

International Organizations (UG)

Spring 2022

Class schedule: MW 11:00 am -12:15 pm

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Office hours: Friday 10 to 12 or by appointment

Course Description

We've heard a lot about international organizations (IOs) like UN, UNSC, WTO, IMF, World Bank, WHO, and so on. What are these organizations? Why do states establish IOs? Can IOs change states' behaviors? Why do different IOs look so different? Why do we have different IOs that seem to serve similar functions? In this course, we will investigate these questions through a rational choice framework. In the first half of the course, we will discuss the strategic problems that IOs are established to address. In the second half of the course, we will dig into specific IOs and explore further how these institutions operate in the issue areas of trade, investment, human rights, climate, public health, and so on.

Learning outcomes

By the end of the semester, you will be able to

- Summarize the main functions of IOs
- Explain why states establish IOs
- Demonstrate why IOs look the way they are
- Give examples of how states take advantage of IOs for their domestic political purposes
- Analyze the role of IOs in current international events
- Construct theories about how IOs can help (or not) address a specific international crisis

Course Requirements and Assessment

Participation in discussion (10%): I will provide a bunch of activities in class so that you can actively think and learn rather than absorb knowledge in a passive way. Please be prepared to come to the class to think, talk, and engage with your peers.

Midterm exam (20%): This is mainly for the purpose to check your understanding with the course materials and whether you need extra work on certain topics. Hence, treat the midterm exam as a chance for you to review what we have learnt in the first half of the semester before we apply these theoretical concepts in more specific IOs for the second half of the semester.

Final exam (30%): This gives you another chance to review and summarize everything we have covered in the class.

Essay (20%): This assignment aims to incentivize you to keep track of the current events related to IOs and apply what we have learnt in class to analyze real world events. The essay requires you to find an international debate/crisis/event that involves at least an IO, e.g., the financial crisis, international public health emergency, climate change, global value chain disruption, etc. You should aim to answer one of the following questions:

- What role does the IO play in the debate/crisis/event?
- Can the IO induce cooperation from its member states or not? Why?

The structure of the essay should include the following components: actors involved in the event, their incentives, the actions available to them, how their actions affect their calculation about what to do, and some hypotheses/a theory about the role of IOs in the issue. The essay should be no more than 3 double-spaced pages with 12 pt. Times New Roman font and appropriate citation format. I understand that writing can be a very painful thing to do, but it is also an extremely important skill to have, so you should treat this assignment as an opportunity to help you put your thoughts into words and sharpen your analytical writing skills. **(DUE: before the class of Week 10)**

IGO case studies (20%): I find it extremely effective to learn new things by teaching. In this assignment, you will make a short video clip (less than 2 minutes) to teach your peers/friends/family members about an IOs of your choice. The video should cover the following information: the expertise the IO has, how this IO induce cooperation from states, and what domestic political function this IO may serve. A good video provides a clear (and maybe fun) experience for the audience to learn something. **(DUE: last day of the class)**

Course Policies

Late Policies: Extensions (permission to turn in an assignment late without the penalty, or to schedule a makeup exam) will be granted by the professor only when deemed *necessary*: because of religious obligations, or a medical emergency, or for reasons of accommodation that are documented by a doctor, counselor or the Moses Center. Please email or speak to the professor as soon as you know about any unforeseen circumstances that conflict with your coursework. It's almost always better to let us know before the exam date or due date than after.

Late final assignments will be degraded one tier each 24-hour period in which they are late. In other words, if they are turned in any time after 5:00pm on the due date and before 5:00pm the next day, an assignment that would under normal circumstances receive an A would receive an A-, an assignment that might normally receive an A- would receive a B+ and so forth.

Attendance: Attendance will be taken together with participation. Students can miss up to two classes, no questions asked, before absence impact the participation portion of their grade.

Outline of Topics and Relevant Readings

Part I Theoretical Topics

- Week 1 Why is International Cooperation Possible? Cooperation Problem
- Week 2 What Hinders Cooperation? Distributive Problem in Bargaining and Domestic Politics
- Week 3 The More the Worse? Collective Action Problem
- Week 4 Why Don't States Act on Their Own? Delegation
- Week 5 Talk is Cheap? Commitment Problem
- Week 6 Why Do the IOs Look the Way They Are? Institutional Design
- Week 7 How Are You Doing So Far? Midterm Exam

Part II Specific Issue Areas

- Week 8 UN/UNSC: Voting and the Empirical Regularity
- Week 9 UNSC: Legitimacy and Information
- Week 10 Why Are They So Powerful? Powerful States' Influence in IMF & World Bank
- Week 11 WTO
- Week 12 Are They Really Good for the People? Human Rights
- Week 13 New Challenges: Climate & Health
- Week 14 Last but Not Least: Final Review

Part I Theoretical Topics

Week 1 Why is International Cooperation Possible? Cooperation Problem in the International Arena

- Keohane, Robert. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1, 4-6.
- Gilligan, M. J., & Johns, L. (2012). Formal Models of International Institutions. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 15(1), 221–243. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-043010-095828>

Week 2 What Hinders Cooperation? Distributive Problem in Bargaining and Domestic Politics

- Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. *International organization*, 42(3), 427-460.
- Fearon, James D. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement and International Cooperation. *International Organization*" 52:269-306 <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898753162820>
- *Blaydes, Lisa. 2004. Rewarding Impatience: A Bargaining and Enforcement Model of OPEC. *International Organization*. 58:213-237. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818304582012>
- *CARNEGIE, A. (2014). States Held Hostage: Political Hold-Up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions. *American Political Science Review*, 108(1), 54-70. doi:10.1017/S0003055413000646

Week 3 The More the Worse? Collective Action Problem

Johns, L., & Pelc, K. J. (2018). Free riding on enforcement in the world trade organization. *The Journal of Politics*, 80(3), 873-889.

Johns, L. (2019). The design of enforcement: Collective action and the enforcement of international law. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 31(4), 543-567.

Week 4 Why Don't States Act on Their Own? Delegation

Hawkins, D. G., Lake, D. A., Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J. (2006). Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory. In *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* (pp. 3–38). Cambridge University Press.

Fang, S., & Stone, R. W. (2012). International organizations as policy advisors. *International organization*, 66(4), 537-569.

Week 5 Talk is Cheap? Commitment Problem

Arias, E., Hollyer, J. R., & Rosendorff, B. P. (2018). Cooperative Autocracies: Leader Survival, Creditworthiness, and Bilateral Investment Treaties*. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(4), 905–921. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12383>

Week 6 Why Do the IOs Look the Way They Are? Institutional Design

Voeten, E. (2019). Making Sense of the Design of International Institutions. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 22(1), 147–163. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041916-021108>

Downs, Roque, and Barsoom. 1996. "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?" *International Organization* Vol. 50, No. 3: 379-406.

Rosendorff, B. P. (2005). Stability and rigidity: Politics and design of the WTO's dispute settlement procedure. *American Political Science Review*, 99(3), 389–400. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055405051737>

Week 7 How Are You Doing So Far? Midterm Exam

Part II Specific Issue Areas

Week 8 UN/UNSC: Voting and the Empirical Regularity

Bailey, M. A., Strezhnev, A., & Voeten, E. (2017). Estimating dynamic state preferences from United Nations voting data. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 61(2), 430-456.

Copelovitch, M., & Powers, R. (2021). Do We Really Know What We Think We Know About the Politics of IMF Lending? Measuring and Reassessing US Influence in Global Financial Governance. *Working Paper*.

Week 9 UNSC: Legitimacy and Information

- Voeten, E. (2005). The political origins of the UN Security Council's ability to legitimize the use of force. *International Organization*, 59(3), 527-557.
- Fang, S. (2008). The informational role of international institutions and domestic politics. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(2), 304-321.

Week 10 Why Are They So Powerful? Powerful States' Influence in IMF & World Bank

- Stone, R. W. (2011). *Controlling institutions: International organizations and the global economy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Dreher, A., Lang, V. F., Rosendorff, B. P., & Vreeland, J. R. (2019). Buying Votes and International Organizations: The Dirty Work-Hypothesis. *Working Paper*, (February). <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1845525>
- Clark, R., & Dolan, L. R. (2020). Pleasing the Principal: U.S. Influence in World Bank Policymaking. *American Journal of Political Science*. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12531>

Week 11 WTO

- Goldstein, J. (2017). Trading in the twenty-first century: is there a role for the World Trade Organization?. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 20, 545-564.
- Davis, Christina. (2004). International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review* 98 (1) (February): 153-69.
- Busch, M. L., & Pelc, K. J. (2010). The politics of judicial economy at the World Trade Organization. *International Organization*, 64(2), 257-279.

Week 12 Are They Really Good For the People? Human Rights

- Hollyer, J. R., & Rosendorff, B. P. (2011). Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention Against Torture? Signaling, Domestic Politics and Non-Compliance. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 6, 275-327.
- Johns, L., & Parente, F. (2021). The Politics of Punishment: Why Non-Democracies Join the International Criminal Court *, (March), 1-41.

Week 13 New Challenges: Climate & Health

- Kennard, A. (2020). The enemy of my enemy: When firms support climate change regulation. *International Organization*, 74(2), 187-221.

Ge, Z. X. (2022). Who Reports Disease Outbreaks? When Interdependence Meets IO Independence. *Working Paper*.

Week 14 Last but Not Least: Final Review