

Embedded Liberalism or Embedded Nationalism?  
How Social Policy Affects Anti-Globalization Positioning of Mainstream and Radical Parties

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**Abstract**

Welfare state effort in industrialized democracies has offsetting implications for anti-globalization nationalism, central to the position-taking of populist radical-right parties. On the one hand, social protections have an “embedded liberalism” effect, mitigating economic insecurities associated with globalization and thereby *dampening* anti-globalization nationalism. On the other hand, social protections have an “embedded nationalism” effect, awakening worries that globalization may undermine hard-won provisions and thereby *deepening* anti-globalization. This paper argues and finds evidence that which of these dynamics predominates depends on the particular kind of anti-globalization debated and on the particular party family doing the debating. Welfare effort may generally dampen anti-globalization nationalism, but it tends to deepen more than dampen anti-globalization with respect to immigration and EU-integration that more directly impact existing national welfare provisions. Welfare effort also deepens more than dampens anti-globalization among radical-right and radical-left parties taking issue-ownership of anti-globalization and of protecting national welfare-state competencies from global pressure.

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## **Introduction**

A major development in industrialized democracies is the resurgence of anti-globalization nationalism, central to the programs of many radical-right and radical-left populist parties but discernible throughout the political spectrum. This apparent backlash has provoked a flood of scholarship exploring the political and policy settings that might fuel or dampen anti-globalization nationalism. Among the macro-level factors considered relevant to anti-globalization is the welfare state. Precisely the major political-economic footprint of the welfare state, however, makes its implications for anti-globalization nationalism a matter of continued debate. On the one hand, welfare effort has been construed as providing risk-indemnification, redistribution and compensation to losers of global political-economic engagement. Such an “embedded liberalism” dynamic can encourage citizens and their representatives to embrace rather than eschew globalism. On the other hand, welfare state provisions have also been construed as cherished accomplishments to be defended against the possible dangers that international integration can pose for existing welfare states. Such an “embedded nationalism” dynamic can inspire anti-globalization nationalism as a way to defend hard-won welfare protection.

In this paper we explore these offsetting dynamics, focusing on the position-taking of political parties, including radical populist parties. We argue and find empirical evidence that the offsetting “embedded liberalism” and “embedded nationalism” dynamics underlie uneven implications of welfare effort for the rise and consolidation of anti-globalization backlash. First, we expect that welfare state effort can address globalization risks but also awaken fears of welfare retrenchment that, respectively, soften or spur political demands for anti-globalization backlash by political parties throughout the political spectrum. Second, we expect that these offsetting implications mean that welfare states play out differently for different kinds of anti-globalization backlash – spurring more than softening backlash against those faces of globalization (e.g. immigration and EU-integration) that most obviously and saliently alter or threaten existing national welfare protections. Third, the offsetting implications of welfare states likely also play out differently for the anti-globalization position-taking of different political parties – spurring backlash particularly among the radical right and radical left parties that have identified (and claimed issue ownership of) how economic and political globalization endangers hard-won national prerogatives.

The paper empirically tests these propositions by analyzing party manifestos in more than two-dozen industrialized democracies between 1960 and 2017. Such data provide unusual coverage and information that allow us to explore all our expectations about how welfare

protections affect different kinds of anti-globalization for different political parties. Our analysis explores, in particular, how different measures of aggregate welfare state development influence broad and narrow measures of anti-globalization backlash, and also specific backlash against European Union integration and against immigration. Our analysis also explores how these different measures of existing welfare effort are associated with position-taking on the different kinds of anti-globalization nationalism expressed by different party families, including radical right and radical left parties, in contrast to their mainstream counterparts.


The principal findings are broadly in line with our expectations but include some important surprises. First, despite offsetting implications that both redress insecurities but also awaken worries, welfare state effort tends on the whole to be associated with more modest anti-globalization nationalism – a pattern suggesting that welfare states’ “embedded liberalism” effects predominate in the party politics of nationalist backlash. Second, more generous welfare states do play out differently across different aspects of anti-globalization nationalism, being less likely to dampen anti-globalization position taking with respect to anti-EU integration and anti-immigration than with respect to broader measures of anti-globalization nationalism (e.g. including not just anti-EU positions, but also general anti-internationalism, trade protectionism, and nationalist sentiments). Third, settings with more substantial welfare states tend to more modestly diminish and even to spark anti-globalization nationalism among radical right and radical left parties – more than holds for their mainstream counterparts. An interesting and important pattern combines what we learn from looking across parties and kinds of anti-globalization nationalism: generous social policy tends to be “effective” in dampening the general anti-globalization nationalism of radical left parties, while actually fostering such nationalism with respect to anti-EU and immigration positions. Altogether, the implications of welfare states for anti-globalization nationalism can entail both “embedded liberalism” and “embedded nationalism” depending on the party and aspect of such nationalism. The empirical exploration offers broad quantitative associations in history rather than research empirics with more causal identification, but the findings have important implications for understanding contemporary political ferment as intertwined with social protection.

### **What We (Need to) Know About Welfare Policy and Anti-Globalization Nationalism**

Among the most important developments that industrialized democracies are experiencing is a widespread turning-against liberal internationalism. Political parties, governments, and social actors throughout the industrialized West have increasingly criticized and sought to curtail global trade and finance, European Union competences, international rule-of-law, multilateral

institutional prerogatives and immigration. Figure 1 provides a snapshot of this increase, tracking the party platforms of all political parties in 23 consolidated democracies, between 1960 and 2017 in terms of platform emphasis on anti-globalization nationalism manifested in opposition to global internationalism generally, free-trade, EU-integration, and support for nationalism.<sup>1</sup> We can see that the average level of such anti-globalization by parties is at its highest point in more than fifty years, and that the chasm dividing parties on these issues has grown larger in the same period (shown by the width of the upper- and lower- range for party families in a given year).

Such trends in anti-globalization nationalism matter a lot, not least given the dark history of nationalism the previous century’s World Wars and colonial oppression. Indeed, anti-globalization nationalism still frequently accompanies anti-democratic authoritarian stances and populism, fetishizing the good “people” and demonizing elites. But anti-globalization nationalism is important in-and-of-itself for the future of political and economic relations and is central to political contestation across industrialized democracies.




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<sup>1</sup> The measure is based on coding of data from the Manifesto Project Database (MPD), discussed in detail below. The countries included for the Figure are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. And the party families, also discussed below, include Radical Left, Social Democratic, Liberal, Christian Democratic, Conservative, Radical Right, and Other (miscellaneous).

Figure 1: Anti-Globalization Nationalism over Time, Average of All Parties (Black Line) and by Party Family (Grey Lines) in 23 Democracies

Given such import, anti-globalization nationalism has been extensively studied in the social sciences, including scholarship exploring the national political-economic settings thought to either foster or discourage anti-globalization backlash. Among the macro-level factors found to be important in influencing anti-globalization is the welfare state – the complex of policy regulations, social welfare transfers and services that not only provide social rights but provide insurance, redistribution and compensation to citizens. The sheer size and presence of the welfare state in contemporary democracies makes it an obvious candidate among national conditions that can be expected to color political and economic interests with respect to anti-globalization nationalism.

With its estimable footprint, however, how the welfare state actually affects anti-globalization nationalism turns out to be a matter of considerable debate and uncertainty. On the one hand, the welfare state may *dampen* anti-globalization nationalism. Rooted in the tradition of Karl Polanyi's *Great Transformation* (1944), many scholars articulate how the welfare state's insurance, social rights, redistributive and/or compensatory functions can ease economic pain and insecurities related to political and economic globalization. John Ruggie famously dubbed "embedded liberalism" as the post-War system of mutually reinforcing multilateral economic openness with safeguards to protect national societies (Ruggie 1982). Scholars in this tradition not only find that economic openness might strongly spur welfare state development (Cameron 1978; Katzenstein 1985; Garrett 1998), but that *ex ante* welfare state effort might deepen commitments to economic and political openness. The welfare state's fostering of globalization, here, can involve social policies directly dampening nationalist backlash (Hays 2009), but also how social policy moderates, dampens the tendency of economic suffering to spur anti-globalization nationalism (Burgoon 2009, 2013). These studies clarify such claims with respect to individual, party, or policy outcomes, and different faces of globalization – ranging from trade openness (Ehrlich and Hearn 2014; Rickard 2015), immigration (Crepaz and Damron 2009), capital investment (Bordo *et al.* 1999), and European integration (McNamara 2015). In line with this is the view that a stalling or rolling-back of social policy may be spurring rising nationalism (Milner 2019; Snyder 2019; Trubowitz and Burgoon 2020). Buttressing this focus on welfare-policy origins of global interconnectedness, finally, are studies suggesting that social policy's lowering of economic insecurities may stem voter support for radical populist parties (Swank and Betz 2003). All told, this thicket of

insights provides good reasons to expect welfare states to have an “embedded liberalism” effect that diminishes anti-globalization nationalism.

On the other hand, the welfare state has implications that can fuel anti-globalization nationalism. Welfare state protections are among the most popular, widely cherished policy accomplishments in the industrialized democracies to have developed such protections (Brooks and Manza 2007; Pierson 1994). This can color the way political actors view their country’s openness to and engagement with the world. Various aspects of economic and political globalization can, or have in any event been popularly portrayed to, threaten hard-won welfare protections at the national level. Trade and investment globalization, for instance, might unleash competition in laxity in labor and welfare standards between countries seeking to lower production costs and improve competitive advantage. Or migration might overburden social policy and undermine its popularity as migrants are seen as less deserving than native-born citizens (Van Oorschot 2006, 2008). More generally, the pooling of political sovereignty in European or global multilateral institutions can not only inspire regulatory convergence that might improve the weakest welfare states (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; De Vries 2018) but punish the strongest welfare states (Vasilopoulou and Talving 2020) and weaken the regulatory autonomy and democratic capacities to maintain generous welfare states (Rodrik 1997; Schmitter and Streeck 1994). Such real or perceived threats to generous social policies as democratic accomplishments can, in turn, spur an “embedded nationalism” – including not just welfare chauvinism but also anti-globalization nationalism and radical movements as ways to defend the welfare state from hostile foreign threats. While there is less literature developing these claims as such, some empirical work supports this logic of “embedded nationalism.” For instance, Veugelers and Magnan (2005) find generous social policy to be part of the path to stronger populist radical right parties; Rapp (2017) finds more generous unemployment benefits to interact with ethnic heterogeneity to undermine political tolerance towards immigration; Rooduijn and Burgoon (2018) find that economic suffering is more likely to spur (nationalist) radical party support under conditions of more generous rather than modest social welfare expenditures; and some scholars have found that macro-level egalitarian welfare-related issues can drive Euroscepticism (Arzheimer 2009). All told, hence, we have good reasons to expect that more generous social policy settings may unleash an “embedded nationalism” dynamic.

Which of these offsetting implications of welfare states predominates remains *prima facie* uncertain. Of course, both the dynamics of “embedded liberalism” versus “embedded nationalism” might obtain simultaneously in the minds of the same political actors, canceling

each other out in the net. Or the predominance of either dynamic may depend on particular features of social policy, features of globalization, levels of politics, regions of the world or time periods. In any event, we have virtually no empirical literature that untangles the possibilities. At this time of writing, hence, whether and under what conditions welfare effort fosters or thwarts anti-globalization nationalism remains an important puzzle for comparative political economy.

### **Argument and Hypotheses**

We seek to clarify how welfare state effort plays out for anti-globalization nationalism, building on the premise that such effort unleashes both an “embedded liberalism” dynamic that dampens anti-globalization nationalism *and* an “embedded nationalism” dynamic that deepens it. This means that we cannot know or predict whether “embedded liberalism” or “embedded nationalism” prevails in the aggregate. This implies three equally plausible hypotheses about how welfare effort can be expected to associate with subsequent anti-globalization nationalism. Our focus, here, is on the position-taking of political parties with respect to anti-globalization nationalism, but the hypotheses should extend to other manifestations of such nationalism – on the one hand voting and preferences of individuals, and on the other hand actual government policies.

H1a (“Embedded Liberalism” Hypothesis):

*Political parties in countries and periods with more generous welfare states are **less supportive of or more opposed to** anti-globalization nationalism than parties in settings with less substantial welfare effort.*

H1b (“Embedded Nationalism” Hypothesis):

*Political parties in countries and periods with more generous welfare states are **more supportive of or less opposed to** anti-globalization nationalism than parties in settings with less substantial welfare effort.*

H1c (“Null” Hypothesis):

*The offsetting “embedded liberalism” and “embedded nationalism” dynamics should tend to cancel one-another out, such that more generous welfare states **have no effect** in the net on anti-globalization nationalism of political parties.*

Consistent with any of these general hypotheses, we can identify particular conditions under which either the “embedded liberalism” or “embedded nationalism” dynamics can be expected to prevail. We anticipate that more welfare state effort is likely to play out differently in terms of redressing insecurities versus awakening defensive worries effort depending on a range of conditions. With our focus on the position-taking by political parties, we focus on two of the most obvious candidates: different kinds of anti-globalization nationalism and different political party families. We develop each of these possibilities in turn.

First, political parties can be expected to stake-out more or less anti-globalization nationalist positions depending on the particular aspect of globalization at stake, since aspects of globalization differ in how much they provoke risks that welfare states can redress and in how much the globalization in question alters or constrains existing national welfare policies. We expect the latter to be particularly important. Some aspects of globalization, such as the general pooling of sovereignty on issues of global political, environmental or trade governance, do not involve meaningful or in any event direct alterations of national welfare states. Even economic globalization conditions like global trade and investment can be expected to have only indirect implications for social policy – via mediated political economy of possible long term institutional convergence or competition in laxity.

On the other hand, some features of globalization have stronger and more direct implications for national welfare states – implications that can, or have at least been seen to, threaten generous national-level welfare states. European Union regulation, for example, has mandated a long series of regulatory changes to conform to the *acquis communautaire*. And while the social policy realm is certainly not the most developed for European competences, it does involve explicit regulations focused on the development or benchmarking of national welfare state provisions – whether in terms of formal harmonization on issues of gender and labor market regulation, or on the European Semester and earlier Open Method of Coordination. Beyond these direct incursions on national welfare state sovereignty, the European project has involved a free market zone that is much more thoroughgoing in its mutual-recognition trade and investment liberalization in the Single Market. This may motivate some groups or parties in settings with less developed welfare states to be more supportive of European integration while motivating those in generous welfare state settings to be particularly worried about the EU hollowing-out hard won welfare gains (Burgoon 2009; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; De Vries 2018).

Also, immigration is a face of economic and social globalization that can be expected to have stronger implications for welfare states than other economic realms like trade or



investment. This is partly because immigration involves the moving of people that can be directly entwined with the search for favorable labor-market and social-policy provisions – welfare magnets or not. It is also because migrants (unlike the cross-border flows of money or goods) involve movements that make direct claims on fiscal policy, particularly features of the welfare state – including education provisions and non-contributory aspects of social policy (Hanson *et al.* 2007).

These very different welfare-state stakes for different aspects of globalization can be expected to moderate whether a substantial welfare state awakens worries or hopes, should that aspect of globalization be taken-on or continued. One can expect, in turn, that anti-globalization position taking with respect to one or another aspect of globalization might differ accordingly. Most importantly, more substantial welfare effort will particularly provoke “embedded nationalism” dynamics with respect to EU-integration and immigration, more so than more general political-economic globalization. Such logic undergirds our second hypothesis:

H2 (“Faces of Globalization Hypothesis”):

*Political parties in settings with more welfare effort are **more supportive of or less opposed to anti-globalization nationalism with respect to issues of EU-integration or immigration than with respect to more general political-economic globalization.***

Second, welfare state protections can also be expected to play out differently for the anti-globalization position-taking by political parties depending on the political party or party family. In particular, parties differ with respect to how much they cue voters and emphasize or claim ownership on globalization, welfare states, or the links between them. Some parties may particularly emphasize the dangers or importance of globalization generally, for instance, or of particular aspects of globalization. These parties might also emphasize more or less the importance of defending or expending (or reforming) the welfare state. And of course, parties might explicitly trumpet the intersection of these issues, focusing more or less on how (a particular aspect of) globalization threatens or is relevant to defending existing national welfare state protections. Such differences involve more or less invocation of the “embedded nationalism” or “embedded liberalism” dynamics that can color their politicking in light of the welfare state conditions within which they operate.

While such differences will partly play out in context-specific ways, the major party families clearly differ with respect to just such issue ownership and framing. In general, a number of scholars have argued and found evidence that mainstream parties – such as the

Social Democratic, Liberal, Christian Democratic, and Conservative party families – contest primarily on the first-dimension issues, such as “left-right” balance between state and market in political-economic life. On the other hand, newer parties often mobilize and focus mainly on “second-dimension” issues – and pro-global versus anti-global nationalism is a key part of second-dimension issues, and hence issues on which the radical left and right parties have/claim issue ownership (Hooghe and Marks 2018; Kitschelt and McGann 1997). This is key for salience of the issues in party platforms.

More importantly, the substantive differences in the positions of mainstream versus radical parties on globalization and welfare issues are also large and meaningful. Separate from variance in salience in platforms by party, the radical right and to some extent also the radical left has been more anti-globalization nationalist in many ways than has the mainstream, including on issues of trade, investment, and the EU (Halikiopoulou *et al.* 2012; Hooghe *et al.* 2002). This skew varies depending on the face of globalization, with radical right parties tending to decry all pooling of national sovereignty for cultural and political reasons as much as or more than for economic reasons more or less related to defending the national welfare state. And they have been particularly nativist with respect to immigration. Radical left parties, on the other hand, are particularly focused on critiquing the economic and neoliberal faces of globalization and EU-integration (Halikiopoulou *et al.* 2012) and have been more supportive of general global cosmopolitanism and are generally more pro-immigration than mainstream parties (Rooduijn *et al.* 2017). But as a general matter we can expect a U-shaped pattern in anti-globalization nationalism as one moves from the extreme left, through the more centrist parties, to the more extreme right (Hix 1999; Hooghe *et al.* 2002; Taggart 1998).

Our third hypothesis is essentially that we also expect such a U-shaped pattern in how globalization can be expected to dampen or deepen anti-globalization nationalism across parties. Among mainstream parties, the “embedded nationalism” dynamic ought to be less salient relative to the “embedded nationalism” dynamic, such that welfare effort will tend to dampen anti-globalization among these parties. Among radical left and radical right parties, however, we expect the opposite, that the “embedded nationalism” dynamic will receive more explicit framing and cuing attention in party discussions – including explicit focus on how globalization threatens national welfare-state autonomy or national sovereignty generally – thereby making radical parties in generous welfare state settings more likely to deepen their anti-globalization nationalism.

H3 (“Radical-versus-Mainstream Party Hypothesis”):

*More substantial or generous welfare effort will more strongly diminish anti-globalization nationalism among **mainstream parties** (Social Democratic, Liberal, Christian Democratic and Conservative party families) than among **radical left and radical right parties**.*

A strong version of this expectation is that more substantial welfare effort should tend to be associated with development of more anti-globalization nationalism among radical parties and *less* anti-globalization nationalism among mainstream parties – befitting the contrasting prominence of the “embedded liberalism” and “embedded nationalism” dynamics in the respective party-family groupings. The more modest variant, however, is that more welfare state generosity or spending should be more negatively or less positively associated with subsequent anti-globalization nationalism among mainstream than among radical parties.

A final expectation framing our empirical analysis, however, combines judgment about how welfare states play out across different aspects of anti-globalization position-taking and about how welfare effort will play out differently across party families. In particular, there are clearer implications for anti-globalization of how radical left parties tend to be much more cosmopolitan than their radical-right and even mainstream counterparts when it comes to immigration and general cooperation, and how the “embedded nationalism” dynamic looms largest for those aspects of globalization that most saliently threaten generous welfare states. This combination suggests that welfare effort’s implications for the positioning of radical left parties is likely most starkly different across faces of (anti-)globalization:

H4 (“Radical Left on Immigration and EU Hypothesis”):

*For radical left parties more than for other parties, more generous welfare state effort should least dampen or more substantially deepen the anti-globalization nationalism with respect to immigration and EU integration than with respect to other faces of globalization.*

## **Research Design**

We test our hypotheses by analyzing party platforms in a broad cross-section of industrialized democracies between 1960 and 2017. Our analyses cover between 21 and 32 countries, depending on the availability of different welfare state measures (see below), with the countries in each analysis listed in Appendix 2. We focus on how various measures of anti-globalization nationalism in such platforms might be influenced by various measures of welfare state effort in the countries within which parties operate. This approach allows us to identify measures of anti-globalization nationalism across the major party families and also across

different faces of nationalism relevant to our arguments. Matched to recognized measures of welfare state size and generosity capturing substantial variation in welfare effort, the resulting data provide substantial leverage to test the four hypotheses. We do so in the simplest, most direct way, focused on direct associations between welfare effort and outcomes, and consider a range of specifications and estimators to gauge how welfare effort plays out for anti-globalization nationalism by political parties. The empirical exploration is meant to lay out broad quantitative associations in history that supports inferences and can roughly test the hypotheses, and is a prelude to more focused causal identification strategies.

### ***Dependent Variables***

Our manifesto measures are based primarily on the Manifesto Data Project (MPD) (Klingemann *et al.* 2007) that includes measures of positioning relevant to a range of pro- and anti-globalization nationalism between 1960 and 2017. To measure anti-immigration positioning, we also draw on a Dancygier and Margalit's (2020) dataset focused on coding of such positioning in 12 countries. These kinds of platform measures have been widely used in the study of political positioning and party dynamics, including in a range of studies of radical populist party positioning and anti-globalization nationalism (Burgoon 2009, 2013; Colantone and Stanig 2018; Milner and Judkins 2004; Zürn *et al.* 2012). We focus on measures that include both positive and negative statements on issues clearly relevant to anti-globalization nationalism. Using these, we calculate “net” measures that combine positions embracing minus positions eschewing such anti-globalization nationalism. To create more normal distributions, we take the natural logarithm of the “positive” statements about these anti-global nationalism issues and subtract the natural logarithm of the “negative” statements about them (adding 0.5 to both to avoid zeroes) (see Lowe *et al.* 2011).

We focus on four measures of anti-globalization nationalism for all included parties: (1) anti-globalization (broad); (2) anti-globalization (narrow); (3) anti-EU; and (4) anti-immigration.<sup>2</sup> *Anti-globalization (broad)*, our most encompassing measure, includes the sum of positive statements about *internationalism* (on international cooperation and support for global institutions); *protectionism* (particularly on trade tariffs and quotas); *European Union* (political and economic integration in Europe); and *National way of life* (nationalism, patriotism, national ideas). *Anti-globalization (narrow)* focuses on the components most

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<sup>2</sup> See Appendix 1 for a full description of these four measures.

acutely relevant to anti-globalization (positive versus negative statements about *internationalism* and *protectionism*) rather than also about nationalism or anti-EU, particularly important for parties operating outside of Europe. *Anti-EU*, then, focuses on positive versus negative statements about the *European Union*. Unfortunately, the MPD coding does not code issues of immigration. For this reason, we rely on a recoding of the extensive Dancygier and Margalit (2020) dataset on party manifestos with respect to immigration issues. We focus on a recoding of their pro-immigration versus anti-immigration stances to match our use of the MPD measures, being a measure of *anti-immigration*. This provides a more valid measure of such positioning than is possible using other datasets, but the drawback is that this covers ‘only’ 12 European countries between 1963 and 2013.

Our calculation of these measures focuses on the individual party in a given country and year, and our baseline specifications use linear interpolation between election years, though all reported results are robust to non-interpolated data. Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Appendix 2.

It is important to ask ourselves whether our dependent variables really measure anti-globalization or *alter-globalization* positions, a crucial distinction that is often overlooked among commentators. Perhaps the most relevant measure in this regard is anti-EU sentiment, since this captures both outright opposition to European integration and opposition to the current form that European integration has taken. For the most part, however, our measures signal hostility to international integration, such that we use the label of anti-globalization throughout the paper.

Although our coding for a given party is the basis for our analysis, our arguments include a focus on how positioning might differ across party families. Figure 2 provides a box-plot overview of our four measures of anti-globalization nationalism, summarizing the party positions on these measures across six party families. For our coding of party families, we rely on the party-family coding from the MPD project with respect to the four principal mainstream party families: Social Democratic parties, Liberal parties, Christian Democratic parties, and Conservative. And our coding of Radical Left and of Radical Right party families follows the coding of the PopuList project’s categorization of “extreme left” and “extreme right” (Rooduijn *et al.* 2020) that overlaps but adjusts the MPD categories of radical left and nationalist parties, respectively. Across these families, we observe considerable variation in positioning by party family, with the box-plot hairs capturing the spread in anti-globalization positioning within the family. The main pattern is the corroboration of the U-cure patterns identified in earlier studies of party positioning with respect to issues of anti-globalization and anti-EU matters. The

important and expected outlier to such distribution is anti-immigration, where we see that the distribution is monotonic, with Radical Left parties tending to be the least anti-immigration oriented and Radical Right parties are very clearly the most anti-immigration in their stances.




Figure 2: Party Manifestos on Anti-Globalization Nationalism, by Measure and Party Family

### ***Independent Variables***

We measure our key explanatory focus, welfare state effort, by relying on widely-used measures of the full range of government policies capturing the welfare state’s insurance, compensation and redistribution functions. We focus on four different variables. First, *social security transfers (as a percentage of GDP)* captures the social assistance provisions, mainly passive transfers for unemployment, old-age, sickness, et cetera (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2019a). Second, *total social expenditures (as a percentage of GDP)* measures a more encompassing gauge of social policies in terms of in kind services and not just social transfers, including most of the well-known realms of social policy but excluding education provisions (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2019b). Third, we consider *total welfare and education spending*, a measure of total welfare spending that adds total social expenditures to public education spending (OECD 2019c). Fourth, we consider *welfare state generosity*, a measure that focuses on the Comparative Welfare Entitlement Database’s (CWED) index of generosity based on programmatic attributes of

rather than spending on social policy assistance with respect to unemployment insurance, sickness/disability insurance, and pension programs (Scruggs *et al.* 2017). Available countries using all four of these measures are listed in Appendix 2, where we also present correlation matrices for the various independent and dependent variables.

The first three of our independent variables are focused on expenditures as a percentage of GDP, capturing the actual take-up of social policies and their felt presence in the country's economic life. If one is interested in understanding the origins of social policy, to explain policy design and generosity, then perhaps such spending measures are not the most appropriate – captured in Esping-Anderson's sage observation that "It's difficult to imagine that anyone struggled for spending *per se*" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 21). However, we are interested in the *consequences* of welfare state effort, and spending captures this more fully, also in terms of what enters political consciousness and observed importance to a country's economic health. This argues at the margin in favor of focusing on spending-based measures, which have the added advantage of providing more coverage in terms of countries and years. But the generosity provisions provide an important triangulation of our main concept of welfare effort.

### ***Estimation Approach and Controls***

Our analysis of these data focus on regressing each of our four measures of anti-globalization nationalism of all parties (in a given party-country-year) on each of our measures of welfare effort. To test Hypotheses 1a-1c and Hypothesis 2, a first specification looks at the general associations between welfare effort and measures of anti-globalization nationalism. To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, a second specification focuses on how such effects of welfare effort on measures of anti-globalization nationalism vary across party families.

Given the continuous measures of party positions, our models are OLS estimators with fixed country and decade effects to address possible country-wise and time-wise omitted variable bias, heteroskedasticity and correlation of errors. To address the many sources of omitted variable bias, we also control for a range of substantive party-country-year and country-year conditions. All of our right-hand side parameters are lagged values, based on five-year moving averages (including observation year) to address obvious simultaneity issues but also to address the time it takes for conditions to percolate their way through party deliberations. The party-specific controls include the party family and a party's vote share in the last election. Importantly, we also include a party's platform positioning with respect to the MPD-scale of *Left-to-Right platform*, which includes an array of manifesto items including support for or against markets or government interventions in the economy and the valuation

of the state. We adjust this measure, however, so remove those components that have entered into our aforementioned measures of anti-globalization nationalism. The country-year conditions in our baseline estimations include *Polity IV* to measure democracy; *KOF index of de facto globalization* to measure ex ante exposure to actual political and economic globalization; and *unemployment rate* to capture macroeconomic economic suffering.

## **Findings**

To present and discuss the results, we focus first on the direct effects that test Hypotheses 1a-1c and Hypothesis 2 and then on the moderating effects of party family that test Hypotheses 3 and 4. In doing so we shall focus on a range of figures that visualize the effects of how our four measures of welfare effort are associated with or affect our four measures of anti-globalization nationalism. We relegate the full regression results for the underlying models to appendix tables (see Appendix 4 and 5).

Before turning to the main results, we note that the various substantive controls perform broadly in line with expectations and past research. For instance, anti-globalization nationalism tends to be positively associated with more generally right-wing platform position-taking and with past exposure to economic, political and social globalization; and negatively associated with the lagged Polity IV democracy measure. Most importantly, anti-globalization nationalism tends to significantly differ across the six party families in line with Figure 3 above – revealing a distinct U-curve pattern of anti-globalization nationalism, except for the more monotonic pattern for anti-immigration.

## ***Average Effects***

Figure 3 summarizes the key regression results of the average-effect models that test Hypotheses 1a-1c and Hypothesis 2. The Figure shows how each of our four measures of anti-globalization nationalism (given by the column name) is associated directly with each of our four measures of welfare effort (given by the row name). Such association is captured here simply by the coefficients and confidence intervals for each of the measures of welfare effort that enter our regressions in sixteen separate models, each also including the full battery of controls to isolate the possible role of welfare effort (see Appendix 4). Where both the coefficient and confidence interval are in negative territory, the results suggest support for the “embedded liberalism” hypothesis (1a). Where the coefficient and confidence interval are positive, in contrast, this supports the “embedded nationalism” hypothesis (1b), while insignificant results support the null – or canceling-out – hypothesis (1c). Our test of



Hypothesis 2 is whether we observe clear difference in what predominates across the four faces of anti-globalization nationalism.




Figure 3: Direct Effects of Welfare Effort on Anti-Globalization Nationalism (with 95% Confidence Intervals)

It is clear from Figure 3 that welfare effort tends to diminish most measures of anti-globalization nationalism. All of our measures of lagged welfare effort are statistically significantly associated with both of our anti-globalization measures (broad and narrow). With respect to anti-EU positioning, furthermore, we see that most measures of welfare effort are negatively signed (significantly so for social-security transfers and for total social expenditures), also suggesting welfare-effort dampening anti-EU position-taking. Anti-immigration is the obvious outlier, where our measures of welfare effort tend to have no significant impact, except for a significantly *positive* association for welfare state generosity. These differences across faces of anti-globalization nationalism are not artifacts of sample coverage – recall that the anti-immigration measure is only available for 12 of the countries available for the other measures. The more negative associations we see for these latter measures of anti-globalization nationalism are not changed in direction and significance should we focus on the same 12 European polities as for the anti-immigration estimation.

This pattern, hence, on the whole suggests support for Hypothesis 1a. The “embedded liberalism” dynamic tends to predominate the “embedded nationalism” dynamic for most

measures of welfare effort and most measures, including the broadest measures, of anti-globalization nationalism. This pattern, incidentally, also applies for taking a measure of anti-globalization nationalism that is the broadest possible in our data, combining our anti-globalization and anti-immigration measures, even though this is only available for much smaller sample of 12 countries (see Appendix 4). The reason why an “embedded liberalism” dynamic might predominate is hard to judge, but it could well express the power of basic economic interest animating the “embedded liberalism” dynamic rather than of more complicated political calculation that animates the “embedded nationalism” (expecting political parties to anticipate how their social policy is affected by a given face of globalization).

While each row of Figure 3 also provides the key information relevant to testing Hypothesis 2, Figure 4 provides a clearer visualization of how differently or similarly welfare effort plays out across the different faces of anti-globalization nationalism. Figure 4 is based on the same models summarized in Appendix 4, but here we show counterfactual predictions of how the full observed variation of a given measure of welfare effort plays out across the four measures of anti-globalization nationalism. Here it is very clear that we have support for Hypothesis 2: Every measure of welfare effort tends to correlate less negatively and less significantly with anti-EU and with anti-immigration measures than with the other and more composite measures of anti-globalization nationalism. In our reckoning, this suggests that the “embedded nationalism” dynamic looms larger, with those faces of anti-globalization nationalism most associated with altering and potentially threatening generous welfare states. Of course, the pattern might have other explanations, for instance that the “embedded liberalism” dynamic is less salient with respect to anti-EU and anti-immigration positions. But there is little theoretical or empirical basis for this interpretation, undergirding our inference that heightened “embedded nationalism” is the most likely culprit.




Figure 4: Counterfactual Predictions of Direct Effects of Welfare Effort on Anti-Globalization

### *Effects By Party Family*

Figure 5, our last figure, summarizes the results relevant to testing Hypotheses 3 and 4, where the differences between party families are the focus. The results are based on counterfactual modeling that follows the same specifications referred to above, in our average-effects models, but here the basis are the sixteen models that include an interaction term between each measure of welfare effort on the one hand and each party family on the other. These provide a full account of differences across party families, and yield very similar results splitting the samples by party family. Each of the sixteen panels of Figure 5 shows the marginal plot of the interactions, showing how each measure of welfare effort affects each party family's position-taking on each measure of anti-globalization nationalism. Included are also the confidence interval capturing whether each conditional effect of welfare effort is statistically significant at the 95%-confidence level – either positively (i.e. where welfare effort spurs anti-globalization nationalism for a given party) or negatively (i.e. where welfare effort diminishes anti-globalization nationalism for a given party). This visualizes our statistical test of both Hypothesis 3 on how welfare effort plays out differently across party families, and Hypothesis 4 on how among radical parties welfare effort should play out particularly differently between anti-EU and anti-immigration compared to general anti-globalization nationalism.

Our Hypothesis 3, recall, is that welfare effort ought to play out differently across party families in a broad U-curve pattern, tending to be more diminishing of backlash for mainstream parties than for radical parties. The results are uneven with respect to such patterns. On the one hand, it is true that the mainstream parties tend more often to have a negative association with various measures of anti-globalization backlash (15/16 for Social Democratic, 16/16 for Liberal, 9/16 for Christian Democratic and 14/16 for Conservative parties) than do either radical left or radical right parties (8/16 for Radical Left and 9/16 for Radical Right). And these negative effects are more often statistically significant for mainstream than for radical parties (6/16 for Social Democratic, 10/16 for Liberal, 3/16 for Christian Democratic and 6/16 for Conservative parties, compared to 5/16 for Radical Left and 0/16 for Radical Right parties). On the other hand, there is enough volatility across the results for the mainstream party families, and particularly for radical left parties, that one cannot speak of a genuine U-curve obtaining. Nonetheless, our inference from the pattern is that “embedded liberalism” tends to loom larger and “embedded nationalism” loom smaller for mainstream than for radical parties.




Figure 5: Marginal Effects of Welfare State Effort on Anti-Globalization, Anti-EU, and Anti-Immigration Party Positions (with 95% Confidence Intervals)

Note: RL = Radical Left, SD = Social Democratic, Lib. = Liberal, CD = Christian Democratic, Con. = Conservative, RR = Radical Right.

Figure 5 also harbors a test of our last Hypothesis 4, that the more “embedded nationalist” position-taking on anti-EU and anti-immigration faces of backlash should be starker for radical left than for other parties. This does indeed emerge. While radical left parties may often enough respond to being in settings with more generous welfare effort by dampening their anti-globalization nationalism, they are alone among all party families in responding to greater welfare effort with *increased* anti-EU and anti-immigrant position-taking. This response is statistically significant in 5 of the 8 models.

Our interpretation, in line with our arguments above, is that particularly radical left parties are torn between their “embedded liberal” and “embedded nationalist” responses to more generous welfare effort in their midst. Where the face of globalization involves less direct economic pressures on generous welfare states – as obtains for our anti-globalization (narrow) measure – we see that radical left parties respond with an “embedded liberalism” dynamic and not an “embedded nationalism” dynamic. However, it is precisely the opposite with respect to the two faces of anti-globalization nationalism closely linked to reigning in possible constraints on generous welfare states posed by EU-integration and immigration. We take this as solid corroboration, hence, for our Hypothesis 4.

All of the patterns reported in Figures 3-5 hold up to a range of sensitivity and robustness tests. First, they hold up to alternative specifications of the basic dataset – for instance, to a version of the data without linear interpolation between election-years or focusing on common baselines of country-years despite varying coverage across welfare-effort measures. Second, the results also hold up to alternative specifications of anti-globalization nationalism. This applies not just the full composite of anti-globalization (broad) plus anti-immigration as alluded to above, but also alternative combinations such as anti-global (medium) that includes other mixes of internationalism, protectionism, nationalism and anti-EU positions. And it applies to other specifications of looking at separate or combining positive and negative statements in party platforms. Third, they also hold up to other specifications of welfare state effort, including other general spending measures, particularly measures focused on transfers as opposed to services – suggesting that the passive and visible face of welfare state effort have the strongest implications (results not shown but available upon request). Fourth, the results

hold up to alternative estimators, including jackknifing of standard errors or full jackknife analysis, or to random intercept multi-level models (with countries as level 2 variables).

### ***Conclusion***

This study has explored the possibility that welfare state effort in democratic polities tends to have offsetting effects for the positioning of political parties regarding anti-globalization nationalism. On the one hand, we expect and find that under many circumstances, social policy may well unleash an “embedded liberalism” dynamic that offers mitigation of economic insecurities related to economic and political globalization and in turn diminishes anti-globalization nationalism of parties. On the other hand, social policy effort may also unleash an “embedded nationalism” dynamic that awakens a defensive worry by political parties that political and economic globalization might threaten generous welfare states. We find that on average – across various measures of welfare effort and various measures of anti-globalization nationalism across various party families – the “embedded liberalism” dynamic tends to predominate.

More importantly, however, we also find support for our expectations about the particular circumstances that can moderate the predominance of “embedded liberalism” versus “embedded nationalism” dynamics. Particularly, we find that various measures of welfare effort do tend to follow a marginally more “embedded nationalist” and less “embedded liberal” dynamic on issues of EU-related and immigration-related globalization – as compared to more generous issues of political-economic globalization. We also find that settings with more generous welfare effort are more likely to diminish and less likely to spur anti-globalization nationalism among mainstream parties than among radical parties of the left and right. And most starkly, we find that welfare effort plays out particularly differently across these issues for radical left parties, which tend to more strongly embrace anti-EU and anti-immigration stances in more generous welfare settings but tend also to more strongly eschew general anti-globalization nationalism when the globalization in question is less constraining of existing national welfare arrangements. Altogether, we see these as patterns that begin to sort out the offsetting and uneven “embedded liberalism” and “embedded nationalism” effects of social policy for anti-globalization nationalism.

We make these inferences conscious of the very preliminary character of the evidence we have marshalled. We await more and better measures of welfare effort and anti-globalization nationalism. This can be found in other measures of party manifestos and positioning, also in other country-years than those in our study. With existing data, further, we can imagine a

refinement and extension of the disentangling of “embedded liberalism” and “embedded nationalism” dynamics. This could involve more detailed analysis of party positioning and statements and legislative behavior. More generally, it can involve looking at which sub-features of welfare state effort play out for backlash or considering how welfare state effort interacts with other macro-political economic conditions. More fundamentally, future work should of course go beyond broad quantitative associations in history to develop research designs that, if narrower in empirical sweep, allow more developed causal identification. In the meantime, we submit that we have unearthed good reasons and empirical bases for the judgment that welfare states may well significantly affect the anti-globalization nationalism.

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## Appendix 1: Anti-Globalization Nationalism in Party Platforms

Our measures of net anti-globalization nationalism make use of two datasets: primarily the Manifesto Project Database (MPD) (Klingemann *et al.* 2007) for most aspects of anti-globalization nationalism; and the Database of Party Positions on Immigration (Dancygier and Margalit 2020) for our measure of net anti-immigration. All measures focus on “net” measures, where statements constituting anti-globalization positioning are subtracted by pro-globalization positioning.

Net Anti-Global (broad)=( $\ln(i107+i108+i407+i602+.5)$ )- $\ln(i109+i110+i406+i601+.5)$ )

Net Anti-Global (narrow)=( $\ln(i107 +i407 +.5)$ )- $\ln(i109 +i406 +.5)$ )

Net Anti-EU=( $\ln(i108 +.5)$ )- $\ln(i110 +.5)$ )

Net Anti-Immigration=( $\ln(\text{neg. stance \% on immig.}+.5)$ )- $\ln(\text{pos. stance \% on immig.}+.5)$ )

The first three of these measures are composites from the Manifesto Project Database codebook words the parameters as follows (preceded, in parentheses, with the sign of whether the element is counted in the above composite as support for or opposition to anti-globalization nationalism).

(-) per107. *Internationalism: Positive*

Need for international co-operation; co-operation with specific countries other than those coded in 101; need for aid to developing countries; need for world planning of resources; need for international courts; support for any international goal or world state; support for UN.

(+) per109. *Internationalism: Negative*

Favourable mentions of national independence and sovereignty as opposed to internationalism; otherwise as 107, but negative.

(-) per108. *European Community: Positive*

Favourable mentions of European Community/European Union in general; desirability of expanding the European Community/European Union and/or of increasing its competence; desirability of the manifesto country joining or remaining a member.

(+) per110. *European Community: Negative*

Hostile mentions of the European Community/European Union; opposition to specific European policies which are preferred by European authorities; otherwise as 108, but negative.

(+) per406. *Protectionism: Positive*

Favourable mentions of extension or maintenance of tariffs to protect internal markets; other domestic economic protectionism such as quota restrictions.

(-) per407. *Protectionism: Negative*

Support for the concept of free trade; otherwise as 406, but negative.

(+) per601. *National Way of Life: Positive*

Appeals to patriotism and/or nationalism; suspension of some freedoms in order to protect the state against subversion; support for established national ideas.

(-) per602. *National Way of Life: Negative*

Against patriotism and/or nationalism; opposition to the existing national state; otherwise as 601, but negative.

Our measure of Net Anti-Immigration is a light recoding of the *Net Stance* measure of party manifestos developed by Dancygier and Margalit (2017). The coding works within the broad framework of the Manifesto Project Database (MPD), focused on coding of all sentence or sentence fragments as a percentage of a given party-country-election-year's total sentences in an electoral platform. To make the results comparable to our aforementioned Anti-Globalization Nationalism measures in the MPD.

Figure A1.1: Anti-Global (broad) over time and party by selected (groupings of) countries





Figure A1.2: Anti-Global (broad) over time and party family by selected countries



## Appendix 2: Summary Statistics

Table A2.1: Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Anti-globalization (broad)	-0.64	1.41	-4.10	4.75	8348
Anti-globalization (narrow)	-1.00	1.14	-3.80	3.82	8348
Anti-European Union	-0.62	1.18	-3.96	4.26	8348
Anti-immigration	-0.18	0.67	-1.10	1.10	1030
Social security transfers (% GDP)	12.68	3.74	3.65	22.79	8357
Welfare generosity	32.47	6.54	10.80	46.60	5107
Total social expenditures (% GDP)	19.92	4.82	0.00	31.88	5718
Total welfare and education spending (% GDP)	25.00	5.27	5.26	37.86	5633
Party family	3.52	1.90	1.00	7.00	8352
Polity IV	9.71	0.87	0.33	10.00	7996
KOF de facto globalization	72.09	10.31	45.84	90.95	7412
Unemployment rate	6.28	4.30	0.00	26.17	8357
Percentage vote	15.60	13.80	0.00	67.88	8357
Adjusted Left-Right platform for anti-globalization (broad)	-3.58	19.40	-74.30	82.20	8348
Adjusted Left-Right platform for anti-globalization (narrow)	-2.09	20.17	-74.30	82.20	8348

Table A2.2: Countries with Valid Data for Independent Variables and Dependent Variable (Anti-Immigration)

	Soc. sec. transfers	Welfare generosity	Total soc. expenditure	Welfare & education	Anti- Immigration
Australia	✓	✓	✓	✓	.
Austria	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Belgium	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bulgaria	✓	.	.	.	.
Canada	✓	✓	✓	✓	.
Croatia	✓	.	.	.	.
Cyprus	✓	.	.	.	.
Czech Republic	✓	.	✓	✓	.
Denmark	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Estonia	✓	.	✓	✓	.
Finland	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
France	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Germany	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Greece	✓	✓	✓	✓	.
Hungary	✓	.	✓	✓	.
Ireland	✓	✓	✓	✓	.
Italy	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Japan	✓	✓	✓	✓	.
Latvia	✓	.	✓	✓	.
Lithuania	✓	.	✓	✓	.
Luxembourg	✓	.	✓	✓	.
Netherlands	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
New Zealand	✓	✓	✓	✓	.
Norway	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Poland	✓	.	✓	✓	.
Portugal	✓	✓	✓	✓	.
Romania	✓	.	.	.	.
Spain	✓	✓	✓	✓	.
Sweden	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Switzerland	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
United Kingdom	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
United States	✓	✓	✓	✓	.

*Note:* All other dependent variables (in addition to Anti-Immigration) are present in all countries listed above

Table A2.3: Correlation Matrix of Anti-Globalization Measures (All Available Country-Year-Parties)

	Anti-global. (broad)	Anti-global. (narrow)	Anti-European Union	Anti- immigration
Anti-global. (broad)	1	.	.	.
Anti-global. (narrow)	0.87	1	.	.
Anti-European Union	0.67	0.28	1	.
Anti- immigration	0.52	0.48	0.39	1

Table A2.4: Correlation Matrix of Welfare State Effort Measures (All Available Country-Years)

	Social security transfers	Welfare generosity	Total social expenditures	Welfare and educ. spending
Social security transfers	1	.	.	.
Welfare generosity	0.54	1	.	.
Total social expenditures	0.78	0.56	1	.
Welfare and educ. spending	0.74	0.57	0.98	1



### Appendix 3: Welfare Effort

Figure A3.1: Social Security Transfers (%GDP) per country and year (1960-2017)





Figure A3.2: Welfare State Generosity (CWED index) per country and year (1970-2011)



## Appendix 4: Regression Results for the Direct Effects Averaged Across All Parties

Table A4.1: Direct Effects of Welfare Effort on Anti-Globalization (broad)

	Model A1	Model A2	Model A3	Model A4
	Soc. sec. transfers	Welfare generosity	Total soc. expenditure	Welfare & education
Welfare state effort	-0.070** (0.020)	-0.053* (0.025)	-0.055* (0.020)	-0.046* (0.019)
Radical Left	0.830*** (0.136)	0.828*** (0.165)	0.673*** (0.150)	0.665*** (0.153)
Social Democratic	-0.385+ (0.196)	-0.407+ (0.229)	-0.574+ (0.211)	-0.561+ (0.212)
Liberal	-0.359 (0.215)	-0.418 (0.274)	-0.425+ (0.232)	-0.415+ (0.233)
Christian Democratic	-0.327 (0.230)	-0.321 (0.252)	-0.394 (0.240)	-0.384 (0.241)
Conservative	-0.162 (0.280)	-0.310 (0.346)	-0.301 (0.302)	-0.293 (0.304)
Radical Right	1.506*** (0.288)	1.502*** (0.368)	1.653*** (0.340)	1.656*** (0.350)
Polity IV	-0.123** (0.050)	-0.291 (0.219)	-0.134 (0.126)	-0.115 (0.124)
KOF de facto globalization	0.043*** (0.013)	0.034* (0.017)	0.044*** (0.015)	0.043*** (0.015)
Unemployment rate	0.028 (0.020)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.028 (0.020)	0.027 (0.021)
Vote percentage	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)
Left-Right platform (adjusted)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-1.989** (0.878)	1.639 (2.496)	-1.570 (1.570)	-1.617 (1.459)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.384	0.389	0.404	0.394
N	6733	4954	5340	5288

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , +  $p < 0.1$  (two-tailed)

Table A4.2: Direct Effects of Welfare Effort on Anti-Globalization (narrow)

	Model A5	Model A6	Model A7	Model A8
	Soc. sec. transfers	Welfare generosity	Total soc. expenditure	Welfare & education
Welfare state effort	-0.044*	-0.057*	-0.053**	-0.046**
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Radical Left	0.537***	0.584***	0.447**	0.447**
	(0.145)	(0.160)	(0.142)	(0.142)
Social Democratic	-0.205	-0.196	-0.195	-0.183
	(0.123)	(0.131)	(0.133)	(0.132)
Liberal	-0.416***	-0.398 <sup>+</sup>	-0.372 <sup>+</sup>	-0.368 <sup>+</sup>
	(0.126)	(0.150)	(0.138)	(0.137)
Christian Democratic	-0.452 <sup>+</sup>	-0.446 <sup>+</sup>	-0.422 <sup>+</sup>	-0.410 <sup>+</sup>
	(0.179)	(0.189)	(0.192)	(0.191)
Conservative	-0.184	-0.201	-0.206	-0.203
	(0.156)	(0.177)	(0.164)	(0.165)
Radical Right	0.822***	0.907***	0.979***	0.987***
	(0.204)	(0.242)	(0.223)	(0.229)
Polity IV	-0.006	-0.176	-0.043	-0.032
	(0.043)	(0.106)	(0.070)	(0.067)
KOF de facto globalization	0.017	0.025 <sup>+</sup>	0.020 <sup>+</sup>	0.022*
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Unemployment rate	0.017	-0.005	0.035 <sup>+</sup>	0.040*
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Vote percentage	-0.006	-0.005	-0.007	-0.008
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Left-Right platform (adjusted)	0.011***	0.012***	0.011***	0.011***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-1.819**	1.073	-1.141	-1.360
	(0.794)	(1.562)	(1.046)	(0.900)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.358	0.362	0.374	0.371
N	6733	4954	5340	5288

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$  (two-tailed)

Table A4.3: Direct Effects of Welfare Effort on Anti-EU

	Model A9	Model A10	Model A11	Model A12
	Soc. sec. transfers	Welfare generosity	Total soc. expenditure	Welfare & education
Welfare state effort	-0.040** (0.013)	0.004 (0.013)	-0.029 (0.019)	-0.022 (0.018)
Radical Left	0.885*** (0.162)	0.923*** (0.213)	0.893*** (0.179)	0.864*** (0.167)
Social Democratic	-0.428* (0.163)	-0.499* (0.216)	-0.618** (0.184)	-0.608** (0.185)
Liberal	-0.577** (0.170)	-0.712** (0.193)	-0.712** (0.176)	-0.702** (0.178)
Christian Democratic	-0.473** (0.157)	-0.412* (0.185)	-0.513** (0.180)	-0.510** (0.181)
Conservative	-0.634* (0.237)	-0.793* (0.293)	-0.732** (0.255)	-0.720** (0.257)
Radical Right	0.806** (0.233)	0.942** (0.313)	0.942** (0.292)	0.992** (0.299)
Polity IV	-0.102+ (0.051)	-0.366+ (0.183)	-0.135 (0.088)	-0.131 (0.093)
KOF de facto globalization	0.033** (0.010)	0.024 (0.014)	0.039** (0.012)	0.039** (0.013)
Unemployment rate	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.018)
Vote percentage	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)
Left-Right platform (adjusted)	0.007+ (0.004)	0.007 (0.004)	0.008+ (0.004)	0.008+ (0.004)
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.677 (0.620)	1.966 (2.007)	-0.785 (0.968)	-0.846 (1.035)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.409	0.425	0.418	0.415
N	6733	4954	5340	5288

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , +  $p < 0.1$  (two-tailed)

Table A4.4: Direct Effects of Welfare Effort on Anti-Immigration

	Model A13	Model A14	Model A15	Model A16
	Soc. sec. transfers	Welfare generosity	Total soc. expenditure	Welfare & education
Welfare state effort	-0.009 (0.018)	0.043* (0.016)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.015)
Radical Left	-0.342 (0.445)	-0.341 (0.473)	-0.368 (0.481)	-0.377 (0.485)
Social Democratic	-0.492 (0.398)	-0.530 (0.446)	-0.532 (0.439)	-0.531 (0.446)
Liberal	-0.266 (0.412)	-0.237 (0.421)	-0.280 (0.432)	-0.282 (0.434)
Christian Democratic	-0.225 (0.427)	-0.239 (0.461)	-0.234 (0.459)	-0.242 (0.462)
Conservative	0.028 (0.371)	-0.002 (0.406)	0.007 (0.401)	0.003 (0.403)
Radical Right	0.812+ (0.399)	0.750 (0.428)	0.775+ (0.431)	0.769 (0.432)
Polity IV	-0.122** (0.053)	-0.091 (0.071)	-0.077 (0.048)	-0.082 (0.052)
KOF de facto globalization	-0.006 (0.016)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.012)	0.000 (0.013)
Unemployment rate	-0.006 (0.038)	-0.027 (0.023)	-0.015 (0.042)	-0.014 (0.042)
Vote percentage	0.007 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)
Left-Right platform (adjusted)	0.005* (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	0.004+ (0.002)	0.004+ (0.002)
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	1.023 (1.471)	-1.883* (0.992)	0.157 (1.140)	0.247 (1.324)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.736	0.757	0.740	0.741
N	941	903	853	849

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , +  $p < 0.1$  (two-tailed)

Table A4.5: Direct Effects of Welfare Effort on Anti-Globalization + Anti-Immigration

	Model A17	Model A18	Model A19	Model A20
	Soc. sec. transfers	Welfare generosity	Total soc. expenditure	Welfare & education
Welfare state effort	-0.077*	-0.001	-0.078*	-0.057
	(0.027)	(0.048)	(0.035)	(0.033)
Radical Left	-0.059	-0.151	0.039	0.016
	(1.405)	(1.476)	(1.459)	(1.458)
Social Democratic	-1.598	-1.702	-1.635	-1.642
	(1.294)	(1.425)	(1.379)	(1.383)
Liberal	-1.029	-1.024	-0.988	-1.000
	(1.240)	(1.316)	(1.280)	(1.282)
Christian Democratic	-1.439	-1.512	-1.388	-1.406
	(1.361)	(1.458)	(1.424)	(1.424)
Conservative	-1.347	-1.477	-1.340	-1.359
	(1.292)	(1.388)	(1.355)	(1.354)
Radical Right	1.516	1.361	1.511	1.487
	(1.447)	(1.546)	(1.508)	(1.510)
Polity IV	0.069	0.095	0.221**	0.167*
	(0.162)	(0.194)	(0.083)	(0.091)
KOF de facto globalization	0.086***	0.106***	0.100**	0.102**
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Unemployment rate	-0.067	-0.133*	-0.067	-0.076
	(0.076)	(0.064)	(0.090)	(0.091)
Vote percentage	0.020	0.019	0.023	0.022
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Left-Right platform (adjusted)	0.028***	0.029***	0.029***	0.029***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-7.174*	-9.718*	-9.195***	-8.900**
	(2.909)	(3.192)	(2.450)	(2.751)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.775	0.776	0.777	0.776
N	941	903	853	849

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , +  $p < 0.1$  (two-tailed)

## Appendix 5: Regression Tables per Party Family

Table A5.1: Anti-Globalization (Broad) by Party Family

	Model A21	Model A22	Model A23	Model A24
	Soc. sec. transfers	Welfare generosity	Total soc. expenditure	Welfare & education
Welfare state effort	-0.064 (0.040)	-0.013 (0.031)	-0.079* (0.035)	-0.064+ (0.032)
Radical Left	0.581 (0.605)	1.751+ (0.983)	0.302 (0.613)	0.293 (0.668)
Social Democratic	-0.138 (0.526)	1.185+ (0.614)	-1.306+ (0.656)	-1.436+ (0.743)
Liberal	0.553 (0.589)	1.186 (1.165)	-0.496 (0.857)	-0.284 (0.971)
Christian Democratic	-0.672 (0.609)	1.810* (0.842)	-1.538+ (0.797)	-1.647+ (0.935)
Conservative	0.070 (0.710)	1.957* (0.699)	-0.583 (0.883)	-0.397 (1.015)
Radical Right	0.742 (1.005)	2.700 (2.085)	0.169 (0.946)	-0.155 (1.148)
Welf. eff. × Rad. Left	0.017 (0.044)	-0.027 (0.028)	0.017 (0.030)	0.013 (0.027)
Welf. eff. × Soc. Dem.	-0.018 (0.035)	-0.046* (0.019)	0.037 (0.030)	0.036 (0.028)
Welf. eff. × Liberal	-0.067 (0.042)	-0.047 (0.032)	0.004 (0.043)	-0.004 (0.039)
Welf. eff. × Chr. Dem.	0.024 (0.047)	-0.062* (0.025)	0.057 (0.042)	0.050 (0.039)
Welf. eff. × Conserv.	-0.017 (0.059)	-0.069** (0.023)	0.014 (0.045)	0.004 (0.041)
Welf. eff. × Rad. Right	0.054 (0.075)	-0.036 (0.062)	0.071 (0.050)	0.069 (0.048)
Polity IV	-0.129** (0.052)	-0.291 (0.219)	-0.128 (0.129)	-0.108 (0.128)
KOF de facto globalization	0.043** (0.013)	0.032+ (0.016)	0.042** (0.015)	0.042* (0.016)

Table A5.1 (continued)

Unemployment rate	0.025 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.022)	0.028 (0.020)	0.028 (0.021)
Vote percentage	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)
Left-Right platform (adjusted)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-1.980* (1.011)	0.473 (2.516)	-0.986 (1.632)	-1.060 (1.541)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.389	0.400	0.410	0.401
N	6733	4954	5340	5288

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , +  $p < 0.1$  (two-tailed)



Table A5.2: Anti-Globalization (Narrow) by Party Family

	Model A25	Model A26	Model A27	Model A28
	Soc. sec. transfers	Welfare generosity	Total soc. expenditure	Welfare & education
Welfare state effort	-0.059*	-0.051*	-0.076***	-0.066***
	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Radical Left	0.877	1.423 <sup>+</sup>	0.559	0.504
	(0.553)	(0.781)	(0.621)	(0.608)
Social Democratic	-0.408	-0.028	-0.759*	-0.838*
	(0.363)	(0.562)	(0.330)	(0.315)
Liberal	-0.537	-0.549	-0.745 <sup>+</sup>	-0.812 <sup>+</sup>
	(0.394)	(0.820)	(0.398)	(0.474)
Christian Democratic	-0.912 <sup>+</sup>	0.106	-1.160*	-1.272*
	(0.531)	(0.830)	(0.510)	(0.568)
Conservative	-0.887*	-0.195	-1.280**	-1.312**
	(0.400)	(0.606)	(0.366)	(0.391)
Radical Right	-0.243	1.107	-0.603	-0.867
	(0.712)	(1.229)	(0.646)	(0.806)
Welf. eff. ×	-0.023	-0.024	-0.005	-0.002
Rad. Left	(0.041)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.024)
Welf. eff. ×	0.016	-0.004	0.028*	0.026*
Soc. Dem.	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Welf. eff. ×	0.009	0.004	0.018	0.017
Liberal	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Welf. eff. ×	0.033	-0.016	0.036	0.033
Chr. Dem.	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Welf. eff. ×	0.053*	-0.000	0.053**	0.044**
Conserv.	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Welf. eff. ×	0.072	-0.008	0.072*	0.068*
Rad. Right	(0.053)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Polity IV	-0.002	-0.176	-0.038	-0.027
	(0.042)	(0.104)	(0.064)	(0.064)
KOF de facto	0.016	0.026 <sup>+</sup>	0.020 <sup>+</sup>	0.023*
globalization	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Unemployment rate	0.016	-0.005	0.035 <sup>+</sup>	0.042*
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.018)

Table A5.2 (continued)

Vote percentage	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)
Left-Right platform (adjusted)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-1.559* (0.876)	0.792 (1.555)	-0.694 (0.935)	-0.887 (0.823)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.370	0.369	0.389	0.386
N	6733	4954	5340	5288

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , +  $p < 0.1$  (two-tailed)

Table A5.3: Anti-EU by Party Family

	Model A29	Model A30	Model A31	Model A32
	Soc. sec. transfers	Welfare generosity	Total soc. expenditure	Welfare & education
Welfare state effort	-0.042 (0.033)	0.042** (0.018)	-0.041 (0.036)	-0.030 (0.034)
Radical Left	-0.453 (0.499)	0.372 (1.016)	-0.164 (0.642)	-0.192 (0.706)
Social Democratic	-0.088 (0.503)	1.571*** (0.550)	-0.842 (0.734)	-0.962 (0.843)
Liberal	0.176 (0.484)	0.770 (0.764)	-0.378 (0.790)	-0.106 (0.911)
Christian Democratic	-0.900 (0.583)	0.764 (0.765)	-1.549* (0.766)	-1.824* (0.920)
Conservative	0.293 (0.593)	2.505*** (0.718)	0.204 (0.877)	0.664 (1.009)
Radical Right	-0.085 (1.076)	3.001 (2.099)	-0.430 (1.127)	-0.742 (1.306)
Welf. eff. ×	0.097***	0.017	0.051*	0.041
Rad. Left	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.026)
Welf. eff. ×	-0.025	-0.061***	0.013	0.016
Soc. Dem.	(0.037)	(0.019)	(0.037)	(0.034)
Welf. eff. ×	-0.056	-0.044*	-0.015	-0.022
Liberal	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.037)
Welf. eff. ×	0.030	-0.035	0.051	0.053
Chr. Dem.	(0.046)	(0.022)	(0.040)	(0.038)
Welf. eff. ×	-0.073	-0.104***	-0.047	-0.055
Conserv.	(0.052)	(0.023)	(0.046)	(0.042)
Welf. eff. ×	0.061	-0.062	0.064	0.065
Rad. Right	(0.079)	(0.063)	(0.056)	(0.052)
Polity IV	-0.112** (0.051)	-0.359* (0.191)	-0.127 (0.085)	-0.118 (0.089)
KOF de facto globalization	0.033*** (0.009)	0.020 (0.013)	0.037*** (0.012)	0.036** (0.013)
Unemployment rate	-0.006 (0.015)	-0.023 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.018)

Table A5.3 (continued)

Vote percentage	-0.008*	-0.006	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Left-Right platform (adjusted)	0.008**	0.008**	0.008**	0.008**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	-0.520	0.881	-0.402	-0.530
	(0.733)	(2.077)	(1.146)	(1.225)
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.428	0.463	0.434	0.437
N	6733	4954	5340	5288

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , +  $p < 0.1$  (two-tailed)

Table A5.4: Anti-Immigration by Party Family

	Model A33	Model A34	Model A35	Model A36
	Soc. sec. transfers	Welfare generosity	Total soc. expenditure	Welfare & education
Welfare state policy	-0.235*** (0.026)	0.659*** (0.047)	-0.161*** (0.027)	-0.144*** (0.024)
Radical Left	-7.731*** (1.420)	18.004*** (1.555)	-5.744*** (0.585)	-6.245*** (0.622)
Social Democratic	-3.112*** (0.340)	20.962*** (1.314)	-3.144*** (0.260)	-3.605*** (0.307)
Liberal	-2.407*** (0.206)	23.498*** (2.025)	-2.875*** (0.217)	-3.334*** (0.255)
Christian Democratic	-3.629*** (0.206)	22.402*** (1.469)	-3.962*** (0.647)	-4.630*** (0.809)
Conservative	-3.246*** (0.713)	22.493*** (1.335)	-2.795*** (0.721)	-3.128*** (0.752)
Radical Right	-1.720*** (0.288)	21.757*** (1.334)	-1.722*** (0.506)	-1.953** (0.643)
Welf. eff. ×	0.542*** (0.086)	-0.474*** (0.049)	0.283*** (0.023)	0.245*** (0.020)
Rad. Left	0.223*** (0.029)	-0.605*** (0.038)	0.148*** (0.012)	0.134*** (0.012)
Welf. eff. ×	0.190*** (0.026)	-0.662*** (0.056)	0.152*** (0.012)	0.137*** (0.011)
Liberal	0.273*** (0.016)	-0.635*** (0.040)	0.197*** (0.023)	0.181*** (0.025)
Welf. eff. ×	0.269*** (0.044)	-0.632*** (0.038)	0.158*** (0.029)	0.137*** (0.025)
Conserv.	0.221*** (0.021)	-0.592** (0.037)	0.145** (0.020)	0.123** (0.022)
Welf. eff. ×	-0.115+ (0.057)	-0.102 (0.064)	-0.069 (0.067)	-0.071 (0.072)
Polity IV	-0.003 (0.016)	0.006 (0.010)	0.004 (0.012)	0.005 (0.013)
KOF de facto globalization	-0.021 (0.035)	-0.033 (0.021)	-0.026 (0.040)	-0.027 (0.040)
Unemployment rate				

Table A5.4 (continued)

Vote percentage	0.007 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)
Left-Right platform (adjusted)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	3.439* (1.131)	-23.631*** (1.752)	2.558+ (1.204)	2.956+ (1.388)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.758	0.788	0.761	0.762
N	941	903	853	849

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , +  $p < 0.1$  (two-tailed)