected and put together, it is easy to tell that they are relevant. The puzzle analogy has an important caveat. Our individual puzzles may be different: what resonates with one may not with another. This means that the truth content of a message may be contingent on the receiver. But the sender, though perhaps an opinion leader, here has no private information with respect to any given receiver unless her model of the receiver’s system of beliefs just happens to be correct. What is unknown is the compatibility (or complementarity) between the message and a given receiver’s system of

beliefs, it is an unknown for both the sender and the receiver, and it only becomes knowledge through the receiver's acts of listening/processing the relevant message.

In this framework, the key subsidiary questions for the inquiry into the possibility of knowledge-based democratic governance are "how does acquisition of knowledge depend on whether the message resonates?" and if it does depend, "is it worth one's time to listen to speaker *A* or to speaker *B*?" The first critical piece of the answer to the first question that emerges from experimental and theoretical studies is that the quality of inference importantly depends on receiver sophistication (Dickson, Hafer, and Landa 2008 and 2015). When the received argument resonates, there is "direct" learning. This is a relatively simple case that imposes little in the way of cognitive burdens on the receiver. But if the argument does not resonate, or resonates only partially, there is room for "indirect" learning, albeit one that requires relatively more complex reasoning, as well as being able to place the argument in perspective with respect to what is "out there", or judge the sincerity of the speaker's effort in light of the interests she is trying to advance. (As an example, consider an argument for the claim "Citibank is too big to fail". What follows from the fact that that argument does not work for you?) In short, an efficient update demands from the receiver sophistication both cognitively, in requiring a contrapositive inference from a null event, and politically, in requiring understanding of what policy alternatives are possible and likely and of the political context framing the speaker's incentives. The less plausible the assumption of sophistication, the less informative the non-resonating argument is, and the more apt is the receiver to regard it as simply irrelevant.

The second key piece turns on the incentives to offer arguments, given the expectation of receivers' responses. The upside of offering an argument is bringing a receiver along; the downside is turning her off. The less sophisticated the receiver, the harder it is for her to make inferences from arguments that do not resonate, and thus, the less possible downside there is to a speaker's trying out an argument on her. Less sophisticated receivers are less likely to be turned off, shifting the speaker's incentives in favor of offering argumentation.

This brings us to the conclusion that speaks to L&M's main question. Lower sophistication on the part of the receivers – their difficulties in making sense of the information they have – encourages argumentation on the part of the opinion leaders, who can be less concerned about the possible downside of alienating the audience. The effect is to make it more likely that receivers, as they sort through streams of information, see the arguments that resonate with them, and, ultimately, are able to make sense of their information. Strikingly, difficulties of turning information into knowledge – which, in this account, stem from insufficient cognitive and/or political sophistication – may, thus, have the effect, in a strategic context, of increasing the citizens' knowledge, making effective, well-reasoned, democratic governance possible even though we seem to be so bad at reasoning at an individual level. What might, at first glance, appear to be impediments to knowledge, in a strategic setting, lead to the seemingly paradoxical result of more knowledgeable citizens and, ultimately, better policy decisions (Hafer and Landa 2013 and 2018).

From the standpoint of democratic theory, this bridging of, on one hand, the substantial informational and cognitive demands placed on the citizens by the normative theories of democracy and, on the other, the more modest expectations that are urged by social and political psychologists is clearly good news. It also suggests that the answer to L&M's key question from the analysis of deliberation as self-discovery complements their position-taking theory: each approach identifies a distinctive mechanism that could lead to better choices by the citizens overwhelmed with information than one might have plausibly expected.

Yet, if this conclusion sounds a touch too rosy, it is. The reason is that, ultimately, the lower the receiver sophistication, the more important is the exposure to the arguments from both right and left for making sense of information. If the only arguments received are for, and never against, policy *A*, an unsophisticated receiver who generally – and perhaps, correctly, for her – leans toward *A*-like policies, may believe she is for *A* even though pro-*A* arguments have not resonated with her, and there exists a contra-*A* argument (albeit one she has not heard) that

would. Such one-sided exposure does not undermine the argument about the beneficial effects of lower sophistication in a strategic sender-receiver setting, but it does, of course, lower the upside of a deliberative process.

This observation suggests a tension between L&M's central subsidiary argument about cue-taking and the epistemic potential of citizens' deliberative engagement described above. The cues from the opinion-leaders whom citizens – correctly – trust as their likely epistemic proxies naturally lead to citizens' self-selecting as those leaders' respective audiences. The effect is the one-sided exposure that creates or reinforces biases in citizens' information-processing. If citizens' deliberative engagement were limited to cue-taking, then the conclusion of epistemic gain would appear unobjectionable, and in a counterfactual world with no informative cues from potential opinion leaders, the epistemic properties of democratic choices would suffer. But if citizens learn more than which positions to take but also *why*, then the absence of the knowledge short-cuts could be a path to better (less biased) knowledge.

The bottom line of this tension is, then, a challenge to the position-taking theory as an affirmative answer to whether citizens can learn what they need to know for effective democratic governance. A finer parsing of when successful (enlightenment-inducing, in L&M's sense) cue-taking would produce net beneficial effects is a largely unexplored avenue of analysis, waiting to be taken up by present and future heirs of L&M's important project.

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[1] Apart from the work discussed in this article, it has had some traction in security studies (Traverton 2003) and in some of the accounts (e.g., Gladwell 2007) of challenges to shareholder oversight.

[2] In this model, similar to textbook incomplete-information models, the agent’s utility is higher when she makes a better decision, but reflection and argumentation (and possibly also the instrumental decision to listen/receive) are a key to getting there.