

# **International Organizations (GA)**

## FALL 2022

Instructor: Zoe Xincheng Ge

Seminar time and location:

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## **Course Description**

This course is a research seminar on international organizations (IOs). In this course, we focus on identifying the relevant actors and their incentives and exploring how the incentives interact with institutions. Throughout the semester, we will explore the following key questions:

- What roles do IOs play in international politics?
- Why do states establish IOs?
- Can IOs change states' behaviors?
- Why do IOs look the way they are?
- How do domestic politics shape states' interactions with IOs?
- What are the distributive consequences of international cooperation?

We will start the course by discussing the overarching theoretical questions in international cooperation. Then, we will dig deeper into the specific theoretical topics that are crucial for our understanding of IOs. Equipped with these analytical tools, we will look into specific IOs and explore further how these institutions operate in the issue areas of trade, investment, human rights, climate, public health, and so on.

## **Outline of Topics**

### **Part I Introduction**

Week 1 Why is International Cooperation Possible?

Week 2 What Hinders International Cooperation?

### **Part II Theoretical Issues in IOs**

Week 3 Institutional Design

Week 4 Delegation

Week 5 Compliance

Week 6 Domestic Politics

Week 7 Information

Week 8 Influence of Powerful Actors

### **Part III Special Issue Areas**

Week 9 Trade

Week 10 Investment

Week 11 IMF & World Bank

Week 12 Regime Complexity  
Week 13 Climate & Public Health

Week 14 Proposal Presentations

## Course Requirements and Assessment

**Participation (10%)**: Students are required to read the papers before the class and get prepared for discussion in class.

**Discussant (20%)**: Student need to serve as a discussant for 2-3 papers throughout the semester. The discussion should be no more than 10 minutes. The discussion should cover the following topics:

- Brief summary of the paper
- Describe how the paper fits into the literature and its contributions
- Evaluate the theory and empirical analyses (if any)
- Provide constructive suggestions on how to improve the paper

**Referee Report (30%)**: Students need to write two referee reports. Students can choose two papers for review based on their research interests. However, the papers should be different from the papers that students discuss in class. The first referee report should be submitted before the Spring Break. The length should be no more than 3 pages.

**Final Paper (40%)**: The final paper can be either a research paper or a proposal that describes a research project that should

- identify a specific question or puzzle
- discuss how you answer the question
- lays out the necessary steps to answer the question, including some preliminary analyses
- suggest how this project contributes to the literature.

The final paper is due December 20, 2022 11:59 pm.

## Course Outline and Relevant Readings

### Part I Introduction

#### Week 1 Why is International Cooperation Possible?

This week we will have a broad discussion about how international cooperation is possible in an anarchic system. Abbott and Snidal (1998) identify that centralization and independence as two key institutional features of IOs. Voeten (2019) provides a comprehensive review of how functional, distributive, historical, and structural schools study IOs. Gilligan and Johns (2012) review how the models on IOs evolved overtime. These readings provide a big picture of the

important questions and approaches that IO scholars focus on so that we will know where we are as we go deep into specific topics.

Required:

Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (1998). Why States Act through Formal International Organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(1)

Voeten, E. (2019). Making Sense of the Design of International Institutions. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 22(1), 147–163. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041916-021108>

Gilligan, M. J., & Johns, L. (2012). Formal Models of International Institutions. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 15(1), 221–243. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-043010-095828>

Recommended:

Keohane, Robert. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1, 4-6.

## **Week 2 What Hinders International Cooperation?**

The distributive consequence is ubiquitous in international cooperation. Putnam (1988) shows how domestic institutions affects international negotiations. Fearon (1998) shows how the shadow of future can delay international cooperation. Blaydes (2004) shows that impatience can generate more from the bargain. Carnegie (2014) shows how the WTO can solve the political hold-up problem and lead to greater increase in trade between politically dissimilar states.

Required:

Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. *International organization*, 42(3), 427-460.

Fearon, James D. 1998. “Bargaining, Enforcement and International Cooperation. *International Organization*” 52:269-306 <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898753162820>

Blaydes, Lisa. 2004. Rewarding Impatience: A Bargaining and Enforcement Model of OPEC. *International Organization*. 58:213-237. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818304582012>

Carnegie, A. (2014). States Held Hostage: Political Hold-Up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions. *The American Political Science Review*, 108(1), 54–70.

Recommended:

TBD

## Part II Theoretical Issues in IOs

### Week 3 Institutional Design

Why do IOs look the way they are? The institutional design literature is crucial for our understanding of how states interact with the IO and what the IO can achieve. Koremenos et al (2003) provides several dimensions of how international institutions vary. Both Rosendorff and Milner (2001) deal with the incomplete contract nature in international institutions and show that the escape clause allow the state to pay a cost to breach the contract and signal their commitment to comply. Rosendorff (2005) shows that dispute settlement mechanism incorporate flexibility in the regime and increase regime stability. Johns (2019) examines the collective problem in the enforcement of punishment and shows that the diffuseness of benefits determines the optimal enforcement mechanism.

Required:

Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., & Snidal, D. (2003). The rational design of international institutions. *The Rational Design of International Institutions*, 1–363.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511512209>

Rosendorff, B. P., & Milner, H. v. (2001). The optimal design of international trade institutions: Uncertainty and escape. *International Organization*, 44(4), 829–857.  
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315251950-22>

Rosendorff, B. P. (2005). Stability and rigidity: Politics and design of the WTO's dispute settlement procedure. *American Political Science Review*, 99(3), 389–400.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055405051737>

Johns, L. (2019). The design of enforcement: Collective action and the enforcement of international law. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 31(4), 543–567.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819875514>

Recommended:

Johnson, T. (2013). Institutional design and bureaucrats' impact on political control. *Journal of Politics*, 75(1), 183–197. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381612000953>

Johns, L. (2014). Depth versus rigidity in the design of international trade agreements. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 26(3), 468–495. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629813505723>

Pelc, K. J., & Urpelainen, J. (2015). When do international economic agreements allow countries to pay to breach? *Review of International Organizations*, 10(2), 231–264.  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-015-9214-z>

## Week 4 Delegation

Delegation is a key dimension of institutional design. Along with the principal-agent problem comes the agency loss due to the preference misalignment. The following studies provide a broad review of why states delegate (Hawkins et al 2006), the level of information transmission in the situation of multiple principals (Johns 2007), the credibility in delegation (Kennard and Stanescu 2019), and the principal agent problem in the creation of new IOs (Johnson and Urpelainen 2014). Students interested in bureaucracy in IOs will find this topic a good theoretical start.

Required:

Hawkins, D. G., Lake, D. A., Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J. (2006). Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory. In *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* (pp. 3–38). Cambridge University Press.

Johns, L. (2007). A servant of two masters: Communication and the selection of international bureaucrats. *International Organization*, 61(2), 245–275.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818307070099>

Kennard, A., & Stanescu, D. (2019). Do International Bureaucrats Matter? Evidence from the International Monetary Fund. *Working Paper*, 1–30.

Johnson, T., & Urpelainen, J. (2014). International bureaucrats and the formation of intergovernmental organizations: Institutional design discretion sweetens the pot. *International Organization*, 68(1), 177–209. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000349>

Recommended:

Keeper, P., & Stasavage, D. (2003). The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy. *American Political Science Review*, 97(3), 407–423. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055403000777>

Pond, A. (2021). Biased politicians and independent agencies. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298211003129>

Hirsch, A. V., & Shotts, K. W. (2018). Policy-development monopolies: Adverse consequences and institutional responses. *Journal of Politics*, 80(4), 1339–1354.  
<https://doi.org/10.1086/698930>

## Week 5 Compliance

Can IOs make state comply? It is critical to acknowledge that IOs in general do not have much enforcement capacity, which makes the coercion mechanism infeasible. Downs et al (1996) discuss the breadth and depth trade-off. Dai (2005) identifies domestic constituencies as a

mechanism of compliance. Von Stein (2005) examines the selection problem in treaty compliance. Bisbee et al (2019) show the spillover effect of treaty compliance.

Required:

Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. (1996) "Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?" *International Organization*. 50 (3): 379-406.

Dai, X. (2005). Why comply? The domestic constituency mechanism. *International Organization*, 59(2), 363–398. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818305050125>

Von Stein, J. (2005). Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance. *The American Political Science Review*, 99(4), 611–622.

Bisbee, J. H., Hollyer, J. R., Peter Rosendorff, B., & Vreeland, J. R. (2019). The Millennium Development Goals and Education: Accountability and Substitution in Global Assessment. In *International Organization* (Vol. 73, Issue 3). <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818319000109>

Recommended:

Simmons, B. (2010). Treaty compliance and violation. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 13, 273–296. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.040907.132713>

Chayes, A., & Chayes, A. H. (1993). On Compliance. *International Organization*, 47(2), 175–205.

Simmons, B. A. (2000). International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs. *American Political Science Review*, 94(4), 819–835.

Rickard, S. J. (2010). Democratic differences: Electoral institutions and compliance with GATT/WTO agreements. *European Journal of International Relations*, 16(4), 711–729. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066109346890>

## **Week 6 Domestic Politics**

Political leaders' domestic political incentives are critical for our understanding of how states interact with IOs and the limits of what IOs can do. The following literature shows how IOs can be used to achieve domestic policy reform (Vreeland 2003), conceal unpopular actions from voters (Dreher et al 2022), borrow legitimacy (Voeten 2005), and signal the strength to domestic opposition (Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011).

Required:

Vreeland, J. R. (2003). *The IMF and economic development*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615726>

Dreher, A., Lang, V., Rosendorff, B. P., & Raymond, J. (2022). Bilateral or Multilateral? International Financial Flows and the Dirty-Work Hypothesis. *Journal of Politics*, *Forthcoming*.

Voeten, E. (2005). The political origins of the UN Security Council's ability to legitimize the use of force. *International Organization*, *59*(3), 527–557.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818305050198>

Hollyer, J. R., & Rosendorff, B. P. (2011). Why do authoritarian regimes sign the convention against torture? Signaling, domestic politics and non-compliance. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, *6*(3–4), 275–327. <https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00010059>

Recommended:

Vreeland, J. R. (2019). Corrupting International Organizations. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *22*, 205–222. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-409548-9.11381-8>

## **Week 7 Information**

IOs have an important function of monitoring states' behavior. Fang and Stone (2012) show that IO with moderately misaligned interest can persuade. Thompson (2006) shows how the mechanism of information transmission explains the unique role of UNSC. In contrast, Carnegie and Carson (2018, 2019) show the flipside of transparency.

Required:

Fang, S., & Stone, R. W. (2012). International organizations as policy advisors. *International Organization*, *66*(4), 537–569. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818312000276>

Thompson, Alexander. (2006) "Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission." *International Organization*. 60 (Winter): 1–34

Carnegie, A., & Carson, A. (2019). The Disclosure Dilemma: Nuclear Intelligence and International Organizations. *American Journal of Political Science*, *63*(2), 269–285.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12426>

Carnegie, A., & Carson, A. (2018). The spotlight's harsh glare: Rethinking publicity and international order. *International Organization*, *72*(3), 627–657.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000176>

Recommended:

Fearon, J. D. (1997). Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *41*(1), 68–90.

Fang, S. (2008). The informational role of international institutions and domestic politics. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(2), 304–321. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00314.x>

Milgrom, P. R., North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1990). The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs. *Economics and Politics*, 2, 1–23.

## **Week 8 Influence of Powerful Actors**

What explains the disproportional influence of powerful actors in IOs? Powerful actors are main shareholders of IOs and a common view is that powerful actors can exert more influence. How can that happen given that dissatisfied states can quit the IO? The following studies provide different explanations: exit option (Voeten 2001), informal control (Stone 2011), bureaucrats' preferences (Clark and Dolan 2020), and commitment to international cooperation (Copelovitch and Powers 2021).

Required:

Voeten, E. (2001). Outside options and the logic of security council action. *American Political Science Review*, 95(4), 845–858. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305540101005>

Stone, R. W. (2011). Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy. In *Cambridge University Press*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511793943>

Clark, R., & Dolan, L. R. (2020). Pleasing the Principal: U.S. Influence in World Bank Policymaking. *American Journal of Political Science*. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12531>

Copelovitch, M., & Powers, R. (2021). Do We Really Know What We Think We Know About the Politics of IMF Lending? Measuring and Reassessing US Influence in Global Financial Governance. *Working Paper*.

Recommended:

Voeten, E. (2021). *Ideology and International Institutions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691207339>

## **Part III Specific Issue Areas**

The following weeks will discuss specific topics that are relevant to students' research interest.

### **Week 9 Trade**



Required:

Davis, Christina. (2004). International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review* 98 (1) (February): 153-69.

Busch, M. L. (2007). Overlapping institutions, forum shopping, and dispute settlement in international trade. *International Organization*, 61(4), 735–761.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818307070257>

Goldstein, Judith, Doug Rivers, and Michael Tomz. (2007) “Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade.” *International Organization*. 61: 37—67.

Recommended:

Goldstein, J. (2017). Trading in the Twenty-First Century: Is There a Role for the World Trade Organization? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 20(February), 545–564.  
<https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051215-023043>

Davis, Christina L. (2012). *Why Adjudicate: Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Johns, L., & Pelc, K. J. (2014). Who gets to be in the room? Manipulating participation in WTO disputes. *International Organization*, 68(3), 663–699.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000241>

Dür, A., Baccini, L., & Elsig, M. (2014). The Design of International Trade Agreements: Introducing a New Database. *Review of International Organizations*, 6(3), 353–375.

## **Week 10 Investment**

Required:

Elkins, Z., Guzman, A. T., & Simmons, B. A. (2008). Competing for capital: The diffusion of bilateral investment treaties, 1960–2000. *The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy*, 220–260. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511755941.006>

Arias, E., Hollyer, J. R., & Rosendorff, B. P. (2018). Cooperative Autocracies: Leader Survival, Creditworthiness, and Bilateral Investment Treaties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(4), 905–921. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12383>

Pelc, K. J. (2017). What Explains the Low Success Rate of Investor-State Disputes? *International Organization*, 71(3), 559–583.

Recommended:

Moehlecke, C., & Wellhausen, R. L. (2022). Political Risk and International Investment Law. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051120>

Gilligan, M., Johns, L., & Rosendorff, B. P. (2010). Strengthening international courts and the early settlement of disputes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 54(1), 5–38. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709352463>

### **Week 11 IMF & World Bank**

Copelovitch, M. S. (2010). Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54, 49–77.

Vreeland, James. (2008) *The International Monetary Fund: Politics of Conditional Lending*. New York: Routledge.

### **Week 12 Regime Complexity**

Pratt, T. (2018). Deference and hierarchy in international regime complexes. *International Organization*, 72(3), 561–590. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000164>

Calvin Thrall. (2022). Spillover Effects in International Law: Evidence from Tax Planning. *Working Paper*.

Clark, R. (2022). Bargain Down or Shop Around? Outside Options and IMF Conditionality. *The Journal of Politics*. <https://doi.org/10.1086/719269>

Ge, Z. X. (2022). Self-Defeating Treaties: Global Value Chains and the Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties. *Working Paper*.

Recommended:

Johnson, T., & Urpelainen, J. (2014). International bureaucrats and the formation of intergovernmental organizations: Institutional design discretion sweetens the pot. *International Organization*, 68(1), 177–209. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000349>

Clark, R. (2021). Pool or Duel? Cooperation and Competition among International Organizations. *International Organization*, 75(4), 1133–1153. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000229>

### **Week 13 Climate & Public Health**

## Climate

Kennard, A. (2020). The Enemy of My Enemy: When Firms Support Climate Change Regulation. *International Organization*, 74(2), 187–221. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000107>

McAllister, J. H., & Schnakenberg, K. E. (2021). Designing the Optimal International Climate Agreement with Variability in Commitments. *International Organization*, 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000400>

## Public Health

Ge, Z. X. (2022). Who Reports Disease Outbreaks? When Interdependence Meets IO Independence. *Working Paper*.

Worsnop, C. Z. (2017). Domestic politics and the WHO's International Health Regulations: Explaining the use of trade and travel barriers during disease outbreaks. *Review of International Organizations*, 12(3), 365–395. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-016-9260-1>

Recommended:

Cory, J., Lerner, M., & Iain Osgood. (2021). Supply Chain Linkages and the Extended Carbon Coalition. *American Journal of Political Science*, 65(1), 69–87. <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/W08NIR>

Gaikwad, N., Genovese, F., & Tingley, D. (2022). Creating Climate Coalitions: Mass Preferences for Compensating Vulnerability in the World's Two Largest Democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422000223>

Kenwick, M. R., & Simmons, B. A. (2020). Pandemic Response as Border Politics. *International Organization*, 1–23. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000363>

## Week 13 Proposal Presentations

### Optional topics:

Human rights

IO and democracy

China & AIIC

UNGA

UNSC

Populism and backlash