Prioritization in the Presence of Self-ordering Opportunities in Omni-channel Services

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Motivated by the popularity of mobile-order-and-pay applications, especially in fast-casual food restaurants and coffee shops, we study omnichannel service systems—where customers can employ mobile applications for self-ordering—with respect to sojourn times, throughput, and social welfare. Our models are two-stage queues with two customer classes: walk-ins and mobiles. We identify Pareto efficient prioritization policies, highlighting trade-offs between each class’s mean sojourn times. We allow customers to make strategic joining decisions based on their anticipated delays under an information structure where walk-ins observe partial queue length information. We draw from a wide array of techniques, including steady-state, transient, busy period, hitting-time analyses, and matrix analytic methods. We showcase the significance of prioritization on the system throughput and social welfare. We demonstrate settings where a traditional service system’s (typically beneficial) transformation to an omnichannel reduces throughput. Our analysis highlights the importance of prioritization policy choice for an efficient transition to an omnichannel service system. The throughput-optimal policy choice highly depends on the operational parameters and customer patience levels; implementing a wrong policy can yield a significant loss in throughput and profitability.

Key words: Service systems; Queueing systems; Strategic queueing; Omni-channel services; Self-ordering technology; Prioritization

1 Introduction

Millions daily wait for services at coffee shops, government offices, and medical clinics. Recent developments in mobile technologies aim to improve customers’ waiting time experience. For example, in some fast-food restaurants and coffee shops, customers can use their mobile phones to place online orders and pay in advance, effectively skipping the in-store ordering line. The use of such applications has been growing. For example, the fraction of transactions conducted via Starbucks’s Mobile Order & Pay application increased from 4% in 2016 to 24% in 2020 (Campbell 2020). Self-processing has also gained traction in other services. For example, car rental companies enable customers to bypass the counter entirely, provided they have completed certain information beforehand, allowing them to proceed directly to their rental vehicle (Alamo 2023).
Despite their potential advantages, introducing the self-processing applications has also caused complications. Reports of “long lines that are being exacerbated by an uptick in mobile ordering... [that are causing] customers to walk out” at Starbucks (Ryan 2017) illustrate the need for proper system design to mitigate throughput loss due to unsatisfied customers. Leveraging detailed queueing models and analyses, we highlight task prioritization as a crucial operational design lever impacting system throughput and customers’ waiting experience in omnichannel services, in which customers can employ mobile applications for self-ordering.

A coffee shop is a paradigmatic case of an omnichannel service system, which has two stages: customers wait in line to place and pay for their order and then wait for the order to be prepared. Major brands, including Starbucks, Dunkin’ Donuts, and McDonald’s, offer online ordering applications, enabling mobile customers (mobiles for short)—those who use the application—to make and pay for their selections, skip the cashier line, wait only for preparation. Meanwhile, walk-in customers (walk-ins for short)—those who cannot or choose not to use the application—must first wait to place their order.

Under this paradigm, the staff preparing orders for mobiles often take orders from— and prepare orders for—walk-ins; i.e., the service capacity is shared between both channels. Mobiles bypass the first stage by processing their own ordering and payment, which reduces their waiting times and frees up some service capacity. These benefits could reduce total service requirements and waiting times (potentially for walk-ins and mobiles) and yield higher profits. This omni-channel paradigm is distinct from its long-existing predecessor, whereby customers can call in an order (e.g., pizza); the latter does not involve self-processing as the phone call keeps the employee occupied.

Mobile self-processing applications, however, could result in inferior customer satisfaction, eventually leading to throughput and revenue loss (Ryan 2017). We show that part of these inefficiencies stems from higher task prioritization complications (compared to the single-channel services). The introduction of self-processing applications splits the homogeneous pool of customers (with respect to service requirements) into two classes (walk-ins and mobiles) with distinct service flows. An essential system design choice is how to prioritize the orders from the two customer classes. Popular and easy-to-implement service policies (e.g., first-come-first-served (FCFS)) might not correctly differentiate the walk-ins’ and mobiles’ distinct requirements and waiting time expectations.

We capture the complicated stochasticity in omni-channel services by modeling them as two-stage tandem queueing networks under single- and two-server settings (§3). We identify and analyze Pareto efficient prioritization policies (with respect to the class-specific mean sojourn times of walk-ins and mobiles) in the case of non-strategic customers and show that they generate the entire Pareto frontier (§4). Then, we allow strategic customers to join or balk based on their anticipated delays (§5) with the challenge that walk-ins observe the first stage’s state (based on which they
draw inferences about the second stage) when constructing their delay anticipation, while mobiles observe nothing. We draw from various techniques to address this challenge: steady-state, transient, busy period, hitting-time analyses, and matrix analytic methods. We showcase the significance of the prioritization policy choice on the system throughput and social welfare (§6) and examine how our models can be extended in a number of ways (§7).

We find that the throughput increases, on the aggregate level, with the rate customers adopt mobile ordering technology. However, such benefits are not homogeneous and heavily rely on implementing the optimal prioritization policy. Furthermore, such throughput gains are not universally achievable. We locate diverse settings where transforming to an omni-channel service reduces throughput, even under the optimal prioritization policy (among those we study). This observation runs counter to both the intuition on the benefits of offering a more efficient service stream and insights generated by some recent work on omni-channel services, which celebrate the advantages of the mobile channel’s introduction.

Our findings are driven by explicitly modeling previously abstracted queueing-theoretic and information-structural features of omni-channel services, including the availability of self-service opportunities for mobile customers. When customers exhibit strategic behavior, the operational advantages of self-service opportunities (i.e., service requirement reductions) are not always sufficient to overcome inefficiencies introduced by mobile customers having less information than walk-ins and/or the waiting-time externalities the classes impose on one another. Such losses in efficiency can degrade the throughput and/or social welfare.

2 Literature Review
Methodologically, our work draws from several research streams. In exploring the Pareto efficient prioritization policies with respect to class-specific mean sojourn times, we take inspiration from the achievable regions methods developed in Bertsimas (1995) and further articulated in Dacre et al. (1999). While our single-server models can also be interpreted as polling models (as surveyed by Boon et al. (2011) and Borst and Boxma (2018)) and our two-server models resemble tandem queues with intermediate arrivals (e.g., Morrison 1979, Shalmon and Kaplan 1984, De Clercq and Walraevens 2020), our objectives, design choices, and analytic techniques are mainly unrelated to those found in the polling and tandem queueing literature streams. In terms of strategic customer behavior, we are indebted to Naor (1969) classical paper and the long tradition of work on queueing games that it has inspired, as surveyed in Hassin and Haviv (2003) and Hassin (2016).

In our strategic models, walk-ins observe only the queue length in the first stage and infer a distribution on the second stage’s queue length when deciding to join. Similarly, D’Auria and Kanta (2015), Kim and Kim (2016), Kerner et al. (2017), and Ji et al. (2023) present models
where arrivals make joining decisions while observing only partial queue-length information. In these papers, the unobserved information is a random variable with finite support. In our work, the support is unbounded; hence, we must contend with an infinite state space, necessitating distinct analytic techniques. One feature of our single-server model—the server alternation between the two stages—is shared with the model studied by Nimrod et al. (2020); however, our model differs significantly in that their work renders both queues unobservable. Most significantly, our model differs from those featured in the papers above in that we consider an omnichannel system with two customer classes; the papers cited above study single-class single-channel systems.

The analytical modeling of omni-channel retailing has received significant attention from various aspects (examples include Chopra 2016, Gao and Su 2016, Bayram and Cesaret 2017, Gallino et al. 2017, Gao and Su 2017, Bell et al. 2018, Jin et al. 2018, Delasay et al. 2022). However, the queueing-theoretic study of omni-channel services remains in its infancy. In the remainder of this section, we discuss several related papers.

Gao and Su (2018) investigate the high-level impact of self-processing technologies on capacity planning (i.e., staffing). While—like our work—they model omni-channel services as tandem queues, they consider an unobservable queueing setting in their model. Consequently—unlike our work—the technical contributions of the paper are not queueing-theoretic. Although Gao and Su (2018) endogenize the arrival rate as a function of the waiting time, they do not explicitly model customers as rational. Meanwhile, considering rational customers in omni-channel services is a primary focus of both our paper and a number of papers that we discuss in the following paragraphs.

Baron et al. (2023) study customers’ channel choice in a single-stage FCFS omni-channel system and show that offering an online ordering channel will increase the system throughput; this increase comes at the cost of a drop in social welfare due to the resulting information uncertainty. However, they find that prioritizing walk-ins can overcome this social welfare loss. Our paper complements this line of investigation by highlighting prioritization as a primary design choice for an efficient transition from single-channel to omni-channel (although we show that such a transition is not always possible). Moreover, much of our paper addresses what Baron et al. (2023) identify as “an intriguing question and a promising future research direction.” Namely, a model where “walk-in customers are aware of the availability of the online channel but only observe the physical queue...[which] increases the analysis complexity of walk-in customers’ joining decisions.” Moreover, in §7.2, we discuss how our modeling framework can be adapted to studying channel choice.

Roet-Green and Yuan (2020) study omni-channel services in a way that can also be thought of as addressing the “intriguing question” posed in Baron et al. (2023). They treat information settings—in terms of the level of system occupancy observability—as the primary design choice. By contrast, our work treats prioritization policies as the primary design choice. Each approach
results in fundamentally different insights. Furthermore, mobiles are also privy to some system state information in all information settings in Roet-Green and Yuan (2020). This induces a threshold joining behavior on the part of mobiles and thus yields finite state spaces, which—together with their restricted focus on single-stage models—precludes their need for much of the sophisticated queueing-theoretic analysis that forms an integral part of our paper. These differences have salient consequences: e.g., they prove that each instance of their model yields a unique equilibrium, whereas we find many instances where our models give rise to multiple equilibria. Roet-Green and Yuan (2020) express interest in exploring models of heterogeneous customers’ patience levels; we explore such heterogeneity as it pertains to our models in §EC.4.7.

Ghosh et al. (2020) explore a discrete-time model, addressing the phenomenon of channel choice (like Baron et al. 2023). Their work considers some additional features (e.g., not all customers are given the opportunity to choose their channel) and also—as in the work of Roet-Green and Yuan (2020)—explores more than one information setting (either mobiles have full, but delayed, information, or no information at all). Unlike the models in Roet-Green and Yuan (2020) and Baron et al. (2023), the extra features in the models in Ghosh et al. (2020) lead to settings where the system throughput under an omni-channel structure falls below that of a single-channel system. In that respect, they draw conclusions that match ours, despite emphasizing different design aspects of omni-channel services. An important contribution of Ghosh et al. (2020) is the study of the possibility of quality degradation during a mobile customer’s travel time. This feature connects the paper to another stream of research on omni-channel services with rational customers that focus on issues associated with travel (examples less closely related to our work include Baron et al. (2020) and Sun et al. (2020)). We briefly address the issue of travel times in our models in §7.2.

The study of channel choice extends to other settings such as the FASTPASS system at Disneyland (Kostami and Ward 2009), call centers offering the call-back option (Engel and Hassin 2017), tele-medicine (Liu et al. 2023), and food delivery services (Chen et al. 2022). In the first three aforementioned settings, the customers choosing the FASTPASS, call-back, or tele-health option receive the same service as their counterparts who choose the traditional option; the channels differ only in the queue each customer must wait in and in the service capacity allocated to that queue. By contrast, in Chen et al. (2022), all customers’ orders are served in the same food preparation queue regardless of their choice of channel (online-delivery vs. walk-in). Crucially, in all four of these papers, customers’ service needs do not depend on the choice of channel. As a result, these models do not capture the operational benefit associated with the opportunity for some customers (e.g., the mobile customers in our model) to partially process their own requests.

Among the mentioned papers studying omni-channel services in the presence of rational customers, only our work considers a two-stage tandem queueing system. This consideration allows our
models to capture the reduction in the need for service capacity when processing mobile customers due to their ability to self-order. Studying a partially observable two-stage queueing system under various prioritization policies necessitates substantial queueing analysis, which constitutes one of the key contributions of our paper. These features also differentiates our models from customers’ self-routing models studied in Parlaktürk and Kumar (2004), which also focuses on prioritization policies in an observable two-stage queueing network (though, unlike ours, under the fluid limit analysis and with both stages fully observable).

Together with Ghosh et al. (2020), Roet-Green and Yuan (2020), and Baron et al. (2023), discussed above, we view our paper as providing valuable complementary perspectives on the various quintessential features of omni-channel services. Considering all perspectives simultaneously allows one to grasp the bigger picture better than taking each perspective in isolation. That said, it may be infeasible to analyze a single model that fully incorporates and exhaustively explores all of these features (e.g., service requirement reduction from self-ordering, prioritization design, information design, channel choice, travel time, etc.) simultaneously, justifying the need for any given study to emphasize some of these features over others.

3 Model

We consider a family of queueing systems with two service stages and two customer classes. Each service stage consists of an infinite buffer queue. Walk-ins arrive to Stage 1 according to a Poisson process with rate $\lambda_w$ and proceed to Stage 2 upon service completion at Stage 1. Meanwhile, mobiles bypass Stage 1 and arrive directly at Stage 2 according to a Poisson process with rate $\lambda_m$; let $\Lambda = \lambda_w + \lambda_m$ denote the total arrival rate to the system. A walk-in’s (resp., mobile’s) sojourn time, $T_w$ (resp., $T_m$), is the duration of time from the moment of arrival to Stage 1 (resp., Stage 2) until the completion of service at Stage 2. We emphasize that while only walk-ins can be present at Stage 1, customers of both classes can be simultaneously present at Stage 2. For tractability, we assume that all service requirements are independent and exponentially distributed with rates $\mu_1$ and $\mu_2$ at Stages 1 and 2, respectively.

We consider two models: (i) In our single-server model (see Fig. 1), a single flexible server moves between the two stages instantaneously to serve customers according to a prioritization policy (defined in §3.1). (ii) In our two-server model (see Fig. 2), each stage is served by its dedicated (inflexible) server; while the Stage 1 server serves walk-ins at Stage 1 in their arrival order, the Stage 2 server can make service order decisions; e.g., they could prioritize mobiles ahead of walk-ins. The single-server model allows us to highlight the sojourn time trade-offs between the walk-ins and mobiles, while the two-server model allows us to test the generalizability of our insights.

In a coffee shop setting, we can think of each walk-in as beginning their sojourn when they arrive at a physical waiting line (Stage 1) leading to a cashier who takes orders, while each mobile begins
their sojourn as soon as they place their order via an app. A barista (who is also the cashier in the single-server model) prepares food and beverages from a virtual queue of orders (Stage 2) placed by walk-ins and mobiles. Additional modeling considerations such as travel times and the possibility of a walk-in deciding to switch to using the app after their arrival are addressed in §7.

3.1 Prioritization Policy Structure
At any time, the flexible server in the single-server model must choose at which stage to work. Furthermore, a server at Stage 2 (the flexible server in the single-server model or the Stage 2 dedicated server in the two-server model) must choose which customer class to serve. To this end, we introduce the notion of prioritization policies that dictate whom the flexible (or Stage 2 dedicated) server must serve at any time. It is helpful to add further granularity in how we view customers by breaking up each walk-in’s service into two tasks. At any given time, each customer’s service belongs to one of three task classes: walk-in tasks at Stage 1 (Os), walk-in tasks at Stage 2 (Ws), and mobile tasks at Stage 2 (Ms).

In the single-server model, we use the convention MWO, for example, to represent a specific work-conserving preemptive class-based priority policy in which the flexible server prioritizes tasks in the following order: (1) Ms (mobiles), (2) Ws (walk-ins in Stage 2), and (3) Os (walk-ins in Stage 1). We can construct 3! = 6 policies by permuting the three task classes. We use a similar convention in the two-server model: Noting that Stage 1’s dedicated server can only serve Os (and Os can only be served by this server), we only need to consider the relative prioritization between Ws and Ms at Stage 2. This yields only two work-conserving preemptive class-based priority policies: MW (where Ms are prioritized) and WM (where Ws are prioritized). In both models, tasks within each class are served in FCFS order.

The families of policies discussed above are not exhaustive. Other feasible policies include those that are not work-conserving, non-preemptive policies, randomized mixtures of other policies, and policies that give two or more classes an equal priority. We note that in the single-server model, much of our work extends to non-preemptive policies with modest modifications to our analytic contributions. Still, we restrict attention to preemptive policies in the interest of brevity. Also, note that our prioritization rules are different from those in Parlaktürk and Kumar (2004) and Kostami
and Ward (2009) in the sense that we do not allow for splitting of the server’s capacity between the customer classes.

Given any policy \( P \), we are primarily interested in the class-specific mean (equivalently, expected) sojourn times, \( \mathbb{E}^P[T_w] \) and \( \mathbb{E}^P[T_m] \), that emerge under that policy in steady state. We facilitate steady-state analysis by making the following assumption:

**Assumption 1.** The parameters \( \Lambda, \lambda_w, \mu_1, \) and \( \mu_2 \) must ensure system stability; i.e., (a) \( \frac{\lambda_w}{\mu_1} + \frac{\Lambda}{\mu_2} < 1 \) for the single-server model, and (b) \( \lambda_w < \mu_1 \) and \( \Lambda < \mu_2 \) for the two-server model.

### 3.2 Customer Behavior and Information Structure

Drawing from the standard framework of rational queueing for risk-neutral customers with linear waiting-time costs (see, e.g., Naor (1969)), we consider risk-neutral delay-sensitive customers who associate a reward (or value) for service and experience a waiting cost linear in their sojourn time. In particular, walk-ins (resp., mobiles) who experience a sojourn time of \( T_w \) (resp, \( T_m \)) attain a utility of \( R_w - C_w T_w \) (resp., \( R_m - C_m T_m \)) where \( R_w \) is the reward a walk-in attains for receiving service and \( C_w \) is the waiting cost rate of a walk-in (with \( R_m \) and \( C_m \) playing analogous roles for mobiles). Normalizing the value of the “outside option” to zero, a customer joins the queue for service if their anticipated utility is positive, balks if this value is negative, and are **indifferent** if this value is exactly zero. For convenience, we define each customer class’s patience level as follows: \( T_{w}^{\text{max}} \equiv \frac{R_w}{C_w} \) and \( T_{m}^{\text{max}} \equiv \frac{R_m}{C_m} \), and observe that the criteria for joining or balking described above are equivalent to customers (i) joining if their patience level (i.e., \( T_{w}^{\text{max}} \) for walk-ins and \( T_{m}^{\text{max}} \) for mobiles) exceeds their anticipated expected sojourn time, (ii) balking if the reverse is true, and (iii) being indifferent when their patience level is equal to their anticipated expected sojourn time.

Note that while we consider **homogeneous** patience levels within each customer class (i.e., \( T_{w}^{\text{max}} \) and \( T_{m}^{\text{max}} \) are constants, which is the case when \( R_w, C_w, R_m, \) and \( C_m \) are all constants), our approach and insights largely generalize to the heterogeneous case (see §EC.4.7 for details). Further note that when anticipating their expected sojourn times, customers indirectly take into account the prioritization policy: they have become accustomed to the policy’s steady-state mean sojourn time, e.g., from experience or word-of-mouth.

**Walk-ins’ joining behavior.**

Walk-ins only observe the number of customers \( N_1 \) in Stage 1 upon arrival, motivated by the fact that a customer walking into a coffee shop sees how many other customers have lined up to place orders but cannot see how many outstanding orders are currently awaiting preparation in Stage 2. However, given that a walk-in observes \( N_1 = i \) customers in Stage 1, they will infer their expected sojourn time (under policy \( P \)) conditioned on this observation (should they ultimately join the queue), \( \mathbb{E}^P[T_w|N_1 = i] \). While the mathematical derivation of this conditional expectation in our
analysis involves computing the joint distribution of $N_1$ and $N_2$, we need not assume that customers know the structure of this joint distribution. The walk-ins’ ability to infer such conditional expected sojourn times in our model is meant to capture their ability to develop informed beliefs about their expected sojourn times based on the visible queue length (for example, through past experience with the system). This modeling approach whereby customers can form beliefs about their expected sojourn times based on two statistically correlated queue lengths—one observable and the other unobservable—conditioned on the observable queue resembles the approach taken by, e.g., Hassin (1996) and Altman et al. (2004).

In light of the above, a walk-in joins if their *conditional expected sojourn time* under policy $P$ is no greater than their patience level (i.e., $\mathbb{E}^P[T_w|N_1 = i] \leq T_{\text{max}}^w$). This gives rise to a threshold $b$ whereby walk-ins join if $N_1 < b$ and balk otherwise; consequently, $b$ acts as a finite buffer size for Stage 1. Here, we simplify exposition by implicitly considering that all indifferent walk-ins join.

**Mobiles’ joining behavior.**

Unlike walk-ins, mobiles enter the system observing nothing; they place their order online before being present to witness the system occupancy. While hypothetically, a mobile application could provide real-time delay estimates, we do not consider such a feature in our model. We concur with the following assessment of this issue provided in Baron et al. (2023): “The invisibility of the online channel also reflects industry practice. To the best of our knowledge, no omnichannel service provider offers real-time queue length information to online customers ... Yet, some providers, e.g., Starbucks, quote expected waiting times to online customers.” Even in the absence of such announcements, mobiles can still behave strategically by employing a *mixed joining strategy*. Specifically, under prioritization policy $P$, each mobile joins with probability $p_m$ (independently of other mobiles) and balks otherwise, where $p_m$ is the highest probability for which $\mathbb{E}^P[T_m] \leq T_{\text{max}}^m$.

**Strategy profiles.**

Based on the discussion above, the joining behavior of all customers is described by the *strategy profile* $(b, p_m)$, where walk-ins join if and only if they observe $N_1 < b$ upon arrival and mobiles join with probability $p_m$. For any $b \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$ and $p_m \in [0, 1]$, the strategy profile $(b, p_m)$ results in a well-defined queueing system; we are most interested in *equilibrium* strategy profiles, i.e., consistent with the joining behavior outlined above (see §5 for details). For example, if $(b, p_m)$ is an equilibrium, then $\mathbb{E}^P[T_w|N_1 = i] \leq T_{\text{max}}^w$ for all $i \in \{0, 1, \ldots, b - 1\}$. However, the notation used in expressing the walk-in’s expected sojourn time obfuscates a vital subtlety: $\mathbb{E}^P[T_w|N_1 = i]$ can depend on $b$ and $p_m$; similarly, $\mathbb{E}^P[T_m]$ can depend on $b$ and $p_m$. We write $\mathbb{P}^P_{(b, p_m)}$ and $\mathbb{E}^P_{(b, p_m)}$ to denote the probability and expectation operators, respectively, under the strategy profile $(b, p_m)$ and priority policy $P$. 
3.3 Throughput, Overall Mean Sojourn Time, Social Welfare

The throughp**ut rate** of walk-ins $\chi_w$ (resp., mobiles $\chi_m$) is the rate at which they are served. When patience levels are infinite (i.e., $T^\text{max}_w = T^\text{max}_m = \infty$), we have throughp**ut rates $\chi_w = \lambda_w$ and $\chi_m = \lambda_m$; otherwise, we have $\chi_w = \lambda_w \mathbb{E}^p(b,p_m)(N_1 < b)$ and $\chi_m = \lambda_m p_m$ under the strategy profile $(b,p_m)$ and priority policy $P$. We measure the overall throughp**ut rate** as $X \equiv \chi_w + \chi_m$, which can serve as a proxy for revenue if walk-ins and mobiles pay the same average price for service. The overall mean sojourn time is given by $\mathbb{E}^p[T] \equiv (\lambda_w \mathbb{E}^p[T_w] + \lambda_m \mathbb{E}^p[T_m]) / \Lambda$ when $T^\text{max}_w = T^\text{max}_m = \infty$ and by $\mathbb{E}^p_{(b,p_m)}[T] \equiv (\chi_w \mathbb{E}^p_{(b,p_m)}[T_w | N_1 < b] + \chi_m \mathbb{E}^p_{(b,p_m)}[T_m]) / X$ when customers are strategic.

When customers are finitely patient, we define the social welfare—denoted by $\text{SW}^p_{(b,p_m)}$ under strategy profile $(b,p_m)$ and policy $P$—as the mean surplus experienced across all customers, where a customer’s surplus is their patience level less their sojourn time (0 if they balk). Our definition corresponds to the standard one in the rational queueing literature:

$$\text{SW}^p_{(b,p_m)} = \frac{\lambda m}{\Lambda} \sum_{i=0}^{b-1} (R_w - C \mathbb{E}^p_{(b,p_m)}[T_w | N_1 = i]) \mathbb{E}^p_{(b,p_m)}(N_1 = i) + \frac{p_m \lambda m}{\Lambda} (R_m - C_m \mathbb{E}^p_{(b,p_m)}[T_m]) .$$

In §§4 and 5, we analyze the cases where customers have infinite and finite patience, respectively. In the infinite patience case ($T^\text{max}_w = T^\text{max}_m = \infty$, which corresponds to the case where $R_w = R_m = \infty$ or $C_w = C_m \to 0^+$), since all customers join (i.e., $(b,p_m) = (\infty,1)$), the primary metrics of interest are the class-specific and overall mean sojourn times. Meanwhile, in the finite patience case ($T^\text{max}_w, T^\text{max}_m < \infty$), we are most interested in the equilibrium throughp**ut and social welfare values, requiring the computation of expected sojourn times.

4 Analysis: The Case of Customers with Infinite Patience

Customers always join when they have infinite patience, i.e., patience levels $T^\text{max}_w = T^\text{max}_m = \infty$ (e.g., when the “outside option” is absolutely unacceptable, yielding $R_w = R_m = \infty$ when we normalize the value of that option to zero). Thus, we need not consider strategic joining behavior. Assumption 1 guarantees systems stability and throughp**ut-optimality under any work-conserving policy. In this setting, we aim to understand the trade-offs associated with prioritizing one customer class over the other in terms of the mean sojourn time of each class, assuming that $\lambda_w, \lambda_m > 0$.

We formalize these tradeoffs by letting $P$ denote the set of all possible policies $P$. For any $P \in \mathcal{P}$, we let $a^P \equiv (\mathbb{E}^p[T_w], \mathbb{E}^p[T_m])$ denote policy $P$’s allocation (i.e., the pair of class-specific mean sojourn times) and $O \equiv \{a^P \in \mathbb{R}_+^2 : P \in \mathcal{P}\}$ denote the allocations’ achievable region. Given two policies $P$ and $P'$, we say that a customer class is “better off” under policy $P$ as opposed to $P'$ if the class experiences a lower mean sojourn time under $P$; if one class is better off under $P$ and the other is not better off under $P'$, then we say that $P$ dominates $P'$, writing $a^P \succ a^{P'}$. The relation ‘$\succ$’ induces partial orders on both $\mathcal{P}$ and $O$. We call a policy $P$ Pareto optimal—writing $P \in \mathcal{P}^*$—if
no other policy dominates it; equivalently, in symbols: ($P \in P^*$) \equiv (\not \exists P' \in P : a_{P'} \succ a_P). The set of allocations yielded by Pareto optimal policies is the Pareto frontier, $O^* \equiv \{a_P : P \in P^*\}.$

Typically, a system designer prefers a policy that minimizes some function of the class-specific sojourn times (e.g., the overall mean sojourn time, either class’s mean sojourn time, or any weighted average of these) that is strictly monotone with respect to the ordering on allocations induced by the ‘$\succ$’ relation. Consequently, the system designer needs only consider Pareto-optimal policies.

We observe that given any pair of policies $P, P' \in P$, we can construct a family of policies $\{(P, P') (\theta) : \theta \in [0, 1]\} \subseteq P$ parameterized by $\theta$ where we use either $P$ or $P'$ in each busy period with probabilities $\theta$ and $1 - \theta$ (independent of past choices), respectively. It follows that for any work-conserving policies $P$ and $P'$, $a_{(P, P') (\theta)} = \theta a_P + (1 - \theta) a_{P'} \in O$. By this reasoning, the set of achievable allocations $O$ is convex. We identify several Pareto optimal policies and show that these policies can generate all other Pareto optimal policies through random mixtures of the kind described above; we call such policies Pareto generators. Formally, for a given model, a set of policies $G \subseteq P^*$ is a set of Pareto generators if the Pareto frontier $O^* \subseteq \text{conv}(\{a_P : P \in G\})$.

Recall our notation for work-conserving preemptive class-based priority policies where, for example, MWO denotes the policy that prioritizes Ms (mobiles) ahead of Ws (walk-ins at Stage 2) and Ws ahead of Os (walk-ins at Stage 1). Of the six policies in the single-server model, three—MOW, OMW, and OWM—prioritize Os over Ws; it is straightforward to show that none of these three policies are Pareto optimal, so we disregard them, focusing instead on MWO, WMO, and WOM. Meanwhile, in the two-server model, the only relevant prioritization is between the two Stage 2 task classes, Ms and Ws (as the Stage 1’s dedicated server only serves Os), yielding the MW and WM policies. We additionally examine a third policy in the two-server model, FCFS (first-come-first-served). This commonly-used policy prioritizes the Ms and Ws equally and serves them in the order they enter Stage 2.

In §EC.1.1, we explicitly compute $a_P$ under all six of the policies described above and establish that these policies are Pareto generators for their respective models:

**Proposition 1** The set {MWO, WMO, WOM} and the set {MW, FCFS, WM} form a set of Pareto generators for the single- and two-server models, respectively.

Fig. 3 shows an example of the achievable region and Pareto frontier for each of the two models. The proof of Proposition 1 establishes that these examples are “representative.” In the single-server model, the allocations under WOM, WMO, and MWO are connected (from the “northwest” to “southeast” in that order) by two line segments, where the latter segment is steeper. Meanwhile, in the two-server model, $a_{\text{FCFS}}$ lies on the line segment running from $a_{\text{WM}}$ southeast to $a_{\text{MW}}$; i.e., FCFS is an extraneous generator, in the sense that {MW, WM} also forms a set of Pareto generators.
Finally, we turn our attention to one particular metric that is often of interest to system designers: the overall mean sojourn time \( E_p[T] \equiv (\lambda_w E_p[T_w] + \lambda_m E_p[T_m]) / \Lambda \) (as opposed to its class-specific counterparts). While any policy \( P \) minimizing \( E_p[T] \) must be Pareto optimal, it is natural to ask if the converse of this statement is true, i.e., does any \( P \in \mathcal{P}^* \) minimize \( E_p[T] \)? The following result answers this question in the affirmative for the two-server model, while highlighting WOM as a counterexample to the converse in the single-server model:

**Proposition 2**  
(a) In the single-server model, a work-conserving prioritization policy minimizes the overall mean sojourn time if it preemptively prioritizes customers in Stage 2 over those in Stage 1; consequently, WMO and MWO are optimal. Meanwhile, WOM is suboptimal with respect to the overall mean sojourn time despite being Pareto optimal. (b) In the two-server model, all Pareto optimal policies are optimal with respect to the overall mean sojourn time.

This section highlighted how each customer class affects the other. The “interaction” between the two classes becomes more complicated once we consider strategic behavior on the part of customers with finite patience levels, which is the focus of the next two sections.

5 Analysis: The Case of Customers with Finite Patience

In the setting where customers have finite patience levels, i.e., \( T_{w, m}^{\text{max}} < \infty \), we need to consider customers’ strategic joining behavior. We are interested in the equilibrium strategy profiles that emerge under policies we identified as Pareto generators in the infinite patience case (see §4). Recall that walk-ins observe the current Stage 1 occupancy \( N_1 \) upon arrival, while mobiles observe nothing. As implied by our choice of notation, each of \( E_{(b, p_m)}(T_w | N_1 = i) \) and \( E_{(b, p_m)}(T_m) \) can depend on both \( b \) and \( p_m \). Hence, given a policy \( P \), we seek to find an equilibrium of the form \((b^*, p_m^*)\) where

---

**Figure 3**  
Examples of the achievable region for the parameter setting \( \lambda_w = 0.1, \lambda_m = 0.5, \mu_1 = \mu_2 = 1 \).
(i) $b^*$ is the equilibrium threshold such that $E^p_{(b^*, p_m^*)}[T_w|N_1 = i] \leq T_w^{\max}$ whenever $N_1 = i \leq b^*$ and
(ii) $p_m^*$ is the highest probability with which mobiles can join while ensuring that $E^p_{(b^*, p_m^*)}[T_m] \leq T_m^{\max}$.

Formalizing, we have the following necessary and sufficient conditions on equilibrium $(b^*, p_m^*)$:

$$E^p_{(b^*, p_m^*)}[T_w|N_1 = i] \leq T_w^{\max}, \quad \forall i \in \{0, 1, \ldots, b^* - 1\},$$

$$E^p_{(b^*, p_m^*)}[T_w|N_1 = b^*] > T_w^{\max},$$

$$\arg \max\{p_m \in [0, 1]: E^p_{(b^*, p_m^*)}[T_m] \leq T_m^{\max}\} = p_m^*,$$

where $\arg \max\{\emptyset\} \equiv 0$. While Assumption 1 guarantees that $E^p_{(b^*, p_m)}[T_w|N_1 = i] < \infty$ and $E^p_{(b^*, p_m)}[T_m] < \infty$ for all policies $P$ under consideration, $b \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$, and $p_m \in [0, 1]$, we will see in §6 that neither the uniqueness nor the existence of equilibria is guaranteed.

### 5.1 Determining Equilibria in the Finite Patience Model

We proceed by discussing our method of finding equilibria, which applies to both the single- and two-server models with minimal differences. The method requires one to obtain $E^p_{(b, p_m)}[T_w|N_1 = i]$ and $E^p_{(b, p_m)}[T_m]$. For now, we assume these expressions are given, deferring their derivations for the single- and two-server models to §§5.2 and 5.3, respectively. The following proposition simplifies the process of searching for equilibria by limiting the candidate values of threshold $b$ and establishing that there exists a mobile joining probability $p_m$ that is a “best response” to any threshold $b$.

**Proposition 3** For any fixed threshold $b$ and any $P \in \{\text{MWO, WMO, WOM}\}$ (in the single-server model) or $P \in \{\text{MW, WM, FCFS}\}$ (in the two-server model):

(a) If we take $p_m$ to be a value such that $(b, p_m)$ is an equilibrium under $P$, then the threshold $b < B \equiv \mu_1(T_w^{\max} - 1/\mu_2)$.

(b) When we view $p_m \in [0, 1]$ as a variable, the expected sojourn time of mobiles $E^p_{(b, p_m)}[T_m]$ is strictly increasing in $p_m$.

Proposition 3(a) simplifies the process of searching for an equilibrium threshold $b$, requiring us to consider only finitely many cases, $b \in \{0, 1, \ldots, \lfloor B \rfloor - 1\}$ (for all six policies of interest). Given a policy $P$, for each possible $b \in \{0, 1, \ldots, \lfloor B \rfloor - 1\}$ (where the bound $B \equiv \mu_1(T_w^{\max} - 1/\mu_2)$ or some better bound if available), we compute

$$p_m(b) \equiv \sup\{p_m \in [0, 1]: E^p_{(b, p_m)}[T_m] \leq T_m^{\max}\},$$

where $\sup\{\emptyset\} \equiv 0$. Meanwhile, Proposition 3(b) (together with the continuity of the mobiles’ mean sojourn time in $p_m$) guarantees the existence of $p_m(b)$. Specifically, $p_m(b) = 1$ if $E^p_{(b, 1)}[T_m] \leq T_m^{\max}$, $p_m(b) = 0$ if $E^p_{(b, 0)}[T_m] > T_m^{\max}$, and $p_m(b) = f_b^{-1}(T_m^{\max})$ (letting the function $f_b(\cdot) \equiv E^p_{(b, \cdot)}[T_m]$) in any other case. While $f_b^{-1}(T_m^{\max})$ is well-defined, it may not be possible to
compute it exactly, in which case we can resort to arbitrarily accurate numerical inversion techniques (e.g., the bisection method). Finally, we must check whether each \((b, p_m(b))\) pair is an equilibrium; this is the case if and only if \(E_p(b, p_m(b))|T_w|N_1 = i \leq T_{w}^{\max}\), for each \(i \in \{0, 1, \ldots, b - 1\}\), and \(E_p(b, p_m(b))|T_w|N_1 = b > T_{w}^{\max}\).

To complete our analysis, we obtain \(E_p(b, p_m(b))|T_w|N_1 = i\) and \(E_p(b, p_m(b))|T_m\) for the single- and two-server policies of interest in §§5.2 and 5.3, respectively. We begin each discussion with an examination of the continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) governing \((N_1, N_2)\) and/or \((N_1, N_{2,w})\), where \(N_{2,w}\) is the number of \(W\) tasks in Stage 2. In particular, we must find the steady-state limiting probability distributions of these chains, which we denote by \(\pi_p(b, p_m)\) \((i, j) = \pi_p(b, p_m)(N_1 = i, N_2 = j)\) and \(\phi_p(b, p_m)\) \((i, j) = \phi_p(b, p_m)(N_1 = i, N_{2,w} = j)\) for any policy \(P\) and strategy profile \((b, p_m)\).

### 5.2 Single-Server Finite Patience Model: Mean Sojourn Times

We derive exact expressions for the mean sojourn times in the single-server model under policies MWO, WMO, and WOM by analyzing their underlying CTMCs. We begin with MWO and WMO, under which \((N_1, N_2) \in \{0, 1, \ldots, b\} \times \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}\) evolves according to the same CTMC (Fig. 4a). We use the limiting probabilities of this CTMC \((\pi^{\text{MWO}}(i, j) = \pi^{\text{WMO}}(i, j))\) in terms of infinite series later to derive the mean sojourn times. For any specified value of \(b \in \{0, 1, \ldots, B - 1\}\), these limiting probabilities—and hence, the expected sojourn times of interest—can be determined in closed form (see §EC.3.1).

To find the mean sojourn times under WOM, rather than analyzing the CTMC governing \((N_1, N_2)\), we analyze a chain with state variables \((N_1, N_{2,w}) \in \{0, 1, \ldots, b\} \times \{0, 1\}\) where \(N_{2,w}\) is the number of \(W\)s in Stage 2. Note that under WOM, Os (i.e., walk-ins in Stage 1) receive service only when there are no \(W\)s in the system. Moreover, once a walk-in’s O task completes service at Stage 1, their \(W\) task arrives to Stage 2 and immediately receives the highest priority, entering service, and precluding the service of any Os until its service completion. Hence, there can be at most one \(W\) in the system at any given time under WOM, resulting in the finite-state CTMC illustrated in Fig. 4b. The chain’s finite state space allows for the straightforward determination of its exact limiting probabilities, \(\phi^{\text{WOM}}(i, j)\) (see §EC.3.2). In the special case where \(b = 0\), we have a degenerate chain where \(\phi^{\text{WOM}}(0, 0) = 1\). In any case, the limiting probabilities allow us to express the conditional expected sojourn time \(E_{\text{WOM}}(i, j) = E_p(b, p_m)|T_w|N_1 = i\).

On the other hand, the \(\phi^{\text{WOM}}(i, j)\) values do not immediately lend themselves to determining \(E_p(b, p_m)|T_m\). Instead, we express \(E_{\text{WOM}}(i, j) = E_p(b, p_m)|T_m\) in terms of the first and second moments of two hitting time random variables, \(U\) and \(V\), which depend on \((b, p_m)\) (for the computation of these moments—which can be found in closed-form for any specified value of \(b\)—see §EC.3.3): \(U\) represents the waiting time of a mobile (i.e., the duration from arrival time until service begins) who
arrives when there are no other mobiles in the system, while $V$ represents the sojourn time of a mobile who enters an empty system.

Carrying out the analysis described above for all three policies of interest, we obtain all of the desired expected sojourn times in the following proposition:

**Proposition 4** Under MWO, WMO, and WOM in the single-server model, we have

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{MWO}}[T_m] &= \frac{1}{\mu_2 - p_m \lambda_m} \\
\mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{MWO}}[T_w|N_1 = i] &= \left( \frac{\mu_2}{\mu_1} + 1 \right) (i + 1) + \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} j \pi_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{MWO}}(i,j) \int_0^{\infty} \int_0^{\infty} \frac{\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \pi_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{MWO}}(i,j)}{\mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{MWO}}[T_m]} dT_m \\
\mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{WOM}}[T_m] &= \frac{1}{\mu_2} \left( 1 + \sum_{i=0}^{b} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} j \pi_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{WOM}}(i,j) \right) \\
\mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{WOM}}[T_w|N_1 = i] &= \frac{1}{\mu_2} - \frac{\mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{MWO}}[T_m]}{\mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{MWO}}[T_m]} + \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{MWO}}[T_m]\mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{WOM}}[T_w|N_1 = i] \\
\mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{WOM}}[T_m] &= \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{WOM}}[V] + \frac{\lambda_m \lambda_m \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{WOM}}[V^2]}{2 (1 - p_m \lambda_m \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{WOM}}[V^2]) + 2 \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{WOM}}[U] + p_m \lambda_m \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{WOM}}[U^2] + \frac{2 \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{WOM}}[U]}{\phi_{(b,p_m)}(i,1) + \phi_{(b,p_m)}(i,0)} \\
\mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{WOM}}[T_w|N_1 = i] &= (i + 1) \frac{1}{\mu_1} + \frac{1}{\mu_2} + \frac{\lambda_m \lambda_m \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{WOM}}[V]}{2 (1 - p_m \lambda_m \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{WOM}}[V^2]) + 2 \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{WOM}}[U] + p_m \lambda_m \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{WOM}}[U^2] + \frac{2 \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{\text{WOM}}[U]}{\phi_{(b,p_m)}(i,1) + \phi_{(b,p_m)}(i,0)} \\
\end{align*}
\]

The results presented in Proposition 4 can then be used to determine the equilibria of the form $(b^*, p_m^*)$ in the single-server model under all three prioritization policies of interest.
5.3 Two-Server Finite Patience Model: Mean Sojourn Times

We proceed to seek expressions for the appropriate expected sojourn times in the two-server model—again with the ultimate goal of determining equilibria of the form \((b^*, p^*_m)\). Determining such expected sojourn times for the two-server model will often necessitate analyzing intractable infinite-state CTMCs and computing infinite sums over recursively defined quantities. Consequently, unlike in the single-server model, the expected sojourn times in the two-server model cannot generally be expressed in closed form (with \(E_{(b, p_m)}^{MW}[T_m]\) being a notable exception). While we provide exact expressions for all sojourn times of interest, these expressions will be in terms of auxiliary quantities (e.g., infinite sums of limiting probabilities) that cannot be determined exactly; we provide methods for approximating these quantities throughout §EC.3.

Under the two-server policies—MW, WM, and FCFS—the system occupancy \((N_1, N_2) \in \{0, 1, \ldots, b\} \times \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}\) evolves according to the Fig. 5a CTMC. Our analysis requires the limiting probabilities \(\pi_{TS}^{(b, p_m)}(i, j)\) of this CTMC (where TS stands for our three policies of interest in the Two-Server model), which can be approximated with arbitrary accuracy (see §EC.3.4).

Prioritization plays a less critical role in the two-server model, as it only affects Stage 2 tasks. However, in this model, service can be provided at both stages simultaneously; this complicates system dynamics, leading to significant analytic challenges. For example, consider the FCFS policy: a tagged walk-in must infer the distribution of \(N_2\) based on the observed value of \(N_1\) upon
arrival. Even if the tagged walk-in knows \( N_2 = j \) with certainty when they arrive, by the time they finally reach Stage 2, the occupancy there may have varied significantly from \( j \) due to arrivals and departures. Hence, the tagged walk-in’s conditional expected sojourn time is

\[
E[T_w|N_1 = i] = (i + 1)/\mu_1 + Y(i, j),
\]

where \( Y(i, j) \) is the expected workload that the tagged walk-in will encounter at Stage 2 once it arrives there, given that they initially observed \( N_1 = i \) and \( N_2 = j \) when first arriving at Stage 1. By the workload at Stage 2, we mean the amount of time needed to clear all Stage 2 tasks—including the tagged walk-in’s task—assuming no further arrivals to Stage 2.

Determining the expected workload \( Y(i, j) \) requires transient queueing analysis while determining the distribution of \( N_2 \) conditioned on \( N_1 = i \) requires steady-state analysis. To allow for transient analysis, let \( \{M_\rho(t)\}_{t \geq 0} \) denote the number of customers in an M/M/1 system under load \( \rho \in (0, \infty) \) at time \( t \) and \( \{t_n\}_{n \geq 1} \) denote the time of the \( n \)-th Poisson arrival to this system since time 0. Now consider Definition 1, adapted from Kaczynski et al. (2012):

**Definition 1** For integers \( u \geq 0 \), \( v \geq 1 \), and \( w \in \{1, 2, \ldots, u + v\} \), let \( P(u, v, w; \rho) \equiv \mathbb{P}(M_\rho(t_w) = w | M_\rho(0) = u) \); i.e., \( P(u, v, w; \rho) \) is the probability that the occupancy of an M/M/1 system under load \( \rho > 0 \) transitions from \( u \) to \( w \) after exactly \( v \) further arrivals.

Lemma 1 expresses \( Y(i, j) \) exactly in terms of infinite sums of these probabilities, which allows for \( Y(i, j) \)—and further infinite sums expressed in terms of \( Y(i, j) \)—to be approximated by using sum truncation together with a recursive method presented in Kaczynski et al. (2012) for computing the \( P(u, v, w; \rho) \) exactly (see §EC.3.5 for details).

**Lemma 1** If a walk-in joins a two-server system when \( (N_1, N_2) = (i, j) \), the expected Stage 2 workload upon arrival of this customer to Stage 2 (including the customer’s own Stage 2 service requirement) under any work-conserving policy is given by:

\[
Y(i, j) = \left( \frac{\mu_1}{\mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m} \right)^{i+1} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \sum_{\ell=1}^{i+j+k+1} \frac{\ell}{\mu_2} P\left( j, i + k + 1, \ell; \frac{\mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m}{\mu_2} \right) \left( \frac{k+i}{k} \right) \left( \frac{p_m \lambda_m}{\mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m} \right)^k.
\]  

(4)

The probabilities \( P(u, v, w; \rho) \) are also instrumental in deriving the mean sojourn times under the WM policy. Under WM, \( (N_1, N_2) \) is again governed by the Fig. 5a CTMC, with limiting probabilities \( \pi^{TS}_{(b, p_m)}(i, j) \). However, in this case, we are also interested \( (N_1, N_{2,w}) \in \{0, 1, \ldots, b\} \times \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0} \), which is governed by the CTMC depicted in depicted in Fig. 5b. In particular, we need the limiting probabilities of this chain \( \phi^{WM}_{(b, p_m)}(i, j) \), which we can approximate with arbitrary accuracy (see §EC.3.7). We also need the expectation of the “hitting time” random variable \( Z(i, j) \), which represents the time it takes to reach a state where \( N_{2,w} = 0 \) from state \( (N_1, N_{2,w}) = (i, j) \) under WM, given the strategy profile \((b, p_m)\), i.e., \( Z(i, j) \sim \inf\{s \geq 0: N_{2,w}(t+s) = 0 | N_1(t) = i, N_{2,w}(t) = j\}, \forall t \geq 0 \). Details on approximating \( \mathbb{E}_{(b, p_m)}^{WM}[Z(i, j)] \) with arbitrary precision are given in §EC.3.8.
Carrying out performance analysis for all three policies of interest in the two-server setting, we obtain the following results for the sojourn times of interest in terms of the problem parameters and sums involving \( P(u,v,w;\rho) \), \( Y(i,j) \), and/or \( \mathbb{E}^{WM}_{(b,p_u)}[Z(i,j)] \).

**Proposition 5** Under MW, FCFS, and WM in the two-server model, we have

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathbb{E}^{MW}_{(b,p_u)}[T_m] &= \frac{1}{\mu_2 - \rho_m \lambda_m} \\
\mathbb{E}^{MW}_{(b,p_u)}[T_w|N_1 = i] &= \frac{i + 1}{\mu_1} + \frac{1}{1 - \rho_m \lambda_m / \mu_2} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} Y(i,j) \pi^{TS}_{(b,p_u)}(i,j) / \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \pi^{TS}_{(b,p_u)}(i,j), \\
\mathbb{E}^{FCFS}_{(b,p_u)}[T_m] &= \frac{1}{\mu_2} \left( 1 + \sum_{i=0}^{b} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} j \pi^{TS}_{(b,p_u)}(i,j) \right) \\
\mathbb{E}^{FCFS}_{(b,p_u)}[T_w|N_1 = i] &= \frac{i + 1}{\mu_1} + \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} Y(i,j) \pi^{TS}_{(b,p_u)}(i,j) / \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \pi^{TS}_{(b,p_u)}(i,j), \\
\mathbb{E}^{WM}_{(b,p_u)}[T_m] &= \sum_{i=0}^{b} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \mathbb{E}^{WM}_{(b,p_u)}[Z(i,j + 1)] \pi^{TS}_{(b,p_u)}(i,j) \\
\mathbb{E}^{WM}_{(b,p_u)}[T_w|N_1 = i] &= \frac{i + 1}{\mu_1} + \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \sum_{\ell=0}^{i+j+1} \ell \rho \left( j, i+1, \ell; \frac{\mu_1}{\mu_2} \right) \phi^{WM}_{(b,p_u)}(i,j) / \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi^{WM}_{(b,p_u)}(i,j).
\end{align*}
\]

### 6 Results and Insights

This section employs our equilibrium determination methodology in the case of finite patience levels (outlined in §5) to explore the impact of our two service design choices on throughput and social welfare: (1) whether to offer a mobile ordering option and, if so (2) the prioritization policy to be implemented. We investigate what happens if a single-channel walk-in only system transitions to an omni-channel system when an exogenous fraction \( \alpha \in [0,1] \) of customers “adopt” the new technology once the app is introduced, converting from being walk-ins to mobiles (i.e., \( \lambda_w = (1 - \alpha)\Lambda \) and \( \lambda_m = \alpha\Lambda \)). Note that the “market size” (i.e., \( \Lambda \)) remains unchanged after the app introduction; we investigate the case where the app expands the market to §7.1. We examine what occurs under the new steady-state equilibrium resulting from the adoption of the app. In reality, some new customers who were previously uninterested in the single-channel system may also adopt the service (allowing for an increase in \( \Lambda \)); while we do not consider this possibility in the interest of brevity, we can study such scenarios using the same methods by setting \( \lambda_w \) and \( \lambda_m \) to any desired values.

#### 6.1 Illustration of the Adoption Rate Impact

This section demonstrates the possible impact of the adoption rate \( \alpha \) on the normalized throughputs and social welfare \( SW^p_{(b,p_u)} \), using an illustrative problem instance; we note that other problem instances can lead to different phenomena (and result in different plots) and we differ an examination of the impact of parameters to §6.2.

This problem instance considers a single-server system in which walk-ins are less patient \( T_{w}^{\max} = 5.2 < T_{m}^{\max} = 8 \), with this difference in patience times coming as a result of differing waiting costs.
(but identical rewards attained from receiving service). For illustration, we generate the plots in Figs. 6a and 6b, by computing equilibria and the resulting metrics for the adoption rate $\alpha \in \{0, 0.005, \ldots , 0.995, 1\}$. Some $\alpha$ values result in multiple equilibria for a policy (the gray regions). Furthermore, at some $\alpha$ values, no pure strategy on the part of walk-ins yields an equilibrium (the yellow regions). Therefore, we plot the metrics associated with a mixed strategy equilibrium on walk-ins by relaxing the assumption that the indifferent walk-ins join; i.e., arriving walk-ins randomize their joining when $b - 1$ other customers are in the Stage 1 queue (see §EC.4.1).

According to Fig. 6a, although WMO always performs at least as well as MWO, the two policies yield the same throughput for most adoption rates (orange-blue dashed curves) due to the discrete nature of the walk-ins’ equilibrium threshold $b^*$. As a higher mobile adoption alleviates Stage 1’s load —and because mobiles are more patient in this case—unsurprisingly, a higher $\alpha$ tends to improve the throughput. Nevertheless, $\alpha$’s increase may trigger a discontinuous drop in the throughput due to a downward shift of size one in $b^*$. That is, a slight rise in $\alpha$ could minimally affect mobiles’ throughput while notably reducing the throughput of walk-ins, as the walk-ins are balking at a shorter queue length than they would at the slightly lower $\alpha$ value; the result would be a net drop in the overall throughput. As WOM aggressively favors walk-ins, mobiles do not join when $\alpha$ is below A. Due to the lack of mobile participation, the overall throughput is initially decreasing in $\alpha$, because the arrival rate of walk-ins $\lambda_w = (1 - \alpha)\Lambda$ is decreasing in $\alpha$ and only walk-ins are contributing to the throughput before the mobiles begin to join. Once $\alpha$ exceeds A,
$\lambda_w$ is low enough to allow a fraction of mobiles to join using a mixed strategy, $p_m \in (0, 1)$. At adoption rates beyond point B, enough mobiles opt to join such that WOM outperforms the other two policies. Finally, when the adoption rate is beyond a threshold (point C), all mobiles join ($p_m = 1$) as service interruptions due to walk-ins become sufficiently infrequent.

As expected, there is little throughput benefit in offering the app when the adoption rate is very low (below point D). Most surprisingly, the no-app benchmark outperforms all three policies for $\alpha$ between points D and E. This examples serves to show that the omni-channel structure is not always beneficial. Below we provide intuition for why an increase in $\alpha$ may be detrimental to throughput even when choosing the best among the three policies, and in particular, why settings exist where all three policies perform worse than not offering an app at all.

First, recall that an $\alpha$ fraction of those who would be walk-ins in the “no-app” scenario will be mobiles when the app is introduced. Intuitively, we may reason that since mobiles self-order, they require less service than walk-ins, thus allowing for less operational load on the system when throughput is held fixed, which may allow for greater total throughput in equilibrium. One possible corrective to this argument is that if mobiles are (sufficiently) less patient than walk-ins, then replacing walk-ins with mobiles may be detrimental with respect to throughput, because mobiles may be more likely to balk than walk-ins; however, this counterargument does not apply to the current example, because mobiles are actually more patient than walk-ins; so, the conversion of walk-ins to mobiles must sometimes introduce a type of inefficiency that is sufficient to overcome both their reduced needs and their greater patience. Such an inefficiency can arise from the different available information for walk-ins and mobiles when making their joining decision: walk-ins observe the queue length at Stage 1, whereas mobiles observe nothing. Depending on the setting, having less information can either induce or deter joining. See Lingenbrink and Iyer (2019) for a thorough investigation of this phenomenon in a single-class M/M/1 setting. While we can prioritize mobiles when their lack of queue length information leads them to balk, this may impose too great an externality on the walk-ins. Ultimately, we find that when some would-be walk-ins become mobiles, information loss and/or inter-class externalities can sometimes outweigh the potential throughput gain from the mobiles’ reduced service (even when mobiles are more patient).

Turning our attention to social welfare, according to Fig. 6b, MWO and WMO outperform the no-app benchmark for the vast majority of $\alpha$ values. Social welfare tends to increase with $\alpha$ partially because the average system-wide patience level also increases with $\alpha$ (because $T_m^{\text{max}} > T_w^{\text{max}}$ in this problem instance). On the other hand, aggressive prioritization of walk-ins (i.e., WOM) often yields considerably lower social welfare than the no-app benchmark; by prioritizing walk-ins—who have higher service requirements than mobiles—WOM yields relatively poor mean sojourn times and hence lower social welfare.
We observe qualitatively similar phenomena in the two-server model. Specifically, Fig. 7a shows that in a two-server setting with equally patient customer classes, there once again exist values of $\alpha$ where the no-app benchmark dominates the other three policies with respect to throughput. Beyond these very small $\alpha$ values, the best-performing policy with respect to throughput is FCFS at moderate $\alpha$ values (tied with MW when $\alpha$ is fairly low) and WM at high $\alpha$ values. Moreover, Fig. 7b reveals that it is even possible for all three policies to underperform the no-app benchmark with respect to social welfare (even at $\alpha=1$). The dominance of the no-app at $\alpha=1$ is initially counter-intuitive: Moving from a customer base of all walk-ins (no-app) to one of all mobiles ($\alpha=1$)—who require less service, are equally patient, and equally numerous—may be expected to generate higher social welfare. It turns out that in the “all walk-in” (no-app) case, about 20% (see the dashed red line in Fig. 7a where $X/\Lambda \approx 0.8$) of customers balk. This throughput inefficiency in the no-app case has a beneficial side effect of reducing congestion and hence expected sojourn times. As a result, despite (in fact, because of) the lower throughput in the no-app case, reduced congestion allows the average customer to experience a greater surplus (i.e., contribution to social welfare) than what they would experience in the omni-channel system at some $\alpha$ values, including the “all mobile” system. Apart from an intermediate region where $\alpha$ is roughly between 28%–40%, the policy that prioritizes mobiles (i.e., MW) performs very well with respect to social welfare until $\alpha > 90\%$, where the congestion effect sharply increases the overall mean sojourn time. These results suggest a rich space of trade-offs between throughput and social welfare.
6.2 Full Factorial Experiment

In §6.1, we showed through illustrative examples that introducing the self-ordering technology may sometimes hurt throughput and social welfare. To explore the generality of this observation and other discussions provided in §6.1, we design an extensive problem set by setting \( \lambda = 1 \) and varying the other parameters as follows: \( \mu_2 \in \{1.5, 2, 2.5, 3\} \), \( \mu_1/\mu_2 \in \{0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4\} \), \( \alpha \in \{0.05, 0.15, \ldots, 0.95\} \), and \( T_{m}^{\max} \in \{0.5, 1, 2, 4\} \), \( T_{w}^{\max}/T_{m}^{\max} \in \{0.8, 1, 1.25\} \). We focus on the single-server model under which we can obtain all expected sojourn times exactly. Of the 2400 possible combinations, we remove 980 instances where customers of at least one class are too impatient to join even an empty system (i.e., \( b = 0 \) is the best response to \( p_{m} = 0 \) or vice-versa; such cases occur precisely when \( T_{w}^{\max} \leq 1/\mu_1 + 1/\mu_2 \) or \( T_{m}^{\max} \leq 1/\mu_2 \)). We do not remove cases where Assumption 1 is violated; such violations merely limit the space of feasible \( b \) and \( p_{m} \) that yield finite sojourn times and do not preclude the existence of equilibria.

For each problem instance, we record the policy that yields the highest throughput (including the no-app scenario with \( \alpha = 0 \)). Occasionally, there will be a tie for the highest throughput between MWO and WMO; where possible, we break such ties in favor of the policy with the higher social welfare, while in the remaining cases—where the systems behave identically—we report a tie. In summary, we list our key observations below:

- **In most settings** (93.2% of problem instances), introducing the app using the optimal prioritization policy increases the throughput. Under the optimal policy, throughput increases almost linearly with the adoption rate (see Fig. 9).

- **In some settings** (6.8% of problem instances), introducing the app, even using the optimal policy, reduces the throughput substantially (on average, 12.4%).

- Prioritizing walk-ins (i.e., WMO) is often the best policy (61.1% of problem instances), but the regret from suboptimally employing it is the highest (on average, 8.4%).

We elaborate on these and other observations in the remainder of this section.

**When should an omni-channel structure be employed?** According to Table 1, transitioning to an omni-channel setting reduces the throughput in 96 (6.8% of the) experiments. This suggests that the detrimental effect of app introduction is not so unlikely that it can be safely dismissed out of hand. Across these 96 no-app cases, the throughput loss resulting from suboptimally offering the app (compared to the policy that generates the highest throughput) can be as high as 40.3%, with a mean of 12.4% (see Table 2).

Based on Fig. 8, the incidence of no-app cases initially increases with the adoption rate, peaking at \( \alpha = 0.25 \), after which the frequency of these cases drops monotonically; two-thirds of no-app cases occur in the lower half of the \( \alpha \) values examined (i.e., between 0.05 and 0.45). As expected, the likelihood of these cases decreases as \( T_{m}^{\max} \) grows: more patience among mobiles is favorable
Table 1  Policies and associated regrets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No-app</th>
<th>MWO</th>
<th>WMO</th>
<th>WOM</th>
<th>Tie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Optimality freq.</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimality prop. (%)</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regret prop. (%)</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regret magn. (%)</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2  Throughput loss of suboptimally offering the app

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Std. dev.</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8  Impact of parameters on the optimality proportion. (No app: , MWO: , WMO: , WOM: , MWO & WMO tie: )

for the app introduction. Note that for a fixed $T_{w}^{\text{max}}/T_{m}^{\text{max}}$, $T_{w}^{\text{max}}$ grows along with $T_{m}^{\text{max}}$, but more patience among walk-ins is also favorable for app introduction as walk-ins will be willing to wait behind mobiles, under say MWO. Similarly, the likelihood of such cases drops as $\mu_{2}$ rises (and $\mu_{1}$ with it): faster service rates play a similar role to that of higher patience levels. On the other hand, there is no such clear trend associated with $T_{w}^{\text{max}}/T_{m}^{\text{max}}$, although we note that the no-app cases
are more likely to arise when $T_w^{\text{max}} > T_m^{\text{max}}$. Meanwhile, cases where app introduction is detrimental rise sharply with $\mu_1/\mu_2$. The faster the walk-in’s service at Stage 1 (relative to that at Stage 2), the less significant the advantage of bypassing Stage 1; consequently, the operational advantage of offering a mobile-ordering option diminishes as $\mu_1/\mu_2$ increases.

**What prioritization policy should be implemented?** Based on Table 1, WOM outperforms the other policies in 61.1% of our experiments. Table 1 also quantifies the regret associated with choosing a policy and implementing it across all experiments in terms of the “proportion” of experiments where another policy would yield either greater throughput or the same throughput (but greater social welfare) and the “magnitude” of this regret (average throughput loss relative to the optimal policy). Prioritizing walk-ins (i.e., WOM) generates regret in the fewest experiments by far. However, it performs quite poorly when suboptimal. This observation is corroborated by Fig. 9, which plots the average throughput change as a function of $\alpha$ relative to the no-app case.

We attribute the widespread dominance of WOM (and the lesser success of the other two policies) to the fact that it is possible to achieve mobile throughput optimality (i.e., $p_m = 1$) in many experiments, even when prioritizing walk-ins. As long as the full participation of mobiles can be guaranteed, the problem of maximizing the overall throughput reduces to maximizing that of walk-ins, which is achieved through WOM. As (i) faster service, (ii) a reduction in the share of customers that are walk-ins (i.e., increased adoption rate), and (iii) more mobile patience all tend to reduce the effect of the negative externality imposed on mobiles by the prioritization of walk-ins, the number of instances in which WOM is optimal increases with (i) $\mu_2$ (and $\mu_1/\mu_2$), (ii) $\alpha$, and (iii) $T_m^{\text{max}}$ (Fig. 8). On the other hand, these instances become more rare as $T_w^{\text{max}}/T_m^{\text{max}}$ increases:

![Figure 9](image_url)
when the ratio of walk-in patience to mobile patience grows—and the latter is not high enough to guarantee \( p_m = 1 \) under WOM—the alternative policies (i.e., MWO and WMO) tend to become more favorable. We can explain this tendency by observing that while prioritizing mobiles can lead to both a mobile throughput gain and a walk-in throughput loss, as \( T_{w}^{\text{max}} / T_{m}^{\text{max}} \) grows, it becomes increasingly likely that the gain will outweigh the loss.

7 Discussion of Modeling Modifications

In the previous section, we assumed that offering the app causes an *exogenously given* fraction of potential customers, \( \alpha \), to place orders through the app instead of walking in for service, while the overall size of the market (i.e., the total potential arrival rate \( \Lambda \)) remains unchanged. In this section, we explore relaxations of the endogeneity and fixed market size assumptions. First, we elaborate on what happens when the market size can expand when the app is introduced (§7.1). Next, we sketch two methods of endogenizing app adoption such that (at least some) customers choose their channel (walk-in vs. mobile) strategically, either prior to their arrival (§7.2) or after they arrive and observe the queue length at Stage 1 (§7.3). The performance analysis of these two endogenized models constitutes a straightforward (although involved) modification of the analysis presented in this paper and its appendices. However, we anticipate that the equilibrium analysis of these models will present new challenges due to the greater complexity in the space of possible. Therefore, we relegate the detailed study of these models to future work.

7.1 Market expansion

In this section, we consider that the app can also be adopted by new customers who would not have been customers were the app unavailable; i.e., the introduction of the app leads to *market expansion* through an increase in the total potential arrival rate \( \Lambda \).

Since \( \Lambda = \lambda_w + \lambda_m \) can change as the market grows, we use \( \Lambda_0 \) to represent the total potential arrival rate in the absence of market expansion, i.e., \( \Lambda_0 \) coincides with \( \Lambda \) in the no-app case. We now capture adoption via two parameters: (i) \( \alpha \in [0, 1] \), as before, is the fraction of walk-ins who “convert” to being mobiles once the app is offered, and (ii) \( \beta \in [0, \infty) \) captures the market size growth—represented as a multiple of \( \Lambda_0 \)—due to new customers who would not have considered using the service prior in the absence of the app; i.e., we have \( \lambda_w = (1 - \alpha)\Lambda_0 \) and \( \lambda_m = (\alpha + \beta)\Lambda_0 \), so that the overall market size \( \Lambda = (1 + \beta)\Lambda_0 \).

In Fig. 10, we examine two possible setting to model market expansion. In setting (a) \( \beta \) is proportional to \( \alpha \), while in setting (b) \( \alpha = 0 \), so that offering the app causes the market to grow by a factor of \( 1 + \beta \), without a reduction in \( \lambda_w \). Examining the setting (a), we find that there exist pairs of nonzero \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) such that not offering the app dominates all three of MWO, WMO, and WOM with respect to throughput. Therefore, even market expansion can fail to overcome throughput loss
induced by the “converted” walk-ins’ loss of information and/or inter-class externalities. Whenever some or all mobiles opt to balk in equilibrium under the throughput-maximizing prioritization policy, an increase in \( \beta \) will fail to increase the throughput, unless \( \beta \) were sufficiently high enough to induce a change in the optimal policy.

On the other hand, in setting (b), where \( \alpha = 0 \), we cannot find any values of \( \beta \) such that “no-app” dominates all three policies. Indeed, it must always be the case that no-app cannot outperform WOM (with respect to throughput) when \( \alpha = 0 \). This is because \( \lambda_w \) remains constant in \( \beta \) when \( \alpha = 0 \), and allowing some mobiles to join the system does not affect the walk-ins since they have full priority. Consequently, \( \chi_w \) (the throughput due to walk-ins) is the same under no-app and WOM for all \( \beta \geq 0 \) when \( \alpha = 0 \). Moreover, since the overall throughput is the sum of the class-specific throughput values (i.e., \( X = \chi_w + \chi_m \)) and \( \chi_m = 0 \) under the no-app case while \( \chi_m \geq 0 \) under WOM, the throughput under no-app is no greater than that under WOM.

Our examination of market expansion leads to a qualification of our earliest insights regarding the potential harm of app introduction: it is not the introduction of the app itself that can cause inefficiencies, per se, but rather the potential for the app to lead to a kind of “cannibalization” if and when some of the walk-ins become mobiles (as modeled in setting (a)).

### 7.2 Channel Choice

We now sketch a modification of our model that allows for (some) customers to strategically choose whether they will be a walk-in or a mobile (or balk) based on their anticipated expected sojourn
time in each of these cases. In the simplest case, there is a single customer class where everyone is a “chooser” who strategically chooses a channel in advance. In a more complex setting, we may have three types of customers: ordinary walk-ins (who cannot choose to use the app, perhaps because their phone is incompatible with the app), ordinary mobiles (who cannot approach the store as a walk-in, perhaps because they are habituated to using the app), and choosers. Of course, all three classes of customers still have the option to balk.

In this setting, the choosers select a strategy that specifies a probability distribution over the three options: choosing to be a walk-in, a mobile, or balking. If they choose to be a walk-in with a nonzero probability, their strategy must also specify the probability that they will balk after their arrival given that they observe $N_1 = i$ customers in Stage 1 (for each possible $i$). In equilibrium, a chooser opts for the option with the highest expected utility, while taking the utility of balking to be zero and randomizing when indifferent between two (or three) utility-maximizing alternatives. Denoting the strategy adopted by the choosers (or more generally, the joint strategy adopted by the walk-ins, mobiles, and choosers) as $s$, we must compute $E^P_s[T_w|N_1 = i]$ and $E^P_s[T_m]$. These computations largely mimic those of their analogues in the models without channel choice (as given in Propositions 4-5). Assume that choosers receive a reward $R_c$ from receiving the service, incur a waiting cost $C_c$ per unit time, and balk under $s$ when they arrive as a walk-in and see a queue length under which they anticipate negative utility (which is true in equilibrium). Then, the utility of a chooser associated with being a walk-in under $P$ is $\sum_{i=0}^{\infty} (R_c - C_c E^P_s[T_w|N_1 = i]) + P^P_s(N_1 = i)$, while the utility associated with being a mobile is $R_c - C_c E^P_s[T_m]$. We note that $P^P_s(N_1 = i)$ is straightforward to compute once the relevant limiting probabilities have been determined.

We can make this model even more realistic by introducing the notion of travel times, as the convenience of ordering before one arrives at the service location (and therefore experiencing less of a wait at the conclusion of travel) may attract choosers to opt for the mobile channel. Adopting the modeling approach in Baron et al. (2023) results in all customers incurring a traveling cost unless they opt to balk before traveling; notably, those that opt to walk-in and then balk upon seeing the length of the Stage 1 queue have still incurred the sunk cost of traveling. Adding traveling costs to our model in this fashion is game-theoretically equivalent to increasing a chooser’s utility for the “outside option” (balking before traveling value) from 0 to some value reflecting the travel cost and leaving all other utilities unchanged.

Alternative methods for modeling travel times could allow for distinguishing between the waiting costs experienced during travel and those experienced after one arrives at service location (e.g., the coffee shop) and capturing the phenomenon of quality degradation during travel (see Ghosh et al. 2020). Such models may require taking expectations of nonlinear functions of $T_m$, which may inhibit tractability given our nuanced queueing framework.
7.3 Channel Switching

Another possible model extension is to allow customers to arrive as a walk-in, and then make one of three decisions based on the observed length of the Stage 1 queue: join, balk, or switch to being a mobile. This captures real-world situations where a customer who encounters an unusually long queue might decide to place an order immediately through the app to “jump” the physical queue. Whereas in the previous section where we discussed a type of channel choice where a decision was made in advance, here we discuss how our model can be adapted to accommodate channel switching, which can be thought of as a type of delayed channel choice. Moreover, by analogy with the previous section, in the simplest setting allowing for switching all customers could be “switchers,” whereas in a more complex setting, we could have up to three classes: dedicated walk-ins, dedicates mobiles, and switchers.

Note that simple sample path coupling arguments can show that regardless of the length of the Stage 1 queue observed by the switcher upon arrival, they will always experience a lower sojourn by (i) switching to be a mobile in the single-server model under the MWO and WMO and in the two-server model under MW and FCFS policies or by (ii) remaining a walk-in in the single-server model under WOM.

Among the six policies we studied, only under WM (in the two-server model) does the optimal (i.e., expected sojourn time-minimizing) channel on the Stage 1 queue length. In this setting, the switchers choose a strategy that gives a probability distribution over the three options—joining (as a walk-in), switching, or balking—for each possible observed queue length. In equilibrium, a switcher’s strategy is utility-maximizing. Denoting the strategy adopted by the switchers (or more generally, the joint strategy adopted by the walk-ins, mobiles, and switchers) as \( s \), we must compute \( E_{WM}^{s}[T_w|N_1 = i] \), \( E_{WM}^{s}[T_m] \) (if the model includes mobiles), and \( E_{WM}^{s}[T_m|N_1 = i] \), which can be expressed in forms very similar to the expressions given for \( E_{(b,p_m)}^{(b,p_m)}[T_w|N_1 = i] \), \( E_{(b,p_m)}^{(b,p_m)}[T_m] \), and a conditioned variant of \( E_{(b,p_m)}^{(b,p_m)}[T_m] \), respectively. We note, however, that in these forms, one must replace \( \pi_{TS}^{(b,p_m)}(i,j) \), \( \phi_{(b,p_m)}^{(b,p_m)}(i,j) \), and \( E_{(b,p_m)}^{(b,p_m)}[Z(i,j+1)] \) with analogous quantities associated with the CTMCs that result from the strategy (or joint strategy profile) \( s \).

While the discussion above seems to preclude a rational basis for channel switching under any of the five non-WM policies, this behavior can be rationalized by assuming either (i) that waiting costs are non-linear or (ii) that switchers derive a reward for service (and/or experiencing a waiting cost rate) that depends on their chosen channel. Note that (i) introduces non-linearity, which can further complicate equilibrium analysis. On the other hand, our framework can accommodate (ii) in a more straightforward fashion, as we already allow for differing values of \( T_{m_{max}} \) and \( T_{w_{max}} \). Nevertheless, (ii) may appear to stretch credulity: why would the same customer derive a different reward (before deducting waiting costs) for the same service based on a channel choice decision that is made after
arrival? We could explain this by an appeal to an idiosyncratic preference for one channel over the other (such as a desire for or aversion to human interaction). While idiosyncratic preferences can form part of a reasonable justification for the existence of fixed walk-ins and mobiles in our base model, it is unreasonable to assume that all switchers exhibit the same idiosyncratic preference. Hence, a channel-dependent reward and/or waiting cost modeling assumption is only appropriate when allowing for heterogeneity across the switchers, so that some attach a higher reward to the mobile channel, while others are predisposed to prefer the walk-in channel.

8 Conclusion
This paper utilizes queueing-theoretic techniques to evaluate single- and two-server omni-channel service models in the presence of non-strategic customers with infinite patience levels and strategic customers with finite patience levels. We highlight the importance of prioritization for an efficient transition to an omnichannel service with a finitely-patient customer base. The throughput-optimal policy choice is highly dependent on the operational parameters and on customer patience levels; implementing a wrong policy can yield a significant loss in throughput and, hence, profitability. We uncover a non-negligible number of settings where offering the app under any of the policies we have studied (i.e., Pareto optimal in the setting where customers are infinitely patient) would be detrimental. Such settings arise in the single- and two-server models (and in the former case, even when patience levels are heterogeneous). Such settings also exist (at least in single-server models) when customers exhibit heterogeneous patience levels within each class (see §EC.4.7), and when offering the app leads to an expansion in the size of the market (§7.1).

We believe our contributions open up ample room for future work in game-theoretic queueing models of omni-channel services. First, our results implicitly feature the occasional existence of throughput-welfare trade-offs, suggesting a rich space of problems that would emerge from introducing a (channel-specific) pricing design lever and the objective of profit maximization. Second, mobile apps are beginning to provide delay estimates to customers, suggesting a real-world need for future work to explore models like those in this paper that assume different information structures. As mentioned in §2, Roet-Green and Yuan (2020) have already begun an exploration of this space, and we are optimistic that a detailed examination of a richer model incorporating features of both our models and theirs can shed further light on the dynamics of omni-channel services.

Additionally, future work on customers with finite patience could introduce dynamic (state-dependent) policies and new techniques for analyzing their performance and equilibria. We are particularly curious about how alternate information structures and dynamic policies can avoid or mitigate the potential harm associated with omni-channel services that this paper highlights.

Finally, the blend of queueing-theoretic methods we have employed in evaluating expected sojourn times may have implications beyond omni-channel services. Specifically, our performance
evaluation methods may be seen as the first steps in analyzing a rich space of queueing network models where some—but not all—service stations are buffered. Another interesting direction for future is to consider the possibility of more than one server at each queue.

We conclude by summarizing our key insights. We find that introducing the self-ordering technologies using the optimal prioritization policy generally increases the throughput (and social welfare). However, there exist settings where introducing such technologies, even when implemented optimally, reduces the throughput substantially. This suggests that the detrimental effect of the self-ordering is not so unlikely that it can be safely dismissed out of hand. Hence, the omni-channel structure is not always beneficial. Under the optimal policy, throughput increases as the adoption rate of the self-ordering technology increases and as customers (on the side of walk-ins and mobiles) exhibit higher patience tolerance. With respect to the optimal prioritization policy, prioritizing walk-ins over mobiles is often best as achieving full participation of mobiles is possible in many parameter settings (even when they receive lower priority). However, in some settings, prioritizing mobiles may offer a modest improvement over not offering the app at all, while prioritizing walk-ins over mobiles will scare mobiles away and yield a substantial loss in throughput.

Our findings emphasize the critical role of prioritization in transitioning to an omni-channel service, especially when dealing with a customer base with finite patience. While it is clear that the adoption of mobile ordering technology can lead to increased throughput, the key takeaway here is that the benefits are not universal and heavily rely on implementing the right prioritization policy. One size does not fit all, as the study reveals that introducing the app, even with the optimal policy, can sometimes reduce throughput substantially. Prioritization strategies must be carefully tailored to operational parameters and customer patience levels to maximize profitability.

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Prioritization in the Presence of Self-ordering Opportunities in Omni-channel Services—Technical Appendices.

The following five technical appendices are provided as a supplement to the body of the paper “Prioritization in the Presence of Self-ordering Opportunities in Omni-channel Services.”

First, Appendix EC.1 provides the supplemental results and proofs while Appendix EC.2 provides proofs of the results presented throughout the body of the paper. Second, several quantities discussed in the paper (such as a variety of limiting probability distributions) appear in formulas of the key results, but details on how to compute these quantities (either exactly or approximately) are omitted from the main body of the paper. A discussion on how to obtain these values exactly or approximately is provided in Appendix EC.3. Third, Appendix EC.4 provides a discussion of mixed strategies on the part of walk-ins. Building off of this discussion, this appendix also provides the analysis of the case where patience levels are heterogeneous. Next, Appendix EC.5 presents tables of results associated with the pruned full factorial experiment presented in Section 6 of the body of the paper. Finally, in the interest of aiding the reader, we provide a near-exhaustive table of the notation used throughout the body of the paper and/or these appendices in Appendix EC.6.

EC.1 Supplemental Results

EC.1.1 Allocations under Pareto Generators and Proofs

The following proposition provides the allocations under Pareto generators (MW, WM, FCFS, WMO, and WOM in the single-server model; MW, FCFS, and WM in the two-server model).

**Proposition EC. 1** We summarize the class-specific mean sojourn times as follows:

(a) for the single-server model:

\[
\begin{align*}
    a^{MWO} &= \left( \frac{\mu_2 (\mu_1 + \mu_2 - \Lambda)}{\mu_2 - \lambda_m}, \frac{1}{\mu_2 - \lambda_m} \right) \\
    a^{WMO} &= \left( \frac{\mu_2^3 + \mu_2^2 (\mu_1 - \Lambda) - \mu_2 \lambda_m (\mu_1 - \lambda_w) + \mu_1 \Lambda \lambda_m}{\mu_2 (\mu_2 - \lambda_m)} - \frac{\mu_2 + \lambda_w}{\mu_2 (\mu_2 - \lambda_m)} \right) \\
    a^{WOM} &= \left( \frac{\mu_1 + \mu_2 - \lambda_w}{\mu_1 \mu_2 - (\mu_1 + \mu_2) \lambda_w}, \frac{\mu_2 (\mu_2 - \lambda_m)}{\mu_2 - \lambda_m} \right)
\end{align*}
\]

(b) for the two-server model:

\[
\begin{align*}
    a^{MW} &= \left( \frac{\mu_2}{(\mu_2 - \Lambda)(\mu_2 - \lambda_m)}, \frac{1}{\mu_2 - \lambda_m} \right) \\
    a^{FCFS} &= \left( \frac{\mu_1 + \mu_2 - \lambda_w - \Lambda}{\mu_1 - \lambda_w}, \frac{1}{\mu_2 - \Lambda} \right) \\
    a^{WM} &= \left( \frac{\mu_1 + \mu_2 - 2 \lambda_w}{\mu_1 - \lambda_w (\mu_2 - \lambda_w)}, \frac{\mu_2}{(\mu_2 - \Lambda)(\mu_2 - \lambda_w)} \right)
\end{align*}
\]

Proof of Proposition EC. 1
The one-server model proof. We derive formulas for the one-server model by focusing on one policy at a time.

**MWO (Eq. (EC.1)).** We can view a system under MWO as operating like a two-class M/G/1 system under preemptive-priority scheduling with class-specific service requirement distributions. Under MWO, the mobiles (resp., walk-ins) form the high-priority (resp., low-priority) class and are conventionally designated as class 1 (resp., class 2). Therefore, we can obtain the desired sojourn times by using the formula for the preempt-resume model (where no work is lost under preemption) given in Harchol-Balter (2013) (Chapter 32.2):

\[
E[T_k] = \frac{E[S_k]}{1 - \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} \rho_i} + \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} \rho_i E[S_i^2]/(2E[S_i])}{\left(1 - \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} \rho_i\right) \left(1 - \sum_{i=1}^{k} \rho_i\right)},
\]

(EC.7)

where \(E[T_k]\) is the sojourn time associated with class \(k\), \([S_i]\) and \(E[S_i^2]\) are the first and second moments of the class \(i\) service requirement distribution, and \(\rho_i = \lambda_i E[S_i]\) is the contribution to the load due to class \(i\) (with \(\lambda_i\) the class \(i\) arrival rate).

By observing that under MWO mobiles (resp. walk-ins) require service only at Stage 2 (resp. both Stages 1 and 2), we see that their service requirements are distributed Exp(\(\mu_2\)) (resp., like the sum of an Exp(\(\mu_1\)) and an independent Exp(\(\mu_2\)) random variable). It then follows that

\[
\lambda_1 = \lambda_w, \quad E[S_1] = \frac{1}{\mu_2}, \quad E[S_1^2] = \frac{2}{\mu_2^2}, \quad \lambda_2 = \lambda_m, \quad E[S_2] = \frac{1}{\mu_2} + \frac{1}{\mu_1}, \quad E[S_2^2] = \frac{2}{\mu_1 \mu_2} + \frac{2}{\mu_1^2} + \frac{2}{\mu_2^2}.
\]

(EC.8)

Substituting the values given in display (EC.8) into (EC.7) readily yields (EC.1).

**WMO (Eq. (EC.2)).** Under WMO, once a walk-in finishes service in Stage 1, they will be served with the highest priority and without interruption in Stage 2 until his service is completed; i.e., the mean sojourn time of walk-ins in Stage 2 is \(1/\mu_2\). Therefore, we can represent the walk-in mean sojourn time as:

\[
E^{WMO}[T_{w}] = E^{WMO}[T_{w,1}] + \frac{1}{\mu_2},
\]

(EC.9)

where \(T_{w,1}\) represents a walk-in’s sojourn time in Stage 1. A walk-in’s Stage 1 sojourn time consists of a busy period with initial work equal to the amount of work the walk-in finds in the system (at both stages) upon its arrival, \(W\), in addition to its own contribution to work in Stage 1—distributed Exp(\(\mu_1\))—and interruptions due to mobile arrivals (which arrive according to a Poisson process with rate \(\lambda_m\), where each interruption contributes an average of \(1/\mu_2\) additional work). Hence, standard busy period analysis yields

\[
E^{WMO}[T_{w,1}] = \frac{E[W] + 1/\mu_1}{1 - \lambda_m/\mu_2}.
\]

(EC.10)
We proceed to determine $E[W]$. First observe that $W$ has the same distribution under any work-conserving service policy, and therefore corresponds to the distribution of the sojourn time in queue, $T_Q$, associated with an M/G/1 system under first-come-first-serve scheduling with two independent arrival streams: the first (resp. second) stream corresponds to that of walk-ins (resp. mobiles) in the original setting and has an arrival rate of $\lambda_w$ (resp. $\lambda_m$); meanwhile, service requirements are distributed like $\text{Exp}(\mu_1) + \text{Exp}(\mu_2)$ (resp. $\text{Exp}(\mu_2)$). By “merging” these arrival streams, we find that this M/G/1 system has a total arrival rate of $\Lambda = \lambda_w + \lambda_m$, with the first and second moments of the service requirement distribution—denoted by $E[S]$ and $E[S^2]$, respectively—given by

$$E[S] = \frac{\lambda_w}{\Lambda} \left( \frac{1}{\mu_1} + \frac{1}{\mu_2} \right) + \frac{\lambda_m}{\Lambda} \left( \frac{1}{\mu_2} \right), \quad \text{and} \quad E[S^2] = \frac{\lambda_w}{\Lambda} \left( \frac{2}{\mu_2^2} + \frac{2}{\mu_1^2} + \frac{2}{\mu_1 \mu_2} \right) + \frac{\lambda_m}{\Lambda} \left( \frac{2}{\mu_2^2} \right). \quad \text{(EC.11)}$$

Letting $\rho \equiv \Lambda E[S]$ denote the load associated with this M/G/1 system, the Pollaczek-Khinchine formula yields the following:

$$E[W] = E[T_Q] = \frac{\rho}{1 - \rho} \frac{E[S^2]}{2E[S]}. \quad \text{(EC.12)}$$

Substituting the equations in display (EC.11) into Eq. (EC.12), and the result into Eq. (EC.9), we obtain the $E_{WMO}[T_w]$ expression in Eq. (EC.2) as desired.

Now, we derive the mobiles mean sojourn time. Under WMO, when a mobile begins service, we know that there are no walk-ins currently at Stage 2, and hence the mobile’s service cannot be interrupted. Let $E_{WMO}[N_{m,Q}]$ and $E_{WMO}[T_{m,Q}]$ denote the mean queue length (ignoring the server) and mean sojourn time in queue (ignoring the service time) associated with mobiles. We have:

$$E_{WMO}[T_{m,Q}] = E_{WMO}[\text{Time to serve orders in queue}] + \sum_{\text{M arrival finds server busy with W or M}} E_{WMO}[\text{Time to finish current service}]$$

$$= E_{WMO}[N_{m,Q}] \cdot \frac{1}{\mu_2} + \sum_{\text{M arrival finds server busy with W or M}} E_{WMO}[\text{Time to finish current service}] \cdot \frac{1}{\mu_2}$$

$$= \frac{\lambda_m}{\mu_2} \cdot E_{WMO}[T_{m,Q}] + \frac{\Lambda}{\mu_2} \cdot \frac{1}{\mu_2} \quad \text{(according to the Little’s law.)} \quad \text{(EC.13)}$$

From Eq. (EC.13), we derive $E_{WMO}[T_{m,Q}] = \Lambda/(\mu_2 (\mu_2 - \lambda_m))$; using $E_{WMO}[T_m] = E_{WMO}[T_{m,Q}] + 1/\mu_2$, we derive the $E_{WMO}[T_m]$ expression in Eq. (EC.2).

WOM (Eq. (EC.3)). WOM prioritizes the walk-ins in both stages as opposed to MWO, which prioritizes the mobiles over all walk-ins. Therefore, applying the same procedure presented in the case of MWO—with the modification that walk-ins are now designated as class 1 and mobiles as class 2—yields the desired result.

The two-server model proof. Before deriving specific formulas, we establish a policy-agnostic framework for approaching the two-server model that will aid us in carrying out these derivations.
We view the two-server model as a tandem Jackson network, we see that Stage 1 is an M/M/1 queue with only walk-in customers. We observe that Stage 2 receives two independent arrival streams: new Ws, which are former Os departing Stage 1 (with rate $\lambda_w$), and external M arrivals (with rate $\mu_2$). The former arrival stream is also the departure process of an M/M/1, and hence, by Burke’s Theorem (see Harchol-Balter (2013) Ch. 16.3), it constitutes a Poisson process, while the latter arrival stream is a Poisson process by assumption. As the two arrival streams are independent, the resulting merged process—and hence, the overall arrival process to Stage 2—is a Poisson process with rate $\lambda_w + \lambda_m$. It follows that Stage 2 is also an M/M/1 queue.

MW (Eq. (EC.4)). Under MW, mobiles have the higher priority in Stage 2, so they experience an M/M/1 with arrival rate $\lambda_m$ and service rate $\mu_2$, and hence $E^{MW}[T_m] = 1/(\mu_2 - \lambda_m)$. Meanwhile, we determine the mean sojourn time of walk-ins under WM by summing their Stage 1 mean sojourn time (which is that of an M/M/1 system with arrival rate $\lambda_w$ and service rate $\mu_1$) with their Stage 2 mean sojourn time; this latter mean sojourn time is obtained from Eq. (EC.7), by noting that under WM walk-ins have lower priority than mobiles in Stage 2. Simplifying the result yields the following:

$$E^{MW}[T_w] = \frac{1}{\mu_1 - \lambda_w} + \frac{1}{\mu_2 - \lambda_w} = \frac{\mu_2}{(\mu_2 - \Lambda)(\mu_2 - \lambda_m)}.$$

FCFS (Eq. (EC.5)). Under FCFS, both walk-ins and mobiles have the same mean sojourn time at Stage 2, so we have $E^{FCFS}[T_m] = 1/(\mu_2 - \Lambda)$ and

$$E^{FCFS}[T_w] = \frac{1}{\mu_1 - \lambda_w} + \frac{1}{\mu_2 - \Lambda} = \frac{\mu_1 + \mu_2 - \lambda_w - \Lambda}{(\mu_1 - \lambda_w)(\mu_2 - \Lambda)}.$$

WM (Eq. (EC.6)). Under WM, walk-ins have the higher priority in Stage 2, so they experience two successive M/M/1 sojourn times (one for each stage); summing the resulting mean sojourn times yields the following:

$$E^{WM}[T_w] = \frac{1}{\mu_1 - \lambda_w} + \frac{1}{\mu_2 - \lambda_w} = \frac{\mu_1 + \mu_2 - 2\lambda_w}{(\mu_1 - \lambda_w)(\mu_2 - \lambda_w)}.$$

Meanwhile, as mobiles have lower priority than walk-ins in Stage 2 under WM, we determine the mean mobile sojourn time by applying Eq. (EC.7):

$$E^{WM}[T_m] = \frac{1}{(\mu_2 - \Lambda)(1 - \lambda_w/\mu_2)} = \frac{\mu_2}{(\mu_2 - \Lambda)(\mu_2 - \lambda_w)}.$$

EC.1.2 The Statement and Proof of the Deconditioning Lemma

The following lemma—which we call the deconditioning lemma—is helpful in proving a number of this paper’s propositions:
Lemma EC. 1 For any policy $P$, we have

$$\mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^P[T_w|N_1 = i] = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^P[T_w|N_1 = i, N_2 = j] \pi_{(b,p_m)}^P(i, j) / \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \pi_{(b,p_m)}^P(i, j)$$

$$= \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^P[T_w|N_1 = i, N_2 = j] \phi_{(b,p_m)}^P(i, j) / \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_{(b,p_m)}^P(i, j).$$

Proof of Lemma EC. 1 The first equality follows from “deconditioning” on $N_2 = j$—along with the implicit use of the PASTA (Poisson Arrivals See Time Averages) property—as follows:

$$\mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^P[T_w|N_1 = i] = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^P[T_w|N_1 = i, N_2 = j] \mathbb{P}_{(b,p_m)}^P(N_2 = j|N_1 = i)$$

$$= \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^P[T_w|N_1 = i, N_2 = j] \mathbb{P}_{(b,p_m)}^P(N_1 = i, N_2 = j) / \mathbb{P}_{(b,p_m)}^P(N_1 = i)$$

$$= \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^P[T_w|N_1 = i, N_2 = j] \pi_{(b,p_m)}^P(i, j) / \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \pi_{(b,p_m)}^P(i, j).$$

The second equality follows in a similar fashion by deconditioning on $N_{2,w} = j$:

$$\mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^P[T_w|N_1 = i] = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^P[T_w|N_1 = i, N_{2,w} = j] \mathbb{P}_{(b,p_m)}^P(N_{2,w} = j|N_1 = i)$$

$$= \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^P[T_w|N_1 = i, N_{2,w} = j] \phi_{(b,p_m)}^P(i, j) / \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \phi_{(b,p_m)}^P(i, j).$$

EC.2 Proofs of Results

Here we provide the proofs of the Propositions and Theorems presented in body of the paper.

EC.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1

Proof outline. We first prove the set $\{\text{MWO, WMO, WOM}\}$ forms a set of Pareto generators for the single-server model in section EC.2.1.1, then we proceed to prove the set $\{\text{MW, FCFS, WM}\}$ also forms a set of Pareto generators for the two-server model in section EC.2.1.2. Finally, we can add FCFS into the set of Pareto generators for the two-server model by observing directly from Eqs. (EC.4)-(EC.6) that $\alpha_{\text{FCFS}} = \theta \alpha_{\text{MW}} + (1 - \theta) \alpha_{\text{WM}}$ where the parameter $\theta = (\mu_2 - \lambda_m)/(2\mu_2 - \Lambda)$, from which it follows that FCFS $\in \mathcal{P}^*$.  

Proposition 1 In the two-server model, we have

EC.2.1.1 Proof for the single-server model

Preliminaries. To prove the statement, it is sufficient to show that the achievable region $\mathcal{O} =$
can achieve allocation of these inequalities strictly). If according to the inequalities that we claim define the achievable region (i.e., if a corresponding to the line running through the second corresponding to the line that runs through both P corresponds to the line running through both P

conv\{a^{MWO}, a^{WMO}, a^{WOM}\} + \text{cone}\{(0, 1), (1, 0)\} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2 is equivalent to the unbounded convex polygon defined by all pairs \(a^p = (\mathbb{E}^p[T_w], \mathbb{E}^p[T_m])\) satisfying the following four inequality constraints (equivalently, all such points lying in the intersection of the four half-planes defined by these affine inequality constraints), which correspond (at equality) to the rays and line segments, which together make up the boundary of the achievable region, \(bd(O)\), as captured by the example illustrated in Fig. 3a (from leftmost to rightmost):

1. \(\mathbb{E}^p[T_w] \geq \mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_w]\)
2. \(\mathbb{E}^p[T_m] \geq \left(\frac{\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_m] - \mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_m]}{\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_w] - \mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_w]}\right) \mathbb{E}^p[T_w] + \frac{\mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_m] \mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_w] - \mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_w] \mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_m]}{\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_w] - \mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_w]}\)
3. \(\mathbb{E}^p[T_m] \geq -\frac{\lambda_w}{\lambda_m} \mathbb{E}^p[T_w] + \frac{\Lambda}{\lambda_m} \mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T]\)
4. \(\mathbb{E}^p[T_m] \geq \mathbb{E}^{MWO}[T_m]\)

The first and fourth inequalities are readily apparent from the formulation of \(O\) given above, with the second corresponding to the line that runs through both \(a^{WOM}\) and \(a^{MWO}\), and the third—which corresponds to the line running through \(a^{WMO}\) and \(a^{MWO}\)—following directly from the fact that for all \(P \in \mathcal{P}\), we have \(\mathbb{E}^p[T] \geq \mathbb{E}^{MWO}[T]\), where the overall mean sojourn time is given by \(\mathbb{E}^p[T] = (\lambda_w \mathbb{E}^p[T_w] + \lambda_m \mathbb{E}^p[T_m]) / \Lambda\) (see Proposition 2). It can be verified in a straightforward manner that—consistent with what we observe from Fig. 3a—the line corresponding to the first inequality is vertical (i.e., parallel to the \(E[T_m]\)-axis), those corresponding to the second and third inequalities are negatively sloped (with the second steeper than the third), while that corresponding to the forth is horizontal (i.e., parallel to the \(E[T_w]\)-axis). Moreover, the first and second lines intersect at \(a^{WOM}\), the second and third at \(a^{WMO}\), and the last two at \(a^{MWO}\), establishing that \(O\) will always qualitatively resemble that in Fig. 3a, although the locations of—and thus the angles and distances between—\(a^{WOM}\), \(a^{WMO}\), and \(a^{MWO}\) are parameter-dependent. If we can show that these four inequalities define the achievable region, then we have proved the first claim of the theorem, and the second claim follows from straightforward observation that the only Pareto allocations are those that in addition to satisfying all four inequalities, satisfy the second and/or third with equality.

It remains only to prove that the constraints defined by these four inequalities are both necessary (i.e., for any policy \(P \in \mathcal{P}\), \(a^p\) satisfies these four inequalities) and sufficient (i.e., any allocation \(a\) satisfying these four inequalities can be achieved by implementing some feasible policy \(P \in \mathcal{P}\), or equivalently for all such \(a\) there exists \(P \in \mathcal{P}\) such that \(a = a^p\)) in order to establish that an allocation \(a \in O\). In referring to these four, we use the terms inequality and constraint interchangeably.

**Proof for sufficiency.** We first address the case where \(a\) lies on one of the four lines corresponding to the inequalities that we claim define the achievable region (i.e., if \(a\) satisfies one or more of these inequalities strictly). If \(a\) lies on the line corresponding to the first inequality, then we can achieve allocation \(a = (\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_w], r_m)\) for some \(r_m > \mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_m]\) by implementing a modification
Figure EC.1  Allocations lying in the red triangle can be implemented by considering a probabilistic mixture of the WOM, WMO, and MWO policies, while allocations within the blue region, such as the example $a$ illustrated here, all lie on a line that runs parallel to that connecting $a^{\text{WOM}}$ and $a^{\text{MWO}}$ and intersects the vertical and horizontal boundaries at a pair of allocations that can be implemented through the policies $P_1$ and $P_4$. Implementing an appropriate random mixture of these two policies will allow for achieving allocation $a$.

of WOM where we slow down the rate at which we serve mobiles (but not walk-ins) at Stage 2 from $\mu_2$ to some specific $\mu'_2 < \mu_2$ that would cause the mean sojourn time of mobiles to rise from $E^{\text{WOM}}[T_m]$ to $r_m$ while keeping that of walk-ins fixed at $E^{\text{WOM}}[T_w]$. Such a value of $\mu'_2$ must exist as the mean sojourn time of walk-ins under such modifications of WOM will continuously vary over the interval $(E^{\text{WOM}}[T_m], \infty)$ as we vary the new service rate of walk-ins at Stage 2 over the interval $(\lambda_m/(1 - \lambda_w/\mu_1 - \lambda_w/\mu_2), \mu_2)$. If $a$ lies on the line corresponding to the second or third inequalities, i.e., if $a \in \text{conv}\{a^{\text{WOM}}, a^{\text{WMO}}\} \cap \text{conv}\{a^{\text{WMO}}, a^{\text{MWO}}\}$, then we can achieve this allocation by implementing $\langle \text{WOM}, \text{WMO}\rangle(\theta)$ or $\langle \text{WMO}, \text{MWO}\rangle(\theta)$ for the appropriately chosen $\theta$. Next, see that if $a$ lies on the line corresponding to the fourth inequality, then $a = (r_w, E^{\text{MWO}}[T_m])$ can be achieved by implementing a modification of MWO analogous to the modification of WOM considered for $a$ lying on the line corresponding to the second inequality; in this case, we slow down the service rate of walk-ins—rather than that of mobiles—at Stage 2.

We now address the remaining case where $a$ satisfies all four inequalities, but does not satisfy any of them strictly. We consider two sub-cases: first, if $a$ lies in (the interior or boundary) of the triangle $\text{conv}\{a^{\text{WOM}}, a^{\text{WMO}}, a^{\text{MWO}}\}$ (shaded in red in Fig. EC.1), then we can achieve $a$ by implementing a policy that randomly uses WOM, WMO, and MWO at the start of each busy period with the appropriate probabilities. The only case that remains is when $a$ satisfies all of the inequalities and also lies above and to the right of the line segment connecting WOM and MWO. In this case, as shown in Fig. EC.1, we can take achieve $a$ by implementing a policy that randomizes between two specific policies, $P_1$ and $P_4$ with appropriate probabilities. These two policies are chosen so that
they yield allocations $a^{P_1}$ and $a^{P_4}$ that uniquely satisfy the following: (i) $a^{P_1}$ and $a^{P_4}$ satisfy the first and fourth inequalities with equality, respectively, (ii) the line segment connecting $a^{P_1}$ and $a^{P_4}$ is parallel to the line segment connecting $a^{WOM}$ to $a^{MWO}$, and (iii) $a$ lies on the aforementioned line segment. Recall from the preceding paragraph that any policy, such as $P_1$ (resp. $P_4$), that satisfies the first (resp. fourth) inequality with equality can be implemented by modifying WOM (resp. MWO) through a service rate reduction for mobiles (resp. walk-ins) at Stage 2. Note that in this case, while we can still implement all of the policies $\{\langle P_1, P_4 \rangle(\theta): \theta \in [0, 1]\}$, it may not be the case that $a^{(P_1, P_4)(\theta)} = \theta a^{P_1} + (1 - \theta) a^{P_4}$, as $P_1$ and $P_4$ are not work-conserving. Nevertheless, there must exist some value of $\theta \in (0, 1)$ for which $a = a^{(P_1, P_4)(\theta)}$ (for $P_1$ and $P_4$ chosen appropriately) because $\{a^{(P_1, P_4)(\theta)}: \theta \in (0, 1)\} = \{\theta a^{P_1} + (1 - \theta) a^{P_4}: \theta \in (0, 1)\}$. This completes the proof that the four inequalities provide constraints on allocations $a$, that are sufficient for establishing that $a \in \mathcal{O}$.

**Proof for necessity.** We proceed by showing that for any $a \in \mathcal{O}$ (or equivalently, for any $P \in \mathcal{P}$), each of the four constraints must hold. Addressing the first constraint, observe that WOM achieves the minimum possible mean walk-in sojourn time, as this policy strictly prioritizes walk-ins over mobiles, while also prioritizing those walk-ins with the least remaining expected service requirements (the latter follows from the fact that Ws are prioritized over Os), and hence, the first constraint must hold. We can address the fourth constraint in a similar manner: MWO achieves the minimum possible mean mobile sojourn time, so the fourth constraint must also hold. Meanwhile, as alluded to earlier in this proof, the necessity of the third constraint follows directly from Proposition 2, which establishes that for all $P \in \mathcal{P}$, we have $\mathbb{E}^P[T] \geq \mathbb{E}^{MWO}[T]$, where the overall mean sojourn time is given by $\mathbb{E}^P[T] = (\lambda_w \mathbb{E}^P[T_w] + \lambda_m \mathbb{E}^P[T_m]) / \Lambda$.

We now turn to addressing the only remaining item: the necessity of the second inequality:

$$\mathbb{E}^P[T_m] \geq \left(\frac{\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_m] - \mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_w]}{\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_w] - \mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_w]}\right) \mathbb{E}^P[T_w] + \frac{\mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_m]\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_w] - \mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_w]\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_m]}{\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_w] - \mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_w]}.$$

We begin by examining the overall mean work in the system under $P$, which we denote by $\mathbb{E}^P[W]$. Clearly, each W and M task contributes an average of $1/\mu_2$ work each. Meanwhile, each O task contributes an average of $1/\mu_1$ work by itself; if we also account for the W task that must be served after serving each O task (in order to serve a walk-in in its entirety), we can view each O currently in the system as contributing an average of $1/\mu_1 + 1/\mu_2$ work to the system. Before using the observations above to derive the total work in the system, we recall that $N_1$ and $N_2$ denote the number of customers at Stages 1 (all of which are walk-ins) and 2, respectively; we further let $N_w$, $N_{2,w}$, and $N_m$ denote the number of walk-in customers in the system as a whole, the number of walk-ins at Stage 2 specifically, and the number of mobile customers (all of whom are at Stage 2), respectively.
respectively, and note that \( N_1 + N_{2,w} = N_w \), while \( N_m + N_{2,w} = N_2 \). We can now decompose \( \mathbb{E}^p[W] \) as follows:

\[
\mathbb{E}^p[W] = \left( \frac{1}{\mu_1} + \frac{1}{\mu_2} \right) \mathbb{E}^p[N_1] + \left( \frac{1}{\mu_2} \right) \mathbb{E}^p[N_{2,w}] + \left( \frac{1}{\mu_1} \right) \mathbb{E}^p[N_m]
\]

\[
= \left( \frac{1}{\mu_1} + \frac{1}{\mu_2} \right) \mathbb{E}^p[N_w] - \left( \frac{1}{\mu_1} \right) \mathbb{E}^p[N_{2,w}] + \left( \frac{1}{\mu_2} \right) \mathbb{E}^p[N_m]
\]  

(E.C.14)

Applying Little’s Law to Eq. (E.C.14), and rearranging terms, we have:

\[
\mathbb{E}^p[T_m] = -\left( \frac{\rho_w}{\rho_m} \right) \mathbb{E}^p[T_w] + \left( \frac{1}{\rho_m} \right) \mathbb{E}^p[W] + \left( \frac{1}{\mu_1 \rho_m} \right) \mathbb{E}^p[N_{2,w}],
\]

(E.C.15)

where \( \rho_w \equiv \lambda_w(1/\mu_1 + 1/\mu_2) \) and \( \rho_m \equiv \lambda_m/\mu_2 \) are the fractions of the time spent serving walk-ins and mobiles, respectively (and hence, \( 1 - \rho_w - \rho_m \) is the fraction of time in which the server is idle).

We rewrite Eq. (E.C.15) in terms of \( \mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_w] \), \( \mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_m] \), \( \mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_w] \), \( \mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_m] \) (all of which are provided explicitly in Proposition 2), and use the resulting expression to bound \( \mathbb{E}^p[T_m] \) as follows:

\[
\mathbb{E}^p[T_m] = \left( \frac{\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_m]}{\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_w]} - \frac{\mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_m]}{\mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_w]} \right) \mathbb{E}^p[T_w] + \left( \frac{1}{\rho_m} \right) \mathbb{E}^p[W] + \left( \frac{1}{\mu_1 \rho_m} \right) \mathbb{E}^p[N_{2,w}]
\]

\[
\geq \left( \frac{\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_m]}{\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_w]} - \frac{\mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_m]}{\mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_w]} \right) \mathbb{E}^p[T_w] + \left( \frac{1}{\rho_m} \right) \mathbb{E}^{WOM}[W] + \left( \frac{1}{\mu_1 \rho_m} \right) \mathbb{E}^{WOM}[N_{2,w}]
\]

(E.C.16)

\[
= \left( \frac{\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_m]}{\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_w]} - \frac{\mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_m]}{\mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_w]} \right) \mathbb{E}^p[T_w] + \frac{\mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_m]\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_w] - \mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_w]\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_m]}{\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[T_w] - \mathbb{E}^{WMO}[T_w]}
\]

(E.C.17)

Hence, \( \mathbb{E}^p[T_m] \) is bounded below by the expression to the right of the equals sign in Eq. (E.C.17), which yields precisely the second constraint, and so it only remains to justify Ineq. (E.C.16) and Eq. (E.C.17). We justify Ineq. (E.C.16) by showing that \( \min_{P \in \mathcal{P}} \mathbb{E}^p[W] = \mathbb{E}^{WOM}[W] \) and \( \min_{P \in \mathcal{P}} \mathbb{E}^p[N_{2,w}] = \mathbb{E}^{WOM}[N_{2,w}] \). Moreover, we provide explicit expressions for these two expectations; Eq. (E.C.17) follows from these expressions directly after straightforward (if lengthy) calculations.

We first show that \( \min_{P \in \mathcal{P}} \mathbb{E}^p[W] = \mathbb{E}^{WOM}[W] \). This follows directly from the fact that \( \text{WOM} \) is work-conserving; indeed, \( \mathbb{E}^p[W] \) must attain its minimum value under all work-conserving policies \( P \in \mathcal{P} \). We proceed to compute \( \mathbb{E}^{WOM}[W] \), noting that this is the same as the time average work under any work-conserving policy. In fact, we can view \( \mathbb{E}^{WOM}[W] \) as the average work in an ordinary M/G/1 system (under any work-conserving scheduling policy) with two streams of Poisson arrivals, exactly like those described in the proof of Eq. (E.C.2) in Appendix EC.1.1; i.e., the first (resp. second) stream corresponds to that of walk-ins (resp. mobiles) in the original setting and has an arrival rate of \( \lambda_w \) (resp. \( \lambda_m \)); meanwhile, service requirements are distributed like \( \text{Exp}(\mu_1) + \text{Exp}(\mu_2) \) (resp. \( \text{Exp}(\mu_2) \)), and so by standard M/G/1 analysis, we have

\[
\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[W] = \left( \lambda_w \left( \frac{1}{\mu_1^2} + \frac{1}{\mu_2} + \frac{1}{\mu_1 \mu_2} \right) + \frac{\rho_m}{\mu_2} \right) / (1 - \rho_w - \rho_m).
\]

(E.C.18)
Finally, we justify $\min_{P \in \mathcal{P}} \mathbb{E}^P[N_{2,w}] = \mathbb{E}^{WOM}[N_{2,w}]$. In fact $\mathbb{E}^P[N_{2,w}]$ is minimized by any policy $P \in \mathcal{P}$ that give $W$s priority over all other tasks. Such policies (including WOM), allow only one $W$ task to be in the system at any given time, as they would not serve an $O$ (allowing it to become a $W$) if there is already a $W$ present in the system. Hence, under such policies, $N_{2,w} = 1$ whenever there is a $W$ in service and $N_{2,w} = 0$ otherwise. Since each $W$ spends the minimum average amount of time possible (i.e., $1/\mu_2$) in service, the claim is justified. Furthermore, $W$s arrive to the system at the same rate at which $O$s complete service, and since the system is throughput-optimal, we know that the arrival rate of $W$s is $\lambda_w$. Meanwhile, we have already argued that under WOM and the other $W$-prioritizing policies, $W$s spend an average of $1/\mu_2$ time in the system, and so by Little’s law, we have $\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[N_{2,w}] = \lambda_w/\mu_2$.

With the explicit computation of $\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[W]$ as given in Eq. (EC.18) and the fact that we have $\mathbb{E}^{WOM}[N_{2,w}] = \lambda_w/\mu_2$, we can readily verify Eq. (EC.17), which completes the proof.

EC.2.1.2 Proof for the two-server model

We follow the same approach that we used in proving the statement for the single-server model (see Appendix EC.2.1.1); we opt for less expository precision and shorter justifications in the interest of brevity. The achievable region $\mathcal{O} = \text{conv}\{a^{MW}, a^{WM}\} + \text{cone}\{(0,1),(1,0)\} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2$ (for allocations in the two-server model) is equivalent the region expressed by the conjunction of the following inequalities (also referred to as constraints):

1. $\mathbb{E}^P[T_w] \geq \mathbb{E}^{WM}[T_w]$
2. $\mathbb{E}^P[T_m] \geq \left(\frac{\mathbb{E}^{WM}[T_m] - \mathbb{E}^{MW}[T_m]}{\mathbb{E}^{WM}[T_w] - \mathbb{E}^{MW}[T_w]}\right) \mathbb{E}^P[T_w] + \frac{\mathbb{E}^{MW}[T_m] \mathbb{E}^{WM}[T_w] - \mathbb{E}^{MW}[T_w] \mathbb{E}^{WM}[T_m]}{\mathbb{E}^{WM}[T_w] - \mathbb{E}^{MW}[T_w]}$
3. $\mathbb{E}^P[T_m] \geq \mathbb{E}^{MW}[T_m]$

Note that the allocation of FCFS policy, $a^{FCFS}$, is located on the line segment generated by $a^{WM}$ and $a^{MW}$. Applying an analogous argument to that deployed in Appendix EC.2.1.1, we can deduce that any allocation satisfying these three constraints can be implemented by a feasible two-server prioritization policy $P \in \mathcal{P}$. It remains to show that these three constraints are also necessary.

It is straightforward to see the first and the third inequalities are satisfied by any service policy since $WM$ and $MW$ achieve the minimum possible mean sojourn time for walk-ins or mobiles respectively. It remains only to prove the second inequality for all $P \in \mathcal{P}$.

For any given set of parameters $\lambda_w$, $\lambda_m$, $\mu_1$, and $\mu_2$ satisfying Assumption 1(b), it follows from Burke’s Theorem (see Section 16.3 in Harchol-Balter (2013)) that the departure process at Stage 1 (and hence the arrival rate of walk-ins to Stage 2) is a Poisson process with rate $\chi_w = \lambda_w$. Hence, we focus on Stage 2, which we view as an $M/M/1$ system with arrival rate $\Lambda = \lambda_w + \lambda_m$ and service
rate $\mu_2$. For any two-server prioritization policy $P \in \mathcal{P}$, we can decompose $E^P[W_2]$, the mean work at Stage 2, and apply Little’s Law to obtain the following:

$$E^P[W_2] = \frac{1}{\mu_2} E^P[N_{2,w}] + \frac{1}{\mu_2} E^P[N_m] = \left(\frac{\lambda_w}{\mu_2}\right) E^P[T_w] - \frac{1}{\mu_1 - \lambda_w} \left(\frac{\lambda_m}{\mu_2}\right) E^P[T_m].$$  \hspace{1cm} (EC.19)

We rearrange terms and write Eq. (EC.19) in terms of $E^{WM}[T_w]$, $E^{WM}[T_m]$, $E^{MW}[T_w]$, $E^{MW}[T_m]$ (all of which are provided explicitly in Proposition EC. 1 (b)), and use the resulting expression to bound $E^P[T_m]$ as follows:

$$E^P[T_m] = \left(\frac{\lambda_m}{\lambda_w}\right) E^P[T_w] + \left(\frac{\mu_2}{\lambda_m}\right) E^P[W_2] + \frac{\lambda_w}{\lambda_m(\mu_1 - \lambda_w)}$$

$$= \left(\frac{E^{WM}[T_m] - E^{MW}[T_m]}{E^{WM}[T_w] - E^{MW}[T_w]}\right) E^P[T_w] + \left(\frac{\mu_2}{\lambda_m}\right) E^{WM}[W_2] + \frac{\lambda_w}{\lambda_m(\mu_1 - \lambda_w)}$$

$$\geq \left(\frac{E^{WM}[T_m] - E^{MW}[T_m]}{E^{WM}[T_w] - E^{MW}[T_w]}\right) E^P[T_w] + \frac{E^{MW}[T_m] E^{WM}[T_w] - E^{MW}[T_m] E^{MW}[T_m]}{E^{WM}[T_w] - E^{MW}[T_w]}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (EC.20)

Hence, $E^P[T_m]$ is bounded below by the expression to the right of the equals sign in Eq. (EC.22), which yields precisely the second constraint, and so it only remains to justify Ineq. (EC.21) and Eq. (EC.22). We justify Ineq. (EC.21) by showing that $\min_{P \in \mathcal{P}} E^P[W_2] = E^{WM}[W_2]$. Moreover, we provide an explicit expression for $E^{WM}[W_2]$, from which we can obtain Eq. (EC.22) directly after straightforward (if lengthy) calculations.

We first show that $\min_{P \in \mathcal{P}} E^P[W_2] = E^{WM}[W_2]$. This follows directly from the fact that WM is work-conserving; indeed, $E^P[W_2]$ must attain its minimum value under all work-conserving policies $P \in \mathcal{P}$. Then we proceed to determine $E^{WM}[W_2]$. Once more, we view Stage 2 as an M/M/1 queueing system, but this time we are considering the system under WM; leveraging the fact that WM is a work-conserving policy, we can apply standard M/M/1 analysis together with Little’s Law to obtain the following:

$$E^{WM}[W_2] = \left(\frac{1}{\mu_2}\right) E^{WM}[N_2] = \frac{\Lambda}{\mu_2(\mu_2 - \Lambda)}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (EC.23)

With the explicit computation of $E^{WM}[W_2]$ as given in Eq. (EC.23), we can readily verify Eq. (EC.22), which completes the proof.

**EC.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2**

We first prove statement (a). In the single-server model, under MWO, mobiles experience an M/M/1 queue as they have the highest priority, while walk-ins will be preempted by mobile arrivals. Meanwhile, under WOM, walk-ins experience an M/G/1 queue with the highest priority, while
mobiles are preempted by walk-in arrivals (to Stage 1). Since customers at Stage 2—which are (expected to be) closer to service completion than those at Stage 1—receive the highest priority under both MWO and WMO, the lowest sojourn time is given by $E^{MWO}[T]$ or equivalently, by $E^{WMO}[T]$ (as $E^{MWO}[T] = E^{WMO}[T]$). On the other hand, WOM is suboptimal with respect to the overall mean response time, because it can give priority to walk-in customers in Stage 1, even when there are mobile customers in Stage 2—who (are expected to) require less service—present in the system.

Moreover, we can obtain an exact formula for the lowest overall mean sojourn time by observing that

$$E^{MWO}[T] = E^{WMO}[T_w] \frac{\lambda_w}{\Lambda} + E^{MWO}[T_m] \frac{\lambda_m}{\Lambda}$$  \hspace{1cm} (EC.24)

and replacing $E^{WMO}[T_w]$ and $E^{WMO}[T_m]$ by their formulas from the allocation given in Eq. (EC.1). Alternatively, we can obtain an equivalent exact formula for the lowest overall mean sojourn time by observing that

$$E^{WMO}[T] = E^{WMO}[T_w] \frac{\lambda_w}{\Lambda} + E^{WMO}[T_m] \frac{\lambda_m}{\Lambda}$$  \hspace{1cm} (EC.25)

and replacing $E^{WMO}[T_w]$ and $E^{WMO}[T_m]$ by their values from the allocation given in Eq. (EC.2).

Finally, we address statement (b). In the two-server model, for any Pareto optimal policy, the statement directly follows from Eq. (EC.20) after rearranging terms.

**EC.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3(a)**
Let $(b, p_m)$ be an equilibrium and assume by way of contradiction that $b > B$. If we can show that $E^{p_{(b, p_m)}}[T_w|N_1 = b - 1] \geq b/\mu_1 + 1/\mu_2 > T_{w}^{\text{max}}$ holds, the proof is complete as we have contradicted the equilibrium conditions. The first inequality follows from the fact that the assumption on $P$ dictates that a walk-in that sees $N_1 = b - 1$ upon arrival must wait behind $b - 1$ other walk-ins at Stage 1, in addition to their own service at each stage. The second inequality follows from the definition of $B$, i.e., $B \equiv \mu_1(T_{w}^{\text{max}} - 1/\mu_2)$, and straightforward arithmetic.

**EC.2.4 Proof of Proposition 3(b)**
First we address the cases of MWO and MW in the single- and two-server settings, respectively. In both cases, mobiles have preemptive priority over all others, and so mobiles experience an M/M/1 system with arrival rate $p_m \lambda_m$ and service rate $\mu_2$. Therefore, $E^{MWO}_{(b, p_m)}[T_m] = E^{MW}_{(b, p_m)}[T_m] = 1/(\mu_2 - p_m \lambda_m)$, which is clearly increasing in the arrival rate $p_m \lambda_m$, and hence in $p_m$.

Next, we examine the case of WOM in the single-server model. We observe that the arrival process of $W$s to Stage 2 is the same as the departure process of $O$s at Stage 1, and since these have priority over mobiles and $b$ is fixed, this arrival process does not depend on $p_m \lambda_m$. Hence,
if we examine only mobiles, we note that they experience a queue with Poisson arrivals and an exponential service process with (exogenous) Markov-modulated service interruptions. In such a system, the higher the arrival rate, the longer the sojourn time, so the desired result holds.

The case of WM and FCFS in the two-server model is similar to that of WOM in the single-server model. As in that case, the arrival process ofWs to Stage 2 does not depend on \( p_m \lambda_m \), which again allows us to view mobiles as experiencing a queue that is a modified M/M/1 with (exogenous) Markov-modulated service interruptions. Again, the desired result follows.

Finally, we consider the case of WMO in the single-server model. Unlike the previous cases, the arrival process ofWs to Stage 2 can depend on \( p_m \lambda_m \) under WMO; so, the same type of argument that we used for the previous cases does not suffice. Instead, we consider the overall mean sojourn time, observing that
\[
E_{WMO}(b,p_m)[T] = E_{MWO}(b,p_m)[T],
\]
where the difference in the mean sojourn times for walk-ins under the two policies is computed by considering only the sojourn times in Stage 2 (as those in Stage 1 are identical for both policies): under MWO the walk-in sojourn time in Stage 2 is distributed like an M/M/1 busy period, while under WMO it would be a single exponential distributed service time. From the computation above, together with the fact that \( \chi_w \) is constant in \( p_m \lambda_m \), we conclude that \( E_{WMO}(b,p_m)[T] \) is increasing in \( p_m \lambda_m \) as desired.

**EC.2.5 Proof of Proposition 4**

**MWO (Eq. (1))**

**Mobiles.** Since mobiles have preemptive priority over all others under MWO, they will experience an M/M/1 queue with arrival rate \( p_m \lambda_m \) and service rate \( \mu_2 \). Consequently, we have
\[
E_{MWO}(b,p_m)[T] = 1/(\mu_2 - p_m \lambda_m).
\]
Walk-ins. We first find $E_{(b,p_m)}^{MWO}[T_w|N_1 = i, N_2 = j]$, and then apply Lemma 1. Under MWO walk-ins are preempted by mobiles in both stages; therefore, we can think of a walk-in’s sojourn time as being distributed as a particular kind of busy period. When a walk-in joins the system seeing $N_1 = i$ other customers in Stage 1 and $N_2 = j$ customers in Stage 2, the total work in the system—which is equal to the sojourn time of the newly arrived walk-in under MWO assuming no further arrivals—consists of $i + 1$ independent Stage 1 services and $i + j + 1$ independent Stage 2 services (as the customers in Stage 1 will all also require service at Stage 2). However, the walk-in will be preempted by any mobile arrivals, with each contributing its service requirement to the walk-in’s sojourn time. The aforementioned preemptions occur according to a Poisson process with rate $p_m \lambda_m$. Hence, the standard busy period analysis—together with the fact that all services are i.i.d. and consume $\text{Exp}(\mu)$ time at Stage $k$—yields:

$$
E_{(b,p_m)}^{MWO}[T_w|N_1 = i, N_2 = j] = \left( \frac{i + 1}{\mu_1} + \frac{i + j + 1}{\mu_2} \right) / \left( 1 - \frac{p_m \lambda_m}{\mu_2} \right) = \frac{(i + 1)(\mu_1 + \mu_2) + j \mu_1}{\mu_1 (\mu_2 - p_m \lambda_m)}.
$$ (EC.27)

Applying Lemma 1 to the above, we obtain the sojourn time of walk-ins:

$$
E_{(b,p_m)}^{MWO}[T_w|N_1 = i] = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} E_{(b,p_m)}^{MWO}[T_w|N_1 = i, N_2 = j] \pi_{(b,p_m)}^{MWO}(i,j) / \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \pi_{(b,p_m)}^{MWO}(i,j) = \frac{\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (i + 1)(\mu_1 + \mu_2) + j \mu_1}{\mu_1 (\mu_2 - p_m \lambda_m)} / \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \pi_{(b,p_m)}^{MWO}(i,j) = \frac{\mu_2}{\mu_1 + 1} \left( i + 1 + \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} j \pi_{(b,p_m)}^{MWO}(i,j) / \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \pi_{(b,p_m)}^{MWO}(i,j) \right) E_{(b,p_m)}^{MWO}[T_m].
$$

WMO (Eq. 2)

Mobiles. We determine the sojourn time of mobiles under WMO, by seeing that a mobile arriving to a system where $N_2 = j$ experiences a sojourn time consisting of $j + 1$ services, each distributed $\text{Exp}(\mu_2)$. We note that when a mobile enters the system when Stage 2 is nonempty (i.e., when $N_2 = j \geq 1$), the job currently in service may be a mobile or a walk-in, while all customers in the Stage 2 queue are mobiles. Which of these is the case, however, is immaterial, however, as the remaining service requirement of the customer in service is distributed $\text{Exp}(\mu_2)$, regardless of whether they are an M or W. So in any case, we have

$$
E_{(b,p_m)}^{WMO}[T_m|N_2 = j] = (j + 1)/\mu_2.
$$

Deconditioning on $N_2 = j$, observing that the mobile-sojourn time is independent of $N_1$ under WMO, and applying the PASTA property proves the claimed result for the mobiles in Eq. (2):

$$
E_{(b,p_m)}^{WMO}[T_m] = \sum_{i=0}^{b} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} E_{(b,p_m)}^{WMO}[T_m|N_1 = i, N_2 = j] \pi_{(b,p_m)}^{WMO}(N_1 = i, N_2 = j) = \frac{b}{\mu_2} \left( 1 + \sum_{i=0}^{b} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} j \pi_{(b,p_m)}^{WMO}(i,j) \right).
$$
Walk-ins. We follow an approach similar to that used to prove the walk-in’s equation in Eq. (1). Under WMO, walk-ins are preempted by mobiles while they are in Stage 1, but then they receive priority once they are in Stage 2. Consequently, since walk-ins can complete Stage 1 service only when Stage 2 is unoccupied (i.e., when \( N_2 = 0 \)), upon completion of Stage 1 service, they move to Stage 1, where they will be served uninterrupted (as there are no other walk-ins already present at Stage 1, nor can they be preempted by mobiles). Hence, the time a walk-in spends in Stage 1 is distributed like a busy period (discussed below), while the time spent in Stage 2 is simply distributed \( \text{Exp}(\mu_2) \).

Now recall that under MWO and based on the busy period analysis, we expressed \( \mathbb{E}^{\text{MWO}}_{(b,p_m)}(T_w|N_1 = i, N_2 = j) \) by the first equality in Eq. (EC.27).

By contrast under WMO, the initial workload (seen by a walk-in that arrives when \( N_1 = i \) and \( N_2 = j \)) that contributes to possible preemptions by mobiles (from the perspective of this walk-in) consists of one fewer Stage 2 service, since the walk-in’s own Stage 2 service is “immune” to interruptions. The arrival rate and service requirement of these interruptions remain unchanged. Hence, we have:

\[
\mathbb{E}^{\text{WMO}}_{(b,p_m)}(T_w|N_1 = i, N_2 = j) = \left( \frac{i+1}{\mu_1} + \frac{i+j}{\mu_2} \right) / \left( 1 - p_m \lambda_m \mu_2 \right) + \frac{1}{\mu_2}.
\]

The application of Lemma 1 again resembles that featured in the proof of Eq. (1), and yields the claimed result for the walk-ins in Eq. (2).

WOM (Eq. (3))

Mobiles. We start by tagging a mobile arrival under WOM. Consider two cases: (i) the tagged mobile arrives to an empty system with no other mobiles, and (ii) the mobile arrives to a system with at least one other mobile present in Stage 2. These cases are mutually exclusive and exhaustive and neither case stipulates anything regarding the presence or absence of walk-ins at either stage at the arrival time. In case (i), the tagged mobile’s sojourn time is clearly distributed like \( U + V \), as the mobile will initiate service after a duration of time distributed like \( U \), after which its remaining sojourn time is distributed like that of a mobile that arrives to an empty system (i.e., like \( V \)). In case (ii) the tagged mobile begins service precisely when there are no mobiles in the system that arrived before it and no walk-ins in the system (at either stage); this will necessarily be a point in time at which the last mobile to arrive before the tagged mobile has just completed service. At this point, the remaining sojourn time of the tagged mobile is distributed like that of a mobile that arrives to an empty system, i.e., it is distributed like \( V \).

Now imagine that we view the “service time” of the tagged mobile—and in fact of any mobile—as the time from when it first enters service until its completion time. That is, we view the service time
as consisting of the ordinary service time of the mobile in addition to the service time of all walk-ins (originally Os and later Ws) that interrupt this service time. Note that we cannot think of V as an ordinary busy period with Poisson arrivals, because walk-ins do not effectively arrive according to a Poisson arrival process (walk-ins attempting to arrive when \(N_1 = b\) will balk). Viewed like this, the system is always “serving” mobiles (if there are any in the system), as the system is either actually serving a mobile, or “serving” a mobile in the new view by actually serving walk-ins that are interrupting the service of a mobile. Hence, the system can be viewed as an M/G/1 system with i.i.d. service requirements distributed like V, however, the first mobile at the start of each mobile busy period (i.e., mobiles that arrive to a system with no other mobiles) must first wait for a duration of time distributed like \(U\) before service begins. Therefore, this system is an M/G/1/setup system with arrivals following a Poisson process with rate \(p_m\lambda_m\), services distributed like \(V\), and setups distributed like \(U\). It follows from the discussion of such systems in Harchol-Balter (2013) (Section 27.3; Eq. (27.14)) that we have the claimed result for mobiles in Eq. (3). The calculation of the moments of \(U\) and \(V\) are provided in Appendix EC.3.3.

**Walk-ins.** Consider a walk-in that sees \(N_1 = i\) Os in Stage 1 and \(N_{2,w} = j\) Ws in Stage 2 upon arrival in the system under WOM; the presence of any Ms in Stage 2 will not concern a walk-in as walk-ins have preemptive priority over mobiles under WOM. Moreover, recall that \(j \in \{0, 1\}\) as there can be at most one W in Stage 2 under WOM (as soon as a walk-in advances to Stage 2, they receive uninterrupted service in Stage 2 until completion). Since walk-ins cannot be preempted, it follows that the walk-in’s sojourn time consists of \(i + 1\) services at each Stage, plus an additional service at Stage 2 if \(j = 1\), so that

\[
\mathbb{E}^{\text{WOM}}_{(b, p_m)}[T_w|N_1 = i, N_{2,w} = j] = \frac{i + 1}{\mu_1} + \frac{i + 1}{\mu_2} + \frac{j}{\mu_2},
\]

which results in the expression for the walk-ins in Eq. (3) by deconditioning on \(N_{2,w} = j\).

**EC.2.6 Proof of Lemma 1**

We consider a “tagged” walk-in who arrives to the system seeing \(N_1 = i\) customers in Stage 1 and \(N_2 = j\) customers in Stage 2. Now consider the time interval \(I(i)\) from when the tagged customer first arrived to Stage 1 (equivalently, arrived to the system) until they first arrived to Stage 2 (equivalently, finished service at Stage 1). As our notation suggests, \(I(i)\) depends on \(i\). Observe that \(Y(i, j)\) must be the expected Stage 2 workload at the end of \(I(i)\). The length of \(I(i)\) is distributed Erlang(\(i + 1, \mu_1\)).

Now let \(K(i)\) (which depends on \(i\)) be the random quantity of mobile customers that arrived during \(I(i)\). It follows that Stage 2 would have received \(i + K + 1\) arrivals—including the tagged customer—during \(I(i)\): the \(i\) walk-ins who were already present in Stage 1, the aforementioned \(K(i)\) mobiles, and the walk-in that arrived to Stage 2 at the end of \(I(i)\).
We will determine the distribution of $K(i)$ shortly, but for now let us assume that we are given that $K(i) = k$. Given this, let $L(i, j, k)$ (which depends on $i$, $j$, and $k$) be the number of customers present in Stage 2 at the end of $I(i)$; the tagged customer will find anywhere between 0 and $i + j + k$ other customers in Stage 2 depending on the number of Stage 2 service completions during $I(i)$; so, $L(i, j, k) \in \{1, 2, \ldots, i + j + k + 1\}$. Moreover, note that $Y(i, j)$ is the expectation of the sum of $L(i, j, k)$ independent service requirements, $S_1, S_2, \ldots$, each of which is distributed $\text{Exp}(\mu_2)$. In order to compute $Y(i, j)$, we now turn to determining the distribution of $L(i, j, k)$.

Now observe that $L(i, j, k) = \ell$ precisely when the Stage 2 occupancy—which starts at $j$ at the start of $I(i)$—reaches $\ell$ at the end of $I(i)$; i.e., $L(i, j, k) = \ell$, when $N_2$ goes from $i$ to $j$ after exactly $i + j + k + 1$ arrivals. Since a customer is in service in Stage 1 during the entirety of $I(i)$ (except possibly at the last moment), Stage 2 functions like an $M/M/1$ queue with an arrival rate of $\mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m$ and a service rate of $\mu_2$, and hence a load of $\rho = (\mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m)/\mu_2$. Therefore, using the notation $P(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$ as defined in Def. 1, we have:

$$P(L(i, j, k) = \ell) = P\left(j, i + k + 1, \ell; \frac{\mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m}{\mu_2}\right).$$

We now return to determining the distribution of $K(i)$. Note that $K(i) \in \{0, 1, \ldots\}$ is the number of arrivals during $I(i)$, where the arrivals follow a Poisson process with rate $p_m \lambda_m$. Recall that the length of $I(i)$ is distributed $\text{Erlang}(i + 1, \mu_1)$, and note that it is independent of the aforementioned Poisson process. Consequently, $K(i)$ can also be thought of as the sum of $i + 1$ independent copies of a random variable, $X$, corresponding to the number of arrivals in a duration of time that is distributed $\text{Exp}(\mu_1)$. Elementary techniques yield $X \sim \text{Geo}(p_m \lambda_m/(\mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m))$, and hence $K(i) \sim \text{NB}(i + 1, p_m \lambda_m/(\mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m))$ (where both of these distributions are of the kind where the support consists of all non-negative integers, including zero). It follows that

$$P(K(i) = k) = \binom{k + i}{i} \left(\frac{p_m \lambda_m}{\mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m}\right)^k \left(1 - \frac{p_m \lambda_m}{\mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m}\right)^{i+1}.$$

Putting everything together, and recalling that $S_1, S_2, \ldots$ are i.i.d. $\text{Exp}(\mu_2)$ random variables representing (remaining) Stage 2 service requirements, we can prove our claim:

$$Y(i, j) = \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{m=1}^{L(i, j, K)} S_m\right] = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{m=1}^{L(i, j, k)} S_m\right] P(K(i) = k) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \mathbb{E}[L(i, j, k)]\mathbb{E}[S_1]P(K(i) = k)$$

$$= \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \sum_{\ell=1}^{i+j+k+1} \frac{\ell}{\mu_2} P(L(i, j, k) = \ell) P(K(i) = k)$$

$$= \sum_{k=0}^{i+j+k+1} \sum_{\ell=1}^{\infty} \frac{\ell}{\mu_2} P\left(j, i + k + 1, \ell; \frac{\mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m}{\mu_2}\right) P(K(i) = k)$$

$$= \left(1 - \frac{p_m \lambda_m}{\mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m}\right)^{i+1} \sum_{k=0}^{i+j+k+1} \sum_{\ell=1}^{\infty} \frac{\ell}{\mu_2} P\left(j, i + k + 1, \ell; \frac{\mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m}{\mu_2}\right) \binom{k + i}{i} \left(\frac{p_m \lambda_m}{\mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m}\right)^k.$$
EC.2.7 Proof of Proposition 5

MW (Eq. (5))

**Mobiles.** As in the case of MW in the single-server setting—by having preemptive priority over all others, mobiles experience an M/M/1 queue, and so $E_{MW}(b,p_m)T_m = 1/(\mu_2 - p_m\lambda_m)$ as claimed.

**Walk-ins.** Under MW, a walk-in seeing $N_1 = i$ customers in Stage 1 and $N_2 = j$ customers in Stage 2 upon arrival spends $i+1$ services in Stage 1 (each distributed Exp($\mu_1$)) before advancing to Stage 2. The walk-in arrives at Stage 2 and spends an amount of time in Stage 2 that is distributed like a busy period initiated by $Y(i,j)$ workload (see Lemma 1) and interrupted by mobile arrivals (with rate $p_m\lambda_m$, with each interruption requiring Exp($\mu_2$) service). Hence, we have $E_{MW}(b,p_m)T_w|N_1 = i, N_2 = j = (i+1)/\mu_1 + Y(i,j)/(1 - p_m\lambda_m/\mu_2)$, which with a straightforward application of Lemma 1 yields the result for the walk-ins in Eq. (5).

FCFS (Eq. (6))

**Mobiles.** Mobiles are treated under FCFS in a similar fashion as they were under WMO in the single-server setting: they are not preempted but have to wait behind any pre-existing Ms or Ws in Stage 2 when they arrive. Hence, if mobiles arrive seeing $N_2 = j$, their sojourn time will consist of $j+1$ Stage 2 services. Following an approach similar to that in the proof of Eq. (1) from Proposition 4, which gives $E_{WMO}(b,p_m)T_m$, we readily have the claimed result:

$$E_{FCFS}(b,p_m)T_m = \sum_{i=0}^{b-1} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \frac{j+1}{\mu_2} \pi_{TS}(i,j) = \frac{1}{\mu_2} \left(1 + \sum_{i=0}^{b-1} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} j \pi_{TS}(i,j)\right).$$

**Walk-ins.** Under FCFS, a walk-in seeing $N_1 = i$ and $N_2 = j$ waits for $i+1$ services in Stage 1, which takes on average $(i+1)/\mu_1$ time, and then waits for a number of services in Stage 2, which takes on average $Y(i,j)$ time (see Lemma 1). Hence, we have $E_{FCFS}(b,p_m)T_w|N_1 = i, N_2 = j = (i+1)/\mu_1 + Y(i,j)$, and applying Lemma 1 yields the result for the walk-ins in Eq. (6).

WM (Eq. (7))

**Mobiles.** Consider a tagged mobile arrival that enters a system under WM. Observe that any mobiles arriving after the tagged mobile have no impact on the sojourn time of the tagged mobile as they are of lower priority. Hence, we can carry out our analysis while imagining that no further mobiles arrive after the tagged mobile.

Under the view described above, the tagged mobile completes service precisely when Stage 2 is next empty, as the tagged arrival has the absolute lowest priority among all customers who will be present in Stage 2 at any point in its sojourn because (i) the tagged mobile is preempted by all Ws, and (ii) the tagged mobile arrived after all other Ms (given our modified view of the system). Hence the sojourn time of the tagged mobile is the time to clear Stage 2 of all its contents; alternatively, it is a busy period initiated by an amount of work equal to $j + 1$ Stage 2 services
(including the service of the tagged mobile), where the only other arrivals are walk-ins, given that there are currently $i$ of them in Stage 1.

The exotic arrival process of $W$s through the tandem queue complicates using standard $M/G/1$ busy period analysis, so we use Markov chain analysis instead. To this end, we observe that it does not matter how many of the $j + 1$ Stage 2 services are $W$s and how many are $M$s, as this does not affect service times. So, let us think of all of them as being $W$s (note that this is clearly false as we know at least one of the $j + 1$ Stage 2 customers is the tagged mobile, which is of course an $M$ and not a $W$). It follows that $E_{(b,p_m)}^{WM}[T_m]$ coincides with the time to clear a “mobile-less” system (i.e., one where $p_m = 0$) of all Stage 2 customers given that we start with $N_1 = i$ and $N_2 = N_{2,w} = j + 1$. In other words, we are interested in the time until we go from stage $(i, j + 1)$ in the Markov chain governing $(N_1, N_{2,w})$ (see Fig. 5b) to any state in the initial column, i.e., $(k, 0)$ for some $k \in \{0, 1, \ldots, b\}$. Hence, $(T_m|N_1 = i, N_2 = j) \sim Z(i, j + 1)$, where

$$Z(i, j) \sim \inf\{s \geq 0: N_{2,w}(t + s) = 0|N_1(t) = i, N_{2,w}(t) = j\}.$$

A method for approximating the expectation of $Z(i, j)$ with arbitrary accuracy is given in Appendix EC.3.8.

To complete the proof of the claim we condition on the event that $N_1 = i$ and $N_2 = j$. Recall that although earlier in our argument we chose to treat all Stage 2 customers as $W$s, when conditioning, we condition on the event that $(N_1 = i, N_2 = j)$ and not on $(N_1 = i, N_{2,w} = j)$ because the tagged mobile arrival is concerned with the total number of Stage 2 customers at the arrival time of the tagged mobile, as the pre-existing mobiles still have a higher priority. Hence, the probabilities of the events of interest are given by $\pi_{MW}^{MW}(i, j)$ (equivalently, $\pi_{TS}^{TS}(i, j)$) rather than $\phi_{MW}^{MW}(i, j)$.

Finally, carrying out the appropriate conditioning step, we can establish the claimed result for mobiles in Eq. (7).

**Walk-ins.** Recall that walk-ins can preempt mobiles under $WM$, so, they need only care about other walk-ins in the system upon arrival. Consider a tagged walk-in under $WM$ that sees upon arrival $N_1 = i$ $O$s in Stage 1 and $N_{2,w} = j$ $W$s in Stage 2. Let $L(i, j)$ be the number of customers in Stage 2 (including the tagged walk-in) at the time of the tagged walk-in’s arrival to Stage 2, given that $N_1 = i$ and $N_2 = j$. It then readily follows that the tagged walk-in’s mean sojourn time is $(i + 1)/\mu_1 + \ell/\mu_2$, given that $L(i, j) = \ell$. Now we turn our attention to determining the distribution of $L(i, j)$.

The distribution of $L(i, j)$ is analogous to the distribution of $L(i, j, k)$ from the proof of Lemma 1 (see Appendix EC.2.6), with the key difference that we ignore mobile arrivals entirely (that is, $K(i) = k = 0$ and we can view $p_m = 0$ when determining the arrival rate to Stage 2). That is, we
view the queue of Ws in Stage 2 as an M/M/1 system with arrival rate $\mu_1$—as Stage 1 is occupied during the entirety of the tagged walk-in’s sojourn there—and service rate $\mu_2$ so that Stage 2 is under a load of $\rho = \mu_1/\mu_2$. It follows that $L(i,j) = \ell$ precisely with the probability that an M/M/1 system with load $\rho = \mu_1/\mu_2$ starting with $j$ customers will have $\ell$ customers after $i + 1$ additional arrivals (as arrival $i + 1$ is the tagged walk-in), so that $P(L(i,j) = \ell) = P(j, i + 1, \ell, \mu_1/\mu_2)$ (see Def. 1). Therefore, it follows that:

$$
E_{WMO}[T_w | N_1 = i, N_{2,w} = j] = \frac{i + 1}{\mu_1} + E[L(i,j)] = \frac{i + 1}{\mu_1} + \sum_{\ell=1}^{i+j+1} \left( \frac{\ell}{\mu_2} \right) P \left( j, i + 1, \ell, \frac{\mu_1}{\mu_2} \right).
$$

Now recall that the probability of an arrival finding $N_1 = i$ and $N_{2,w} = j$ is given by $\phi_{(b,p,m)}^{WM}(i,j)$; so, by deconditioning on $N_{2,w} = j$ (in a fashion similar to Lemma 1), we have the claimed result for walk-ins in Eq. (7).

**EC.3 Computational details**

We provide details for calculating various quantities of interest.

**EC.3.1 The Limiting Probabilities $\pi_{WMO}^{(b,p,m)}(i,j)$ and $\pi_{WMO}^{(b,p,m)}(i,j)$ and their Associated Series**

Recall that $(N_1,N_2)$ is governed by the same CTMC under both MWO and WMO (see Fig. 4a), which has finitely many phases (rows) and infinitely many levels (columns). We notice that phase transitions are unidirectional throughout the infinite repeating portion of the chain (but bidirectional in the initial non-repeating portion). We use $\pi_{(b,p,m)}(i,j)$ to denote the limiting probabilities under both MWO and WMO, and we let $\bar{\pi}_j = (\pi_{(b,p,m)}(0,j), \ldots, \pi_{(b,p,m)}(b,j))$, $j \geq 0$. We define the five square matrices $F_0, F, L_0, L, B \in \mathbb{R}^{(b+1) \times (b+1)}$ such that (using zero-based indexing so that the upper left element of any matrix $M$ is denoted by $M(0,0)$) for the repeated portion of the Markov chain, $F(\ell,k)$, $L(\ell,k)$, and $B(\ell,k)$ “generally” correspond to the transition rates from states $(\ell,j-1)$, $(\ell,j)$, and $(\ell,j+1)$, respectively, to state $(k,j)$ for any $\ell, k \in \{0,1,\ldots,b\}$ and $j \geq 1$.

The only exceptions to this correspondence are the diagonal entries of $L$, which are equal to the negative of the sum of the outflow rates from any state $(\ell,j)$. Meanwhile, the matrices $F_0$ and $L_0$ play the similar role as $F$ and $L$ (respectively) for the initial non-repeating portion of the chain.

We now write the balance equations as matrix equations as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\left\{ \\
\bar{0} &= \bar{\pi}_0 \cdot L_0 + \bar{\pi}_1 \cdot B \\
\bar{0} &= \bar{\pi}_0 \cdot F_0 + \bar{\pi}_1 \cdot L + \bar{\pi}_2 \cdot B \\
\bar{0} &= \bar{\pi}_j \cdot F + \bar{\pi}_{j+1} \cdot L + \bar{\pi}_{j+2} \cdot B \\
\end{aligned} 
$$

where

$$
F_0 = \begin{pmatrix} p_m \lambda_m \\ \mu_1 & p_m \lambda_m \\ \ldots \\ \mu_1 & p_m \lambda_m \\ \mu_1 & p_m \lambda_m \end{pmatrix}, \
F = \begin{pmatrix} p_m \lambda_m \\ \mu_1 & p_m \lambda_m \\ \ldots \\ \mu_1 & p_m \lambda_m \end{pmatrix},
$$
which we proceed to solve in theory of matrix analytic methods, this matrix satisfies the following matrix-quadratic equation, we discard the greater solution as it exceeds 1. Hence, we aim to find a matrix \( R \) that satisfies the following matrix-quadratic equation:

\[
\begin{align*}
L_0 &= \begin{pmatrix}
-\gamma_0 & \lambda_w & & & \\
-\gamma_1 & -\lambda_w & & & \\
& \ddots & \ddots & & \\
& & \ddots & \ddots & \\
& & & -\lambda_w & -\gamma_b
\end{pmatrix}, & L &= \begin{pmatrix}
-\xi_0 & \lambda_w & & & \\
-\xi_1 & -\lambda_w & & & \\
& \ddots & \ddots & & \\
& & \ddots & \ddots & \\
& & & -\lambda_w & -\xi_b
\end{pmatrix}, & B &= \begin{pmatrix}
\mu_2 & & & & \\
& \mu_2 & & & \\
& & \ddots & & \\
& & & \ddots & \\
& & & & \mu_2
\end{pmatrix},
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\gamma_i = \begin{cases}
p_m\lambda_m + \lambda_w & i = 0 \\
p_m\lambda_m + \lambda_w & 1 \leq i \leq b - 1, \\
p_m\lambda_m & i = b
\end{cases}, \quad \xi_i = \begin{cases}
p_m\lambda_m + \lambda_w + \mu_2 & 0 \leq i \leq b - 1 \\
p_m\lambda_m + \mu_2 & i = b
\end{cases}.
\]

We aim to find a matrix \( R \in \mathbb{R}^{(b+1) \times (b+1)} \) such that \( \pi_j = \pi_1 R_j^{-1} \forall j \geq 1 \). Following the standard theory of matrix analytic methods, this matrix satisfies the following matrix-quadratic equation, which we proceed to solve in \( R \):

\[
F + RL + R^2B = 0,
\]

where \( 0 \) is the \((b + 1) \times (b + 1)\) square zero matrix.

We let \( R(i,j) \) denote the \((i,j)\)-th element of \( R, \forall i,j \in \{0, 1, \ldots, b\} \) and observe that \( R \) is an upper triangular matrix (as all phase-transitions in the infinite repeating portion of the CTMC of interest are unidirectional). Consequently, \( R(i,j) = 0 \), whenever \( 0 \leq j < i \leq b \). By rewriting the matrix-quadratic Eq. (EC.30) into the corresponding system of component-wise (scalar) quadratic equations, we observe that for all \( i \in \{0, 1, \ldots, b\} \), the \( i \)-th diagonal element of \( R \), \( R(i,i) \), is the (lesser) solution to a the single (scalar) quadratic equation \( \mu_2 R(i,i)^2 - \xi R(i,i) + p_m\lambda_m = 0 \) (we discard the greater solution as it exceeds 1). Hence, \( R(i,i) = \left( \xi_i - \sqrt{\xi_i^2 - 4p_m\lambda_m\mu_2} \right) / 2\mu_2 \). We note that all elements of the diagonal of \( R \) are actually the same except for the last, \( R(b,b) \).

After determining all the elements on the diagonal of \( R \), let \( e_i \) denote the \( i \)-th unit vector. We can compute each value of the super-diagonal of \( R \) by solving the following system of linear equations:

\[
\begin{align*}
\lambda_i R(i,j) - \xi_j R(i,j) + \mu_2(e_i^T R^2 e_j) &= 0 & 1 \leq j \leq b - 1 \\
\lambda_i R(i,j-1) - (p_m\lambda_m + \mu_2)R(i,j) + \mu_2(e_i^T R^2 e_j) &= 0 & j = b
\end{align*}
\]

As long as the values of this super-diagonal are determined, we can compute the “super-diagonal” of this super-diagonal following the same procedure; finally, all other elements of \( R \) can be determined recursively in closed form.

**Example of finding the closed form solution of \( R \) when \( b = 2 \).** We first solve the diagonal element of the matrix \( R \), which gives us \( R(i,i) = \left( \xi_i - \sqrt{\xi_i^2 - 4p_m\lambda_m\mu_2} \right) / 2\mu_2 \), for \( i = 0, 1, 2 \). Note that \( R(0,0) = R(1,1) \) and \( R(2,2) \) can be further simplified as \( R(2,2) = p_m\lambda_m / \mu_2 \). Then using the linear equations described above, we solve the super-diagonal elements \( (R(0,1) \) and \( R(1,2) \)),
finally, we derive $R(0,2)$ in the closed form as well. We summarize the closed form solution of each element of the matrix $R$ in this specific case as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
R(0,0) &= \frac{(\xi_{0} - \sqrt{\xi_{0}^{2} - 4p_m \lambda_m \mu_2})}{2p_2} \\
R(1,1) &= \frac{(\xi_{1} - \sqrt{\xi_{1}^{2} - 4p_m \lambda_m \mu_2})}{2p_2} \\
R(2,2) &= p_m \lambda_m / \mu_2 \\
R(0,1) &= \frac{\lambda_2 (\xi_1 - \sqrt{\xi_1^{2} - 4p_m \lambda_m \mu_2})}{2\mu_2 \sqrt{\xi_1^{2} - 4p_m \lambda_m \mu_2}} \\
R(1,2) &= \frac{\lambda_m (\xi_1 - \sqrt{\xi_1^{2} - 4p_m \lambda_m \mu_2})}{2\mu_2 - \mu_2 (\xi_1 - \sqrt{\xi_1^{2} - 4p_m \lambda_m \mu_2})} \\
R(0,2) &= \sqrt{\xi_1^{2} - 4p_m \lambda_m \mu_2} (2\mu_2 - \xi_1 + \sqrt{\xi_1^{2} - 4p_m \lambda_m \mu_2})^2 \\
R(1,0) &= 0 \\
R(2,0) &= 0 \\
R(2,1) &= 0
\end{align*}
\]

where

\[
\xi_i = \begin{cases} 
  p_m \lambda_m + \lambda_w + \mu_2 & \forall i \in \{0,1\} \\
  p_m \lambda_n + \mu_2 & i = 2
\end{cases}
\]

Finally, from the first two equations in Eq. (EC.28) we have that

\[
[\pi_0^* \pi_1^*] [L_0 B_0 L + \bar{R}B] = \bar{0},
\]

which we can combine with the normalizing equation (i.e. the sum of all the limiting probabilities is equal to one) to find the initial limiting probabilities $\pi_0$ and $\pi_1$ (see Eq. 21.5 in Harchol-Balter 2013). Hence, the limiting probabilities $\pi_{\text{MWO}}(b,pm)(i,j)$ and $\pi_{\text{WMO}}(b,pm)(i,j)$ are all determined and their associated series such as $\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \pi_{\text{MWO}}(b,pm)(i,j)$ and $\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} j \pi_{\text{WMO}}(b,pm)(i,j)$ can all be computed as follows (for any policy $P \in \{\text{MWO}, \text{WMO}\}$):

\[
\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \pi_{(b,pm)}(i,j) = \left( \pi_0^p + \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \pi_1^p R_j \right) e_i = \left( \pi_0^p + \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \pi_1^p R_j \right) e_i = \left( \pi_0^p + \pi_1^p (I - R)^{-1} \right) e_i,
\]

\[
\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} j \pi_{(b,pm)}(i,j) = \pi_1^p \left( \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} j R_j^{j-1} \right) e_i = \pi_1^p \frac{d}{dR} \left( \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} R_j \right) e_i = \pi_1^p (I - R)^{-2} e_i.
\]

**EC.3.2 The Limiting Probabilities $\phi_{(b,pm)}^{\text{WOM}}(i,j)$**

The quantities $\phi_{(b,pm)}^{\text{WOM}}(i,j)$, $i \in \{0,1,\ldots,b\}$ and $j \in \{0,1\}$, are the limiting probabilities of a finite state CTMC (see Fig. 4b), so we can find them by solving the balance equations below (where for simplicity we use the notation $\phi_{i,j} = \phi_{(b,pm)}^{\text{WOM}}(i,j)$):

\[
\begin{align*}
\lambda_w \phi_{0,0} &= \mu_2 \phi_{0,1} \\
(\lambda_w + \mu_1) \phi_{i,0} &= \lambda_w \phi_{i-1,0} + \mu_2 \phi_{i,1} & \forall i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, b-1\} \\
\mu_1 \phi_{b,0} &= \lambda_w \phi_{b-1,0} + \mu_2 \phi_{b,1} \\
(\lambda_w + \mu_2) \phi_{0,1} &= \mu_1 \phi_{0,1} \\
(\lambda_w + \mu_2) \phi_{i,1} &= \lambda_w \phi_{i-1,1} + \mu_1 \phi_{i+1,0} & \forall i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, b-1\} \\
\mu_2 \phi_{b,1} &= \lambda_w \phi_{b-1,1} \\
\sum_{i=0}^{b} (\phi_{i,0} + \phi_{i,1}) &= 1
\end{align*}
\]
EC.3.3 The Laplace Transforms and Moments of $U$ and $V$

In this section we give a procedure for determining the Laplace transforms of $U$ and $V$ in closed form. We denote the transforms by $\tilde{U}(s) \equiv E^{WOM}_{(b,p_m)}[e^{-sU}]$ and $\tilde{V}(s) \equiv E^{WOM}_{(b,p_m)}[e^{-sV}]$ (all transforms in this appendix implicitly depend on the strategy profile $(b,p_m)$, but we omit the reference to strategy profile in our notation in the interest of brevity). One can determine the first and second moments of $U$ and $V$ from the Laplace transforms readily from standard formulas (given at the end of this section). Alternatively, similar techniques used for computing the Laplace transforms can be used to compute the first moments directly, and subsequently, the second moments as well.

Finding $\tilde{U}(s)$. Recall that $U$ is the time until a mobile arrival that enters a mobile-less system (i.e., a system that has no mobiles)—but a steady-state number of walk-ins in each stage conditioned on the fact that there are no mobiles in the system—will ultimately leave the system. It follows that $U$ depends on the system state at the time of the mobile’s arrival. There are $2(b+1)$ such states, as the number of Os in the system, $N_1 \in \{0,1,\ldots,b\}$, while the number of Ws in the system, $N_{2,w} \in \{0,1\}$. Therefore, we can define random variables $U_{i,j} \sim (U | N_1 = i, N_{2,w} = j)$. If we can find the probability that $N_1 = i$ and $N_{2,w} = j$ at the time of a mobile’s arrival to a mobile-less system, and the distribution of $\tilde{U}_{i,j}(s)$ for all $(i,j) \in \{0,1,\ldots,b\} \times \{0,1\}$, then we can determine $\tilde{U}(s)$ by taking a standard mixture of transforms.

We first address the probability that $N_1 = i$ and $N_{2,w} = j$ at the time of a mobile’s arrival to a mobile-less system. We can determine such probabilities as the limiting probabilities—which we denote by $\psi_{WOM}^{(b,p_m)}(i,j)$—of a CTMC. Consider the stochastic process that governs $(N_1, N_{2,w})$ during the union of all time intervals (epochs) in which the system is mobile-less. As soon as a mobile would arrive, we immediately “jump ahead” in time until the first moment in which the system is again memory-less; so the time intervals in question are closed on the left (i.e., at their lower bound in time) and open at the right (i.e., at their upper bound in time). That is, if a mobile would arrive, we instead transition directly to state $(0,0)$, as the next time that the system is again mobile-less, there would not be any walk-ins of any kind in the system (as all walk-ins have preemptive priority over mobiles under WOM). Since mobiles arrive with rate $p_m \lambda_m$, the stochastic process governing $(N_1, N_{2,w})$ during mobile-less epochs is a CTMC, which corresponds to the one depicted in Fig. 4b with the key difference that there is an additional transition (or increased transition rate) from each non-$(0,0)$ state to state $(0,0)$ with rate (or increase in rate equal to) $p_m \lambda_m$; mobiles cannot of course arrive when we are in state $(0,0)$ as well, but in that case we would be back at $(0,0)$ at the start of the next mobile-less time epoch; so no transition is necessary as CTMCs do not have “self-loops” by standard convention.

The limiting probability distribution of the CTMC corresponds to $\psi_{WOM}^{(b,p_m)}(i,j)$, as mobile arrivals are governed by a Poisson process that is independent of the state of this chain, and so the likelihood
of a mobile arriving to a mobile-less system in a state where \( N_1 = i \) and \( N_{2,w} = j \) is given by the corresponding limiting probability of this CTMC. These limiting probabilities can be computed by solving a system of linear equations that greatly resemble those corresponding to the system of linear equations that we solve to obtain \( \phi^{WOM}_{(b,pm)}(i,j) \) probabilities (Eqs. (EC.31) in Appendix EC.3.2) with several differences: (i) The variable symbols contain a \( \psi \) rather than a \( \phi \), and more crucially in that (ii) the balance equations take into account the outgoing rate from each non-(0,0) state \((i,j)\) equal to \( p_m \lambda_m \psi^{WOM}_{(b,pm)}(i,j) \), and (iii) there is an increased incoming rate to state (0,0) equal to the some of all those rates; taking the normalization equation into account, this increase is equal to \( p_m \lambda_m \left( 1 - \psi^{WOM}_{(b,pm)}(0,0) \right) \). Hence, we can obtain the limiting probabilities of interest by solving the system equations below (where for simplicity we use the notation \( \psi_{i,j} \equiv \psi^{WOM}_{(b,pm)}(i,j) \)):

\[
\begin{align*}
\lambda_w \psi_{0,0} &= \mu_2 \psi_{0,1} + p_m \lambda_m (1 - \psi_{0,0}) \\
(\lambda_w + \mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m) \psi_{i,0} &= \lambda_w \psi_{i-1,0} + \mu_2 \psi_{i,1} & \forall i \in \{1,2,\ldots,b-1\} \\
(\mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m) \psi_{b,0} &= \lambda_w \psi_{b-1,0} + \mu_2 \psi_{b,1} \\
(\lambda_w + \mu_2 + p_m \lambda_m) \psi_{0,1} &= \mu_1 \psi_{1,0} \\
(\lambda_w + \mu_2 + p_m \lambda_m) \psi_{i,1} &= \lambda_w \psi_{i-1,1} + \mu_1 \psi_{i+1,0} & \forall i \in \{1,2,\ldots,b-1\} \\
(\mu_2 + p_m \lambda_m) \psi_{b,1} &= \lambda_w \psi_{b-1,1} \\
\sum_{i=0}^{b} (\psi_{i,0} + \psi_{i,1}) &= 1
\end{align*}
\]

(EC.32)

Next, we turn to the task of finding \( \widetilde{U}_{i,j}(s) \), which we shall also present as the solution to a linear system of equations (with symbolic coefficients). First, see that \( U_{0,0} = 0 \), as if a mobile arrives to an empty system, it immediately goes into service. In all other cases, \( U_{i,j} \) corresponds to the time it takes for a system currently in a state where \( N_1 = i \) and \( N_{2,w} = j \) to be empty of all its walk-ins, without regard for any mobile arrivals (since any mobile arrivals will have lower priority than the original mobile arrival). That is, \( U_{i,j} \) is distributed like the time it takes to enter state (0,0) of the Markov chain depicted in Fig. 4b, given that we initially start in state \((i,j)\). Note that this is the original Markov chain and not the modified one with additional transitions to state (0,0) that we described earlier in our procedure for finding \( \psi^{WOM}_{(b,pm)}(i,j) \).

Now that we can interpret the \( U_{i,j} \) random variables as the hitting times of a finite state Markov chain, it is straightforward to write a system of linear equations for the transforms of interest using first-step analysis. Recall that the Laplace transform of an exponential random variable with rate \( \kappa \) is \( \kappa/(\kappa + s) \) and that the minimum of two exponential random variables \( \text{Exp}(\eta) \) and \( \text{Exp}(\kappa) \) is
distributed as $\text{Exp}(\kappa + \eta)$. Then, we have:

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{U}_{0,0}(s) &= 1 \\
\tilde{U}_{1,0}(s) &= \frac{\lambda_w + \mu_1}{s + \lambda_w + \mu_1} \left( \frac{\lambda_w}{\lambda_w + \mu_1} \tilde{U}_{i+1,0}(s) + \frac{\mu_1}{\lambda_w + \mu_1} \tilde{U}_{i-1,1}(s) \right), & \forall i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, b - 1\} \\
\tilde{U}_{b,0}(s) &= \frac{\mu_1}{s + \mu_1} \tilde{U}_{b-1,1}(s) \\
\tilde{U}_{i,1}(s) &= \frac{\lambda_w + \mu_2}{s + \lambda_w + \mu_2} \left( \frac{\lambda_w}{\lambda_w + \mu_2} \tilde{U}_{i+1,1}(s) + \frac{\mu_2}{\lambda_w + \mu_2} \tilde{U}_{i,0}(s) \right), & \forall i \in \{0, 1, \ldots, b - 1\} \\
\tilde{U}_{b,1}(s) &= \frac{\mu_2}{s + \mu_2} \tilde{U}_{b,0}(s)
\end{align*}
\]  

(EC.33)

Solving the above system of equations will yield all of the $\tilde{U}_{i,j}(s)$ in closed form. Together with the $\psi_{(b,p_m)}^{WOM}(i, j)$ values, we can determine $\tilde{U}(s)$ by taking the appropriate weighted sum:

\[
\tilde{U}(s) = \sum_{i=0}^{b} \tilde{U}_{i,0}(s) \psi_{(b,p_m)}^{WOM}(i, 0) + \tilde{U}_{i,1}(s) \psi_{(b,p_m)}^{WOM}(i, 1).
\]  

(EC.34)

**Finding $\tilde{V}(s)$**. Recall that $V \sim (T_m | N_1 = 0, N_2 = 0)$ under WOM. Once service begins on a mobile, we know that there are currently no walk-ins in the system. One of two events will happen, either (i) a walk-in will arrive to Stage 1 interrupting the service of the mobile until there are again no walk-ins in the system, or (ii) the mobile will be served before any walk-ins arrive. Under case (i), the process that interrupts the mobile will be distributed like $U_{1,0}$, and once the mobile resumes service its expected remaining service time is again distributed like an independent copy of $V$ (due to the memoryless property). Formalizing the first-step analysis described above, we have:

\[
\tilde{V}(s) = \frac{\lambda_w + \mu_2}{s + \lambda_w + \mu_2} \left( \frac{\lambda_w}{\lambda_w + \mu_2} \tilde{U}_{1,0}(s) \tilde{V}(s) + \frac{\mu_2}{\lambda_w + \mu_2} \right) \\
\implies \tilde{V}(s) = \frac{\mu_2}{s + \lambda_w \left( 1 - \tilde{U}_{1,0}(s) \right) + \mu_2}.
\]  

(EC.35)

Finally, the moments of $U$ and $V$ can be obtained by using the standard technique which gives the first and second moments of a random variable $X$—with well defined Laplace transform $\tilde{X}(s)$—to be $\lim_{s \to 0^+} X'(s) = -\mathbb{E}[X]$ and $\lim_{s \to 0^+} X''(s) = \mathbb{E}[X^2]$, respectively.

**A computationally efficient technique for finding the first and second moments of $U$ and $V$**. Rather than compute $\tilde{U}(s)$ and $\tilde{V}(s)$, if we are only interested in the first and second moments of $U$ and $V$ (which is the case for finding the sojourn times of interest in this paper), we can use the standard technique for finding moments from transforms (described above) to each
equation in the system (EC.33) directly, yielding a new system (where we use the shorthand $E[U_{i,j}]$ for $E^{WOM}_{(b,p_m)}[U_{i,j}]$):

$$
\begin{align*}
E[U_{0,0}] &= 1 \\
E[U_{i,0}] &= \frac{1 + \lambda_w E[U_{i+1,0}] + \mu_1 E[U_{i-1,1}]}{\lambda_w + \mu_1} \\
E[U_{b,0}] &= \frac{1}{\mu_2} + E[U_{b,0}] \\
E[U_{i,1}] &= \frac{1 + \lambda_w E[U_{i+1,1}] + \mu_2 E[U_{i,0}]}{\lambda_w + \mu_2} \\
E[U_{b,1}] &= \frac{1}{\mu_2} + E[U_{b,0}] \\
E[U_{i,0}^2] &= \frac{2 + 2\lambda_w E[U_{i+1,0}] + 2\mu_1 E[U_{i-1,1}]}{(\lambda_w + \mu_1)^2} + \frac{\lambda_w E[U_{i+1,1}] + \mu_1 E[U_{i-1,1}]}{\lambda_w + \mu_1} \\
E[U_{b,0}^2] &= \frac{2 + 2\mu_1 E[U_{b-1,1}]}{(\lambda_w + \mu_1)^2} + E[U_{b-1,1}] \\
E[U_{i,1}^2] &= \frac{2 + 2\lambda_w E[U_{i+1,1}] + 2\mu_2 E[U_{i,0}]}{(\lambda_w + \mu_2)^2} + \frac{\lambda_w E[U_{i+1,1}] + \mu_2 E[U_{i,0}]}{\lambda_w + \mu_2} \\
E[U_{b,1}^2] &= \frac{2 + 2\mu_2 E[U_{b,0}]}{\mu_2^2} + E[U_{b,0}^2]
\end{align*}
$$

(EC.36)

After solving this system, we can find the first and second moments via standard conditioning:

$$
E^{WOM}_{(b,p_m)}[U^n] = \sum_{i=0}^{b} E^{WOM}_{(b,p_m)}[U^n_{i,0}] \psi_{(b,p_m)}(i,0) + E^{WOM}_{(b,p_m)}[U^n_{i,1}] \psi_{(b,p_m)}(i,1),
$$

where we are interested in the cases where $n \in \{1,2\}$. Similar methods yield:

$$
E^{WOM}_{(b,p_m)}[V] = \frac{1 + \lambda_w E[U_{1,0}]}{\mu_2}, \quad E^{WOM}_{(b,p_m)}[V^2] = 2 \left(1 + \lambda_w E[U_{1,0}]\right)^2 + \lambda_w \mu_2 E[U_{1,0}^2].
$$

(EC.37)

**EC.3.4 Approximating the Limiting Probabilities $\pi^{TS}_{(b,p_m)}(i,j)$ and an Associated Series**

To determine the limiting probabilities of the CTMC of Fig. 5a, $\pi^{TS}_{(b,p_m)}(i,j)$, we first observe that the chain has finitely many phases (rows) and infinitely many levels (columns). Moreover, phase transitions are bidirectional throughout the infinite portion of the chain, that is, we can transition to a higher row and a lower row from any phase. Such chains do not often lend themselves to exact analysis; so, we opt to approximate the probabilities via numerical matrix analytic methods.

We first define the three square matrices $F, L, B \in \mathbb{R}^{(b+1) \times (b+1)}$ such that (using zero-based numbering so that the upper left element of any matrix $M$ is denoted by $M(0,0)$) $F(\ell,k), L(\ell,k)$, and $B(\ell,k)$ “generally” correspond to the transition rates from states $(\ell, j-1)$, $(\ell, j)$, and $(\ell, j+1)$, respectively, to state $(k, j)$ for any $\ell, k \in \{0,1, \ldots, b\}$ and $j \geq 1$. The only exceptions to this correspondence are the entries $L(\ell,k)$ when $\ell = k$. In these cases, $L(\ell,k) = L(\ell,\ell)$ is equal to the
negative of the sum of the outflow rates from state \((\ell, j)\). Thus, for the CTMC of Fig. 5a, \(B\) and \(F\) has the same structures as \(B\) and \(F_0\) in Eq. (EC.29), respectively, and \(L\) follows:

\[
L = \begin{pmatrix}
-\nu_0 & \lambda_w & 0 & \cdots \\
-\nu_1 & -\nu_1 & \lambda_w & \cdots \\
0 & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots \\

-\nu_{b-1} & \cdots & -\nu_{b-1} & -\nu_b
\end{pmatrix}, \quad \text{where} \quad \nu_i = \begin{cases} 
p_{m}\lambda_m + \lambda_w + \mu_2 & i = 0 \\
\mu_1 + p_m\lambda_m + \lambda_w + \mu_2 & 1 \leq i \leq b - 1 \quad \text{(EC.38)} \\
\mu_1 + p_m\lambda_m + \mu_2 & i = b
\end{cases}
\]

We would like to express the limiting probabilities of interest in terms of a square matrix \(R \in \mathbb{R}^{(b+1) \times (b+1)}\) that satisfies Eq. (EC.30). In general, we cannot find \(R\) in closed form, so we resort to a procedure where we iteratively calculate \(R_{n+1} = -(R_n^2B + F)L^{-1}\) (here \(R_n\) denotes the \(n\)-th iteration of \(R\)) until \(\|R_{n+1} - R_n\| < \epsilon\) (here we define the metric \(\|\cdot\|\) to be the maximum of all the elements in the matrix), for any arbitrary given \(\epsilon\). The associated series can be computed in the similar way as in Appendix EC.3.1.

**EC.3.5 The Transient Probabilities** \(P(u, v, w; \rho)\)

Individual probabilities of the form \(P(u, v, w; \rho)\) can be computed exactly in a recursive fashion from the following relations due to Kaczynski et al. (2012):

\[
\begin{align*}
P(u, u + v; \rho) &= \left(\frac{\rho}{\rho + 1}\right)^v \quad u \geq 1, v \geq 1 \\
P(0, v, v) &= \left(\frac{\rho}{\rho + 1}\right)^v \\
P(u, 1; \rho) &= \frac{\rho}{(\rho + 1)^u \left(\frac{1}{\rho + 1}\right)^{u-w+2}} \\
P(u, v, w; \rho) &= \frac{\rho}{\rho + 1} \sum_{j=w-1}^{u+v-1} \left(\frac{1}{\rho + 1}\right)^{j-w+1} P(u, v - 1, j; \rho) \quad v \geq 2 \text{ and } 2 \leq w \leq u + v - 1
\end{align*}
\]

In the interest of computational efficiency, it is advisable to use a “memoization” approach when computing a set of probabilities.

**EC.3.6 Approximating \(Y(i, j)\) and an Associated Series**

We cannot determine \(Y(i, j)\) in closed form so we rely on truncation. Truncating the first summation (by summing from \(k = 0\) to \(K\) instead of \(k = 0\) to \(\infty\)) in the expression giving \(Y(i, j)\) (i.e., Eq. (4)) at \(K\) and denoting the result by \(Y_K(i, j)\) given by

\[
Y_K(i, j) = \left(1 - \frac{p_m\lambda_m}{\mu_1 + p_m\lambda_m}\right)^{i+1} \sum_{k=0}^{K} \sum_{\ell=1}^{i+j+k+1} \frac{\ell}{\mu_2} P\left(j, i + k + 1, \ell; \frac{\mu_1 + p_m\lambda_m}{\mu_2}\right) \left(\frac{p_m\lambda_m}{\mu_1 + p_m\lambda_m}\right)^k
\]

it follows that \(Y_K(i, j) \to Y(i, j)\) as \(K \to \infty\), and so \(Y(i, j) \approx Y_K(i, j)\) for sufficiently large \(K\) values. Based on our exploration of different parameters, it appears that \(|Y_{K+1}(i, j) - Y_K(i, j)|\) is negligible for values of \(K\) on the order of 20, suggesting that the approximation is adequate when \(K\) is on that order.
Similarly, we approximate the following series involving \( Y(i,j) \) via “double truncation” for sufficiently large \( J \) and \( K \) values (where it may or may not be appropriate to set \( J = K \) based on the parameters). We have:

\[
\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} Y(i,j)\pi^{TS}_{(b,p_m)}(i,j) \approx \sum_{j=0}^{J} Y_K(i,j)\pi^{TS}_{(b,p_m)}(i,j).
\]

Of course, since we generally do not know \( \pi^{TS}_{(b,p_m)}(i,j) \) exactly, we compute the above approximation in terms of the approximated (rather than exact) \( \pi^{TS}_{(b,p_m)}(i,j) \) values.

**EC.3.7 Approximating the Limiting Probabilities \( \phi^{WM}_{(b,p_m)}(i,j) \) and an Associated Series**

We can approximate the limiting probabilities of the CTMC shown in Fig. 5b, \( \phi^{WM}_{(b,p_m)}(i,j) \), by using the same approach we used to determine the \( \pi^{TS}_{(b,p_m)}(i,j) \) values (see Appendix EC.3.4), with the only difference that we set \( p_m = 0 \) everywhere (regardless of the actual value of \( p_m \), which \( \phi^{WM}_{(b,p_m)}(i,j) \) does not depend on) as the Fig. 5b chain is a special case of the Fig. 5a chain where \( p_m = 0 \). As a result, we start with a modified \( F \) matrix with zero entries for its main diagonal. We follow the rest of the procedure in the exact same way. The limiting probabilities yielded by this procedure will be (an approximation of) \( \phi^{WM}_{(b,p_m)}(i,j) \), and the series computed will be (an approximation of) \( \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} j\phi^{WM}_{(b,p_m)}(i,j) \).

**EC.3.8 Approximating \( E^{WM}_{(b,p_m)}[Z(i,j)] \) and an Associated Series**

First observe that \( Z(i,j) \) corresponds to the “hitting time” associated with reaching a state of the form \( (k,0) \) (for any value of \( k \in \{0,1,\ldots,b\} \)) starting at an initial state \( (i,j) \) in the CTMC shown in Fig. 5b. Now, assume that we are in some state \( (\ell,m) \) where \( m \geq 1 \), and consider the first time we reach \( (k,m-1) \) for any \( k \in \{0,1,\ldots,b\} \) (i.e., the first time \( N_{2,w} \) drops from its initial value of \( m \)). Let \( \tau_\ell \) be the expected “hitting time” (duration) associated with this trip from \( (\ell,m) \) to some \( (k,m-1) \), and for any specific value of \( k \in \{0,1,\ldots,b\} \), let \( p_{\ell\rightarrow k} \) be the probability with which we specifically end up in \( (k,m-1) \) at the conclusion of this trip (i.e., we reach \( (k,m-1) \) before reaching \( (k',m-1) \) for any \( k' \neq k \)). As our notation suggests, these quantities are well-defined for any \( m \geq 1 \), and do not otherwise depend on the particular value of \( m \) (i.e., the initial level or \( N_{2,w} \) value is irrelevant); this fact is easily confirmed by considering the repeating nature of the CTMC of Fig. 5b

With the \( \tau_\ell \) and \( p_{\ell\rightarrow k} \) quantities, we can determine \( E^{WM}_{(b,p_m)}[Z(i,j)] \) via first-step analysis. First, note from the definition of \( Z(i,j) \) and \( \tau_\ell \) that we readily have \( E^{WM}_{(b,p_m)}[Z(i,1)] = \tau_i, \forall i \in \{0,1,\ldots,b\} \). Meanwhile, when examining \( Z(i,j) \) for any value of \( j > 1 \), we string together trips that drop the
phase number \((N_{2,w})\) by one while taking into account the distribution over the level \((N_1)\) that we are in at the conclusion of each phase drop. Hence, we have the following relations:

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{WM}[Z(i,1)] &= \tau_i, \quad 0 \leq i \leq b, \\
\mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{WM}[Z(i,j)] &= \tau_i + \sum_{k=0}^{b} (p_{i\rightarrow k}) \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{WM}[Z(i,j-1)] \quad 0 \leq i \leq b, 1 \leq j.
\end{align*}
\]

(EC.39)

We can solve for any \(\mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^{WM}[Z(i,1)]\) values in closed form in terms of the \(\tau_\ell\) and \(p_{\ell\rightarrow k}\) values; a “memoization” approach is advisable. We note that this can become cumbersome for large values of \(j\). So from a computational efficiency perspective, it is preferable to have numerical values for \(\tau_\ell\) and \(p_{\ell\rightarrow k}\). We now address how to derive these values.

We proceed by deriving a system of equations relating the \(\tau_\ell\) values to one another in terms of the \(p_{\ell\rightarrow k}\) values via a straightforward application of the first step analysis:

\[
\begin{align*}
\tau_0 &= \frac{1}{\lambda_w} + \frac{\lambda_w}{\lambda_w + \mu_2} \tau_1 \\
\tau_\ell &= \frac{1}{\lambda_w + \mu_1 + \mu_2} + \frac{\lambda_w}{\lambda_w + \mu_1 + \mu_2} \tau_{\ell+1} + \frac{\mu_1}{\lambda_w + \mu_1 + \mu_2} \left( \tau_{\ell-1} + \sum_{k=0}^{b} (p_{(\ell-1)\rightarrow k}) \tau_k \right), \quad 1 \leq \ell \leq b-1. \\
\tau_b &= \frac{1}{\mu_1 + \mu_2} + \frac{\mu_1}{\mu_1 + \mu_2} \left( \tau_{b-1} + \sum_{k=0}^{b} (p_{(b-1)\rightarrow k}) \tau_k \right)
\end{align*}
\]

(EC.40)

It turns out that Eq. (EC.40) is a finite system of equations that are linear in the \(\tau_\ell\) values, which we can easily solve for in closed form, this time in terms of the \(p_{\ell\rightarrow k}\) probabilities. Unfortunately, the \(p_{\ell\rightarrow k}\) probabilities cannot generally be determined in closed-form in terms of elementary functions, as writing a system of equations relating these values to one another will involve nonlinear terms and solving the system will require solving higher ordered polynomials (the order of which can be arbitrary high based on the value of \(b\)). Therefore, we resort to approximating the \(p_{\ell\rightarrow k}\) probabilities numerically.

In order to approximate the \(p_{\ell\rightarrow k}\) probabilities numerically, we invoke the notion of the \(G\) matrix from the literature on matrix analytic methods (for a comprehensive discussion of the \(G\) matrix, see the chapter 6 of the standard textbook (Latouche and Ramaswami (1999))). The \(G\) matrix associated with a quasi-birth–death process (such as those depicted in Fig. 5) is a square matrix with a number of rows and columns equal to the number of phases and levels of the chain in question such that (using zero-based numbering so that we start with row 0) the entry in row \(\ell\) and column \(k\) of \(G\) corresponds precisely to \(p_{\ell\rightarrow k}\) as we have defined it above. That is, \(p_{\ell\rightarrow k} = G(\ell,k)\), so it remains to approximate \(G\). There are a variety of ways to carry out the task in the literature, but for the purpose of our discussion the most straightforward (although not necessarily most efficient) approach is likely to use the relation:

\[
G = -F^{-1} \left( R^{-1} F - L \right),
\]

(EC.41)
where $F$ and $L$ are matrices associated with the Markov chain of interest and $R$ is the rate matrix. $F$ and $L$ are given in Eq. (EC.38) for the more general CTMC of Fig. 5a; we need only modify $F$ for the CTMC of Fig. 5b by replacing its main diagonal entries with zeroes. Approximating $G$ turns out to be straightforward once we identify $F$, $L$, and $B$ and use them to approximate the $R$ matrix (on this, see Appendices EC.3.4 and EC.3.7).

Finally, putting everything together and proceeding in roughly reverse order of the presentation of our discussion in this section, we can find the $E_{(b,p_m)}^{WM}[Z(i,j)]$ as follows:

1. Identify $F$, $B$, and $L$, as given in Eq. (EC.38), with the modification that the main diagonal of $F$ should be replaced with zeroes.
2. Use $F$, $B$, and $L$ to compute $R$ following the procedure given in Appendix EC.3.4.
3. Use Eq. (EC.41) to compute $G$.
4. Solve the linear system Eq. (EC.40) to obtain all of the $\tau_\ell$ values based on $G$ (recall that $p_{\ell \rightarrow k} = G(\ell,k)$).
5. Use the recursive relations given in Eq. (EC.39), to compute any of the $E_{(b,p_m)}^{WM}[Z(i,j)]$ of interest (say $\forall i \in \{0,1,\ldots,b\}$ and $j \in \{1,2,\ldots,J\}$ for some $J$).

We note that Step 2 is the only step that is not based on one or more exact relations, i.e., it introduces an approximation, resulting in an inexact value for $R$. Consequently, all calculations based directly or indirectly on $R$—namely, $G$, the $\tau_\ell$ values, and the $E_{(b,p_m)}^{WM}[Z(i,j)]$ values—will also all be approximations. We also note that $E_{(b,p_m)}^{WM}[Z(i,j)]$ is actually constant in $p_m$ as mobile arrivals do not affect this quantity.

Finally, in the absence of better alternatives, the following series (which depends on the index $i$) can be approximated by truncation:

$$ \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \pi_{TS}^{b,p_m}(i,j)E_{(b,p_m)}^{TS}[Z(i,j+1)] \approx \sum_{j=0}^{J} \pi_{TS}^{b,p_m}(i,j)E_{(b,p_m)}^{TS}[Z(i,j+1)], $$

for sufficiently large $J$ (where the right-hand side converges to the left-hand side as $J \rightarrow \infty$). We also note that as we generally do not know $\pi_{TS}^{b,p_m}(i,j)$ exactly, we compute the approximation for this series in terms of the approximated (rather than exact) $\pi_{TS}^{b,p_m}(i,j)$ values.

**EC.4 Mixed walk-in strategies and heterogeneous patience levels**

In this section we relax the assumption that indifferent walk-ins will always join, by allowing walk-ins to pursue a mixed strategy. This generalization will be essential in addressing the case of walk-ins with heterogeneous patience levels. In this section, we address both the single- and two-server settings, but we will primarily focus on the former, where we provide a systematic method for determining such equilibria, although in some problem instances we can only find approximate equilibria under WMO.
EC.4.1 Mixed Walk-In Strategies

Throughout §5, we assume that the strategy (behavior) employed by walk-ins is described by a single integer value, \( b \). Specifically, in that section, we assume that if a walk-in observes \( N_1 = i < b \) other walk-ins in Stage 1 upon arrival, they will join, and otherwise, they will balk. We now consider a more general mixed strategy on the part of walk-ins, where for each non-negative integer \( i \), we denote by \( p_i \), the fraction (probability) of walk-in customers who opt to join given that they observe \( N_1 = i \) other walk-ins in Stage 1 upon arrival. Letting \( b \equiv \arg \min_{i \in \mathbb{Z} \geq 0} p_i = 0 \), we once again have \( b \) as a threshold on \( N_1 \) at which no walk-ins join. A pure walk-in strategy described by \( b \) corresponds precisely to the mixed walk-in strategy where \( p_0 = p_1 = \cdots = p_{b-1} = 1 \) and \( p_b = 0 \); i.e., the strategy \( b \) corresponds to a \( p_w \) that is a vector of length \( b \), with each entry is equal to 1. It follows that the space of walk-in strategies is formally given by

\[
S \equiv \bigcup_{b=0}^{\infty} \prod_{i=0}^{b-1} (0,1],
\]

where \( \prod \) denotes the generalized Cartesian product. Note that \( p_w \) is the “empty vector” (which we can denote by \( \varnothing \) when \( b = 0 \). We could equivalently consider strategies coming from the space \( \prod_{i=0}^{\infty} [0,1] \), which would include “redundant” strategies as whenever \( p_i = 0 \), the values of \( p_k \) where \( k > i \) are inconsequential.

We use \((p_w,p_m)\) to denote the strategy profile describing the behavior of both walk-ins and mobiles, where the interpretation of \( p_m \) remains unchanged (i.e., \( p_m \) is the fraction of mobile arrivals who join). Note that the strategy profile \((p_w,p_m)\) implies a value for \( b \) as well (i.e., \( b \) is the number of entries in the vector \( p_w \)). In this setting, given a policy \( P \), an equilibrium is a joint-strategy, \((p^*_w,p^*_m)\), which satisfies

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathbb{E}_{(p_w,p_m)}^P[T_w | N_1 = i] &\leq T_w^{\max} \quad \forall i \in \{0,1,\ldots,b^*-1\} \text{ s.t. } p_i = 1 \\
\mathbb{E}_{(p_w,p_m)}^P[T_w | N_1 = i] &\geq T_w^{\max} \quad \forall i \in \{0,1,\ldots,b^*-1\} \text{ s.t. } p_i < 1 \\
\arg \max \{p_m \in [0,1] : \mathbb{E}_{(p_w,p_m)}^P[T_m] \leq T_m^{\max}\} &= p_m^*,
\end{align*}
\]

where \( b^* \) is the number of entries in \( p_w^* \). Meanwhile, we also have a slightly revised formula for social welfare in this setting:

\[
SW^P_{(p_w,p_m)} = \frac{1}{\lambda} \left( \sum_{i=0}^{b-1} p_i \left( T_w^{\max} - \mathbb{E}_{(p_w,p_m)}^P[T_w | N_1 = i] \right) \mathbb{E}_{(p_w,p_m)}^P(N_1 = i) + p_m \lambda_m \left( T_m^{\max} - \mathbb{E}_{(b,p_m)}^P[T_m] \right) \right).
\]
EC.4.2 General Approach for Finding Equilibria with Mixed Walk-in Strategies

We proceed to discuss how we can find equilibria under mixed walk-in strategies in the single-server model, taking $E_{P(p_w,p_m)}[T_w|N_1 = i]$ and $E_{P(p_w,p_m)}[T_m]$ as given; the computation of these sojourn times is deferred to Appendix EC.4.6. There are challenges associated with determining equilibria in the two-server setting, so we avoid that case.

A key distinguishing feature of equilibria determination in this setting as compared with the setting of pure walk-in strategies (where the walk-in behavior depends on an integer value, $b$), is that we can no longer examine a finite number of cases $b \in \{0,1,\ldots,B\}$. In fact the space of mixed walk-in strategies, $S$, is unaccountably large, spanning a union of hypercubes of different dimensionalities.

In an effort to make the equilibria determination problem tractable, we use a different approach depending on the policy under consideration. We make a couple of observations. First, under MWO, we note that mobiles have priority over all walk-ins. As a result, $E_{P(p_w,p_m)}[T_m]$ does not depend on $p_w$, so we can determine $p_m^*$ first (via the final equilibrium constraint) and then, given this value of $p_m^*$, we find those vectors $p_w^* \in S$ that satisfy the equilibrium constraints for walk-ins. Second, under WOM, we have the opposite situation: walk-ins have priority over mobiles and so $E_{P(p_w,p_m)}[T_w|N_1 = i]$ does not depend on $p_m$. This allows us to determine $p_w^*$ based on the equilibrium constraints for walk-ins, and then, given this vector for $p_w^*$, we find the value of $p_m^* \in [0,1]$ that satisfies the final equilibrium constraint (i.e., we find the “best response” of mobiles to the strategies adopted by the walk-ins). Such straightforward situations do not necessarily arise in the case of WMO, and so we defer discussion equilibria determination under WMO to Appendix EC.4.5.

EC.4.3 Finding $p_m^*$ in the setting with mixed walk-in strategies

We now directly address the method for finding equilibria, $(p_w^*,p_m^*)$. We first discuss the method of determining $p_m^*$ under MWO and WOM, noting that this is the first step we use in finding equilibria for MWO, but the second step (following the determination of $p_w^*$, as this value is required) for WOM. For $P \in \{\text{MWO}, \text{WOM}\}$, we must simply compute $p_m^* = \arg\max_{p_m \in [0,1]}\{E_{(p_w,p_m)}[T_m] \leq T_{\text{max}}^m\}$, taking $p_w^*$ to be as already found (using the method discussed below) under WOM and taking the choice of $p_w^*$ to be inconsequential for MWO (as $E_{(p_w,p_m)}[T_m]$ is constant in $p_w$). Under both policies, if it is neither the case that $p_m^* = 0$ or $p_m^* = 1$ (both of which can be readily checked), then $p_m^*$ is the unique value of $p_m$ satisfying $E_{(p_w,p_m)}[T_m] = T_{\text{max}}^m$, which can either be determined exactly, if possible, or approximated with arbitrary precision using a bisection search, as $E_{(p_w,p_m)}[T_m]$ is continuous and monotone in $p_m$ (we assert continuity without proof, while monotonicity follows from a slight modification of the proof of Proposition 3, which establishes the monotonicity of $E_{(b,p_m)}[T_m]$).
**EC.4.4 Finding \( p_w^* \) in the setting with mixed-walk in strategies**

We now address the determination of \( p_w^* \), noting that this is the second step when \( p_m^* \) is required, as is the case under \( MWO \) (and sometimes under \( WMO \), see Appendix EC.4.5), and the first step otherwise (i.e., under \( WOM \)). We use the notation \( x \sim y \) (resp. \( x \sim y \)) to denote the concatenation of the vector \( x \) and the scalar \( y \) (resp. the vector \( y \)); e.g., if \( x = (1, 1/2) \), \( y = 1/3 \), and \( y = (1/3, 1/4) \), then \( x \sim y = (1, 1/2, 1/3) \), while \( x \sim y = (1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4) \). This notation allows us to present the following crucial result, which plays a key role in determination of \( p_w^* \):

**Proposition EC.1** For any policy \( P \) in the one-server setting, any \( p_w \in \mathcal{S} \) with at least \( i \) entries, and any \( q \in [0, 1]^k \), we have

\[
\mathbb{E}_{(p_w, p_m)}^P[T_w|N_1 = i] = \mathbb{E}_{(p_w^\sim q, p_m)}^P[T_w|N_1 = i].
\]

That is, the response time of a walk-in seeing \( i \) customers in the system upon arrival does not depend on the strategies of those walk-ins who observe at least \( i + 1 \) customers upon arrival.

**Proof.** This observation follows readily from examining the relevant Markov chains (i.e., those depicted in Fig. 4), by noting that once one leaves state \((N_1, N_2) = (i, j)\), to enter phase \( i + 1 \), the next time one will enter phase \( i \) will always be in state \((N_1, N_2) = (i, 1)\) (and analogously for \((N_1, N_2, w)\) in the \( WOM \) case), from which it follows that the limiting distribution of \( N_2 \) and \( N_2, w \) conditioned on \( N_1 = i \) is the same under both \( p_w \) and \( p_w \sim q \): i.e., \( \pi^p_{i,j} = \pi^p_{i,j} \), and \( \phi^p_{i,j} = \phi^p_{i,j} \) do not change if we replace \( p_w \) with \( p_w \sim q \), which is sufficient to yield the desired claim (see Proposition 4).

Proposition EC.1 does not hold in the two-server model (as phase transitions are bidirectional), hence analysis is not tractable in that setting; nonetheless, an adaptation of this technique was able to give approximate equilibria that were used in generating Fig. 7 for the two-server model. With this proposition in mind, we provide the following “algorithm sketch” for determining at least one equilibrium strategy, \( p_w^* \):

1. Set \( i \leftarrow 0 \) and \( p_w \leftarrow \emptyset \), where \( \emptyset \) represents the empty vector. Then, continue on to Step 2.
2. If \( \mathbb{E}_{(p_w, p_m)}^P[T_w|N_1 = i] \geq T_w^{\max} \), then report that \((p_w^*, p_m^*)\) is an equilibrium where \( p_w^* = p_w \) and end the algorithm. Otherwise, continue to Step 3.
3. If \( \mathbb{E}_{(p_w, p_m)}^P[T_w|N_1 = i] \leq T_w^{\max} \), set \( i \leftarrow i + 1 \) and \( p_w \leftarrow p_w \sim 1 \); then, return to Step 2. Otherwise, continue to Step 4.
4. Consider the following function, \( g \), of \( p \in [0, 1] \): \( g(p) = \mathbb{E}_{(p_w, p_m)}^P[T_w|N_1 = i] - T_w^{\max} \). Based on the results of Steps 2 and 3, the fact that we have reached this step indicates that \( g(0) < 1 \) and \( g(0) > 1 \). So, by the continuity of \( g \) (which we state without proof), we know that \( g \) has at least one root. Find such a root—or approximate one to arbitrary accuracy via a bisection search—and call it \( p^* \). Now set \( i \leftarrow i + 1 \) and \( p_w \leftarrow p_w \sim p^* \). Then, return to Step 2.
Note that this algorithm will terminate in finite time (as long as the lengths of bisection searches are limited) as $i$ increments by one through each loop of the algorithm, and the algorithm will terminate without $i$ exceeding $B$. Further, note that this algorithm will find only one equilibrium value of $p_w$. We know of no method for systematically and exhaustively finding all such equilibria (although we have observed that multiple may exist as step 4 may have more than one solution), although one can “search” for additional equilibria in an exploratory manner by developing variants of this algorithm that permute (with appropriate modifications) Steps 2, 3, and 4 and introduce some degree of randomization in initializing the bisection search.

We note that the mixed equilibria discussed in our results (see §6) are all of the form $(1,1,\ldots,1,p)$. We conjecture that equilibria of this form (allowing for $p = 0$, yielding a non-mixed threshold strategy) always exist. In obtaining the results presented in §6, we attempt to find equilibria with mixed walk-in strategies whenever we fail to find any equilibria with a pure walk-in strategy. In all such cases, we have observed that there exists some $b \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$ such that $b + 1$ is a best-response for a walk-in when all other walk-ins are employing threshold $b$ and vice versa. In such cases, we set $p_w \leftarrow (1,1,\ldots,1)$ with length $b$ and set $i \leftarrow b$ and start running through the above algorithm at Step 4; in all cases, we observe that the algorithm next terminates when reaching step 2, yielding an equilibrium walk-in strategy of the form $(1,1,\ldots,1,p)$.

**EC.4.5 Determining equilibria with mixed walk-in strategies under WMO**

The case of determining equilibria with mixed walk-in strategies under WMO is more challenging as compared to finding such equilibria under the other two single-server policies. This is because in the case of WMO, we must determine $p_w^*$ and $p_m^*$ jointly, since walk-in strategies affect the “best response” of mobiles, and vice-versa. The following proposition highlights a restricted case, where we can circumvent this problem:

**Proposition EC.2** If $T_m^{\max} \geq 1/(\mu_2 - \lambda_m) + 1/\mu_2$, then under any equilibrium $(p_w^*, p_m^*)$, we must have $p_m^* = 1$ under WMO.

**Proof.** We first observe that we can view the subsystem of mobiles at Stage 2 under WMO as behaving like an M/M/1 with setup. Mobiles arrive according to a Poisson process with rate $p_m \lambda_m$. Once the system begins serving mobiles, it will continue serving mobiles (who have exponential service requirements) without interruption, at rate $\mu_2$. However, when a mobile arrives to this system, they may not immediately begin service. Specifically, immediate service does not begin if a W is already present at Stage 2, in which case they will be in service. Say that whenever a mobile arrives into the system with no other mobiles, the event where the mobile cannot go into service immediately occurs with probability $q$ (note that successive events are not necessarily independent,
and $q$ depends on $p_w$). When such an event occurs, we can view the time to serve this walk-in as a setup time that is distributed $\text{Exp}(\mu_2)$, after which time we can serve mobiles until the completion of the mobile busy period without any interruptions. It is easy to see that mobile sojourn times are upper-bounded by the special case where we always have setups, i.e., $q = 1$. In this case, the mobiles experience an $\text{M/M/1}$ with exponentially distributed setup times with an arrival rate $p_m \lambda_m$ and both service and setup rates equal to $\mu_2$, which is known to have a mean sojourn time equal to that of the corresponding $\text{M/M/1}$ plus the mean setup time (see Harchol-Balter 2013, Section 27.3). Therefore, we have the upper bound $E_{(p_w, p_m)}^\text{WMO}[T_m] \leq 1/(\mu_2 - p_m \lambda_m) + 1/\mu_2$, which guarantees $p_m = 1$ is a best response to any $p_w \in \mathcal{S}$, so long a $T_m^\text{max} \geq 1/(\mu_2 - \lambda_m) + 1/\mu_2$, which establishes the claim.

Proposition EC.2 tells us that by restricting attention to settings where $T_m^\text{max} \geq 1/(\mu_2 - \lambda_m) + 1/\mu_2$ (under WMO), we know that $p_m^* = 1$, and can thus proceed to determining $p_w^*$ in accordance with the method presented in Appendix EC.4.4. This condition is satisfied by 1232 out of (86.76%) the 1420 problem instances in our pruned full-factorial experiment. Of the remaining 188 instances, we find an equilibrium with a pure walk-in strategy in an additional 131 instances, leaving 54 remaining cases.

We now sketch an iterative technique for approximating equilibria with mixed walk-in strategies when $T_m^\text{max} < 1/(\mu_2 - \lambda_m) + 1/\mu_2$ and no pure strategy equilibria are found to exist:

1. Set $p_w \leftarrow \emptyset$ and $p_m \leftarrow 1$ (or better initial “guesses” if available based on the failed process of attempting to determine pure strategy equilibria). Continue on to Step 2.

2. Apply the method presented in Appendix EC.4.4 (without overwriting $p_w \leftarrow \emptyset$ in Step 1 of that algorithm and taking $p_m^*$ to be the current value of $p_m$), updating $p_w$ based on the value of $p_m^*$ returned (note that this need not be an equilibrium strategy; instead it is merely the best response to the current value of $p_m$). Note the change (in terms of an appropriate metric, e.g., the infinity-norm after adding zeros to the tail of a shorter vector where appropriate) in $p_w$ as a result of this entire step and call it $\Delta_w$, then continue to Step 3.

3. Apply the method presented in Appendix EC.4.3 to find an updated value of $p_m$ that is a best response to the current $p_w$. Note the change in $p_m$ as a result of this step and call it $\Delta_m$, then continue to Step 4.

4. If $\max(\Delta_w, \Delta_m)$ falls below a desired precision threshold, then terminate the algorithm here and report $(p_w, p_m)$ as an approximate equilibrium. Otherwise, return to Step 2.

While we cannot prove that this technique is guaranteed to converge, it yielded adequate results in the aforementioned 54 cases where other methods did not suffice. A similar technique can be used to find mixed equilibria in the two-server setting.
EC.4.6 Sojourn Time Computation Under Mixed Walk-in Strategies

We now turn to the question of how to compute the sojourn times of interest under strategy profiles of the form \((p_w, p_m)\) in both the single- and two-server settings. One can show without difficulty that \(\mathbb{E}_{(p_w, p_m)}^P[T_w | N_1 = i]\) and \(\mathbb{E}_{(p_w, p_m)}^P[T_m]\) follow the same forms given for \(\mathbb{E}_{(b, p_m)}^P[T_w | N_1 = i]\) and \(\mathbb{E}_{(b, p_m)}^P[T_m]\) (respectively), as given in Propositions 4 and 5. More precisely, under all policies of interest, \(P\), the aforementioned propositions continue to hold when all instances of the operator \(\mathbb{E}_{(b, p_m)}^P\) and all implicit references to the operator \(\mathbb{E}_{(b, p_m)}^P\)—in their statements are replaced with \(\mathbb{E}_{(p_w, p_m)}^P\) and \(\mathbb{P}_{(p_w, p_m)}\) respectively. Such “implicit references” to \(\mathbb{E}_{(b, p_m)}^P\) appear in the limiting probabilities \(\pi_{(b, p_m)}^P(i, j)\) and \(\phi_{(b, p_m)}^P(i, j)\), where reference to the strategy profile has been suppressed in the interest of brevity.

In order to compute \(\mathbb{E}_{(p_w, p_m)}^P[T_w | N_1 = i]\) and \(\mathbb{E}_{(p_w, p_m)}^P[T_m]\) for all policies of interest (exactly in the single-server setting and approximately in the two-server setting), we must compute the following under the strategy profile \((p_w, p_m)\): (i) the first and second moments of \(U\) and \(V\) under WOM, (ii) the mean value of \(Z(i, j)\) under WM, and (iii) the limiting probabilities \(\pi_{(b, p_m)}^{WMO}(i, j)\) (equivalently, \(\pi_{(b, p_m)}^{WMO}(i, j)\)), \(\phi_{(b, p_m)}^{WOM}(i, j)\), \(\pi_{(b, p_m)}^{TS}(i, j)\), and \(\phi_{(b, p_m)}^{WM}(i, j)\) (and where appropriate, one or more series associated with these limiting probabilities). The determination of these quantities under the strategy profile \((p_w, p_m)\) requires only a minor modification of the methods given throughout Appendix EC.3 for determination of their analogues under the strategy profile \((b, p_m)\). These modifications result by observing that the only consequence of generalizing from strategy profiles of the form \((b, p_m)\) to those of the form \((p_w, p_m)\) on all quantities of interest is an alteration of the Markov chains governing \((N_1, N_2)\) and \((N_1, N_{2, w})\). This is also why the aforementioned adaptation of Propositions 4 and 5 to the setting with mixed walk-in strategies is possible.

Specifically, all four chains of interest under the strategy profile \((p_w, p_m)\) are identical to their counterparts under \((b, p_m)\) (these are illustrated in Figs. 4 and 5) with one crucial change: the transition rate from phase (row) \(i\) to phase (row) \(i + 1\) should be \(p_i \lambda_w\) rather than \(\lambda_w\), \(\forall i \in \{0, 1, \ldots, b\}\). As a result, we can obtain the values of interest using the following modifications of the methods presented throughout Appendix EC.3, all of which essentially require replacing each instance of \(\lambda_w\) by \(p_i \lambda_w\) for the appropriately chosen value of \(i\):

1. The limiting probabilities \(\pi_{(p_w, p_m)}^{WMO}(i, j)\) and \(\pi_{(p_w, p_m)}^{WMO}(i, j)\) are equal to one another (as were their analogues, \(\pi_{(b, p_m)}(i, j)\) and \(\pi_{(b, p_m)}(i, j)\)). These quantities, together with their associated series, can be computed exactly via the same method given in Appendix EC.3.1 for comput-
2. The limiting probabilities $\phi(i,j)$ and $\pi(i,j)$, by using the following revised matrices $L_0$ and $L$ and values $\gamma_0, \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_b$ and $\xi_0, \xi_1, \ldots, \xi_b$, in place of those given in display (EC.29):

$$L_0 = \begin{pmatrix} -\gamma_0 p_0 \lambda_w & -\gamma_1 p_1 \lambda_w & \cdots & -\gamma_{b-1} p_{b-1} \lambda_w \\ -\gamma_{b+1} p_{b+1} \lambda_w & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\ \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \cdots \\ -\gamma_{b-1} p_{b-1} \lambda_w & \cdots & \cdots & -\gamma_{b} p_b \lambda_w \end{pmatrix}, \quad L = \begin{pmatrix} -\xi_0 p_0 \lambda_w & -\xi_1 p_1 \lambda_w & \cdots & -\xi_{b-1} p_{b-1} \lambda_w \\ -\xi_{b} p_{b} \lambda_w & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\ \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \cdots \\ -\xi_{b-1} p_{b-1} \lambda_w & \cdots & \cdots & -\xi_{b} p_{b} \lambda_w \end{pmatrix},$$

$$\gamma_i = \begin{cases} p_m \lambda_m + p_0 \lambda_w & i = 0 \\ \mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m + p_1 \lambda_w & 1 \leq i \leq b - 1 \\ \mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m & i = b \end{cases}, \quad \xi_i = \begin{cases} p_m \lambda_m + p_i \lambda_w + \mu_2 & 0 \leq i \leq b - 1 \\ p_m \lambda_m + \mu_2 & i = b \end{cases}.$$ 

Note that the statement “all elements of the diagonal of $R$ are actually the same except for the last, $R(b,b)$,” no longer holds, but this holds no consequences for the method in general.

2. The limiting probabilities $\phi(w_m(w_m, b, i))$ can be computed exactly via the same method given in Appendix EC.3.2 for computing the limiting probabilities $\phi(b, i)$, by using the following revised system of equations in place of system (EC.31):

$$\begin{align*}
p_0 \lambda_w \psi_{0,0} &= \mu_2 \phi_{0,1} \\
(p_1 \lambda_w + \mu_1) \psi_{i,0} &= p_{i-1} \lambda_w \psi_{i-1,0} + \mu_2 \phi_{i,1} \quad \forall i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, b - 1\} \\
\mu_1 \phi_{b,0} &= p_{b-1} \lambda_w \phi_{b-1,0} + \mu_2 \phi_{b,1} \\
(p_0 \lambda_w + \mu_2) \phi_{0,1} &= \mu_1 \phi_{1,0}, \\
(p_1 \lambda_w + \mu_2) \phi_{i,1} &= p_{i-1} \lambda_w \psi_{i-1,1} + \mu_1 \phi_{i+1,0} \quad \forall i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, b - 1\} \\
\mu_2 \phi_{b,1} &= p_{b-1} \lambda_w \phi_{b-1,1}, \\
\sum_{i=0}^{b} (\phi_{i,0} + \phi_{i,1}) &= 1.
\end{align*}$$

3. The transforms of $U$ and $V$ under the strategy profile $(p_w, p_m)$—from which one can find the quantities of interest $E_{(p_w, p_m)}[U]$, $E_{(p_w, p_m)}[U^2]$, $E_{(p_w, p_m)}[V]$, and $E_{(p_w, p_m)}[V^2]$—can be computed exactly via the same method given in Appendix EC.3.3, by making the following modifications:

(a) System (EC.32) should be revised as follows:

$$\begin{align*}
p_0 \lambda_w \psi_{0,0} &= \mu_2 \psi_{0,1} + p_m \lambda_m \left(1 - \psi_{0,0}\right) \\
(p_1 \lambda_w + \mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m) \psi_{i,0} &= p_{i-1} \lambda_w \psi_{i-1,0} + \mu_2 \psi_{i,1}, \quad \forall i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, b - 1\} \\
\mu_1 \psi_{b,0} &= p_{b-1} \lambda_w \psi_{b-1,0} + \mu_2 \psi_{b,1}, \\
(p_0 \lambda_w + \mu_2 + p_m \lambda_m) \psi_{0,1} &= \mu_1 \psi_{1,0}, \\
(p_1 \lambda_w + \mu_2 + p_m \lambda_m) \psi_{i,1} &= p_{i-1} \lambda_w \psi_{i-1,1} + \mu_1 \psi_{i+1,0}, \quad \forall i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, b - 1\} \\
\mu_2 \psi_{b,1} &= p_{b-1} \lambda_w \psi_{b-1,1}, \\
\sum_{i=0}^{b} (\psi_{i,0} + \psi_{i,1}) &= 1.
\end{align*}$$
(b) System (EC.33) should be revised as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{U}_{0,0}(s) &= 1, \\
\tilde{U}_{i,0}(s) &= \frac{p_i \lambda_w + \mu_2}{s + p_i \lambda_w + \mu_1} \left( \frac{p_i \lambda_w}{p_i \lambda_w + \mu_1} \tilde{U}_{i+1,0}(s) + \frac{\mu_1}{p_i \lambda_w + \mu_1} \tilde{U}_{i-1,1}(s) \right), \quad \forall i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, b - 1\}, \\
\tilde{U}_{b,0}(s) &= \frac{\mu_1}{s + \mu_1} \tilde{U}_{b-1,1}(s), \\
\tilde{U}_{i,1}(s) &= \frac{p_i \lambda_w + \mu_2}{s + p_i \lambda_w + \mu_2} \left( \frac{p_i \lambda_w}{p_i \lambda_w + \mu_2} \tilde{U}_{i+1,1}(s) + \frac{\mu_2}{p_i \lambda_w + \mu_2} \tilde{U}_{i,0} \right), \quad \forall i \in \{0, 1, \ldots, b - 1\}, \\
\tilde{U}_{b,1}(s) &= \frac{\mu_2}{s + \mu_2} \tilde{U}_{b,0}(s). 
\end{align*}
\] (EC.42)

(c) Eq. (EC.35) should be revised as follows:

\[
\tilde{V}(s) = \frac{p_0 \lambda_w + \mu_2}{s + p_0 \lambda_w + \mu_2} \left( \frac{p_0 \lambda_w}{p_0 \lambda_w + \mu_2} \tilde{U}_{1,0}(s) \tilde{V}(s) + \frac{\mu_2}{p_0 \lambda_w + \mu_2} \right)
\]

\[
\implies \tilde{V}(s) = \frac{\mu_2}{s + p_0 \lambda_w \left( 1 - \tilde{U}_{1,0}(s) \right) + \mu_2}.
\] (EC.43)

If one opts to use the more efficient method discussed at the end of Appendix EC.3.3, system (EC.36) and display (EC.37), should be revised to be consistent with system (EC.42) and display (EC.43), respectively.

4. The limiting probabilities \( \pi_{TS}^{\ell}(i, j) \) and \( \phi_{(p_{b,p_m})}^{WM}(i, j) \) and their associated series can be approximated via the methods given in Appendices EC.3.4 and EC.3.7 for computing the limiting probabilities \( \pi_{TS}^{TS}(i, j) \) and \( \phi_{(b,p_m)}^{WM}(i, j) \), respectively, by using the following revised matrix \( L \) and values \( \nu_0, \nu_1, \ldots, \nu_b \), in place of those given in display (EC.38):

\[
L = \begin{pmatrix}
-\nu_0 \frac{p_0 \lambda_w}{s + p_0 \lambda_w + \mu_2} & -\nu_1 \frac{p_1 \lambda_w}{s + p_1 \lambda_w + \mu_2} & \cdots & -\nu_{b-1} \frac{p_{b-1} \lambda_w}{s + p_{b-1} \lambda_w + \mu_2} \\
\nu_1 \frac{p_1 \lambda_w}{s + p_1 \lambda_w + \mu_2} & \nu_2 \frac{p_2 \lambda_w}{s + p_2 \lambda_w + \mu_2} & \cdots & \nu_b \frac{p_b \lambda_w}{s + p_b \lambda_w + \mu_2} \\
\cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\
\end{pmatrix}, \quad \nu_1 = \begin{cases}
p_m \lambda_m + p_0 \lambda_w + \mu_2 & i = 0 \\
p_1 + p_m \lambda_m + p_i \lambda_w + \mu_2 & 1 \leq i \leq b - 1.
\end{cases}
\]

5. The quantity \( \mathbb{E}_{(p_{b,p_m})}^{WM}[Z(i, j)] \) can be approximated via the methods given in Appendix EC.3.8 by using the following revised system of equations in place of system (EC.40):

\[
\begin{align*}
\tau_0 &= \frac{1 + p_0 \lambda_w \tau_1}{p_0 \lambda_w + \mu_2} \\
\tau_\ell &= \frac{1 + p_\ell \lambda_w \tau_{\ell+1}}{p_\ell \lambda_w + \mu_1 + \mu_2} + \frac{\mu_1}{p_\ell \lambda_w + \mu_1 + \mu_2} \left( \tau_{\ell-1} + \sum_{k=0}^{b} p_{(\ell-1)\to k} \tau_k \right), \quad 1 \leq \ell \leq b - 1 \\
\tau_b &= \frac{1}{\mu_1 + \mu_2} + \frac{\mu_1}{\mu_1 + \mu_2} \left( \tau_{b-1} + \sum_{k=0}^{b} p_{(b-1)\to k} \tau_k \right) 
\end{align*}
\]
EC.4.7 Heterogeneous Patience Levels in the Single-Server Setting

We turn our attention to the case where patience levels are heterogeneous (due to heterogeneity in $R_w$ and $R_m$, while $C_w = C_m = 1$) and consider the case where for each walk-in (resp. mobile), $R_w = T_w^{\text{max}}$ (resp., $R_m = T_m^{\text{max}}$) is a random variable that is independently drawn from a bounded continuous distribution with c.d.f. $F_w$ (resp., $F_m$). For the discussion that follows, it will be helpful to recall that a bounded distribution with c.d.f. $F$ has lower and upper bounds that can be expressed by $F^{-1}(0)$ and $F^{-1}(1)$, respectively.

The theory developed in Appendix EC.4.1 makes it quite simple to address this extension, which also explains why we again necessarily restrict attention to the single-server setting. This is because we again have action profiles of the form $(p_w, p_m)$ with $p_w \in \mathcal{S}$, although there is additional meaning carried in this action profile that was absent in the case of constant (homogeneous) patience levels: specifically, $p_i$ (where $p_i$ is determined by $p_w = (p_0, p_1, \ldots, p_{b-1})$) denotes that a walk-in with patience level $T_w^{\text{max}}$ will join when $N_1 = i$ if and only if $T_w^{\text{max}}$ is at or above the $(1 - p_i)$ quantile (of the patience level distribution for all walk-ins), i.e., $T_w^{\text{max}} \geq F_w^{-1}(1 - p_i)$. Similarly, $p_m$ denotes that a mobiles with patience level $T_m^{\text{max}}$ will join if and only if $T_m^{\text{max}}$ is at or above the $(1 - p_m)$ quantile (of the patience level distribution for all mobiles), i.e., $T_m^{\text{max}} \geq F_m^{-1}(1 - p_m)$. Of course, as a consequence of these interpretations, the original meanings of $p_i$ and $p_m$ still hold true as well: an arbitrary walk-in joins at $N_1 = i$ with probability $p_i$, while an arbitrary mobile joins with probability $p_m$.

In light of the above, in this setting $(p_w^*, p_m^*)$ is an equilibrium if it satisfies the following revised equilibrium conditions:

$$
\mathbb{E}_p^{p_w, p_m}(T_w | N_1 = i) = F_w^{-1}(1 - p_i) \quad \forall i \in \{0, 1, \ldots, b^* - 1\}
$$

$$
\arg \max \{p_m \in [0, 1]: \mathbb{E}_p^{p_w, p_m}(T_m) \leq F_m^{-1}(1 - p_m)\} = p_m^*, \quad (\text{EC.44})
$$

where $b^*$ is again the number of entries in $p_w^*$. Meanwhile, social welfare takes on the following form under heterogeneous patience levels:

$$
\text{SW}^{p_w, p_m} = \frac{1}{\Lambda} \left( \lambda_w \sum_{i=0}^{b-1} p_i \left( T_w^{\text{max}}(i) - \mathbb{E}_p^{p_w, p_m}(T_w | N_1 = i) \right) \mathbb{E}_p^{p_w, p_m}(N_1 = i) + p_m \lambda_m \left( T_m^{\text{max}} - \mathbb{E}_p^{p_w, p_m}(T_m) \right) \right),
$$

where $T_w^{\text{max}}(i)$ is the average patience level of walk-ins who join when $N_1 = i$ and $T_m^{\text{max}}$ is the average patience level of mobiles who join. Specifically, these quantities are given by

$$
\overline{T}^{\text{max}}(i) = \frac{1}{p_i} \int_{F_w^{-1}(1 - p_i)} F_w^{-1}(1) t \, dF_w(t) \quad \text{and} \quad \overline{T}^{\text{max}} = \frac{1}{p_m} \int_{F_m^{-1}(1 - p_m)} F_m^{-1}(1) t \, dF_m(t).
$$

The method described in Appendix EC.4.2 can then be modified in order to find one or more equilibria in this setting. This modification is straightforward as one needs only change equations.
being solved and the inequalities being checked on the basis of the new equilibrium conditions given in display (EC.44). Note that the assumption $T_m^{\text{max}} \geq 1/(\mu_2 - \lambda_m) + 1/\mu_2$ that facilities tractable analysis becomes $F_m^{-1}(0) \geq 1/(\mu_2 - \lambda_m) + 1/\mu_2$ in this setting.

Applying this method to the case where patience thresholds follow a truncated normal distribution, we find results that are in line with those presented in the body of the paper in the setting where customers have homogeneous patience level (see Fig. EC.2); i.e., we observe a region of adoption rates, $\alpha$, where all three policies underperform the no-app benchmark with respect to throughput.
Table EC.1  Non-degenerate parameter combinations (specified by “×”)

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<tr>
<th>$\mu_2$</th>
<th>$\frac{\mu_1}{\mu_2}$</th>
<th>$\frac{\mu_1}{\mu_2}$</th>
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EC.5 Experiments

In Table EC.1, we specify the non-degenerate parameter combinations using the “×” symbol. Each cell in Table EC.1 includes 10 experiments (values of $\alpha$). Our discussions in §6 of the paper, which are based on the tables provided in this section, are all based on the non-degenerate parameter combinations.

Table EC.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the percentage of throughput loss due to introduction of a mobile-ordering application in experiments in which opting not to offer an app outperforms the three omni-channel prioritization policies in the single-server setting (MWO, WMO, and WOM) with respect to throughput. The percentage of throughput loss is calculated as:

$$\text{% throughput loss} = \frac{\text{No-app throughput} - \text{Maximum throughput of omni-channel policies}}{\text{No-app throughput}} \times 100.$$

Table EC.2  Summary statistics for % throughput loss

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<th>Average</th>
<th>Std. dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>1st quartile</th>
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Table EC.3 provides the number and percentage of cases in which each policy is optimal with respect to throughput (with ties broken in favor of highest social welfare, whenever possible), at all fixed levels of the five parameters $\mu_2, \mu_1/\mu_2, \alpha, T_{\text{max}}^m$, and $T_{\text{max}}^w/T_{\text{max}}^m$. 
Table EC.3  Effect of parameters on the optimal policy

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### EC.6 Notation Table

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<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>Adoption rate; $\alpha \equiv \lambda_m / \Lambda$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$a^p$</td>
<td>Allocation (class-specific mean sojourn time pair) under service policy $P$; $a \equiv (E^p[T_w], E^p[T_m])$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a^{p*}$</td>
<td>An arbitrary Pareto optimal allocation; more precisely, the allocation under (an arbitrary Pareto optimal policy) $P^*$</td>
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<td>$b$</td>
<td>Buffer size at Stage 1; queue length of Stage 1 at which all walk-ins balk</td>
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<tr>
<td>$b^*$</td>
<td>Equilibrium threshold for walk-ins</td>
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<td>$B$</td>
<td>Strict upper bound on the buffer size at Stage 1</td>
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<td>$B$</td>
<td>Repeated backward transition matrix used in matrix-analytic methods</td>
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<td>$bd(O)$</td>
<td>Boundary of the achievable region</td>
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<td>$C$</td>
<td>Cost per unit time spent waiting in the system</td>
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<td>$\chi_w, \chi_m$</td>
<td>Throughput rate for walk-in($\chi_w$) and mobile ($\chi_m$) customers</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\Delta_w, \Delta_m$</td>
<td>Change in $p_w (\Delta_w)$ and $p_m (\Delta_m)$ in one step of the algorithm for determining equilibria with mixed walk-in strategies under WMO</td>
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<td>$e_i$</td>
<td>$i$-th unit vector</td>
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<td>Total net change of throughput due to information uncertainty</td>
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<td>$E_w, E_m$</td>
<td>Net change of throughput due to individual walk-in ($E_w$) and mobile ($E_m$) information uncertainty</td>
</tr>
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<td>$E^p$</td>
<td>Expectation operator under policy $P$</td>
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<td>$E^p_{(b,p_m)}$</td>
<td>Expectation operator under strategy profile ($b,p_m$) and policy $P$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$E^p_{(p_w,p_m)}$</td>
<td>Expectation operator under strategy profile ($p_w,p_m$) and policy $P$</td>
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<td>$E^p[T]$</td>
<td>Overall mean response time; $E^p[T] \equiv (\lambda_w E^p[T_w] + \lambda_m E^p[T_m]) / \Lambda$</td>
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<td>$E^p[W]$</td>
<td>Mean value of overall work in the system</td>
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<td>$E^p[W_2]$</td>
<td>Mean value of overall work in Stage 2</td>
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<td>$E^p[W_w], E^p[W_m]$</td>
<td>Mean values of the work due to walk-ins ($E^p[W_w]$) and work due to mobiles ($E^p[W_m]$) in the system</td>
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<td>$F_0, F$</td>
<td>Initial ($F_0$) and repeated ($F$) forward transition matrices used in matrix-analytic methods</td>
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<td>$f_b(\cdot)$</td>
<td>Mobiles' mean sojourn time as a function of $p_m$ with index $b$; $f_b(\cdot) \equiv E^p_{(b,\cdot)}[T_m]$</td>
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<td>$F_w, F_m$</td>
<td>CDF of patience levels for walk-ins ($F_w$) and mobiles ($F_m$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$G$</td>
<td>G-matrix used in matrix-analytic methods; $G(\ell,k) \equiv p_{\ell \rightarrow k}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_i$</td>
<td>An auxiliary value defined by $p_{m \lambda_m + \lambda_w}$, if $i = 0$; $\mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m + \lambda_w$, if $1 \leq i \leq b - 1$; $\mu_1 + p_m \lambda_m$, if $i = b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$I$</td>
<td>Identity matrix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$I(i)$</td>
<td>Time interval corresponding to a tagged walk-in's sojourn at Stage 1 until they arrive to Stage 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K(i)$</td>
<td>Random quantity of mobile customers that arrived during $I(i)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L_0, L$</td>
<td>Initial ($L_0$) and repeated ($L$) local transition matrices used in matrix-analytic methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Lambda$</td>
<td>Total arrival rate for all customers; $\Lambda \equiv \lambda_w + \lambda_m$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_w, \lambda_m$</td>
<td>Arrival rates of walk-in ($\lambda_w$) and mobile ($\lambda_m$) customers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L(i,j)$</td>
<td>Number of customers in Stage 2 (including the tagged walk-in) at time of the tagged walk-in's arrival to Stage 2, given that $N_1 = i$ and $N_2 = j$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L(i,j,k)$</td>
<td>Number of customers present in Stage 2 at the end of $I(i)$, given that $K(i) = k$ and initially $N_2 = j$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>Mobile task at Stage 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M_w(t)$</td>
<td>Number of customers in an M/M/1 system under load $\rho \in (0, \infty)$ at time $t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_1$</td>
<td>Service rate at Stage 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
\( \mu_2 \) ≜ Service rate at Stage 2
\( N_1, N_2 \) ≜ Number of customers in Stage 1 (\( N_1 \)) and Stage 2 (\( N_2 \))
\( N_{2,w} \) ≜ Number of walk-ins at Stage 2 (i.e., number of W tasks)
\( N_w, N_m \) ≜ Number of walk-ins (\( N_w \)) and mobiles (\( N_m \))
\( \nu_i \) ≜ an auxiliary value defined by \( p_m \lambda + \lambda_w + \mu_2 \), if \( i = 0 \);
\( \mu_1 + p_m \lambda + \lambda_w + \mu_2, \) if \( 1 \leq i \leq b - 1 \);
\( \mu_1 + p_m \lambda + \lambda_w + \mu_2, \) if \( i = b \)
\( \mathcal{O} \) ≜ Achievable region of allocations; \( \mathcal{O} = \{ t^p \in \mathbb{R}_+^2 : P \in \mathcal{P} \} \)
\( \mathcal{O}^* \) ≜ Pareto frontier; \( \mathcal{O}^* = (\mathcal{O} \cap \mathcal{V}) \cap \mathcal{bd}(\mathcal{O}), \) for \( i \in \{1, 2\} \)
\( \mathcal{O} \) ≜ Walk-in task at Stage 1
\( P \) ≜ Arbitrary service policy
\( P^* \) ≜ Arbitrary Pareto optimal policy
\( (P_1, P_2)(\theta) \) ≜ Random mixture of policies \( P_1 \) (w.p. \( \theta \)) and \( P_2 \) (w.p. \( 1 - \theta \))
\( \mathcal{P} \) ≜ Policy space: the set of all possible policies
\( \mathcal{P}^* \) ≜ Pareto space; \( \mathcal{P}^* = \{ P^* | \exists P \in \mathcal{P} : t^p \succ t^{P^*} \} \)
\( \mathcal{P}^p \) ≜ Probability operator under strategy profile (\( b, p_m \)) and policy \( P \)
\( \phi^p_{(b, p_m)}(i, j) \) ≜ Limiting probability associated with state (\( i, j \)) in the \( (N_1, N_{2,w}) \) CTMC
under strategy profile (\( b, p_m \)) and policy \( P \); \( \phi^p_{(b, p_m)}(i, j) \equiv \mathbb{P}^p_{(b, p_m)}(N_1 = i, N_{2,w} = j) \)
\( \pi^p_{(b, p_m)}(i, j) \) ≜ Limiting probability associated with state (\( i, j \)) in the \( (N_1, N_{2,w}) \) CTMC
under strategy profile (\( b, p_m \)) and policy \( P \); \( \pi^p_{(b, p_m)}(i, j) \equiv \mathbb{P}^p_{(b, p_m)}(N_1 = i, N_{2,w} = j) \)
\( \tau_{TS, (b, p_m)}(i, j) \) ≜ Two-server limiting probability \( \tau_{TS, (b, p_m)}(i, j) \) under \( P \in \{WM, FCFS, MW\} \)
\( \mu_{WOM} \) ≜ Mobiles’ joining probability
\( \mu_{WOM}^* \) ≜ Mobiles’ joining probability under equilibrium
\( \psi^W_{(b, p_m)}(i, j) \) ≜ Steady-state probability that a mobile arriving to a mobile-less system
under WOM sees (\( N_1 = i, N_{2,w} = j \)); \( \psi^W_{(b, p_m)}(i, j) = \mathbb{P}^W_{(b, p_m)}(N_1 = i, N_{2,w} = j) \)
\( P(u, v, w; \rho) \) ≜ Probability that we specifically end up in state (\( k, m - 1 \))
before reaching state (\( k', m - 1 \)) for any \( k' \neq k \) from state (\( l, m \)) under WM
\( \rho_\omega, \rho_m \) ≜ fractions of the time spent serving walk-ins (\( \rho_\omega \)) and mobiles (\( \rho_m \))
\( \mathcal{S} \) ≜ Generalized walk-in strategy space; \( \mathcal{S} = \bigcup_{b=0}^{\infty} \prod_{i=1}^{b-1} (0, 1] \)
\( SW^p_{(b, p_m)} \) ≜ Social welfare under policy \( P \) under strategy profile (\( b, p_m \))
\( SW^p_{(b, p_m)} \) ≜ Revised social welfare formula when walk-ins applying mixed strategies
\( \tau_{WOM} \) ≜ Expected “hitting time” associated with the trip from state (\( \ell, m \)) where
\( m \geq 1 \), until the first time we reach state (\( k, m - 1 \)) for any \( k \in \{0, 1, \ldots, b\} \)
\( t_n \) ≜ Time of the \( n \)-th Poisson arrival to an M/M/1 system since time 0
\( T_w, T_m \) ≜ Sojourn time of a walk-in (\( T_w \)) or mobile (\( T_m \)) customer
\( T_{\max}^w, T_{\max}^m \) ≜ Patience level for walk-in (\( T_{\max}^w \)) and mobile (\( T_{\max}^m \)) customers
\( T_{\max}^m(i) \) ≜ Average patience level of walk-in customers who join when \( N_1 = i \)
\( T_{\max}^m(i) \) ≜ Average patience level of mobiles who join
\( U \) ≜ Waiting time of a mobile who arrives when there are no other mobiles
\( \tilde{U}(s) \) ≜ The Laplace transform of the random variable \( U \); \( \tilde{U}(s) = \mathbb{E}^W_{(b, p_m)}[e^{-sU}] \)
\( U_{i,j} \) ∆ The time it takes for a system currently in a state \((N_1, N_{2,w}) = (i, j)\) to be empty of all its walk-ins, without regard for any mobile arrivals; 
\( U_{i,j} \sim (U|N_1 = i, N_{2,w} = j) \)

\( \overline{U}_{i,j}(s) \) ∆ Laplace transform of \( U_{i,j} \); \( \overline{U}_{i,j}(s) \equiv E_{(b,p_m)}^{WOM}[e^{-sU_{i,j}}] \)

\( V \) ∆ Sojourn time of a mobile who enters an empty system; \( V \sim (T_m|N_1 = N_2 = 0) \)

\( \overline{V}(s) \) ∆ Laplace transform of \( V \); \( \overline{V}(s) \equiv E_{(b,p_m)}^{WOM}[e^{-sV}] \)

\( \hat{W} \) ∆ Walk-in task at Stage 2

\( \hat{W} \) ∆ The work in the system

\( \xi_i \) ∆ An auxiliary value defined by 
\( p_m \lambda_m + \lambda_w + \mu_2 \), if \( 0 \leq i \leq b - 1 \); \( p_m \lambda_m + \mu_2 \), if \( i = b \)

\( X \) ∆ Total throughput

\( Y(i,j) \) ∆ Expected workload that a walk-in will encounter at Stage 2 once it arrives there given that \( N_1 = i \) and \( N_2 = j \) when it arrived to Stage 1

\( Y_K(i,j) \) ∆ Truncation of the first summation (by summing from \( k = 0 \) to \( K \) instead of \( k = 0 \) to \( \infty \)) in the expression of \( Y(i,j) \)

\( Z(i,j) \) ∆ Time it takes to reach a state where \( N_{2,w} = 0 \) from state \((N_1, N_{2,w}) = (i, j)\) under \( WM_i \), given \((b,p_m)\); 
\( Z(i,j) \sim \inf\{s \geq 0: N_{2,w}(t + s) = 0|N_1(t) = i, N_{2,w}(t) = j\}, \forall t \geq 0 \)

\( \succ \) ∆ Dominance relation on allocations

\( \odot \) ∆ Vector concatenation operator